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Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2461 (Obsoleted by RFC 4861) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2818 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7159 (Obsoleted by RFC 8259) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5785 (Obsoleted by RFC 8615) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 6106 (Obsoleted by RFC 8106) Summary: 3 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 intarea P. Pfister, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Cisco 4 Intended status: Informational D. Schinazi 5 Expires: January 29, 2018 T. Pauly 6 Apple 7 E. Vyncke 8 Cisco 9 B. Bruneau 10 Ecole Polytechnique 11 July 28, 2017 13 Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data 14 draft-bruneau-intarea-provisioning-domains-02 16 Abstract 18 An increasing number of hosts and networks are connected to the 19 Internet through multiple interfaces, some of which may provide 20 multiple ways to access the internet by the mean of multiple IPv6 21 prefix configurations. 23 This document describes a way for hosts to retrieve additional 24 information about their network access characteristics. The set of 25 configuration items required to access the Internet is called a 26 Provisioning Domain (PvD) and is identified by a Fully Qualified 27 Domain Name (FQDN). This identifier, retrieved using a new Router 28 Advertisement (RA) option, is associated with the set of information 29 included within the RA and may later be used to retrieve additional 30 information associated with the PvD by the mean of an HTTP request. 32 Status of This Memo 34 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 35 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 37 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 38 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 39 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 40 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 42 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 43 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 44 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 45 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 47 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2018. 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 Table of Contents 66 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 67 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router 69 Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 70 3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements . . . . . . . . . 4 71 3.2. Router Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 72 3.3. Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 73 3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 6 74 3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 7 75 3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host . . . . . . . . . 7 76 4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information . . . . . . . . . 7 77 4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 7 78 4.2. Providing the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 9 79 4.3. PvD Additional Information Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 80 4.3.1. Connectivity Characteristics Information . . . . . . 10 81 4.3.2. Private Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 82 4.3.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 83 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 84 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 85 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 86 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 87 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 88 9.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 89 9.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 90 Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 91 A.1. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 92 A.2. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 93 A.3. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 94 Appendix B. Connection monetary cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 95 B.1. Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 96 B.2. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 97 B.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 98 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 100 1. Introduction 102 It has become very common in modern networks that hosts have internet 103 or more specific network access through different networking 104 interfaces, tunnels, or next-hop routers. The concept of 105 Provisioning Domain (PvD) was defined in [RFC7556] as a set of 106 network configuration information which can be used by hosts in order 107 to access the network. 109 This specification provides a way to identify explicit PvDs with 110 Fully Qualified Domain Names called PvD IDs, which are included in a 111 new Router Advertisement [RFC4861] option. This new option, when 112 present, is used to associate the correlated set of configuration 113 information with the identified PvD. It is worth noting that 114 multiple PvDs with different PvD IDs could be provisioned on any host 115 interface, as well as noting that the same PvD ID could be used on 116 different interfaces in order to inform the host that both PvDs, on 117 different interfaces, ultimately provide identical services. 