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Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == Line 78 has weird spacing: '...related thr...' == Line 85 has weird spacing: '... data man...' == Line 93 has weird spacing: '...uipment upd...' -- The document date (November 15, 2018) is 1986 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Internet Research Task Force H. Baba 3 Internet-Draft The University of Tokyo 4 Intended status: Informational Y. Ishida 5 Expires: May 19, 2019 Japan Network Enabler Corporation 6 T. Amatsu 7 Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. 8 K. Kunitake 9 BroadBand Tower, Inc. 10 K. Maeda 11 Individual Contributor 12 November 15, 2018 14 Problems in and among industries for the prompt realization of IoT and 15 safety considerations 16 draft-baba-iot-problems-06 18 Abstract 20 This document contains opinions gathered from enterprises engaging in 21 the IoT business as stated in the preceding version hereof, and also 22 examines the possibilities of new social problems in the IoT era. 23 Recognition of the importance of information security has grown in 24 step with the rising use of the Internet. Closer examination reveals 25 that the IoT era may see a new direct physical threat to users. For 26 instance, the situation at a smart house may lead it to judge that 27 the owner has only temporarily stepped out, causing it to unlock the 28 front door, which in turn makes it easier for thieves to enter. 29 These kinds of scenarios may occur without identity fraud, hacking, 30 and other means of compromising information security. Therefore, for 31 the purpose of this document, this issue shall be referred to as "IoT 32 Safety" to distinguish it from Information Security. 34 We believe that it is necessary to deepen our understanding of these 35 new IoT-related threats through discussion and ensure there are 36 measures to address these threats in the future. At the same time, 37 we must also coordinate these measures with the solutions to the 38 problems described in the previous version of this document. 40 Status of This Memo 42 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 43 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 45 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 46 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 47 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 48 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 50 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 51 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 52 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 53 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 55 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2019. 57 Copyright Notice 59 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 60 document authors. All rights reserved. 62 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 64 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 65 publication of this document. Please review these documents 66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 70 described in the Simplified BSD License. 72 Table of Contents 74 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 75 2. Technical Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 76 2.1. Safety, Security and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77 2.1.1. Challenges in protecting lives and property from IoT- 78 related threats (IoT Safety) . . . . . . . . . . . 4 79 2.1.1.1. Safety of body/life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 80 2.1.1.2. Safety of equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 81 2.1.1.3. Proper performance of equipment . . . . . . . . . 5 82 2.1.2. Information Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 83 2.1.3. Privacy in acquiring data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 84 2.2. Challenges posed by data acquisition, data distribution, 85 data management and data quantity . . . . . . . . . . 7 86 2.2.1. Traffic patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 87 2.2.2. Acquired mass data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 88 2.2.3. Explosive increase and diversity of data . . . . . . 7 89 2.3. Mapping of the physical world and the virtual world . . . 8 90 2.3.1. Physically handling acquired data . . . . . . . . . . 8 91 2.3.2. Data calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 92 2.4. Product lifetime, generation management, and the cost of 93 equipment updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 94 2.4.1. Product lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 95 2.4.2. Introducing IoT equipment into commodity equipment . 9 96 2.5. Too many related standards and the speed of 97 standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 99 2.5.1. Too many related standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 100 2.5.2. Speed of standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 101 2.6. Interoperability, fault isolation, and total quality 102 assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 103 2.6.1. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 104 2.6.2. Fault isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 105 2.6.3. Quality assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 106 2.7. Product design policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 107 2.7.1. Changes in design policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 108 2.8. Various technology restrictions within actual usage . . . 