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Please use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is what you mean). Found 'MUST not' in this paragraph: For deploying RFA authentication method, generated fingerprints MUST not be truncated to make those short as to preserve the relevant properties of the hash function against brute-force search attacks. -- The document date (February 25, 2013) is 4071 days in the past. Is this intentional? 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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Working Group U. Chunduri 3 Internet-Draft A. Tian 4 Intended status: Informational A. Keranen 5 Expires: August 29, 2013 Ericsson 6 February 25, 2013 8 KARP KMP: Simplified Peer Authentication 9 draft-chunduri-karp-kmp-router-fingerprints-02 11 Abstract 13 This document describes the usage of Router Fingerprint 14 Authentication (RFA) with public keys as a potential peer 15 authentication method with KARP pair wise and group Key Management 16 Protocols (KMPs). The advantage of RFA is, it neither requires out- 17 of-band, mutually agreeable symmetric keys nor a full PKI based 18 system (trust anchor or CA certificates) for mutual authentication of 19 peers with KARP KMP deployments. Usage of Router Fingerprints give a 20 significant operational improvement from symmetric key based systems 21 and yet provide a secure authentication technique. 23 Status of this Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2013. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 1.2. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 2. Router Fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 3. Usage of Router Fingerprints with KARP KMP . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 3.1. Impact on the PAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 4. Publishing Router Fingerprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 5. Scope of Fingerprints usage with RPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 6. Fingerprint Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 66 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 68 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 10. Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 70 10.1. Applicable Authentications methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 10.1.1. Symmetric key based authentication . . . . . . . . . 8 72 10.1.2. Asymmetric key based authentication . . . . . . . . . 9 73 10.1.3. EAP based authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 74 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 75 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 76 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 77 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 79 1. Introduction 81 Usage of IKEv2[RFC5996] as the KMP for with specific extensions for 82 pair wise routing protocols (RPs) is described in [mahesh-karp-rkmp]. 83 Also IKEv2 based KMP for group keying RPs is described in [hartman- 84 karp-mrkmp]. With proliferation of authentication methods supported 85 by IKEv2, this draft explores a simple and secure peer authentication 86 method, which can be potentially used for all KARP KMP deployments. 88 Currently operators don't often change the manual keys deployed for 89 protecting RP messages because of various reasons as noted in Section 90 2.3 of KARP threat document [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs]. One of the 91 KARP WG goals is to define methods to support key changes for all RPs 92 which use either Manual Key Management (MKM) or KMP without much 93 operational overhead. 95 Apart from Peer's identity verification, authentication and parameter 96 negotiation, deployment of KMP can be more useful, when it comes to 97 rekey the keys used by RPs. Rekeying can be achieved without the 98 operator's intervention and as per the provisioned rekey policy. But 99 for operators, usage of IKEv2 KMP opens up numerous possibilities for 100 peer authentication and manual symmetric keys are not only used for 101 bootstrapping KMP, but used for peer authentication. Various other 102 peer authentication mechanisms with advantages/drawbacks of each 103 mechanism are described in the Section 10.1 of this document. 105 If symmetric pre-shared keys are used by IKEv2 KMP to authenticate 106 the peer before generating the shared key(s); apart from other issues 107 with symmetric keys, the problem still remain the same when it comes 108 to changing these keys. 110 To reduce operational costs for changing keys at peering points with 111 relatively large number of RP peers, this document describes the use 112 of one of the available IKEv2 KMP peer authentication methods with 113 raw public keys. The hash of these encoded public keys is called as 114 Router Fingerprints and the authentication method is called Router 115 Fingerprint Authentication (RFA) in rest of the document. The RFA 116 method in conjunction with KARP KMPs require, neither out-of-band 117 symmetric keys nor a fully functional PKI based system with trust 118 anchor certificates as explained further in Section 2. 