idnits 2.17.1 draft-gould-regext-secure-authinfo-transfer-01.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section. (See Section 2.2 of https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist for how to handle the case when there are no actions for IANA.) Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (June 26, 2019) is 1765 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Best Current Practice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '1' on line 769 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 8499 (Obsoleted by RFC 9499) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group J. Gould 3 Internet-Draft R. Wilhelm 4 Intended status: Best Current Practice VeriSign, Inc. 5 Expires: December 28, 2019 June 26, 2019 7 Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Secure Authorization Information 8 for Transfer 9 draft-gould-regext-secure-authinfo-transfer-01 11 Abstract 13 The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), in RFC 5730, defines the 14 use of authorization information to authorize a transfer. The 15 authorization information is object-specific and has been defined in 16 the EPP Domain Name Mapping, in RFC 5731, and the EPP Contact 17 Mapping, in RFC 5733, as password-based authorization information. 18 Other authorization mechanisms can be used, but in practice the 19 password-based authorization information has been used at the time of 20 object create, managed with the object update, and used to authorize 21 an object transfer request. What has not been fully considered is 22 the security of the authorization information that includes the 23 complexity of the authorization information, the time-to-live (TTL) 24 of the authorization information, and where and how the authorization 25 information is stored. This document defines an operational 26 practice, using the EPP RFCs, that leverages the use of strong random 27 authorization information values that are short-lived, that are not 28 stored by the client, and that are stored using a cryptographic hash 29 by the server to provide for secure authorization information used 30 for transfers. 32 Status of This Memo 34 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 35 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 37 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 38 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 39 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 40 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 42 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 43 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 44 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 45 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 47 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2019. 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 Table of Contents 66 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 67 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 68 2. Registrant, Registrar, Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 69 3. Secure Authorization Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 70 3.1. Secure Random Authorization Information . . . . . . . . . 6 71 3.2. Authorization Information Time-To-Live (TTL) . . . . . . 7 72 3.3. Authorization Information Storage and Transport . . . . . 7 73 4. Create, Transfer, and Secure Authorization Information . . . 7 74 4.1. Create Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 75 4.2. Update Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 76 4.3. Info Command and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 77 4.4. Transfer Request Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 78 5. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 79 5.1. Verisign EPP SDK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 80 5.2. RegistryEngine EPP Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 81 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 82 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 83 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 84 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 85 8.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 86 Appendix A. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 87 A.1. Change from 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 88 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 90 1. Introduction 92 The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), in [RFC5730], defines the 93 use of authorization information to authorize a transfer. The 94 authorization information is object-specific and has been defined in 95 the EPP Domain Name Mapping, in [RFC5731], and the EPP Contact 96 Mapping, in [RFC5733], as password-based authorization information. 98 Other authorization mechanisms can be used, but in practice the 99 password-based authorization information has been used at the time of 100 object create, managed with the object update, and used to authorize 101 an object transfer request. What has not been considered is the 102 security of the authorization information that includes the 103 complexity of the authorization information, the time-to-live (TTL) 104 of the authorization information, and where and how the authorization 105 information is stored. This document defines an operational 106 practice, using the EPP RFCs, that leverages the use of strong, 107 random authorization information values that are short-lived, that 108 are not stored by the client, and that are stored by the server using 109 a cryptographic hash to provide, for secure authorization information 110 used for transfers. This operational practice can be used to support 111 transfers of any EPP object, where the domain name object defined in 112 [RFC5731] is used in this document for illustration purposes. 