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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '0' on line 225 == Missing Reference: 'ThisRFC' is mentioned on line 263, but not defined -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'IANA-AF' ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6485 (Obsoleted by RFC 7935) -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'X680' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'X690' Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 5 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group A. Azimov 3 Internet-Draft E. Uskov 4 Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs 5 Expires: July 10, 2019 R. Bush 6 Internet Initiative Japan 7 K. Patel 8 Arrcus 9 J. Snijders 10 NTT 11 R. Housley 12 Vigil Security 13 January 6, 2019 15 A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization 16 draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-profile-01 18 Abstract 20 This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System 21 Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An 22 Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object 23 that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System 24 holder has authorized a Provider Autonomous System to be its upstream 25 provider and for the Provider to send prefixes received from the 26 Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and 27 peers. 29 Requirements Language 31 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 32 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 33 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 34 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 35 capitals, as shown here. 37 Status of This Memo 39 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 40 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 42 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 43 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 44 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 45 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 47 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 48 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 49 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 50 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 52 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 10, 2019. 54 Copyright Notice 56 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 57 document authors. All rights reserved. 59 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 60 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 61 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 62 publication of this document. Please review these documents 63 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 64 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 65 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 66 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 67 described in the Simplified BSD License. 69 Table of Contents 71 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 72 2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 73 3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 74 3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 76 3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77 3.4. providerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 78 4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 79 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5 80 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 81 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 82 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 83 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 84 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 85 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 86 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 88 1. Introduction 90 The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 91 is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more 92 information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed 93 to verify that a Provider AS (PAS) has permission from a Customer AS 94 (CAS) holder to send routes in all directions. The digitally signed 95 Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this 96 verification mechanism. 98 The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects 99 [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 100 [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic 101 validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be 102 validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current 103 infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in 104 [RFC6485], or its successor. 106 To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of 107 [RFC6488]), this document defines: 109 1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed 110 object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the 111 encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed 112 attribute within the signerInfo structure). 114 2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload 115 signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1 116 [X680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690]. 118 3. The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation 119 steps specified in [RFC6488]). 121 2. The ASPA Content Type 123 The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the 124 numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear 125 both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as 126 well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo 127 structure (see [RFC6488]). 129 3. The ASPA eContent 131 The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as 132 the Provider AS (PAS) that is authorized to further propagate 133 announcements received from the customer. If customer has multiple 134 providers, it issues multiple ASPAs, one for each provider AS. An 135 ASPA is formally defined as: 137 ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= 138 { ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } 140 id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } 142 ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { 143 version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, 144 AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, 145 customerASID ASID, 146 providerASID ASID } 148 ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } 150 AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER 152 ASID ::= INTEGER 154 Note that this content appears as the eContent within the 155 encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488]. 157 3.1. version 159 The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0. 161 3.2. AFI 163 The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the 164 relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized. Presently 165 defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified 166 in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF]. 168 3.3. customerASID 170 The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous 171 System that authorizes an upstream provider (listed in the 172 providerASId) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family 173 other ASes. 175 3.4. providerASID 177 The providerASID contains the AS number that is authorized to further 178 propagate announcements in the specified address family received from 179 the customer. 181 4. ASPA Validation 183 Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing 184 announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object 185 itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the 186 validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following 187 additional ASPA-specific validation step. 189 o The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is 190 present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the 191 ASPA), and the customer AS number in the ASPA is contained within 192 the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's autonomous 193 system identifier delegation extension. 195 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type 196 RPKI-ASPA-2018 197 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 198 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018(TBD2) } 199 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 200 BEGIN 201 IMPORTS 203 CONTENT-TYPE 204 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268 205 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 206 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ; 208 ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-ASPA, ... } 210 -- 211 -- ASPA Content Type 212 -- 214 id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) 215 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 } 217 id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 } 219 id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } 221 ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= 222 { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } 224 ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { 225 version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, 226 AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, 227 customerASID ASID, 228 providerASID ASID } 230 ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } 232 AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER 234 ASID ::= INTEGER 236 END 238 6. IANA Considerations 240 Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018 to the SMI Security for S/MIME 241 Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry 242 (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi- 243 numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows: 245 Decimal | Description | Specification 246 ----------------------------------------------------------- 247 TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018 | [ThisRFC] 249 Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 250 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ 251 smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows: 253 Decimal | Description | Specification 254 ----------------------------------------------------------- 255 TBD | id-ct-ASPA | [ThisRFC] 257 Please add the ASPA to the RPKI Signed Object registry 258 (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as 259 follows: 261 Name | OID | Specification 262 ----------------------------------------------------------- 263 ASPA | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD | [ThisRFC] 265 7. Security Considerations 267 8. Acknowledgments 269 9. References 271 9.1. Normative References 273 [IANA-AF] IANA, "Address Family Numbers", 274 . 276 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 277 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 278 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 279 . 281 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 282 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, 283 DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, 284 . 286 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 287 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 288 . 290 [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for 291 Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", 292 RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012, 293 . 295 [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object 296 Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 297 (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012, 298 . 300 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 301 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 302 May 2017, . 304 [X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation 305 One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", 306 ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2015. 308 [X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: 309 Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical 310 Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules 311 (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. 313 9.2. Informative References 315 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 316 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 317 February 2012, . 319 Authors' Addresses 321 Alexander Azimov 322 Qrator Labs 324 Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com 326 Eugene Uskov 327 Qrator Labs 329 Email: eu@qrator.net 331 Randy Bush 332 Internet Initiative Japan 334 Email: randy@psg.com 335 Keyur Patel 336 Arrcus, Inc. 338 Email: keyur@arrcus.com 340 Job Snijders 341 NTT Communications 342 Theodorus Majofskistraat 100 343 Amsterdam 1065 SZ 344 The Netherlands 346 Email: job@ntt.net 348 Russ Housley 349 Vigil Security, LLC 350 918 Spring Knoll Drive 351 Herndon, VA 20170 352 USA 354 Email: housley@vigilsec.com