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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 dnsop Randy Bush 2 INTERNET-DRAFT Verio 3 draft-bush-dnsop-root-opreq-01.txt Daniel Karrenberg 4 June 1999 RIPE/NCC 5 Mark Kosters 6 Network Solutions 7 Raymond Plzak 8 SAIC 10 Root Name Server Operational Requirements 12 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. 14 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with 15 all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 except that the right to 16 produce derivative works is not granted. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 0. Abstract 36 As the internet becomes increasingly critical to the world's social 37 and economic infrastructure, attention has rightly focused on the 38 correct, safe, reliable, and secure operation of the internet 39 infrastructure itself. The root domain name servers are seen as a 40 crucial part of that technical infrastructure. The primary focus of 41 this document is to provide guidelines for operation of the root name 42 servers. Other major zone server operators (gTLDs, ccTLDs, major 43 zones) may also find it useful. These guidelines are intended to 44 meet the perceived societal needs without overly prescribing 45 technical details. 47 INTERNET-DRAFT Root Name Server Operational Requirements 99.06.05 49 1. Background 51 The resolution of domain names on the internet is critically 52 dependent on the proper, safe, and secure operation of the root 53 domain name servers. Currently, these dozen or so servers are 54 provided and operated by a very competent and trusted group of 55 volunteers. This document does not propose to change that, but 56 merely to provide formal guidelines so that the community understands 57 how and why this is done. 59 1.1 The ICANN has become responsible for the operation of the root 60 servers. The ICANN has appointed a Root Server System Advisory 61 Committee (RSSAC) to give technical and operational advice to the 62 ICANN board. The ICANN and the RSSAC look to the IETF to provide 63 engineering standards. 65 1.2 The root servers serve the root, aka 'dot', zone. Although today 66 some of the root servers also serve some TLDs (top level domains) 67 such as gTLDs (COM, NET, ORG, etc.), infrastructural TLDs such as 68 INT and IN-ADDR.ARPA, and some ccTLDs (country code TLDs, e.g. SE 69 for Sweden), this is likely to change (see 2.5). 71 1.3 The root servers are neither involved with nor dependent upon the 72 'whois' data. 74 1.4 The domain name system has proven to be sufficiently robust that 75 we are confident that the, presumably temporary, loss of most of 76 the root servers should not significantly affect operation of the 77 internet. 79 1.5 Experience has shown that the internet is quite vulnerable to 80 incorrect data in the root zone or TLDs. Hence authentication, 81 validation, and security of these data are of great concern. 83 2. The Servers Themselves 85 The following are requirements for the technical details of the root 86 servers themselves: 88 2.1 It would be short-sighted of this document to specify particular 89 hardware, operating systems, or name serving software. 90 Variations in these areas would actually add overall robustness. 92 INTERNET-DRAFT Root Name Server Operational Requirements 99.06.05 94 2.2 Each server MUST run software which correctly implements the IETF 95 standards for the DNS, currently [RFC1035] [RFC2181]. While 96 there are no formal test suites for standards compliance, the 97 maintainers of software used on root servers are expected to take 98 all reasonable actions to conform to the IETF's then current 99 documented expectations. 101 2.3 At any time, each server MUST be able to handle a load of 102 requests for root data which is three times the measured peak of 103 such requests on the most loaded server in then current normal 104 conditions. This is usually expressed in requests per second. 105 This is intended to ensure continued operation of root services 106 should two thirds of the servers be taken out of operation, 107 whether by intent, accident, or malice. 109 2.4 Each root server should have sufficient connectivity to the 110 internet to support the bandwidth needs of the above requirement. 111 Connectivity to the internet SHOULD be as diverse as possible. 113 Root servers SHOULD have mechanisms in place to accept IP 114 connectivity to the root server from any internet provider 115 delivering connectivity at their own cost. 117 2.5 Servers MUST provide authoritative responses only from the zones 118 they serve. The servers MUST disable recursive lookup, 119 forwarding, or any other function that may allow them to provide 120 cached answers. They also MUST NOT provide secondary service for 121 any zones other than the root and root-servers.net zones. These 122 restrictions help prevent undue load on the root servers and 123 reduce the chance of their caching incorrect data. 125 2.6 Root servers MUST answer queries from any internet host, i.e. may 126 not block root name resolution from any valid IP address, except 127 in the case of queries causing operational problems, in which 128 case the blocking SHOULD last only as long as the problem, and be 129 as specific as reasonably possible. 131 2.7 Root servers MUST NOT answer AXFR, or other zone transfer, 132 queries from clients other than other root servers. This 133 restriction is intended to, among other things, prevent 134 unnecessary load on the root servers. 