114 The overall goal is to have strong, random authorization information 115 values, that are short-lived, and that are either not stored or 116 stored as a cryptographic hash values by the non-responsible parties. 117 In a registrant, registrar, and registry model, the registrant 118 registers the object through the registrar to the registry. The 119 registrant is the responsible party and the registrar and the 120 registry are the non-responsible parties. EPP is a protocol between 121 the registrar and the registry, where the registrar is referred to as 122 the client and the registry is referred to as the server. The 123 following are the elements of the operational practice and how the 124 existing features of the EPP RFCs can be leveraged to satisfy them: 126 "Strong Random Authorization Information": The EPP RFCs define the 127 password-based authorization information value using an XML 128 schema "normalizedString" type, so they don't restrict what can 129 be used in any way. This operational practice defines the 130 recommended mechanism for creating a strong random authorization 131 value, that would be generated by the client. 132 "Short-Lived Authorization Information": The EPP RFCs don't 133 explicitly support short-lived authorization information or a 134 time-to-live (TTL) for authorization information, but there are 135 EPP RFC features that can be leveraged to support short-lived 136 authorization information. If authorization information is set 137 only when there is a transfer in process, the server needs to 138 support empty authorization information on create, support 139 setting and unsetting authorization information, and support 140 automatically unsetting the authorization information upon a 141 successful transfer. All of these features can be supported by 142 the EPP RFCs. 143 "Storing Authorization Information Securely": The EPP RFCs don't 144 specify where and how the authorization information is stored in 145 the client or the server, so there are no restrictions to define 146 an operational practice for storing the authorization information 147 securely. The operational practice will not require the client 148 to store the authorization information and will require the 149 server to store the authorization information using a 150 cryptographic hash. Returning the authorization information set 151 in an EPP info response will not be supported. 153 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document 155 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 156 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 157 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 159 XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications 160 and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the 161 character case presented in order to develop a conforming 162 implementation. 164 In examples, "C:" represents lines returned by a protocol client. 165 Indentation and white space in examples are provided only to 166 illustrate element relationships and are not a REQUIRED feature of 167 this protocol. 169 The examples reference XML namespace prefixes that are used for the 170 associated XML namespaces. Implementations MUST NOT depend on the 171 example XML namespaces and instead employ a proper namespace-aware 172 XML parser and serializer to interpret and output the XML documents. 173 The example namespace prefixes used and their associated XML 174 namespaces include: 176 "domain": urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0 177 "contact": urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:contact-1.0 179 2. Registrant, Registrar, Registry 181 The EPP RFCs refer to client and server, but when it comes to 182 transfers, there are three actors that are involved. This document 183 will refer to the actors as registrant, registrar, and registry. 184 [RFC8499] defines these terms formally for the Domain Name System 185 (DNS). The terms are further described below to cover their roles as 186 actors of using the authorization information in the transfer process 187 of any object in the registry, such as a domain name or a contact: 189 "registrant": [RFC8499] defines the registrant as "an individual or 190 organization on whose behalf a name in a zone is registered by 191 the registry". The registrant can be the owner of any object in 192 the registry, such as a domain name or a contact. The registrant 193 interfaces with the registrar for provisioning the objects. A 194 transfer is coordinated by the registrant to transfer the 195 sponsorship of the object from one registrar to another. The 196 authorization information is meant to authenticate the registrant 197 as the owner of the object to the non-sponsoring registrar and to 198 authorize the transfer. 199 "registrar": [RFC8499] defines the registrar as "a service provider 200 that acts as a go-between for registrants and registries". The 201 registrar interfaces with the registrant for the provisioning of 202 objects, such as domain names and contacts, and with the 203 registries to satisfy the registrant's provisioning requests. A 204 registrar may directly interface with the registrant or may 205 indirectly interface with the registrant, typically through one 206 or more resellers. Implementing a transfer using secure 207 authorization information extends through the registrar's 208 reseller channel up to the direct interface with the registrant. 209 The registrar's interface with the registries uses EPP. The 210 registrar's interface with its reseller channel or the registrant 211 is registrar-specific. In the EPP RFCs, the registrar is 212 referred to as the "client", since EPP is the protocol used 213 between the registrar and the registry. The sponsoring registrar 214 is the authorized registrar to manage objects on behalf of the 215 registrant. A non-sponsoring registrar is not authorized to 216 manage objects on behalf of the registrant. A transfer of an 217 object's sponsorship is from one registrar, referred to as the 218 losing registrar, to another registrar, referred to as the 219 gaining registrar. 