120 Section 2 describes the Router Fingerprints in the context of various 121 KMPs and specifically for IKEv2 KMP. Generation and usage of the 122 Router Fingerprints is described in Section 3 and Section 4 describes 123 a reliable method for publishing the Router Fingerprints. 125 1.1. Requirements Language 127 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 128 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 129 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 131 1.2. Acronyms 133 CRL - Certificate Revocation List. 135 EBGP - External BGP (BGP connection between external peers). 137 EE - End Entity. 139 IBGP - Internal BGP (BGP connection between internal peers). 141 KMP - Key Management Protocol (auto key management). 143 MKM - Manual Key management Protocols. 145 PAD - Peer Authorization Database. 147 RFA - Router Fingerprint Authentication. 149 RP - Routing Protocol. 151 2. Router Fingerprint 153 Router Fingerprint is a sequence of bytes used to authenticate the 154 public key before using the same public key to authenticate the peer 155 in the context of KARP KMP. 157 Various forms of fingerprint mechanisms based on the public keys are 158 already in use as defined in [RFC4252] and [RFC4253]. Fingerprints 159 are also used primarily for root key authentication in X.509 based 160 PKI [RFC5280]. This documents only highlights the usage of raw 161 public key based authentication mechanism already defined in 162 [RFC5996] for KARP deployments. 164 To generate a fingerprint: 166 1. A router needs to generate an asymmetric Private/Public key pair. 167 Asymmetric crypto algorithms based on RSA [RFC3447] or for 168 shorter and still secure keys Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 169 [RFC4492] can be used for generating the Private/Public key pair. 171 2. Once the Asymmetric key pair is generated, the public key can be 172 encoded with any additional data (specific to the router or 173 routing instance) and can be in the form of more easily 174 administrable X.509 PKI Certificate profile and to be specific as 175 specified in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure in Section 4.1 of 176 [RFC5280]. This does not force use of X.509 or full compliance 177 with [RFC5280] since formatting any public key as a 178 SubjectPublicKeyInfo is relatively straightforward and well 179 supported by libraries. 181 3. The result should be hashed with a cryptographic hash function, 182 preferably SHA-256 or hash functions with similar strength (see 183 more discussion on choosing preferred hash function in 184 Section 8). 186 The fingerprint generated is not a secret and can be distributed 187 publicly. This is further discussed in Section 4. 189 3. Usage of Router Fingerprints with KARP KMP 191 To use Router Fingerprints authentication with KARP KMP, a Private/ 192 Public key-pair MUST be generated by the router as specified in 193 Section 2. With current specification [RFC5996] when sender needs to 194 get the certificate of the receiver, Certificate Request payload 195 CERTREQ as specified in [RFC5996] is sent with cert encoding set to 196 "Raw RSA Key" and Certification Authority field is empty. The 197 receiver of this CERTREQ payload, (currently) uses PKCS #1 encoding 198 for the generated RSA Public Key and sends the same in CERT payload 199 as Certificate Data with Certificate Encoding set to "Raw RSA Key" as 200 described in Section 3.6 of IKEv2 [RFC5996]. Once the public key of 201 the sender is received, verification is done with the already 202 published/stored fingerprints of the sender. To deploy RFA method 203 more widely - 205 1. type of public keys supported should be generic; for e.g., 206 support for raw Elliptic Curve public keys and 208 2. more generic encoding formats should be supported for carrying 209 the raw public keys other than currently defined PKCS #1. 211 [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-oob-pubkey] enhances support for other types of 212 public keys and also defines new encoding format to carry the public 213 key fingerprint in the CERT payload. For RPs to use Router 214 Fingerprint Authentication in the context of IKEv2 MUST follow the 215 encoding format as specified in [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-oob-pubkey]. 217 3.1. Impact on the PAD 219 The Peer Authorization Database (PAD) and the role it plays in peer 220 authentication is defined in section 4.4.3 of [RFC4301]. One of the 221 functions of the PAD is to provide the authentication data for each 222 peer. [RFC4301] supports X.509 certificate or pre-shared secret 223 authentication data types but commonly there are also other 224 authentication methods implemented (i.e. EAP and raw public keys/ 225 fingerprints). For RFA, the public key received is in the form of 226 SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure of X.509 PKI profile and the PAD entry 227 MUST contain the published fingerprint of the peer. 229 4. Publishing Router Fingerprints 231 The router fingerprint generated is not a secret and can be exchanged 232 out-of-band or can be distributed publicly. Please refer to 233 Section 5 for the generic usage and scope of the RFA in routing 234 environments. In the case of inter-domain routing using EBGP 235 [RFC4271], if the routers are outside of the SIDR [I-D.ietf-sidr- 236 bgpsec-overview] environment, fingerprint can also be exchanged out- 237 of-band through Service Level Agreements (SLAs) at the RP peering 238 points. 