11 109 2.8.1. Using radio waves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 110 2.8.2. Batteries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 111 2.8.3. Wiring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 112 2.8.4. Being open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 113 3. Non-technical Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 114 3.1. Changing the product paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 115 3.1.1. Ecosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 116 3.1.2. Coordination and significant changes in strategy . . 13 117 3.1.3. Competition with existing industries . . . . . . . . 13 118 3.2. Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 119 3.2.1. Rising costs and monetization . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 120 3.3. Information security and privacy of social systems . . . 14 121 3.3.1. Classification of ownership, location, and the usage 122 of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 123 3.4. Disclosure of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 124 3.4.1. Side effects and malicious use potentially caused by 125 the disclosure of data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 126 3.5. Preparing social support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 127 3.5.1. Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 128 3.5.2. Corporate social responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . 14 129 3.5.3. Customization for individual customers . . . . . . . 15 130 3.5.4. IoT literacy of the users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 131 3.5.5. Individual vs. family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 132 4. Information Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 133 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 134 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 135 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 137 1. Introduction 139 Many activities are progressing in various fields, such as the 140 proposal of standards for creating an IoT world. There are also many 141 reports that analyze and predict the benefits that IoT can bring to 142 the economy and society. These developments remind us of the end of 143 the 20th century, when the effect and impact of the Internet was 144 actively debated. 146 The authors tried using the following approach to clarify the issues 147 for the prompt realization of IoT. First, the players were 148 conveniently divided into two groups: ICT industry players and Things 149 industry players. Next, we met major players in the ICT industry and 150 Things industry and asked about the challenges they faced and the 151 challenges the other side faced in creating IoT. 153 The ICT industry players mentioned here include communication 154 carriers, ICT equipment vendors, the Internet service providers, 155 application vendors, and software houses. The Things industry 156 players include home and housing equipment manufacturers, 157 infrastructure providers such as railways companies and power 158 companies, and manufacturers of home appliances such as air 159 conditioners and refrigerators, which are also the ICT users. 161 This paper is principally a summary of the meetings results, and a 162 presentation of the micro case studies about the challenges for 163 realizing IoT services. It is not an overview of the IoT world or a 164 macro-proposal intended to promote the benefits of IoT. 166 In addition, the revised version includes an examination of the 167 possibilities of new direct physical threats in the IoT era that have 168 not yet been seen. These threats should affect the safety of our 169 bodies, lives, and "things," which includes property. For this 170 reason, this issue shall be referred to as "IoT Safety" to 171 distinguish it from Information Security for the purpose of this 172 document. 174 For the past few years, we got new findings through COMMA House, the 175 experimental smart house owned by The University of Tokyo. 176 Therefore, we will add new topics to the next version. 178 2. Technical Challenges 180 2.1. Safety, Security and Privacy 182 2.1.1. Challenges in protecting lives and property from IoT-related 183 threats (IoT Safety) 185 The introduction of IoT may generate threats to "Safety" through the 186 actual operation of mechanical devices, in addition to the 187 Information Security problems discussed in Section 2.1.2 below. For 188 example, the spread of applications for visualizing electric power 189 consumption allows for mischief in device operation without the use 190 of identity fraud or hacking. In addition, there is the potential 191 for problems to arise in the normal operation of individual devices 192 that are not caused by abnormal current or voltage, another troubling 193 aspect of the introduction of IoT. These issues cannot be resolved 194 with ordinary information security measures for Network Layer 4 or 195 lower. In another case, a command to an IoT device is proper by 196 itself, but it may conflict with the other commands or its 197 environmental status. Therefore, the authors consider it necessary 198 to have a system for interpreting the details of operations of many 199 appliances and preventing operations according to the necessity in 200 Layer 7 (what the authors tentatively call "Sekisyo".) 