220 "registry": [RFC8499] defines the registry as "the administrative 221 operation of a zone that allows registration of names within the 222 zone". The registry typically interfaces with the registrars 223 over EPP and generally does not interact directly with the 224 registrant. In the EPP RFCs, the registry is referred to as the 225 "server", since EPP is the protocol used between the registrar 226 and the registry. The registry has a record of the sponsoring 227 registrar for each object and provides the mechanism (over EPP) 228 to coordinate a transfer of an object's sponsorship between 229 registrars. 231 3. Secure Authorization Information 233 The authorization information in the EPP RFCs ([RFC5731] and 234 [RFC5733]) that support transfer use password-based authorization 235 information. Other EPP objects that support password-based 236 authorization information for transfer can use the Secure 237 Authorization Information defined in this document. For the 238 authorization information to be secure it must be a strong random 239 value and must have a short time-to-live (TTL). The security of the 240 authorization information is defined in the following sections. 242 3.1. Secure Random Authorization Information 244 For authorization information to be secure, it MUST be generated 245 using a secure random value. The authorization information is 246 treated as a password, where according to [RFC4086] a high-security 247 password must have at least 49 bits of randomness or entropy. The 248 required length L of a password, rounded up to the largest whole 249 number, is based on the set of characters N and the desired entropy 250 H, in the equation L = ROUNDUP(H / log2 N). With a target entropy of 251 49, the required length can be calculated after deciding on the set 252 of characters that will be randomized. The following are a set of 253 possible character sets and the calculation of the required length. 255 Calculation of the required length with 49 bits of entropy and with 256 the set of all printable ASCII characters except space (0x20), which 257 consists of the 94 characters 0x21-0x7E. 259 ROUNDUP(49 / log2 94) = ROUNDUP(49 / 6.55) = ROUNDUP(7.48) = 8 261 Calculation of the required length with 49 bits of entropy and with 262 the set of case-insensitive alphanumeric characters, which consists 263 of 36 characters (a-z A-Z 0-9). 265 ROUNDUP(49 / log2 36) = ROUNDUP(49 / 5.17) = ROUNDUP(9.48) = 10 267 Considering the age of [RFC4086], the evolution of security 268 practices, and that the authorization information is a machine- 269 generated value, the recommendation is to use at least 128 bits of 270 entropy. The lengths are recalculated below using 128 bits of 271 entropy. 273 Calculation of the required length with 128 bits of entropy and with 274 the set of all printable ASCII characters except space (0x20), which 275 consists of the 94 characters 0x21-0x7E. 277 ROUNDUP(128 / log2 94) = ROUNDUP(128 / 6.55) = ROUNDUP(19.54) = 20 279 Calculation of the required length with 128 bits of entropy and with 280 the set of case insensitive alphanumeric characters, which consists 281 of 36 characters (a-z A-Z 0-9). 283 ROUNDUP(128 / log2 36) = ROUNDUP(128 / 5.17) = ROUNDUP(24.76) = 25 285 The strength of the random authorization information is dependent on 286 the actual entropy of the underlying random number generator. For 287 the random number generator, the practices defined in [RFC4086] and 288 section 4.7.1 of the NIST Federal Information Processing Standards 289 (FIPS) Publication 140-2 [1] SHOULD be followed to produce random 290 values that will be resistant to attack. A random number generator 291 (RNG) is preferable over the use of a pseudorandom number generator 292 (PRNG) to reduce the predictability of the authorization information. 293 The more predictable the random number generator is, the lower the 294 true entropy, and the longer the required length for the 295 authorization information. 297 3.2. Authorization Information Time-To-Live (TTL) 299 The authorization information SHOULD only be set when there is a 300 transfer in process. This implies that the authorization information 301 has a Time-To-Live (TTL) by which the authorization information is 302 cleared when the TTL expires. The EPP RFCs have no definition of 303 TTL, but since the server supports the setting and unsetting of the 304 authorization information by the sponsoring registrar, then the 305 sponsoring registrar can apply a TTL based on client policy. The TTL 306 client policy may be based on proprietary registrar-specific criteria 307 which provides for a transfer-specific TTL tuned for the particular 308 circumstances of the transaction. The sponsoring registrar will be 309 aware of the TTL and the sponsoring registrar MUST inform the 310 registrant of the TTL when the authorization information is provided 311 to the registrant. 313 3.3. Authorization Information Storage and Transport 315 To protect the disclosure of the authorization information, the 316 authorization information MUST be stored by the registry using a 317 strong one-way cryptographic hash and MUST NOT be stored by the 318 registrar. The plain text version of the authorization information 319 MUST NOT be written to any logs by the registrar or the registry. 320 All communication that includes the authorization information MUST be 321 over an encrypted channel, such as [RFC5734] for EPP. The 322 registrar's interface for communicating the authorization information 323 with the registrant MUST be over an authenticated and encrypted 324 channel. 