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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Independent Submission M. Fabbrini 2 Internet-Draft February 8, 2020 3 Intended status: Informational 4 Expires: August 11, 2020 6 A Web Model where Content Is Stored in a 7 File's Source: The Unentangled Network 9 draft-fabbrini-web-model-unentangled-network-01 11 Abstract 13 This document describes an experimental model of web whose main 14 characteristic is that the content is stored in a file's source and 15 accessed through a common text browser from the command line under 16 Linux Os. 18 This work also aims to evaluate the implications of such a network 19 in relation, among other aspects, to security and tracking. 21 Status of This Memo 23 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 24 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 28 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 29 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 11, 2020. 38 Copyright Notice 40 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 41 document authors. All rights reserved. 43 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 44 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 45 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 46 publication of this document. Please review these documents 47 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 48 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 49 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 50 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 51 described in the Simplified BSD License. 53 Table of Contents 55 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 56 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 57 2. The Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3. System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 4. Content Retrieving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 5. Ineffectiveness of Malicious Scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 6. Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 7. Ads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 8. Separation of Content and Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 9. Enhanced Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 67 12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 70 1. Introduction 72 Nowadays getting text content is not a risk-free task and also 73 involves some drawbacks that often discourage the intensive use of 74 the internet by some users who are particularly sensitive to privacy 75 issues. 77 Rendering a web page in a browser poses first of all security risks 78 deriving mostly from the execution of malicious script code. 80 Secondly, the tracking of every user action carried out by the 81 advertising machine, which was once mainly represented by cookies, 82 is now enriched by tools that are permanently installed on local 83 storages, such as for example service workers and IndexedDB. 84 The particular web model proposed in this document mitigates both 85 the security risks and the intrusiveness of tracking tools. 87 1.1. Requirements Language 89 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 90 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 91 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 93 2. The Core 95 The peculiar characteristic of this model is that the text content 96 is inserted in the source of a file. 98 The carrier document can be of two types: 100 i. a text file saved as an image or binary format. 101 ii. a file in which the textual content follows the correct hex 102 signature such as for instance "42 4D" relating to the BMP 103 format. 105 3. System Requirements 107 The model was imagined for the Linux Os environment with Lynx as 108 text browser. Lynx, one of the most popular web browsers for 109 command-line interfaces, was originally designed to display plain 110 ASCII text on simple terminals of UNIX, without including any 111 multimedia content. Although Lynx is preferable for some specific 112 features, any other text web browser can be used. 114 4. Content Retrieving 116 To start Lynx, at the command line prompt, enter 'lynx' followed 117 by the '-source' option and append a carrier document's url. 119 Example: 121 'lynx -source https://example.com/.../foo.png' 123 The result of executing this command is that the unrendered source 124 of the document is displayed. 126 5. Ineffectiveness of Malicious Scripts 128 Since the unrendered source is retrieved, no event can be triggered 129 by a script. 131 In particular, attacks launched via JavaScript will be impossible 132 to perform. 134 6. Fingerprinting 136 Browser fingerprinting involves gathering information about an 137 internet user's browser and associated software and hardware, such 138 as the browser type, the operating system, various network request 139 headers, cookies, extensions, screen resolution and so on. 141 These properties can be collected using JavaScript. 143 Since in this environment no script can be run, fingerprinting 144 methodologies based on JavaScript are ineffective. 146 7. Ads 148 In a text-only environment, with scripting languages out of the game, 149 the invasive banner and video ads that often make the content de 150 facto impossible to read, will not find space. 152 8. Separation of Content and Form 154 This web model allows the separation of content and form. 156 In fact, it is up to the user to choose the font, size, color, acting 157 on the terminal settings of the installed Linux version. 159 9. Enhanced Trust 161 As a consequence of what is discussed in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, the 162 information system resulting from the implementation of such a 163 network model will be probably trusted by the users. 165 10. IANA Considerations 167 This memo includes no request to IANA. 169 11. Security Considerations 171 In addition to what is examined in paragraph 5, it is worth noting 172 that although in any browser it is possible to disable JavaScript, 173 in the Unentangled Network security is in a certain sense 174 "by design". In fact, it is the model itself that prevent scripts 175 from running and no user intervention is required. 177 12. Informative References 179 [I-D.wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting] 180 I. Goldberg, T. Wang, C. Wood, "Network-Based 181 Website Fingerprinting", draft-wood-pearg-website 182 -fingerprinting-00, (work in progress). 184 [SW] F. Copes "Service Workers explained" 185 187 [Lynx] Thomas E. Dickey 188 190 [JSTAttacks] Michael Schwarz, Florian Lackner, Daniel Gruss 191 Graz University of Technology "JavaScript 192 Template Attacks: Automatically Inferring Host 193 Information for Targeted Exploits 195 198 [JSFingerprinting] T.Claburn "JavaScript tells all, which turns out 199 not to be so great for privacy: Side-channel 200 leaks can be exploited to follow you around the 201 interweb 202 205 Author's Address 207 Michele Fabbrini 208 Email: unentangled.net@protonmail.com 209 335 Via Statale Abetone 210 I-56017 San Giuliano Terme 211 Pisa, Tuscany 212 Country: Italy