119 This document also introduces a way for hosts to retrieve additional 120 information related to a specific PvD by the mean of an HTTP-over-TLS 121 query using an URI derived from the PvD ID. The retrieved JSON 122 object contains additional network information that would typically 123 be considered unfit, or too large, to be directly included in the 124 Router Advertisements. This information can be used by the 125 networking stack, the applications, or even be partially displayed to 126 the users (e.g., by displaying a localized network service name). 128 2. Terminology 130 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 131 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 132 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 133 [RFC2119]. 135 In addition, this document uses the following terminology: 137 PvD: A Provisioning Domain, a set of network configuration 138 information; for more information, see [RFC7556]. 140 PvD ID: A Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) used to identify a 141 PvD. 143 Explicit PvD: A PvD uniquely identified with a PvD ID. for more 144 information, see [RFC7556]. 146 Implicit PvD: A PvD associated with a set of configuration 147 information that, in the absence of a PvD ID, is associated with 148 the advertising router. 150 3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router Advertisements 152 Each provisioning domain is identified by a PvD ID. The PvD ID is a 153 Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) which MUST belong to the network 154 operator in order to avoid ambiguity. The same PvD ID MAY be used in 155 several access networks when the set of configuration information is 156 identical (e.g. in all home networks subscribed to the same service). 158 3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements 160 This document introduces a new Router Advertisement (RA) option 161 called the PvD ID Router Advertisement Option, used to convey the 162 FQDN identifying a given PvD. 164 0 1 2 3 165 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 166 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 167 | Type | Length |H|L| Reserved | 168 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 169 | Sequence | ... 170 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ PvD ID FQDN ... 171 ... ... 172 ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 173 ... | Padding | 174 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 176 PvD ID Router Advertisements Option format 178 Type : (8 bits) To be defined by IANA. 180 Length : (8 bits) The length of the option (including the Type 181 and Length fields) in units of 8 octets. 183 H-flag : (1 bit) Whether some PvD Additional Information is 184 made available through HTTP over TLS, as described in Section 4. 186 L-flag : (1 bit) Whether the router is also providing IPv4 187 access using DHCPv4 (see Section 3.3.2). 189 Reserved : (14 bits) Reserved for later use. It MUST be set to 190 zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver. 192 Sequence : (16 bits) Sequence number for the PvD Additional 193 Information, as described in Section 4. 195 PvD ID FQDN : An ASCII string representation of the FQDN used as 196 PvD ID. The string ends at the first byte set to zero, or the end 197 of the option, whichever comes first. 199 Padding : Zero or more padding octets such as to set the option 200 length (Type and Length fields included) to eight times the value 201 of the Length field. It MUST be set to zero by the sender and 202 ignored by the receiver. 204 Routers MUST NOT include more than one PvD ID Router Advertisement 205 Option in each RA. In case multiple PvD ID options are found in a 206 given RA, hosts MUST ignore all but the first PvD ID option. 208 Note: The existence and/or size of the sequence number is subject to 209 discussion. The validity of a PvD Additional Information object is 210 included in the object itself, but this only allows for 'pull based' 211 updates, whereas the RA options usually provide 'push based' updates. 213 3.2. Router Behavior 215 A router MAY insert at most one PvD ID Option in its RAs. The 216 included PvD ID is associated with all the other options included in 217 the same RA (e.g., Prefix Information [RFC4861], Recursive DNS Server 218 [RFC6106], Routing Information [RFC4191] options). 220 In order to provide multiple independent PvDs, a router MUST send 221 multiple RAs using different source link-local addresses (LLA) (as 222 proposed in [I-D.bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming]), each of 223 which MAY include a PvD ID option. In such cases, routers MAY 224 originate the different RAs using the same datalink layer address. 226 If the router is actually a VRRP instance [RFC5798], then the 227 procedure is identical except that the virtual datalink layer address 228 is used as well as the virtual IPv6 addresses. 