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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group M. Behringer 3 Internet-Draft F. Le Faucheur 4 Intended status: Informational Cisco Systems Inc 5 Expires: May 19, 2008 November 16, 2007 7 Applicability of Keying Methods for RSVP Security 8 draft-behringer-tsvwg-rsvp-security-groupkeying-01.txt 10 Status of this Memo 12 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 13 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 14 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 15 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 17 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 18 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 19 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 20 Drafts. 22 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 23 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 24 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 25 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 27 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 28 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 30 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 31 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 33 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2008. 35 Copyright Notice 37 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 39 Abstract 41 The Resource reSerVation Protocol (RSVP) allows hop-by-hop 42 authentication of RSVP neighbors. This requires messages to be 43 cryptographically signed using a shared secret between participating 44 nodes. This document compares group keying for RSVP with per 45 neighbor or per interface keying, and discusses the associated key 46 provisioning methods as well as applicability and limitations of 47 these approaches. Draft-weis-gdoi-for-rsvp specifies how the Group 48 Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) can be used to distribute group keys 49 to RSVP nodes. The present document also discusses applicability of 50 such group keying to RSVP encryption. 52 Table of Contents 54 1. Introduction and Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. The RSVP Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. Key types for RSVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 3.1. Interface based keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 3.2. Neighbor based keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 3.3. Group keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 4. Key Provisioning Methods for RSVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 4.1. Static Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 4.2. Per Neighbor Key Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 4.3. Dynamic Key Distribution using GDOI . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 5. Applicability of Various Keying Methods for RSVP . . . . . . . 6 65 5.1. Per Neighbor or Per Interface Keys for Authentication . . 6 66 5.2. Group Keys for Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 5.3. Non-RSVP Hops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 68 5.4. Subverted RSVP Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 5.5. RSVP Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 70 5.6. RSVP Notify Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 71 6. End Host Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 72 7. Applicability to Other Architectures and Protocols . . . . . . 10 73 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 74 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 75 10. Changes to Previous Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 76 11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 77 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 14 80 1. Introduction and Problem Statement 82 The Resource reSerVation Protocol [RFC2205] allows hop-by-hop 83 authentication of RSVP neighbors, as specified in [RFC2747]. In this 84 mode, an integrity object is attached to each RSVP message to 85 transmit a keyed message digest. This message digest allows the 86 recipient to verify the authenticity of the RSVP node that sent the 87 message, and to validate the integrity of the message. Through the 88 inclusion of a sequence number in the scope of the digest, the digest 89 also offers replay protection. 91 [RFC2747] does not dictate how the key for the integrity operation is 92 derived. Currently, most implementations of RSVP use a statically 93 configured key, per interface or per neighbor. However, to manually 94 configure key per router pair across an entire network is 95 operationally hard, especially for key changes. Effectively, many 96 users of RSVP therefore resort to the same key throughout their 97 network, and change it rarely if ever, because of the operational 98 burden. [RFC3562] however recommends regular key changes, at least 99 every 90 days. 101 [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp] provides an alternative solution, using GDOI 102 ([RFC3547]) for key distribution. This allows dynamic key updates, 103 valid for a complete set of RSVP speakers. 