326 4. Create, Transfer, and Secure Authorization Information 328 To make the transfer process secure using secure authorization 329 information, as defined in Section 3, the client and server need to 330 implement steps where the authorization information is set only when 331 a transfer is actively in process and ensure that the authorization 332 information is stored securely and transported only over secure 333 channels. The steps in management of the authorization information 334 for transfers include: 336 1. Registrant requests to register the object with the registrar. 337 Registrar sends the create command, with empty authorization 338 information, to the registry, as defined in Section 4.1. 339 2. Registrant requests from the losing registrar the authorization 340 information to provide to the gaining registrar. 341 3. Losing registrar generates a secure random authorization 342 information value, sends it to the registry as defined in 343 Section 4.2, and provides it to the registrant. 344 4. Registrant provides the authorization information value to the 345 gaining registrar. 346 5. Gaining registrar optionally verifies the authorization 347 information with the info command to the registry, as defined in 348 Section 4.3. 349 6. Gaining registrar sends the transfer request with the 350 authorization information to the registry, as defined in 351 Section 4.4. 352 7. If the transfer successfully completes, the registry 353 automatically unsets the authorization information; otherwise the 354 losing registrar unsets the authorization information when the 355 TTL expires, as defined in Section 4.2. 357 The following sections outline the practices of the EPP commands and 358 responses between the registrar and the registry that supports secure 359 authorization information for transfer. 361 4.1. Create Command 363 For a Create Command, the registry MUST allow for the passing of an 364 empty authorization information and MAY disallow for the passing of a 365 non-empty authorization information. By having an empty 366 authorization information on create, the object is initially not in 367 the transfer process. Any EPP object extension that supports setting 368 the authorization information with a "eppcom:pwAuthInfoType" element, 369 can have an empty authorization information passed, such as [RFC5731] 370 and [RFC5733]. 372 Example of passing empty authorization information in an [RFC5731] 373 domain name create command. 375 C: 376 C: 377 C: 378 C: 379 C: 381 C: example.com 382 C: 383 C: 384 C: 385 C: 386 C: 387 C: ABC-12345 388 C: 389 C: 390 Example of passing empty authorization information in an [RFC5733] 391 contact create command. 393 C: 394 C: 395 C: 396 C: 397 C: 399 C: sh8013 400 C: 401 C: John Doe 402 C: Example Inc. 403 C: 404 C: 123 Example Dr. 405 C: Suite 100 406 C: Dulles 407 C: VA 408 C: 20166-6503 409 C: US 410 C: 411 C: 412 C: +1.7035555555 413 C: +1.7035555556 414 C: jdoe@example.com 415 C: 416 C: 417 C: 418 C: 419 C: 420 C: 421 C: 422 C: 423 C: 424 C: ABC-12345 425 C: 426 C: 428 4.2. Update Command 430 For an Update Command, the registry MUST allow for the setting and 431 unsetting of the authorization information. The registrar sets the 432 authorization information by first generating a strong, random 433 authorization information value, based on Section 3.1, and setting it 434 in the registry in the update command. The registry SHOULD validate 435 the randomness of the authorization information based on the length 436 and character set required by the registry. For example, a registry 437 that requires 20 random printable ASCII characters except space 438 (0x20), should validate that the authorization information contains 439 at least one upper case alpha character, one lower case alpha 440 character, and one non-alpha numeric character. If the authorization 441 information fails the randomness validation, the registry MUST return 442 an EPP error result code of 2202. 444 Often the registrar has the "clientTransferProhibited" status set, so 445 to start the transfer process, the "clientTransferProhibited" status 446 needs to be removed, and the strong, random authorization information 447 value needs to be set. The registrar MUST define a time-to-live 448 (TTL), as defined in Section 3.2, where if the TTL expires the 449 registrar will unset the authorization information. 451 Example of removing the "clientTransferProhibited" status and setting 452 the authorization information in an [RFC5731] domain name update 453 command. 455 C: 456 C: 457 C: 458 C: 459 C: 461 C: example.com 462 C: 463 C: 464 C: 465 C: 466 C: 467 C: LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP 468 C: 469 C: 470 C: 471 C: 472 C: 473 C: ABC-12345-XYZ 474 C: 475 C: 477 When the registrar-defined TTL expires, the sponsoring registrar 478 cancels the transfer process by unsetting the authorization 479 information value and may add back statuses like the 480 "clientTransferProbited" status. Any EPP object extension that 481 supports setting the authorization information with a 482 "eppcom:pwAuthInfoType" element, can have an empty authorization 483 information passed, such as [RFC5731] and [RFC5733]. Setting an 484 empty authorization information unsets the value. [RFC5731] supports 485 an explicit mechanism of unsetting the authorization information, by 486 passing the authorization information value. The 487 registry MUST support unsetting the authorization information by 488 accepting an empty authorization information value and accepting an 489 explicit unset element if it is supported by the object extension. 491 Example of unsetting the authorization information explicitly in an 492 [RFC5731] domain name update command. 494 C: 495 C: 496 C: 497 C: 498 C: 500 C: example.com 501 C: 502 C: 503 C: 504 C: 505 C: 506 C: 507 C: 508 C: 509 C: 510 C: 511 C: ABC-12345-XYZ 512 C: 513 C: 514 Example of unsetting the authorization information with an empty 515 authorization information in an [RFC5731] domain name update command. 