230 3.3. Host Behavior 232 RAs are used to configure IPv6 hosts. When a host receives an RA 233 message including a PvD ID Option, it MUST associate all the 234 configuration objects which are updated by the received RA (e.g., 235 Prefix Information [RFC4861], Recursive DNS Server [RFC6106], Routing 236 Information [RFC4191] options) with the PvD identified by the PvD ID 237 Option, even if some objects are already ssociated with a different 238 explicit or implicit PvD. 240 If the received RA does not include a PvD ID Option, the host MUST 241 associate the configuration objects which are updated by the received 242 RA with an implicit PvD, even if some objects were already associated 243 with a different explicit or implicit PvD. This implicit PvD is 244 identified by the link-local address of the router sending the RA and 245 the interface on which the RA was received. 247 This document does not update the way Router Advertisement options 248 are processed. But in addition to the option processing defined in 249 other documents, hosts implementing this specification MUST associate 250 each created or updated object (e.g. address, default route, more 251 specific route, DNS server list) with the PvD associated with the 252 received RA. 254 Note: There is a discussion whether there can be multiple implicit 255 PvDs on a single interface (i.e. whether the router link-local 256 address should be used to identify the implicit PvDs). 258 While resolving names, executing the default address selection 259 algorithm [RFC6724] or executing the default router selection 260 algorithm ([RFC2461], [RFC4191] and [RFC8028]), hosts MAY consider 261 only the configuration associated with an arbitrary set of PvDs. 263 For example, a host MAY associate a given process with a specific 264 PvD, or a specific set of PvDs, while associating another process 265 with another PvD. A PvD-aware application might also be able to 266 select, on a per-connection basis, which PvDs should be used for a 267 given connection. In particular, constrained devices such as small 268 battery operated devices (e.g. IoT), or devices with limited CPU or 269 memory resources may purposefully use a single PvD while ignoring 270 some received RAs containing different PvD IDs. 272 The way an application expresses its desire to use a given PvD, or a 273 set of PvDs, or the way this selection is enforced, is out of the 274 scope of this document. Useful insights about these considerations 275 can be found in [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs]. 277 3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association 279 When a host retrieves configuration elements using DHCPv6, they MUST 280 be associated with the explicit or implicit PvD of the RA received on 281 the same interface, using the same link-local address, and with the 282 O-flag set [RFC4861]. If no such PvD is found, or whenever multiple 283 different PvDs are found, the host behavior is unspecified. 285 This process requires hosts to keep track of received RAs, associated 286 PvD IDs, and routers link-local addresses. 288 3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association 290 When a host retrieves configuration elements from DHCPv4, they MUST 291 be associated with the explicit PvD received on the same interface, 292 whose PVD ID Options L-flag is set and, in the case of a non point- 293 to-point link, using the same link-layer address. If no such PvD is 294 found, or whenever multiple different PvDs are found, the 295 configuration elements coming from DHCPv4 MUST be associated with an 296 IPv4-only implicit PvD identified by the interface on which the 297 DHCPv4 transaction happened. 299 3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host 301 The situation when a host becomes also a router by acting as a router 302 or ND proxy on a different interface (such as WiFi) to share the 303 connectivity of another interface (such as cellular), also known as 304 "tethering" is TBD but it is expected that the one or several PvD 305 associated to the shared interface will also be advertised to the 306 clients. 308 4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information 310 Once a new PvD ID is discovered, it may be used to retrieve 311 additional information about the characteristics of the provided 312 connectivity. This set of information is called PvD Additional 313 Information, and is encoded as a JSON object [RFC7159]. 315 The purpose of this additional set of information is to securely 316 provide additional information to hosts about the connectivity that 317 is provided using a given interface and source address pair. It 318 typically includes data that would be considered too large, or not 319 critical enough, to be provided within an RA option. The information 320 contained in this object MAY be used by the operating system, network 321 libraries, applications, or users, in order to decide which set of 322 PvDs should be used for which connection, as described in 323 Section 3.3. 325 4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information 327 When the H-flag of the PvD ID Option is set, hosts MAY attempt to 328 retrieve the PvD Additional Information associated with a given PvD 329 by performing an HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] GET query to https:///.well-known/pvd [RFC5785]. Inversely, hosts MUST NOT do so 331 whenever the H-flag is not set. 333 Note: Should the PvD AI retrieval be a MAY or a SHOULD ? Could the 334 object contain critical data, or should it only contain informational 335 data ? 