105 The present document describes the various keying methods and their 106 applicability to different RSVP deployment environments, for both 107 message integrity and encryption. It does not mandate any particular 108 method, but is meant as a comparative guideline to understand where 109 each RSVP keying method is best deployed, and its limitations. 110 Furthermore, it discusses how RSVP hop by hop authentication is 111 impacted in the presence of non-RSVP nodes, or subverted nodes, in 112 the reservation path. 114 The document "RSVP Security Properties" ([RFC4230]) provides an 115 overview of RSVP security, including RSVP Cryptographic 116 Authentication [RFC2747], but does not discuss key management, nor 117 the extensions that [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp] suggests. It states 118 that "RFC 2205 assumes that security associations are already 119 available.". The present document focuses specifically on key 120 management with different key types, including GDOI derived keys, as 121 specified in [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp]. Therefore this document 122 complements [RFC4230]. 124 2. The RSVP Trust Model 126 Many protocol security mechanisms used in networks require and use 127 per peer authentication. Each hop authenticates its neighbor with a 128 shared key or certificate. This is also the model used for RSVP. 129 Trust in this model is transitive. Each RSVP node trusts explicitely 130 only its RSVP next hop peers, through the message digest contained in 131 the INTEGRITY object. The next hop RSVP speaker in turn trusts its 132 own peers and so on. See also the document ""RSVP security 133 properties" [RFC4230] for more background. 135 The keys used for generating the RSVP messages can, in particular, be 136 group keys (for example distributed via GDOI [RFC3547], as discussed 137 in [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp]). The trust model is the same as for 138 RSVP authentication. This is described in more detail in the section 139 "Using GDOI For RSVP Encryption" in section 5.5. 141 The trust an RSVP node has to another RSVP node has an explicit and 142 an implicit component. Explicitely the node trusts the other node to 143 maintain the RSVP messages intact or confidential, depending on 144 whether authentication or encryption (or both) is used. This means 145 only that the message has not been altered or seen by another, non- 146 trusted node. Implicitely each node trusts each other node with 147 which it has a trust relationship established via the mechanisms here 148 to adhere to the protocol specifications laid out by the various 149 standards. Note that in any group keying scheme like GDOI a node 150 trusts explicitely as well as implicitely all the other members of 151 the group. 153 The RSVP protocol can operate in the presence of a non-RSVP router in 154 the path from the sender to the receiver. The non-RSVP hop will 155 ignore the RSVP message and just pass it along. The next RSVP node 156 can then process the RSVP message. For RSVP authentication to work 157 in this case, the key used for computing the RSVP message digest 158 needs to be shared by the two RSVP neighbors, even if they are not IP 159 neighbors. However, in the presence of non-RSVP hops, while an RSVP 160 node always know the next IP hop before forwarding an RSVP Message, 161 it does not always know the RSVP next hop. Thus, the presence of 162 non-RSVP hops impacts operation of RSVP authentication and may 163 influence the keying approaches. This is further discussed in 164 Section 5.3. 166 3. Key types for RSVP 168 3.1. Interface based keys 170 Most current RSVP authentication implementations support interface 171 based RSVP keys. When the interface is point-to-point (and therefore 172 an RSVP router only has a single RSVP neighbor on each interface), 173 this is similar to neighbor based keys in the sense that a different 174 key is used for each neighbor. However, when the interface is 175 multipoint, all RSVP speakers on a given subnet have to share the 176 same key in this model, which makes it unsuitable for deployment 177 scenarios where different trust groups share a subnet, for example 178 Internet exchange points. In such a case, neighbor based keys are 179 required. 181 3.2. Neighbor based keys 183 In this model, an RSVP key is bound to an interface plus a neighbor 184 on that interface. It allows the distinction of different trust 185 groups on a single subnet. (Assuming that layer-2 security is 186 correctly implemented to prevent layer-2 attacks.) 