240 [farrell-decade-ni] defines a "Named Information" identifier, which 241 provides a set of standard ways to use hash function outputs in 242 names. As there are many ways to publish fingerprints in an 243 unambiguous manner (e.g., as defined in Section 5 of [RFC4572]); on 244 the WG consensus, KARP deployments MUST use the method described in 245 [farrell-decade-ni] for interoperability. A KARP KMP deployment 246 using router fingerprints need to resort to out-of-band public key 247 validation procedure to verify authenticity of the keys being used. 248 The router fingerprints MUST be part of the KMP PAD to validate the 249 public key received in the KMP messages. 251 5. Scope of Fingerprints usage with RPs 253 The fingerprint method described in this document in general is more 254 suitable for intra domain deployments. This includes KMP usage for 255 e.g., for IBGP [RFC4271] and LDP [RFC5036] peers, where KARP KMP can 256 be deployed without having to configure either manual pre-shared keys 257 to bootstrap KMP or full PKI with trust anchor certificates. Also 258 KMPs for group keying RPs can use this method for authenticating the 259 peers in the group. This method also can be potentially used between 260 EBGP [RFC4271] speakers outside of the SIDR ([I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec- 261 overview]) deployment scope, where full PKI infrastructure is not 262 available to deploy with KARP KMP and at the same time, still 263 operators want to avoid provisioning manual keys. 265 6. Fingerprint Revocation 267 The idea of RFA in the context of KARP KMP is to deploy a better 268 authentication method than the mutually shared symmetric keys between 269 two routers. This SHOULD be used especially where number of peers 270 using this method is relatively smaller and operationally manageable. 271 Any changes in the router fingerprints SHOULD be administered 272 manually by the operator. For e.g., to revoke the compromized key 273 operator simply need to remove the fingerprint from the PAD, which do 274 require and update to the PAD of all possible nodes in the network 275 where this node was talking to. Quite often those configurations are 276 already pushed to routers by some kind of managament tool, so it is 277 completly possible to do this quite easily. 279 When there are a large number of peers, the need for router 280 fingerprint changes may increase. This may be for reasons of key 281 compromises or other potential changes to the routers. In such 282 environments, operators SHOULD look to full PKI with trust anchor 283 certificates and CRL profiles as specified in the [RFC5280]. In this 284 context, RFA mechanism should be only seen as substantial improvement 285 from mutually shared manual keying authentication methods. 287 7. IANA Considerations 289 This document defines no new namespaces. 291 8. Security Considerations 293 If collision attacks are perceived as a threat, the hash function to 294 generate the fingerprints MUST also possess the property of 295 collision-resistance. To mitigate preimage attacks, the 296 cryptographic hash function used for a fingerprint MUST possess the 297 property of second preimage resistance. 299 For deploying RFA authentication method, generated fingerprints MUST 300 not be truncated to make those short as to preserve the relevant 301 properties of the hash function against brute-force search attacks. 303 Considering the above facts, it's recommended to use SHA-256 or 304 similar hash functions with good security properties to generate the 305 fingerprints. 307 9. Acknowledgements 309 The authors would like to thank Jari Arkko for initial and valuable 310 discussions on operationally simplified authentication methods in 311 general and RFA mechanism as described in this document in 312 particular. Authors would like to acknowledge Joel Halpern for 313 supporting this work and providing continuous feedback on the draft, 314 including the usefulness of this approach in routing environments. 316 10. Appendix A 318 10.1. Applicable Authentications methods 320 One advantage that IKEv2 provides is the largest selection of key 321 management and parameter coordination authentication methods suitable 322 for various environments. The goal of this section is to look at 323 various KMP authentication options available and recommend suitable 324 options for use in negotiating keys and other parameters for routing 325 protocol protection. 