336 Note that the DNS name resolution of as well as the actual 337 query MUST be performed using the PvD associated with the PvD ID. In 338 other words, the name resolution, source address selection, as well 339 as the next-hop router selection MUST be performed while using 340 exclusively the set of configuration information attached with the 341 PvD, as defined in Section 3.3. In some cases, it may therefore be 342 necessary to wait for an address to be available for use (e.g., once 343 the Duplicate Address Detection or DHCPv6 processes are complete) 344 before initiating the HTTP over TLS query. 346 If the HTTP status of the answer is greater than or equal to 400 the 347 host MUST abandon and consider that there is no additional PvD 348 information. If the HTTP status of the answer is between 300 349 included and 399 included it MUST follow the redirection(s). If the 350 HTTP status of the answer is between 200 included and 299 included 351 the host MAY get a file containing a single JSON object. When a JSON 352 object could not be retrieved, an error message SHOULD be logged and/ 353 or displayed in a rate-limited fashion. 355 After retrieval of the PvD Additional Information, hosts MUST watch 356 the PvD ID Sequence field for change. In case a different value than 357 the one in the RA Sequence field is observed, or whenever the 358 validity time included in the PVD Additional Information JSON object 359 is expired, hosts MUST either perform a new query and retrieve a new 360 version of the object, or deprecate the object and stop using it. 362 Hosts retrieving a new PvD Additional Information object MUST check 363 for the presence and validity of the mandatory fields Section 4.3. A 364 retrieved object including an outdated expiration time or missing a 365 mandatory element MUST be ignored. In order to avoid traffic spikes 366 toward the server hosting the PvD Additional Information when an 367 object expires, a host which last retrieved an object at a time A, 368 including a validity time B, SHOULD renew the object at a uniformly 369 random time in the interval [(B-A)/2,A]. 371 The PvD Additional Information object includes a set of IPv6 prefixes 372 which MUST be checked against all the Prefix Information Options 373 advertised in the Router Advertisement. If any of the prefixes 374 included in the Prefix Information Options is not included in at 375 least one of the listed prefixes, the PvD associated with the tested 376 prefix MUST be considered unsafe and MUST NOT be used. While this 377 does not prevent a malicious network provider, it does complicate 378 some attack scenarios, and may help detecting misconfiguration. 380 The server providing the JSON files SHOULD also check whether the 381 client address is part of the prefixes listed into the additional 382 information and SHOULD return a 403 response code if there is no 383 match. The server MAY also use the client address to select the 384 right JSON object to be returned. 386 4.2. Providing the PvD Additional Information 388 Whenever the H-flag is set in the PvD RA Option, a valid PvD 389 Additional Information object MUST be made available to all hosts 390 receiving the RA. In particular, when a captive portal is present, 391 hosts MUST still be allowed to access the object, even before logging 392 into the captive portal. 394 Routers MAY increment the PVD ID Sequence number in order to inform 395 host that a new PvD Additional Information object is available and 396 should be retrieved. 398 4.3. PvD Additional Information Format 400 The PvD Additional Information is a JSON object. 402 The following array presents the mandatory keys which MUST be 403 included in the object: 405 +----------+-------------------+-----------+------------------------+ 406 | JSON key | Description | Type | Example | 407 +----------+-------------------+-----------+------------------------+ 408 | name | Human-readable | UTF-8 | "Awesome Wifi" | 409 | | service name | string | | 410 | expires | Date after which | [RFC3339] | "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z" | 411 | | this object is | | | 412 | | not valid | | | 413 | prefixes | Array of IPv6 | Array of | ["2001:db8:1::/48", | 414 | | prefixes valid | strings | "2001:db8:4::/48"] | 415 | | for this PVD | | | 416 +----------+-------------------+-----------+------------------------+ 418 A retrieved object which does not include a valid string associated 419 with the "name" key at the root of the object, or a valid date 420 associated with the "expiration" key, also at the root of the object, 421 MUST be ignored. In such cases, an error message SHOULD be logged 422 and/or displayed in a rate-limited fashion. 424 The following table presents some optional keys which MAY be included 425 in the object. 427 +-----------------+-----------------------+---------+---------------+ 428 | JSON key | Description | Type | Example | 429 +-----------------+-----------------------+---------+---------------+ 430 | localizedName | Localized user- | UTF-8 | "Wifi Genial" | 431 | | visible service name, | string | | 432 | | language can be | | | 433 | | selected based on the | | | 434 | | HTTP Accept-Language | | | 435 | | header in the | | | 436 | | request. | | | 437 | noInternet | No Internet, set when | boolean | true | 438 | | the PvD only provides | | | 439 | | restricted access to | | | 440 | | a set of services. | | | 441 | characteristics | Connectivity | JSON | See Section | 442 | | characteristics | object | 4.3.1 | 443 | metered | metered, when the | boolean | false | 444 | | access volume is | | | 445 | | limited. | | | 446 +-----------------+-----------------------+---------+---------------+ 448 It is worth noting that the JSON format allows for extensions. 