188 3.3. Group keys 190 Here, all members of a group of RSVP nodes share the same key. This 191 implies that a node uses the same key regardless of the next RSVP hop 192 that will process the message (within the group of nodes sharing the 193 particular key). It also implies that a node will use the same key 194 on the receiving as on the sending side (when exchanging RSVP 195 messages withn the group). 197 4. Key Provisioning Methods for RSVP 199 4.1. Static Key Provisioning 201 The simplest way to implement RSVP authentication is to use static, 202 preconfigured keys. Static keying can be used with interface based 203 keys, neighbor based keys or group keys. 205 However, such static key provisioning is expensive on the operational 206 side, since no secure automated mechanism can be used, and initial 207 provisioning as well as key updates require configuration. This 208 method is therefore mostly useful for small deployments, where key 209 changes can be carried out manually, or for deployments with 210 automated configuration tools which support key changes. 212 Static key provisioning is therefore not an ideal model in a large 213 network. 215 Often, the number of interconnection points across two domains where 216 RSVP is allowed to transit is relatively small and well controlled. 217 Also, the different domains may not be in a position to use an 218 infrastructure trusted by both domains to update keys on both sides. 219 Thus, manually configured keys may be applicable to inter-domain RSVP 220 authentication. 222 Since it is not practical to carry out the key change at the exact 223 same time on both sides, some grace period needs to be implemented 224 during which an RSVP node will accept both the old and the new key. 225 Otherwise, RSVP operation would suffer interruptions. 227 4.2. Per Neighbor Key Negotiation 229 To avoid the problem of manual key provisioning and updates in static 230 key deployments, key negotiation between RSVP neighbors could be 231 used. Key negotiation could be used to derive either interface or 232 neighbor based keys. However, existing key negotiation protocols 233 such as IKEv1[RFC2409] or IKEv2 [RFC4306] may not be appropriate in 234 all environments because of the relative complexity of the protocols 235 and related operations. 237 4.3. Dynamic Key Distribution using GDOI 239 [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp] describes a mechanism to distribute group 240 keys to a group of RSVP speakers, using GDOI [RFC3547]. In this 241 model, a key server authenticates each of the RSVP nodes 242 independently, and then distributes a group key to the entire group. 244 5. Applicability of Various Keying Methods for RSVP 246 5.1. Per Neighbor or Per Interface Keys for Authentication 248 Per interface and per neighbor keys can be used within a single 249 security domain. As mentioned above, per interface keys are only 250 applicable when all the hosts reachable on the specific interface 251 belong to the same security domain. 253 These key types can also be used between security domains, since they 254 are specific to a particular interface or neighbor. Again, interface 255 level keys can only be deployed safely when all the reachable 256 neighbors on the interface belong to the same security domain. 258 As discussed in Section 5.3, per neighbor and per interface keys can 259 not be used in the presence of non-RSVP hops. 261 5.2. Group Keys for Authentication 263 Group keys apply naturally to intra-domain RSVP authentication, since 264 all RSVP nodes implicitely trust each other. Using group keys, they 265 extend this trust to the group key server. This is represented in 266 Figure 1. 268 ......GKS1............. 269 : : : : : 270 : : : : : 271 source--R1--R2--R3-----destination 272 | | 273 |<-----domain 1----------------->| 275 Figure 1: Group Key Server within a single security domain 277 A single group key cannot normally be used to cover multiple security 278 domains however, because by definition the different domains do not 279 trust each other and would not be willing to trust the same group key 280 server. For a single group key to be used in several security 281 domains, there is a need for a single group key server, which is 282 trusted by both sides. While this is theoretically possible, in 283 practice it is unlikely that there is a single such entity trusted by 284 both domains. Figure 2 illustrates this setup. 286 ...............GKS1.................... 287 : : : : : : : : 288 : : : : : : : : 289 source--R1--R2--R3--------R4--R5--R6--destination 290 | | | | 291 |<-----domain 1--->| |<-------domain 2----->| 293 Figure 2: A Single Group Key Server across security domains 295 A more practical approach for RSVP operation across security domains, 296 is to use a separate group key server for each security domain, and 297 to use per interface or per peer authentication between the two 298 domains. Figure 3 shows this set-up. 300 ....GKS1...... ....GKS2......... 