136 2.8 Servers MUST generate checksums when sending UDP datagrams and 137 MUST verify checksums when receiving UDP datagrams. 139 INTERNET-DRAFT Root Name Server Operational Requirements 99.06.05 141 3. Security Considerations 143 The servers need both physical and protocol security as well as 144 unambiguous authentication of their responses. 146 3.1 Physical security MUST be ensured in a manner expected of data 147 centers critical to a major enterprise. 149 3.1.1 Whether or not the overall site in which a root server is 150 located has access control, the specific area in which the 151 root server is located MUST have positive access control, 152 i.e. the number of individuals permitted access to the area 153 MUST be limited, controlled, and recorded. At a minimum, 154 control measures SHOULD be either mechanical or electronic 155 locks. Physical security MAY be enhanced by the use of 156 intrusion detection and motion sensors, multiple serial 157 access points, security personnel, etc. 159 3.1.2 Unless there is documentable experience that the local 160 power grid is more reliable than the MTBF of a UPS (i.e. 161 five to ten years), power continuity for at least 48 hours 162 MUST be assured, whether through on-site batteries, on-site 163 power generation, or some combination thereof. This MUST 164 supply the server itself, as well as the infrastructure 165 necessary to connect the server to the internet. There 166 MUST be procedures which ensure that power fallback 167 mechanisms and supplies are tested no less frequently than 168 the specifications and recommendations of the maufacturer. 170 3.1.3 Fire detection and/or retardation MUST be provided. 172 3.1.4 Provision MUST be made for rapid return to operation after 173 an system outage. This SHOULD involve backup of systems 174 software and configuration. But SHOULD also involve backup 175 hardware which is pre-configured and ready to take over 176 operation, which MAY require manual procedures. 178 3.2 Network security should be of the level provided for critical 179 infrastructure of a major commercial enterprise. 181 INTERNET-DRAFT Root Name Server Operational Requirements 99.06.05 183 3.2.1 The root servers themselves MUST NOT provide services other 184 than root name service e.g. remote internet protocols such 185 as http, telnet, rlogin, ftp, etc. The only login accounts 186 permitted should be for the server administrator(s). 187 "Root" or "privileged user" access MUST NOT be permitted 188 except through an intermediate user account. If remote 189 access is required for administration and maintenance then 190 the login MUST be protected by a secure means that is 191 strongly authenticated and encrypted. 193 3.2.2 Root name servers SHOULD NOT trust other hosts, except 194 secondary servers trusting the primary server, for matters 195 of authentication, encryption keys, or other access or 196 security information. Trusted key servers for Kerberos, 197 IPSEC, etc, MUST be protected with the same prudence as the 198 root servers. 200 3.2.3 The LAN segment(s) on which a root server is homed MUST NOT 201 also home crackable hosts. I.e. the LAN segments should be 202 switched or routed so there is no possibility of 203 masquerading. 205 3.2.4 The LAN segment(s) on which a root server is homed SHOULD 206 be separately firewalled or packet filtered to discourage 207 network access to any port other than those needed for name 208 service. 210 3.2.5 The root servers SHOULD have their clocks synchronized via 211 NTP [RFC1305] [RFC2030] or similar mechanisms. For this 212 purpose, servers and their associated firewalls SHOULD 213 allow the root servers to be NTP clients. Root servers 214 MUST NOT act as NTP peers or servers. 216 3.2.6 All attempts at intrusion or other compromise SHOULD be 217 logged, and all such logs from all root servers SHOULD be 218 analysed by a cooperative security team communicating with 219 all server operators to look for patterns, serious 220 attempts, etc. Servers SHOULD log in GMT to facilitate log 221 comparison. 223 3.2.7 Server logging SHOULD be to separate hosts which SHOULD be 224 protected similarly to the root servers themselves. 226 3.2.8 The server SHOULD be protected from attacks based on source 227 routing. 229 3.2.9 The network on which the server is homed SHOULD have in- 230 addr.arpa service. 232 INTERNET-DRAFT Root Name Server Operational Requirements 99.06.05 234 3.3 Protocol authentication and security are required to ensure that 235 data presented by the root servers are those created by those 236 authorized to maintain the root zone data. 238 3.3.1 The root zone MUST be signed by the IANA in accordance with 239 DNSSEC, see [RFC2535] or its replacements. It is 240 understood that DNSSEC is not yet deployable on some common 241 platforms, but will be deployed when supported. 243 3.3.2 Root servers MUST be DNSSEC-capable so that queries may be 244 authenticated by clients with security and authentication 245 concerns. It is understood that DNSSEC is not yet 246 deployable on some common platforms, but will be deployed 247 when supported. 249 3.3.3 Transfer of the root zone between root servers MUST be 250 authenticated and be as secure as reasonably possible. 251 Servers MUST use DNSSEC to authenticate root zones received 252 from other servers. It is understood that DNSSEC is not 253 yet deployable on some common platforms, but will be 254 deployed when supported. 