202 These threats are categorized into three types: threat to physical 203 safety; the threat of the failure or destruction of equipment and 204 property; and the threat of impeding the proper performance of 205 equipment. The following section introduces examples of the 206 different threats. 208 2.1.1.1. Safety of body/life 210 Information on things such as the use of faucets and housing 211 equipment, the locking of the front doors and windows, and the state 212 of electric power consumption based on the smart meter is used by 213 smart houses to regulate homes. This information is used to 214 determine whether anyone is at home, and the electronic lock of the 215 front door and windows is unlocked and a notice of absence is issued 216 to a thief. 218 2.1.1.2. Safety of equipment 220 Air conditioners and other equipment that normally are not expected 221 to be frequently started or stopped each a day can be caused to break 222 down by repeatedly turning them on and off as many as hundreds of 223 times a day. 225 2.1.1.3. Proper performance of equipment 227 Water heaters containing a hot well can be caused to operate 228 erratically. This is done by frequently transmitting signals from 229 the mischief application instead of operation panel to tell the water 230 heater that only 10% of the normal amount of hot water is needed, 231 leaving the water heater perpetually low on water. 233 2.1.2. Information Security 235 We have confirmed two viewpoints regarding the information security 236 of services using IoT equipment and devices. The first is tangible 237 information security involving the critical infrastructure. The 238 second concerns the information security of individuals and homes. 240 In regards to information security involving the critical 241 infrastructure, the basic policy in the past was to stay physically 242 disconnected from an external network, such as the Internet, to 243 ensure information security. However, because of the advance in the 244 systems from proprietary communication protocols to open IP protocols 245 to detect symptoms of problems and to remotely maintain a large 246 number of facilities spread over a wide area, connecting to an 247 external network will become unavoidable to achieve various goals. 248 In addition, it is clear that isolated networks are also subject to 249 the same kind of risks, even though it is not directly connected to 250 the outside. There is no major difference in the information 251 security risks because isolated networks are already the target of 252 international cyber terrorism, with internal crimes and targeted 253 attacks occurring more frequently. Based on these reasons, the ICT 254 security of the social infrastructure requires an extremely high 255 level of information security. 257 Looking at the information security of micro units, such as 258 individuals and homes, the improved convenience provided by the 259 introduction of IoT will lead to greater risks. For example, there 260 is a product available for connecting the entrance door to the 261 network. In ICT security technology, increasing the key length of 262 the encryption makes it much harder to break. But even if the latest 263 information security technology is used when it is installed, the 264 information security technology will become obsolete and even pose a 265 risk about halfway through the twenty- to thirty-year lifetime of the 266 entrance door. As has been explained in other items, the ICT sense 267 of time is completely different from that of Things. 269 2.1.3. Privacy in acquiring data 271 The problem of privacy in handling acquired data is a huge challenge 272 for companies promoting IoT. In addition, the ownership of this data 273 poses yet another challenge. 275 For example, railway companies have installed many cameras for 276 station security and for marketing beverage vending machines. This 277 creates problems for personal identification and privacy. At the 278 present time, the companies are processing the images in real time 279 and do not store the images to avoid the problems. 281 Another huge challenge is the ownership of data. Up until now, there 282 has been a divided debate on whether data belonged to the company or 283 to the users. Likewise, the relationship inside a small user group 284 is also extremely diverse and complicated. One specific example is 285 of a company that had obtained permission from the head of the 286 household to use the data when it carried out an HEMS trial. Later 287 on, the spouse of the head of the household disagreed and as a result 288 permission to use the data was withdrawn. 