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1 Independent Submission M. Fabbrini
2 Internet-Draft February 8, 2020
3 Intended status: Informational
4 Expires: August 11, 2020
6 A Web Model where Content Is Stored in a
7 File's Source: The Unentangled Network
9 draft-fabbrini-web-model-unentangled-network-01
11 Abstract
13 This document describes an experimental model of web whose main
14 characteristic is that the content is stored in a file's source and
15 accessed through a common text browser from the command line under
16 Linux Os.
18 This work also aims to evaluate the implications of such a network
19 in relation, among other aspects, to security and tracking.
21 Status of This Memo
23 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
24 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
27 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
28 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
29 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
36 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 11, 2020.
38 Copyright Notice
40 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
41 document authors. All rights reserved.
43 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
44 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
45 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
46 publication of this document. Please review these documents
47 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
48 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
49 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
50 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
51 described in the Simplified BSD License.
53 Table of Contents
55 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
56 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
57 2. The Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
58 3. System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
59 4. Content Retrieving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
60 5. Ineffectiveness of Malicious Scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
61 6. Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
62 7. Ads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
63 8. Separation of Content and Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
64 9. Enhanced Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
65 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
66 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
67 12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
68 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
70 1. Introduction
72 Nowadays getting text content is not a risk-free task and also
73 involves some drawbacks that often discourage the intensive use of
74 the internet by some users who are particularly sensitive to privacy
75 issues.
77 Rendering a web page in a browser poses first of all security risks
78 deriving mostly from the execution of malicious script code.
80 Secondly, the tracking of every user action carried out by the
81 advertising machine, which was once mainly represented by cookies,
82 is now enriched by tools that are permanently installed on local
83 storages, such as for example service workers and IndexedDB.
84 The particular web model proposed in this document mitigates both
85 the security risks and the intrusiveness of tracking tools.
87 1.1. Requirements Language
89 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
90 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
91 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
93 2. The Core
95 The peculiar characteristic of this model is that the text content
96 is inserted in the source of a file.
98 The carrier document can be of two types:
100 i. a text file saved as an image or binary format.
101 ii. a file in which the textual content follows the correct hex
102 signature such as for instance "42 4D" relating to the BMP
103 format.
105 3. System Requirements
107 The model was imagined for the Linux Os environment with Lynx as
108 text browser. Lynx, one of the most popular web browsers for
109 command-line interfaces, was originally designed to display plain
110 ASCII text on simple terminals of UNIX, without including any
111 multimedia content. Although Lynx is preferable for some specific
112 features, any other text web browser can be used.
114 4. Content Retrieving
116 To start Lynx, at the command line prompt, enter 'lynx' followed
117 by the '-source' option and append a carrier document's url.
119 Example:
121 'lynx -source https://example.com/.../foo.png'
123 The result of executing this command is that the unrendered source
124 of the document is displayed.
126 5. Ineffectiveness of Malicious Scripts
128 Since the unrendered source is retrieved, no event can be triggered
129 by a script.
131 In particular, attacks launched via JavaScript will be impossible
132 to perform.
134 6. Fingerprinting
136 Browser fingerprinting involves gathering information about an
137 internet user's browser and associated software and hardware, such
138 as the browser type, the operating system, various network request
139 headers, cookies, extensions, screen resolution and so on.
141 These properties can be collected using JavaScript.
143 Since in this environment no script can be run, fingerprinting
144 methodologies based on JavaScript are ineffective.
146 7. Ads
148 In a text-only environment, with scripting languages out of the game,
149 the invasive banner and video ads that often make the content de
150 facto impossible to read, will not find space.
152 8. Separation of Content and Form
154 This web model allows the separation of content and form.
156 In fact, it is up to the user to choose the font, size, color, acting
157 on the terminal settings of the installed Linux version.
159 9. Enhanced Trust
161 As a consequence of what is discussed in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, the
162 information system resulting from the implementation of such a
163 network model will be probably trusted by the users.
165 10. IANA Considerations
167 This memo includes no request to IANA.
169 11. Security Considerations
171 In addition to what is examined in paragraph 5, it is worth noting
172 that although in any browser it is possible to disable JavaScript,
173 in the Unentangled Network security is in a certain sense
174 "by design". In fact, it is the model itself that prevent scripts
175 from running and no user intervention is required.
177 12. Informative References
179 [I-D.wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting]
180 I. Goldberg, T. Wang, C. Wood, "Network-Based
181 Website Fingerprinting", draft-wood-pearg-website
182 -fingerprinting-00, (work in progress).
184 [SW] F. Copes "Service Workers explained"
185
187 [Lynx] Thomas E. Dickey
188
190 [JSTAttacks] Michael Schwarz, Florian Lackner, Daniel Gruss
191 Graz University of Technology "JavaScript
192 Template Attacks: Automatically Inferring Host
193 Information for Targeted Exploits
195
198 [JSFingerprinting] T.Claburn "JavaScript tells all, which turns out
199 not to be so great for privacy: Side-channel
200 leaks can be exploited to follow you around the
201 interweb
202
205 Author's Address
207 Michele Fabbrini
208 Email: unentangled.net@protonmail.com
209 335 Via Statale Abetone
210 I-56017 San Giuliano Terme
211 Pisa, Tuscany
212 Country: Italy