449 Whenever an unknown key is encountered, it MUST be ignored along with 450 its associated elements. 452 4.3.1. Connectivity Characteristics Information 454 The following set of keys can be used to signal certain 455 characteristics of the connection towards the PvD. 457 They should reflect characteristics of the overall access technology 458 which is not limited to the link the host is connected to, but rather 459 a combination of the link technology, CPE upstream connectivity, and 460 further quality of service considerations. 462 +---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+ 463 | JSON key | Description | Type | Example | 464 +---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+ 465 | maxThroughput | Maximum | object({down(int), | {"down": | 466 | | achievable | up(int)}) in kb/s | 10000, "up": | 467 | | throughput | | 5000} | 468 | minLatency | Minimum | object({down(int), | {"down": 10, | 469 | | achievable | up(int)}) in ms | "up": 20} | 470 | | latency | | | 471 | rl | Maximum | object({down(int), | {"down": | 472 | | achievable | up(int)}) in losses | 0.1, "up": | 473 | | reliability | every 1000 packets | 1} | 474 +---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+ 476 4.3.2. Private Extensions 478 JSON keys starting with "x-" are reserved for private use and can be 479 utilized to provide information that is specific to vendor, user or 480 enterprise. It is RECOMMENDED to use one of the patterns "x-FQDN- 481 KEY" or "x-PEN-KEY" where FQDN is a fully qualified domain name or 482 PEN is a private enterprise number [PEN] under control of the author 483 of the extension to avoid collisions. 485 4.3.3. Example 487 Here are two examples based on the keys defined in this section. 489 { 490 "name": "Foo Wireless", 491 "localizedName": "Foo-France Wifi", 492 "expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z", 493 "prefixes" : ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"], 494 "characteristics": { 495 "maxThroughput": { "down":200000, "up": 50000 }, 496 "minLatency": { "down": 0.1, "up": 1 } 497 } 498 } 500 { 501 "name": "Bar 4G", 502 "localizedName": "Bar US 4G", 503 "expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z", 504 "prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"], 505 "metered": true, 506 "characteristics": { 507 "maxThroughput": { "down":80000, "up": 20000 } 508 } 509 } 511 5. Security Considerations 513 Although some solutions such as IPsec or SEND [RFC3971] can be used 514 in order to secure the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, actual 515 deployments largely rely on link layer or physical layer security 516 mechanisms (e.g. 802.1x [IEEE8021X]) in conjunction with RA Guard 517 [RFC6105]. 519 This specification does not improve the Neighbor Discovery Protocol 520 security model, but extends the purely link-local configuration 521 retrieval mechanisms with HTTP-over-TLS communications. 523 During the exchange, the server authenticity is verified by the mean 524 of a certificate, validated based on the FQDN found in the Router 525 Advertisement (e.g. using a list of pre-installed CA certificates, or 526 DNSSec [RFC4035] with DNS Based Authentication of Named Entities 527 [RFC6698]). This authentication creates a secure binding between the 528 information provided by the trusted Router Advertisement, and the 529 HTTP server. But this does not mean the Advertising Router and the 530 PvD server belong to the same entity. 532 The IPv6 prefixes list included in the PvD Additional Information 533 JSON object is used to validate that the prefixes included in the 534 Router Advertisements are really part of the PvD. An adversarial 535 router willing to fake the use of a given explicit PvD, without any 536 access to the actual PvD, would need to perform NAT66 in order to 537 circumvent this check. 539 It is also RECOMMENDED that the PvD server checks the source 540 addresses of incoming connexions (see Section 4.1). This check 541 ensures that the internet access provided by any router advertising a 542 given PvD eventually reaches the internet using the actual PvD 543 (Tunneling can still be used). 545 For privacy reasons, it is desirable that the PvD Additional 546 Information object may only be retrieved by the hosts using the given 547 PvD. Host identity SHOULD be validated based on the client address 548 that is used during the HTTP query. 550 6. Privacy Considerations 552 TBD 554 7. IANA Considerations 556 IANA is kindly requested to allocate a new IPv6 Neighbor Discovery 557 option number for the PvD ID Router Advertisement option. 559 The URI used to retrieve the PvD Additional Information JSON object 560 is the well known URI (see [RFC5785]) with the URI suffix "pvd". 562 TBD: JSON keys will need a new registry. 564 8. Acknowledgements 566 Many thanks to M. Stenberg and S. Barth for their earlier work: 567 [I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns]. 569 Thanks also to Ray Bellis, Lorenzo Colitti, Thierry Danis, Marcus 570 Keane, Erik Kline, Jen Lenkova, Mark Townsley, James Woodyatt and 571 Mikael Abrahamson for useful and interesting discussions. 