301 : : : : : : : : 302 : : : : : : : : 303 source--R1--R2--R3--------R4--R5--R6--destination 304 | | | | 305 |<-----domain 1--->| |<-------domain 2----->| 307 Figure 3: A group Key Server per security domain 309 5.3. Non-RSVP Hops 311 In the presence of a non-RSVP router in the path from the sender to 312 the receiver, regular RSVP keeps working. The non-RSVP node ignores 313 the RSVP message, and passes it on transparently to the next node. 314 Figure 4 illustrates this scenario. R2 in this picture does not 315 participate in RSVP, the other nodes do. In this case, R2 will pass 316 on any RSVP messages unchanged, and will ignore them. 318 ----R3--- 319 / \ 320 sender----R1---R2(*) R4----receiver 321 \ / 322 ----R5--- 323 (*) Non-RSVP hop 325 Figure 4: A non-RSVP Node in the path 327 However, this creates an additional challenge for RSVP 328 authentication. In the presence of a non-RSVP hop, with some RSVP 329 messages such as a Path message, an RSVP router does not know the 330 RSVP next hop for that message at the time of forwarding it. In 331 fact, part of the role of a Path message is precisely to discover the 332 RSVP next hop (and to dynamically re-discover it when it changes, say 333 because of a routing change). For example, in Figure 4, R1 knows 334 that the next IP hop for a Path message addresed to the receiver is 335 R2, but it does necessarily not know if the RSVP next hop is R3 or 336 R5. 338 This means that per interface and per neighbor keys cannot easily be 339 used in the presence of non-RSVP routers on the path between senders 340 and receivers. 342 By contrast, group keying will naturally work in the presence of non- 343 RSVP routers. Referring back to Figure 4, with group keying, R1 344 would use the group key to sign a Path message addressed to the 345 receiver and forwards it to R2. Being a non-RSVP node, R2 and will 346 ignore and forward the Path message to R3 or R5 depending on the 347 current shortest path as determined by routing. Whether it is R3 or 348 R5, the RSVP router that receives the Path message will be able to 349 authenticate it successfully with the group key. 351 5.4. Subverted RSVP Nodes 353 A subverted node is defined here as an untrusted node, for example 354 because an intruder has gained control over it. Since RSVP 355 authentication is hop-by-hop and not end-to-end, a subverted node in 356 the path breaks the chain of trust. This is to a large extent 357 independent of the type of keying used. 359 For interface or per-neighbor keying, the subverted node can now 360 introduce fake messages to its neighbors. This can be used in a 361 variety of ways, for example by changing the receiver address in the 362 Path message, or by generating fake Path messages. This allows path 363 states to be created on every RSVP router along any arbitrary path 364 through the RSVP domain. That in itself could result in a form of 365 Denial of Service by allowing exhaustion of some router resources 366 (e.g. memory). The subverted node could also generate fake Resv 367 messages upstream corresponding to valid Path states. In doing so, 368 the subverted node can reserve excessive amounts of bandwidth thereby 369 possibly performing a denial of service attack. 371 Group keying allows the additional abuse of sending fake RSVP 372 messages to any node in the RSVP domain, not just adjacent RSVP 373 nodes. However, in practice this can be achieved to a large extent 374 also with per neighbor or interface keys, as discussed above. 375 Therefore the impact of subverted nodes on the path is comparable, 376 independently whether per-interface, per-neighbor or group keys are 377 used. 379 5.5. RSVP Encryption 381 The keying material can also be used to encrypt the RSVP messages 382 using IPsec [RFC2401], instead of, or in addition to authenticating 383 them. The same considerations apply for this case as discussed above 384 for the authentication case. Group keys are applicable only within a 385 trusted domain, but they allow operation through non-RSVP speakers 386 without further configuration. Per interface or per neighbor keys 387 work also inter-domain, but do not operate in the presence of a non- 388 RSVP router. 390 The existing GDOI standard as described in [RFC3547] contains all 391 relevant policy options to allow for RSVP encryption, and no 392 extensions are necessary. An example GDOI policy would be to encrypt 393 all packets of the RSVP protocol itself (IP protocol 46). A router 394 implementing GDOI is therefore automatically able to encrypt RSVP. 396 [Editor's note: Applicability of tunnel vs transport mode still need 397 to be discussed.] 