256 3.3.4 A 'hidden primary' server, which only allows access by the 257 authorized secondary root servers, MAY be used. 259 3.3.5 Root zone updates SHOULD only progress after a number of 260 heuristic checks designed to detect erroneous updates have 261 been passed. In case the update fails the tests, human 262 intervention MUST be requested. 264 3.3.6 Root zone updates SHOULD normally be effective no later 265 than 6 hours from notification of the root server operator. 267 3.3.7 A special procedure for emergency updates SHOULD be 268 defined. Updates initiated by the emergency procedure 269 SHOULD be made no later than 12 hours after notification. 271 3.3.8 In the advent of a critical network failure, each root 272 server MUST have a method to update the root zone data via 273 a medium which is delivered through an alternative, non- 274 network, path. 276 3.3.9 Each root MUST keep global statistics on the amount and 277 types of queries received/answered on a daily basis. These 278 statistics must be made available to RSSAC and RSSAC 279 sponsored researchers to help determine how to better 280 deploy these machines more efficiently across the internet. 281 Each root MAY collect data snapshots to help determine data 283 INTERNET-DRAFT Root Name Server Operational Requirements 99.06.05 285 points such as DNS query storms, significant implementation 286 bugs, etc. 288 4. Communications 290 Communications and coordination between root server operators and 291 between the operators and the IANA and and ICANN are necessary. 293 4.1 Planned outages and other down times SHOULD be coordinated 294 between root server operators to ensure that a significant number 295 of the root servers are not all down at the same time. 296 Preannouncement of planned outages also keeps other operators 297 from wasting time wondering about any anomalies. 299 4.2 Root server operators SHOULD coordinate backup timing so that 300 many servers are not off-line being backed up at the same time. 301 Backups SHOULD be frequently transferred off site. 303 4.3 Root server operators SHOULD exchange log files, particularly as 304 they relate to security, loading, and other significant events. 305 This MAY be through a central log coordination point, or MAY be 306 informal. 308 4.4 Statistics as they concern usage rates, loading, and resource 309 utilization SHOULD be exchanged between operators, and MUST be 310 reported to the IANA for planning and reporting purposes. 312 4.5 Root name server administrative personnel MUST be available to 313 provide service 24 hours a day, 7 days per week. On call 314 personnel MAY be used to provide this service outside of normal 315 working hours. 317 5. Acknowledgments 319 The authors would like to thank Scott Bradner, Robert Elz, Chris 320 Fletcher, and John Klensin for their constructive comments. 322 6. References 324 [RFC1035] 325 Domain names - implementation and specification. P.V. Mockapetris. 326 Nov 1987. 328 [RFC1305] 329 Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification, Implementation. 330 David L. Mills. Mar 1992 332 INTERNET-DRAFT Root Name Server Operational Requirements 99.06.05 334 [RFC2030] 335 Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4 for IPv4, IPv6 and 336 OSI. D. Mills. Oct 1996. 338 [RFC2181] 339 Clarifications to the DNS Specification. R. Elz, R. Bush. Jul 340 1997. 342 [RFC2535] 343 Domain Name System Security Extensions. D. Eastlake, 3rd, C. Kauf- 344 man. Mar 1999. 346 7. Authors' Addresses 348 Randy Bush 349 5147 Crystal Springs 350 Bainbridge Island, WA US-98110 351 +1 206 780 0431 352 randy@psg.com 354 Daniel Karrenberg 355 RIPE Network Coordination Centre (NCC) 356 Singel 258 357 NL-1016-AB Amsterdam 358 Netherlands 359 EMail: dfk@ripe.net 361 Mark Kosters 362 Network Solutions 363 505 Huntmar Park Drive 364 Herndon, VA 22070-5100 365 +1 703 742 0400 366 markk@internic.net 368 Raymond Plzak 369 SAIC 370 1710 Goodridge Drive 371 McLean, Virginia 22102 372 +1 703 821 6535 373 plzakr@saic.com 375 8. Specification of Requirements 377 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 378 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 379 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 381 INTERNET-DRAFT Root Name Server Operational Requirements 99.06.05 383 9. Full Copyright Statement 385 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. 387 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, 388 and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in 389 its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in 390 whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above 391 copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and 392 derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any 393 way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet 394 Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of 395 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights 396 defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required 397 to translate it into languages other than English. 399 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked 400 by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. 402 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" 403 basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 404 DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO 405 ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY 406 RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A 407 PARTICULAR PURPOSE.