327 As some of the authentication mechanisms are optional in IKEv2, one 328 mandatory authentication mechanism from the list below needs to be 329 selected for routing environments to ensure inter-operability and 330 quicker adoption. This section attempts to summarize the available 331 options and constraints surrounding the options. 333 10.1.1. Symmetric key based authentication 335 IKEv2 [RFC5996] allows for authentication of the IKEv2 peers using a 336 symmetric pre-shared key. For symmetric pre-shared key peer 337 authentication, deployments need to consider the following as per 338 [RFC5996]: 340 1. Deriving a shared secret from a password, name, or other low- 341 entropy source is not secure. These sources are subject to 342 dictionary and social-engineering attacks, among others. 344 2. The pre-shared key should not be derived solely from a user- 345 chosen password without incorporating another source of 346 randomness. 348 3. If password-based authentication is used for bootstrapping the 349 IKE_SA, then one of the EAP methods as described in 350 Section 10.1.3 needs to be used. 352 One of the IPsecME WG charter goals is to provide IKEv2 [RFC5996] a 353 secure password authentication mechanism which is protected against 354 off-line dictionary attacks, without requiring the use of 355 certificates or Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), even when 356 using the low-entropy shared secrets. There are couple of documents 357 which try to address this issue and the work is still in progress. 359 10.1.2. Asymmetric key based authentication 361 Another peer authentication mechanism IKEv2 uses is asymmetric key 362 certificates or public key signatures. This approach relies on a 363 Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates. If this 364 can be deployed for IKEv2 peer authentication, it will be one of the 365 most secure authentication mechanisms. With this authentication 366 option, there is no need for out-of-band shared keys between peers 367 for mutual authentication. 369 Apart from RSA and DSS digital signatures for public key 370 authentication provided by IKEv2, [RFC4754] introduces Elliptic Curve 371 Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signatures. ECDSA provides 372 additional benefits including computational efficiency, small 373 signature sizes, and minimal bandwidth compared to other available 374 digital signature methods. 376 10.1.3. EAP based authentication 378 In addition to supporting authentication using shared secrets and 379 public key signatures, IKEv2 also supports authentication based on 380 the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748]. 381 EAP is an authentication framework that supports multiple 382 authentication mechanisms. IKEv2 provides EAP authentication because 383 public key signatures and shared secrets are not flexible enough to 384 meet the requirements of many deployment scenarios. For KARP KMP, 385 EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2 as specified in [RFC5998] can be 386 explored. 388 By using EAP, IKEv2 KMP can leverage existing authentication 389 infrastructure and credential databases, because EAP allows users to 390 choose a method suitable for existing credentials. Routing protocols 391 today use password-based pre-shared keys to integrity protect the 392 routing protocol messages. The same pre-shared key can be used to 393 bootstrap the KMP and as a potential authentication key in KMP. With 394 appropriate password based EAP methods, stronger keys can be 395 generated without using certificates. 397 For authenticating the nodes running routing protocols, EAP and the 398 IKEv2 endpoints are co-located (so no separate EAP server required). 399 When EAP is deployed, authenticating the IKEv2 responder using both 400 EAP and public key signatures could be redundant. EAP methods that 401 offer mutual authentication and key agreement can be used to provide 402 responder authentication in IKEv2 completely based on EAP. 404 Section 4 of [RFC5998] lists safe EAP methods to support 405 EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION. For routing protocols deployment, because 406 an EAP server is co-located with IKEv2 responder, channel binding 407 capability of the selected EAP method is irrelevant. Various 408 qualified mutual authentication methods are listed in [RFC5998]; of 409 these, a password based methods [RFC4746], [RFC5931], [RFC6124] can 410 offer potential EAP alternative for pre-shared key only 411 authentication. 413 11. References 415 11.1. Normative References 417 [I-D.chunduri-karp-using-ikev2-with-tcp-ao] 418 Chunduri, U., Tian, A., and J. Touch, "Using IKEv2 with 419 TCP-AO", draft-chunduri-karp-using-ikev2-with-tcp-ao-03 420 (work in progress), January 2013. 422 [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-oob-pubkey] 423 Kivinen, T., Wouters, P., and H. Tschofenig, "More Raw 424 Public Keys for IKEv2", 425 draft-kivinen-ipsecme-oob-pubkey-03 (work in progress), 426 November 2012. 