399 5.6. RSVP Notify Messages 401 [RFC3473] introduces the Notify message and allows such Notify 402 messages to be sent in a non-hop-by-hop fashion. As discussed in the 403 Security Considerations section of [RFC3473], this can interfere with 404 RSVP's hop-by-hop integrity and authentication model. [RFC3473] 405 describes how standard IPsec based integrity and authentication can 406 be used to protect Notify messages. We observe that, alternatively, 407 in some environments, group keying may allow use of regular RSVP 408 authentication ([RFC2747]) for protection of non-hop-by-hop Notify 409 messages. For example, this may be applicable to controlled 410 environments where nodes invoking notification requests are known to 411 belong to the same key group as nodes generating Notify messages. 413 6. End Host Considerations 415 Unless RSVP Proxy entities ([I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-proxy-approaches] 416 are used, RSVP signaling is controlled by end systems and not 417 routers. As discussed in [RFC4230], RSVP allows both user-based 418 security and host-based security. User-based authentication aims at 419 "providing policy based admission control mechanism based on user 420 identities or application." To identify the user or the application, 421 a policy element called AUTH_DATA, which is contained in the 422 POLICY_DATA object, is created by the RSVP daemon at the user's host 423 and transmitted inside the RSVP message. This way, a user may 424 authenticate to the Policy Decision Point (or directly to the first 425 hop router). Host-based security relies on the same mechanisms as 426 between routers (i.e. INTEGRITY object ) as specified in [RFC2747]. 427 For host-based security, interface or neighbor based keys may be 428 used, however, key management with pre-shared keys can be difficult 429 in a large scale deployment, as described in section 4. In principle 430 an end host can also be part of a group key scheme, such as GDOI. If 431 the end systems are part of the same zone of trust as the network 432 itself, group keying can be extended to include the end systems. If 433 the end systems and the network are in different zones of trust, 434 group keying cannot be used. 436 7. Applicability to Other Architectures and Protocols 438 While, so far, this document only discusses RSVP security assuming 439 the traditional RSVP model as defined by [RFC2205] and [RFC2747], the 440 analysis is also applicable to other RSVP deployment models as well 441 as to similar protocols: 443 o Aggregation of RSVP for IPv4 and IPv6 Reservations [RFC3175]: This 444 scheme defines aggregation of individual RSVP reservations, and 445 discusses use of RSVP authentication for the signaling messages. 446 Group keying is applicable to this scheme, particularly when 447 automatic Deaggregator discovery is used, since in that case, the 448 Aggregator does not know ahead of time which Deaggregator will 449 intercept the initial end-to-end RSVP Path message. 450 o Generic Aggregate Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) 451 Reservations [RFC4860]: This document also discusses aggregation 452 of individual RSVP reservations. Here again, group keying applies 453 and is mentioned in the Security Considerations section. 454 o Aggregation of Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) Reservations 455 over MPLS TE/DS-TE Tunnels [RFC4804]([RFC4804]): This scheme also 456 defines a form of aggregation of RSVP reservation but this time 457 over MPLS TE Tunnels. Similarly, group keying may be used in such 458 an environment. 460 o Pre-Congestion Notification (PCN): [I-D.ietf-pcn-architecture] 461 defines an architecture for flow admission and termination based 462 on aggregated pre-congestion information. One deployment model 463 for this architecture is based on IntServ over DiffServ: the 464 DiffServ region is PCN-enabled, RSVP signalling is used end-to-end 465 but the PCN-domain is a single RSVP hop, i.e. only the PCN- 466 boundary-nodes process RSVP messages. In this scenario, RSVP 467 authentication may be required among PCN-boundary-nodes and the 468 considerations about keying approaches discussed earlier in this 469 document apply. In particular, group keying may facilitate 470 operations since the ingress PCN-boundary-node does not 471 necessarily know ahead of time which Egress PCN-boundary-node will 472 intercept and process the initial end-to-end Path message. Note 473 that from the viewpoint of securing end-to-end RSVP, there are a 474 lot of similarities in scenarios involving RSVP Aggregation over 475 aggregate RSVP reservations ([RFC3175], [RFC4860]), RSVP 476 Aggregation over MPLS-TE tunnels ([RFC4804]), and RSVP 477 (Aggregation) over PCN ingress-egress aggregates. 479 8. Security Considerations 481 This entire document discusses RSVP security. 