573 Finally, many thanks to Thierry Danis for his implementation work 574 ([github]), Tom Jones for his integration effort into the Neat 575 project and Rigil Salim for his implementation work. 577 9. References 579 9.1. Normative references 581 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 582 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 584 [RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor 585 Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 586 1998. 588 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, DOI 10.17487/ 589 RFC2818, May 2000, 590 . 592 [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, 593 "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, 594 September 2007. 596 [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 597 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 598 2014, . 600 9.2. Informative references 602 [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: 603 Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, 604 . 606 [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure 607 Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005. 609 [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 610 Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security 611 Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005, 612 . 614 [RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and 615 More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, November 2005. 617 [RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known 618 Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785, DOI 619 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010, 620 . 622 [RFC5798] Nadas, S., Ed., "Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP) 623 Version 3 for IPv4 and IPv6", RFC 5798, DOI 10.17487/ 624 RFC5798, March 2010, 625 . 627 [RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J. 628 Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105, DOI 629 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011, 630 . 632 [RFC6106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli, 633 "IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration", 634 RFC 6106, November 2010. 636 [RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication 637 of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) 638 Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August 639 2012, . 641 [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, 642 "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 643 (IPv6)", RFC 6724, September 2012. 645 [RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain 646 Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015, 647 . 649 [RFC8028] Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by 650 Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028, DOI 10.17487/ 651 RFC8028, November 2016, 652 . 654 [I-D.bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming] 655 Baker, F., Bowers, C., and J. Linkova, "Enterprise 656 Multihoming using Provider-Assigned Addresses without 657 Network Prefix Translation: Requirements and Solution", 658 draft-bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming-01 (work 659 in progress), October 2016. 661 [I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns] 662 Stenberg, M. and S. Barth, "Multiple Provisioning Domains 663 using Domain Name System", draft-stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns-00 664 (work in progress), October 2015. 666 [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs] 667 Kline, E., "Multiple Provisioning Domains API 668 Requirements", draft-kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs-00 (work in 669 progress), November 2015. 671 [PEN] IANA, "Private Enterprise Numbers", . 674 [IEEE8021X] 675 IEEE, "IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area 676 Networks: Port based Network Access Control, IEEE Std", . 678 [github] Cisco, "IPv6-mPvD github repository", . 681 Appendix A. Changelog 683 Note to RFC Editors: Remove this section before publication. 685 A.1. Version 00 687 Initial version of the draft. Edited by Basile Bruneau + Eric Vyncke 688 and based on Basile's work. 690 A.2. Version 01 692 Major rewrite intended to focus on the the retained solution based on 693 corridors, online, and WG discussions. Edited by Pierre Pfister. 694 The following list only includes major changes. 696 PvD ID is an FQDN retrieved using a single RA option. This option 697 contains a sequence number for push-based updates, a new H-flag, 698 and a L-flag in order to link the PvD with the IPv4 DHCP server. 700 A lifetime is included in the PvD ID option. 702 Detailed Hosts and Routers specifications. 704 Additional Information is retrieved using HTTP-over-TLS when the 705 PvD ID Option H-flag is set. Retrieving the object is optional. 707 The PvD Additional Information object includes a validity date. 709 DNS-based approach is removed as well as the DNS-based encoding of 710 the PvD Additional Information. 712 Major cut in the list of proposed JSON keys. This document may be 713 extended later if need be. 715 Monetary discussion is moved to the appendix. 717 Clarification about the 'prefixes' contained in the additional 718 information. 720 Clarification about the processing of DHCPv6. 722 A.3. Version 02 724 The FQDN is now encoded with ASCII format (instead of DNS binary) 725 in the RA option. 727 The PvD ID option lifetime is removed from the object. 