290 2.2. Challenges posed by data acquisition, data distribution, data 291 management and data quantity 293 2.2.1. Traffic patterns 295 The manner in which data is acquired from and distributed to IoT 296 equipment/devices differs immensely from the traffic patterns of the 297 present Internet. The present form of the Internet focuses on 298 distributing information, and its systems focus on effectively 299 delivering contents to the users. On the other hand, routinely or 300 temporarily sending or receiving data through a huge number of 301 various sensors and devices presents a very different kind of 302 Internet traffic. However, questions such as how much traffic will 303 come from what kind of Things, and how will they superimpose each 304 other have not been sufficiently studied. There is no concrete 305 explanation about the backbone design and operation of traffic, and 306 there have been many cases in which the unclear specifications for 307 IoT traffic made the design difficult on the communication company 308 side. There are many challenges related to the set up and management 309 of IoT equipment. We have heard from the construction companies that 310 the configuration of IoT equipment with a large number of sensors 311 involves a lot of hard work. 313 2.2.2. Acquired mass data 315 It is necessary to develop a management method to reuse acquired data 316 safely and effectively. Even now, there are occasional instances of 317 the theft and leakage of social data (such as IDs) that can be used 318 to identify individuals. In the IoT era, there will be mass data 319 that can lead to Things, and the Things in turn will lead to 320 individuals. There are IoT industry players who do not invest as 321 much in ICT systems as government agencies and large companies do, 322 and thus a management system to safely and effectively reuse the 323 acquired data needs to be developed. The laws and regulations 324 related to ID management differ vastly by country and region. These 325 issues related to society and individuals are largely affected by 326 differences in common sense, and therefore need to be localized. 328 2.2.3. Explosive increase and diversity of data 330 In the future IoT era, there are concerns about the explosive 331 increase in data quantity and the diversity of data sent from sensors 332 and IoT equipment. On the other hand, M2M communication does not 333 require mass data like images, and an extraordinary increase in 334 traffic will be unlikely despite the increase in the number of 335 sensors. 337 If data is sent from all Things, there will be an infinite number of 338 different kinds of data. In addition, with the present form of 339 Internet traffic, data is received by people, and most of it consists 340 of video or image downloads. The download traffic is several times 341 greater than that of the upload traffic. If there is a tremendous 342 increase in the use of IoT, such as M2M communication, the difference 343 between upload and download traffic will probably not be that much. 344 It might be necessary to fundamentally review the network and in 345 particular the last mile characteristics. The importance of this 346 issue is not yet widely recognized. 348 2.3. Mapping of the physical world and the virtual world 350 2.3.1. Physically handling acquired data 352 The acquired data simply represents certain kinds of digital value, 353 and it is important to uncover the meaning of this data. As 354 described previously, configuration of IoT equipment, such as the 355 large number of installed sensors, requires a lot of hard work. An 356 even greater amount of effort will be needed to determine the meaning 357 of the data and connect it to the physical world. 359 In energy management experiments, data is mapped manually. This is a 360 time consuming process, and one that is prone to human error. Cases 361 that rely on the use of human hands require the configuration of 362 automated setting systems to reduce labor, costs, and human errors to 363 introduce IoT 365 2.3.2. Data calibration 367 Another important thing is calibration. This involves properly 368 linking the data sent from Things to the Things concerned, and 369 correctly indicating the operating conditions. 371 It may be necessary to have a tool to treat this problem concerning 372 continuation of operation and the one pertaining to introduction of 373 IoT described previously as a package. 375 2.4. Product lifetime, generation management, and the cost of equipment 376 updates 378 2.4.1. Product lifetime 380 The life of most ICT equipment is about 5 years or less, while the 381 life of IoT equipment and devices is at least 10 years. There is a 382 clear gap between these two types of equipment. 384 In the example of the entrance door connected to the network 385 mentioned earlier, the door is often used for about twenty to thirty 386 years after installed. If is connected to a network, the 387 communication technology and communication service will most likely 388 have undergone numerous generation changes in that twenty- to thirty- 389 year time span. This presents a large gap between the ICT industry 390 and the Things industry. 392 A solution to this problem that was reached during the meeting with 393 the housing equipment manufacturers is that with the automatic 394 control of multiple shutters in a building, the portion between the 395 controller and the multiple shutters, the so-called mature 396 technology, can be placed under the control of the shutter 397 manufacturers, while the controller connected to the network will 398 deal with the generation changes of the communication service. 