483 9. Acknowledgements 485 The authors would like to thank everybody who provided feedback on 486 this document. Specific thanks to Bob Briscoe, Hannes Tschofenig and 487 Brian Weis. 489 10. Changes to Previous Version 491 The following changes were made in version 01: 493 o New section "Applicability to Other Architectures and Protocols": 494 Goal is to clarify the scope of this document: The idea presented 495 here is also applicable to other architectures 496 (PCN[I-D.ietf-pcn-architecture], RFC3175 and RFC4860, etc. 497 o Clarified the scope of this document versus RFC4230 (in the 498 introduction, last paragraph). 499 o Added a section on "End Host Considerations". 500 o Expanded section 5.5 (RSVP Encryption) to clarify that GDOI 501 contains all necessary mechanisms to do RSVP encrpytion. 502 o Tried to clarify the "trust to do what?" question raised by Bob 503 Briscoe in a mail on 26 Jul 2007. See the section on trust model. 505 o Lots of small editorial changes (references, typos, figures, etc). 506 o Added an Acknowledgements section. 508 11. Informative References 510 [I-D.ietf-pcn-architecture] 511 Eardley, P., "Pre-Congestion Notification Architecture", 512 October 2007. 514 [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-proxy-approaches] 515 Faucheur, F., "RSVP Proxy Approaches", 516 draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-proxy-approaches-02 (work in 517 progress), September 2007. 519 [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp] 520 Weis, B., "Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) support 521 for RSVP", July 2007. 523 [RFC2205] Braden, B., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S., and S. 524 Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1 525 Functional Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997. 527 [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the 528 Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. 530 [RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange 531 (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998. 533 [RFC2747] Baker, F., Lindell, B., and M. Talwar, "RSVP Cryptographic 534 Authentication", RFC 2747, January 2000. 536 [RFC3175] Baker, F., Iturralde, C., Le Faucheur, F., and B. Davie, 537 "Aggregation of RSVP for IPv4 and IPv6 Reservations", 538 RFC 3175, September 2001. 540 [RFC3473] Berger, L., "Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching 541 (GMPLS) Signaling Resource ReserVation Protocol-Traffic 542 Engineering (RSVP-TE) Extensions", RFC 3473, January 2003. 544 [RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The 545 Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003. 547 [RFC3562] Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5 548 Signature Option", RFC 3562, July 2003. 550 [RFC4230] Tschofenig, H. and R. Graveman, "RSVP Security 551 Properties", RFC 4230, December 2005. 553 [RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", 554 RFC 4306, December 2005. 556 [RFC4804] Le Faucheur, F., "Aggregation of Resource ReSerVation 557 Protocol (RSVP) Reservations over MPLS TE/DS-TE Tunnels", 558 RFC 4804, February 2007. 560 [RFC4860] Le Faucheur, F., Davie, B., Bose, P., Christou, C., and M. 561 Davenport, "Generic Aggregate Resource ReSerVation 562 Protocol (RSVP) Reservations", RFC 4860, May 2007. 564 Authors' Addresses 566 Michael H. Behringer 567 Cisco Systems Inc 568 Village d'Entreprises Green Side 569 400, Avenue Roumanille, Batiment T 3 570 Biot - Sophia Antipolis 06410 571 France 573 Email: mbehring@cisco.com 574 URI: http://www.cisco.com 576 Francois Le Faucheur 577 Cisco Systems Inc 578 Village d'Entreprises Green Side 579 400, Avenue Roumanille, Batiment T 3 580 Biot - Sophia Antipolis 06410 581 France 583 Email: flefauch@cisco.com 584 URI: http://www.cisco.com 586 Full Copyright Statement 588 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 590 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 591 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 592 retain all their rights. 594 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 595 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 596 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 597 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 598 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 599 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 600 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 602 Intellectual Property 604 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 605 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 606 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 607 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 608 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 609 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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