729 Use well known URI "https:///.well-known/pvd" 731 Reference RFC3339 for JSON timestamp format. 733 The PvD ID Sequence field has been extended to 16 bits. 735 Modified host behavior for DHCPv4 and DHCPv6. 737 Removed IKEv2 section. 739 Removed mention of RFC7710 Captive Portal option. A new I.D. 740 will be proposed to address the captive portal use case. 742 Appendix B. Connection monetary cost 744 NOTE: This section is included as a request for comment on the 745 potential use and syntax. 747 The billing of a connection can be done in a lot of different ways. 748 The user can have a global traffic threshold per month, after which 749 his throughput is limited, or after which he/she pays each megabyte. 750 He/she can also have an unlimited access to some websites, or an 751 unlimited access during the weekends. 753 An option is to split the bill in elementary billings, which have 754 conditions (a start date, an end date, a destination IP address...). 755 The global billing is an ordered list of elementary billings. To 756 know the cost of a transmission, the host goes through the list, and 757 the first elementary billing whose the conditions are fulfilled gives 758 the cost. If no elementary billing conditions match the request, the 759 host MUST make no assumption about the cost. 761 B.1. Conditions 763 Here are the potential conditions for an elementary billing. All 764 conditions MUST be fulfill. 766 +-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+ 767 | Key | Description | Type | JSON Example | 768 +-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+ 769 | beginDate | Date before | ISO 8601 | "1977-04-22T06:00:00Z" | 770 | | which the | | | 771 | | billing is | | | 772 | | not valid | | | 773 | endDate | Date after | ISO 8601 | "1977-04-22T06:00:00Z" | 774 | | which the | | | 775 | | billing is | | | 776 | | not valid | | | 777 | domains | FQDNs whose | array(string) | ["deezer.com","spotify. | 778 | | the billing | | com"] | 779 | | is limited | | | 780 | prefixes4 | IPv4 | array(string) | ["78.40.123.182/32","78 | 781 | | prefixes | | .40.123.183/32"] | 782 | | whose the | | | 783 | | billing is | | | 784 | | limited | | | 785 | prefixes6 | IPv6 | array(string) | ["2a00:1450:4007:80e::2 | 786 | | prefixes | | 00e/64"] | 787 | | whose the | | | 788 | | billing is | | | 789 | | limited | | | 790 +-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+ 792 B.2. Price 794 Here are the different possibilities for the cost of an elementary 795 billing. A missing key means "all/unlimited/unrestricted". If the 796 elementary billing selected has a trafficRemaining of 0 kb, then it 797 means that the user has no access to the network. Actually, if the 798 last elementary billing has a trafficRemaining parameter, it means 799 that when the user will reach the threshold, he/she will not have 800 access to the network anymore. 802 +------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+ 803 | Key | Description | Type | JSON Example | 804 +------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+ 805 | pricePerGb | The price per | float | 2 | 806 | | Gigabit | (currency | | 807 | | | per Gb) | | 808 | currency | The currency | ISO 4217 | "EUR" | 809 | | used | | | 810 | throughputMax | The maximum | float (kb/s) | 100000 | 811 | | achievable | | | 812 | | throughput | | | 813 | trafficRemaining | The traffic | float (kB) | 12000000 | 814 | | remaining | | | 815 +------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+ 817 B.3. Examples 819 Example for a user with 20 GB per month for 40 EUR, then reach a 820 threshold, and with unlimited data during weekends and to 821 example.com: 823 [ 824 { 825 "domains": ["example.com"] 826 }, 827 { 828 "prefixes4": ["78.40.123.182/32","78.40.123.183/32"] 829 }, 830 { 831 "beginDate": "2016-07-16T00:00:00Z", 832 "endDate": "2016-07-17T23:59:59Z", 833 }, 834 { 835 "beginDate": "2016-06-20T00:00:00Z", 836 "endDate": "2016-07-19T23:59:59Z", 837 "trafficRemaining": 12000000 838 }, 839 { 840 "throughputMax": 100000 841 } 842 ] 844 If the host tries to download data from example.com, the conditions 845 of the first elementary billing are fulfilled, so the host takes this 846 elementary billing, finds no cost indication in it and so deduces 847 that it is totally free. If the host tries to exchange data with 848 foobar.com and the date is 2016-07-14T19:00:00Z, the conditions of 849 the first, second and third elementary billing are not fulfilled. 851 But the conditions of the fourth are. So the host takes this 852 elementary billing and sees that there is a threshold, 12 GB are 853 remaining. 855 Another example for a user abroad, who has 3 GB per year abroad, and 856 then pay each MB: 858 [ 859 { 860 "beginDate": "2016-02-10T00:00:00Z", 861 "endDate": "2017-02-09T23:59:59Z", 862 "trafficRemaining": 3000000 863 }, 864 { 865 "pricePerGb": 30, 866 "currency": "EUR" 867 } 868 ] 870 Authors' Addresses 872 Pierre Pfister (editor) 873 Cisco 874 11 Rue Camille Desmoulins 875 Issy-les-Moulineaux 92130 876 France 878 Email: ppfister@cisco.com 880 David Schinazi 881 Apple 883 Email: dschinazi@apple.com 885 Tommy Pauly 886 Apple 888 Email: tpauly@apple.com 889 Eric Vyncke 890 Cisco 891 De Kleetlaan, 6 892 Diegem 1831 893 Belgium 895 Email: evyncke@cisco.com 897 Basile Bruneau 898 Ecole Polytechnique 899 Vannes 56000 900 France 902 Email: basile.bruneau@polytechnique.edu