400 2.4.2. Introducing IoT equipment into commodity equipment 402 It costs a lot to make the many different types of commodity 403 equipment popular around the world usable as IoT equipment and 404 devices. There are two ways to change commodity equipment into IoT 405 equipment. One way is to convert it to IoT compatible equipment. 406 The other way involves adding devices to commodity equipment. There 407 are costs in both cases, and it will take a long time to introduce 408 IoT unless different incentives are offered to help to overcome the 409 burden of cost. 411 2.5. Too many related standards and the speed of standardization 413 2.5.1. Too many related standards 415 There are many standards related to IoT equipment and devices. There 416 are multiple standards, technologies and services for communication 417 technology, such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, and LTE, and it is 418 difficult to choose which to apply. 420 The Things industry players do not always have the communication 421 technology professionals needed for IoT. In the meeting, we learned 422 that many companies were uncertain and hesitant about fields outside 423 their own area of expertise. On the other hand, technological 424 competition will improve quality as well as the level of completion, 425 and thus will be beneficial for users. 427 In the future, a consulting business for clarifying ICT technology 428 for the Things industry players may emerge. If there is a system 429 that can interconnect multiple standards, it will accelerate the 430 Things industry to enter IoT 432 2.5.2. Speed of standardization 434 The concept of product life in ICT industry is completely different 435 from that of the Things industry, and as a result the concept of 436 standardization also varies greatly. Before standardization occurs 437 in the ICT industry, many different proposals are made, from which 438 the best is selected. The final decision often changes, and products 439 have to be updated in order to follow the changes in standards. But 440 in the Things industry, the standards have to remain unchanged for as 441 long as possible because of the long product lifetimes. Therefore, 442 it takes a long time to determine when a particular standard has 443 become mature. When the Things industry goes to implement a standard 444 from the ICT industry, it feels that the standard is incredibly fluid 445 and seemingly undecided. Furthermore, the standardization process of 446 the two industries is very different, and making it difficult to work 447 on the other side when trying to determine a standard. 449 2.6. Interoperability, fault isolation, and total quality assurance 451 2.6.1. Interoperability 453 The verification of interoperability poses a major challenge because 454 of the configuration used by multi-vendors. In addition to 455 interoperability between equipment, the ability to ensure backward 456 compatibility is also important for bringing about the IoT world. 458 If these capabilities cannot be provided, it will be very difficult 459 to create an IoT world in which past products can function. 461 2.6.2. Fault isolation 463 The method for fault isolation that may occur presents another 464 challenge. 466 Many PC users have experienced various kinds of problems. When their 467 PC experiences a problem, they have to isolate the faults by 468 themselves, with no one available to lend a helping hand. 470 In the IoT world, these issues become more difficult and complicated. 471 For example, a smart home is equipped with air conditioners, kitchen 472 supplies, and doors connected to the Internet. A problem that occurs 473 in the smart home poses a much more serious problem to end users than 474 an e-mail failure or problem with a PC. 476 If users are left to isolate the fault on their own, they may not 477 know which manufacturer they contact for repairs if they are unable 478 to isolate the fault on their own, or the manufacturer may refuse to 479 perform repairs because they fall outside the scope of their 480 responsibility. As can be seen, the issue is an important challenge 481 that will determine whether the B2C specific IoT world can be 482 established. 484 2.6.3. Quality assurance 486 The quality assurance of individual pieces of IoT equipment does not 487 guarantee the total quality of IoT. Since IoT involves connecting 488 multiple Things and communication, it is natural to assume that the 489 total service quality will depend on the quality of the IoT equipment 490 and devices, which can sometimes become bottleneck. However, users 491 are not aware of this. 493 As was mentioned previously in Section 2.6 issues that are not 494 directly related to the quality of an individual component can be 495 important factors in determining the quality of the service. In this 496 way, the quality of IoT is not decided by each individual Thing, but 497 needs to be considered as a service spread across the network. 499 2.7. Product design policy 501 2.7.1. Changes in design policy 503 The design policy has to be changed from placing emphasis on the high 504 functionality of a single product to stressing the singular function 505 of individual products as well as how they work in coordination with 506 other products. For many years, the Things industry has focused on 507 producing high functionality products with added value. But in the 508 IoT era, the implicit assumption is to confine Things to their basic 509 function and enhance the level of coordination between Things, rather 510 than focusing on the added value. Simplified Things must be able to 511 be controlled with an external application that can also be used by 512 the Things of cross manufacturers. 