428 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 429 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 431 [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, 432 "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", 433 RFC 5996, September 2010. 435 11.2. Informative References 437 [I-D.farrell-decade-ni] 438 Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B., 439 Keraenen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with 440 Hashes", draft-farrell-decade-ni-10 (work in progress), 441 August 2012. 443 [I-D.hartman-karp-mrkmp] 444 Hartman, S., Zhang, D., and G. Lebovitz, "Multicast Router 445 Key Management Protocol (MaRK)", 446 draft-hartman-karp-mrkmp-05 (work in progress), 447 September 2012. 449 [I-D.ietf-karp-ops-model] 450 Hartman, S. and D. Zhang, "Operations Model for Router 451 Keying", draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-04 (work in progress), 452 October 2012. 454 [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs] 455 Lebovitz, G., Bhatia, M., and B. Weis, "Keying and 456 Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Overview, 457 Threats, and Requirements", 458 draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-07 (work in progress), 459 December 2012. 461 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] 462 Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", 463 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-02 (work in progress), 464 May 2012. 466 [I-D.mahesh-karp-rkmp] 467 Jethanandani, M., Weis, B., Patel, K., Zhang, D., Hartman, 468 S., Chunduri, U., Tian, A., and J. Touch, "Negotiation for 469 Keying Pairwise Routing Protocols in IKEv2", 470 draft-mahesh-karp-rkmp-04 (work in progress), 471 February 2013. 473 [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography 474 Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications 475 Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. 477 [RFC3618] Fenner, B. and D. Meyer, "Multicast Source Discovery 478 Protocol (MSDP)", RFC 3618, October 2003. 480 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. 481 Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", 482 RFC 3748, June 2004. 484 [RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic 485 Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005. 487 [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 488 Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. 490 [RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 491 Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006. 493 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway 494 Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 496 [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the 497 Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. 499 [RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B. 500 Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites 501 for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006. 503 [RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the 504 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session 505 Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572, July 2006. 507 [RFC4746] Clancy, T. and W. Arbaugh, "Extensible Authentication 508 Protocol (EAP) Password Authenticated Exchange", RFC 4746, 509 November 2006. 511 [RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using 512 the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", 513 RFC 4754, January 2007. 515 [RFC5036] Andersson, L., Minei, I., and B. Thomas, "LDP 516 Specification", RFC 5036, October 2007. 518 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 519 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 520 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 521 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 523 [RFC5440] Vasseur, JP. and JL. Le Roux, "Path Computation Element 524 (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440, 525 March 2009. 527 [RFC5931] Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication 528 Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only a Password", 529 RFC 5931, August 2010. 531 [RFC5998] Eronen, P., Tschofenig, H., and Y. Sheffer, "An Extension 532 for EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2", RFC 5998, 533 September 2010. 535 [RFC6124] Sheffer, Y., Zorn, G., Tschofenig, H., and S. Fluhrer, "An 536 EAP Authentication Method Based on the Encrypted Key 537 Exchange (EKE) Protocol", RFC 6124, February 2011. 539 [RFC6518] Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for 540 Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", RFC 6518, 541 February 2012. 543 Authors' Addresses 545 Uma Chunduri 546 Ericsson 547 300 Holger Way 548 San Jose, California 95134 549 USA 551 Phone: +1 (408) 750-5678 552 Email: uma.chunduri@ericsson.com 554 Albert Tian 555 Ericsson 556 300 Holger Way 557 San Jose, California 95134 558 USA 560 Phone: +1 (408) 750-5210 561 Email: albert.tian@ericsson.com 563 Ari Keranen 564 Ericsson 565 Hirsalantie 11 566 Jorvas, 02420 567 Finland 569 Phone: 570 Email: ari.keranen@ericsson.com