514 Given this situation, the Things industry faces the challenge of 515 adopting a completely different policy. During the meeting with the 516 manufacturing industries, we could sense their difficulty in 517 understanding and recognizing the need to change the policy. 519 2.8. Various technology restrictions within actual usage 521 2.8.1. Using radio waves 523 There are many cases that have provided us with insight about issues 524 related to the use of radio waves in IoT (such as the wave traveling 525 range and whether or not it travels further than stated in 526 assumptions available). The suppliers or providers who configure IoT 527 are not always wave communication technology experts. People who are 528 unfamiliar with radio waves seem to think that waves travel from 529 antenna to antenna in a straight line, and that they can be blocked 530 by obstacles. As a result, they often ask questions about how many 531 meters radio waves can travel or whether radio waves can actually 532 travel. Few people understand the fact that the emitted radio waves 533 are reflected from various locations and are superimposed at the 534 reception point where they are received, or that depending on how 535 waves are reflected a change in the reception signal intensity, 536 called fading, may occur. The lack of engineers who can advise on 537 specialized matters such as these poses a major obstacle. 539 2.8.2. Batteries 541 The power capacity and lifetime of batteries represent another set of 542 challenges similar in nature to the issue of radio waves traveling 543 distance. There are questions such as the difference between the 544 real and catalog specifications, as well as factors that affect the 545 battery power capacity. The IoT providers, who are also users of 546 IoT, have to solve these issues, while these are difficult problems 547 even for experts. 549 2.8.3. Wiring 551 The incredible amount of wiring and its complexity (power lines and 552 communication lines) pose major challenges. The complexity of 553 wiring- such as the large number of sensors and equipment, the power 554 lines that drive them, and the communication lines that connect them 555 to the network for acquiring information-is to the point that people 556 doing IoT installation work will start wishing for a wire harness. 557 In addition, the installation of cables and electric work are often 558 done by different engineers. This make the issue even more 559 complicated. 561 2.8.4. Being open 563 A single company alone cannot make all the commodities for IoT. The 564 IoT world needs to be open, and this can only be achieved with the 565 cooperation of many different industries. Up until now, companies in 566 the Things industry have developed products in a closed loop process, 567 seeking to capture users with their company's own products. For this 568 reason, they lack an open design concept of interoperability. Today, 569 an entirely new design concept is needed to design products that can 570 interconnect with the products of other companies. 572 3. Non-technical Challenges 574 3.1. Changing the product paradigm 576 3.1.1. Ecosystems 578 While the goal of setting up IoT is to generate new value, it may 579 actually lead to the destruction of the ecosystems in which 580 industries operate. In the IoT era, the traditional vertically 581 integrated way of producing Things in manufacturing industries will 582 consume too much time and cost. This approach also makes it 583 difficult to incorporate the ideas of other cultures. The need for 584 paradigm shift is easy to understand, but difficult to implement. 585 Promoting this shift will pose a management challenge that requires a 586 considerable amount of skill and effort to overcome. 588 3.1.2. Coordination and significant changes in strategy 590 It will become necessary to run businesses jointly with new partners, 591 as well as cooperate and work in coordination with other industries 592 and competitors. This issue-even when it is fully understood-will be 593 very difficult to address and put into practice. 595 We have seen instances in which only a limited amount of information 596 was given when parties exchanged opinions. There have also been 597 instances in which communication was difficult because of differences 598 in terminology and culture. 600 3.1.3. Competition with existing industries 602 The issue of competition with existing industries often arises when 603 attempts are made to change or reform a business model change or 604 reform. This issue can also be viewed as the reorganization of 605 industries, rather than competition between existing industries. 606 However, this realignment of industries is difficult to move forward 607 in the absence of supervisors. 609 3.2. Benefits 611 3.2.1. Rising costs and monetization 613 Introducing IoT within products will cause costs to go up, and yet 614 the benefits it provides are unclear. There is no specific killer 615 application available, and the number of users will not rise 616 immediately. Therefore, finding a way to make the business 617 profitable will be very difficult. This issue is especially 618 difficult for businesses and products that rely on cost reductions to 619 deliver low prices that make them competitive. 621 3.3. Information security and privacy of social systems 623 3.3.1. Classification of ownership, location, and the usage of data 625 There are many questions regarding the wide variety of data gathered 626 from IoT equipment, including questions related to ownership, storage 627 location, and the authorization to grant a license to use data. 628 These need to be addressed so that the system and equipment can be 629 accepted by society. 631 For example, if a company installs a door in a house that gathers 632 data on the opening and closing of the door, questions about the data 633 will arise. Does it belong to the users or the company? Can another 634 company use this data? 636 3.4. Disclosure of data 638 3.4.1. Side effects and malicious use potentially caused by the 639 disclosure of data 641 For example, it has been shown that the electricity smart meter can 642 lead to burglary because it shows when electricity is used and not 643 used, providing an indication of the time when no one is home. This 644 particular example demonstrates the importance of ensuring 645 information security and privacy. 647 3.5. Preparing social support 649 3.5.1. Regulations 651 Systems of laws and regulations are important for ensuring the safety 652 of the conventional products, but they can also be a barrier for 653 innovation. 655 IoT can be affected by laws and regulations at home and abroad, and 656 can also be influenced by regulations that extend across multiple 657 countries. Regulatory authorities need to monitor IoT carefully and 658 adjust the regulations and laws they oversee in a way that does not 659 negatively impact the global competition environment. 661 3.5.2. Corporate social responsibility 663 In addition to pursuing profit, companies that promote IoT also need 664 to improve the benefits offered to users and society 666 3.5.3. Customization for individual customers 668 There is an ongoing shift in demand away from general products to 669 customized products for individual customers. This could also be 670 viewed as a shift away from manufacturing businesses to service 671 businesses. IoT will play an important role in this shift. 673 Instead of manufacturing Things through mass production, it will be 674 easier to customize a product by moving some of the functions to an 675 application. Likewise, the manufacturing business also needs to move 676 forward with the previously mentioned paradigm shift in order to 677 achieve customization 679 3.5.4. IoT literacy of the users 681 Because Things are connected to the network, apps will need to be 682 created. Some of these will serve as the interface with which people 683 interact with IoT. 685 In the IoT era of the future, users will need to possess a certain 686 amount of knowledge about IoT apps 688 3.5.5. Individual vs. family 690 The issue of whether the data of Things in the house belongs to the 691 family or the individual will largely affect data analysis and the 692 handling of privacy. 694 As was mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the spouse could later object to 695 the head of the household granting authorization to use data. 697 4. Information Security Considerations 699 Meetings with the players in various IoT fields provided insight into 700 information security issues. These issues are described in the 701 following sections. 703 o Section 2.1.2 Physical damper of devices 705 o Section 2.1.2 Product lifetime and encryption strength 707 For details, please see the corresponding text. 709 5. Privacy Considerations 711 Similarly, issues regarding privacy are described in the following 712 sections. 714 o Section 2.1.2, Section 3.3.1 Ownership of the data 716 o Section 3.4.1 Data disclosure and malicious use 718 o Section 3.5.5 Individual vs. family 720 For details, please see the corresponding text. 722 6. Acknowledgments 724 We would like to thank the foundation the promotion of industrial 725 science and its RC-88 member companies for their cooperation. 727 And we also appreciate Ministry of Internal Affairs and 728 Communications. 730 Authors' Addresses 732 Hiroyuki Baba 733 The University of Tokyo 734 Institute of Industrial Science 735 4-6-1 Komaba 736 Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8505 737 Japan 739 Email: hbaba@iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp 741 Yoshiki Ishida 742 Japan Network Enabler Corporation 743 7F S-GATE Akasaka-Sanno. 744 1-8-1 Akasaka 745 Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052 746 Japan 748 Email: ishida@jpne.co.jp 750 Takayuki Amatsu 751 Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. 752 1-1-3 Uchisaiwai-cho 753 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8560 754 Japan 756 Email: amatsu.t@tepco.co.jp 757 Koichi Kunitake 758 BroadBand Tower, Inc. 759 Hibiya Parkfront. 760 2-1-6, Uchisaiwai-cho 761 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0011 762 Japan 764 Email: kokunitake@bbtower.co.jp 766 Kaoru Maeda 767 Individual Contributor 768 Japan 770 Email: kaorumaeda.ml@gmail.com