517 C: 518 C: 519 C: 520 C: 521 C: 523 C: example.com 524 C: 525 C: 526 C: 527 C: 528 C: 529 C: 530 C: 531 C: 532 C: 533 C: 534 C: ABC-12345-XYZ 535 C: 536 C: 538 Example of unsetting the authorization information with an empty 539 authorization information in an [RFC5733] contact update command. 541 C: 542 C: 543 C: 544 C: 545 C: 547 C: sh8013 548 C: 549 C: 550 C: 551 C: 552 C: 553 C: 554 C: 555 C: ABC-12345-XYZ 556 C: 557 C: 559 4.3. Info Command and Response 561 For an Info Command, the registry MUST allow for the passing of a 562 non-empty authorization information for verification. The gaining 563 registrar can pre-verify the authorization information provided by 564 the registrant prior to submitting the transfer request with the use 565 of the Info Command. The registry compares the hash of the passed 566 authorization information with the hashed authorization information 567 value stored for the object. When the authorization information is 568 not set or the passed authorization information does not match the 569 previously set value, the registry MUST return an EPP error result 570 code of 2202 [RFC5730]. 572 Example of passing a non-empty authorization information in an 573 [RFC5731] domain name info command to verify the authorization 574 information value. 576 C: 577 C: 578 C: 579 C: 580 C: 582 C: example.com 583 C: 584 C: LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP 585 C: 586 C: 587 C: 588 C: 589 C: ABC-12345 590 C: 591 C: 593 The Info Response in object extensions, such as [RFC5731] and 594 [RFC5733], MUST NOT include the optional authorization information 595 element. The authorization information is stored as a hash in the 596 registry, so returning the plain text authorization information is 597 not possible. The registry MUST NOT return any indication of whether 598 the authorization information is set or unset by not returning the 599 authorization information element in the response. 601 4.4. Transfer Request Command 603 For a Transfer Request Command, the registry MUST allow for the 604 passing of a non-empty authorization information to authorize a 605 transfer. The registry compares the hash of the passed authorization 606 information with the hashed authorization information value stored 607 for the object. When the authorization information is not set or the 608 passed authorization information does not match the previously set 609 value, the registry MUST return an EPP error result code of 2202 610 [RFC5730]. Whether the transfer occurs immediately or is pending is 611 up to server policy. When the transfer occurs immediately, the 612 registry MUST return the EPP success result code of 1000 and when the 613 transfer is pending, the registry MUST return the EPP success result 614 code of 1001. The losing registrar MUST be informed of a successful 615 transfer request using an EPP poll message. 617 Example of passing a non-empty authorization information in an 618 [RFC5731] domain name transfer request command to authorize the 619 transfer. 621 C: 622 C: 623 C: 624 C: 625 C: 627 C: example1.com 628 C: 629 C: LuQ7Bu@w9?%+_HK3cayg$55$LSft3MPP 630 C: 631 C: 632 C: 633 C: 634 C: ABC-12345 635 C: 636 C: 638 Upon successful completion of the transfer, the registry MUST 639 automatically unset the authorization information. If the transfer 640 does not complete within the time-to-live (TTL) (Section 3.2), the 641 registrar MUST unset the authorization information as defined in 642 Section 4.2. 644 5. Implementation Status 646 Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and the reference to 647 RFC 7942 [RFC7942] before publication. 649 This section records the status of known implementations of the 650 protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this 651 Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942 652 [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is 653 intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing 654 drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual 655 implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. 656 Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information 657 presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not 658 intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available 659 implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that 660 other implementations may exist. 662 According to RFC 7942 [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and 663 working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the 664 benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable 665 experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols 666 more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this 667 information as they see fit". 669 5.1. Verisign EPP SDK 671 Organization: Verisign Inc. 673 Name: Verisign EPP SDK 675 Description: The Verisign EPP SDK includes both a full client 676 implementation and a full server stub implementation of draft-gould- 677 regext-secure-authinfo-transfer. 679 Level of maturity: Development 681 Coverage: All aspects of the protocol are implemented. 683 Licensing: GNU Lesser General Public License 685 Contact: jgould@verisign.com 687 URL: https://www.verisign.com/en_US/channel-resources/domain- 688 registry-products/epp-sdks 690 5.2. RegistryEngine EPP Service 692 Organization: CentralNic 694 Name: RegistryEngine EPP Service 696 Description: Generic high-volume EPP service for gTLDs, ccTLDs and 697 SLDs 699 Level of maturity: Deployed in CentralNic's production environment as 700 well as two other gTLD registry systems, and two ccTLD registry 701 systems. 703 Coverage: Auhtorization Information is "write only" in that the 704 registrars can set the Auhtorization Information, but not get the 705 Auhtorization Information in the Info Response. 707 Licensing: Proprietary In-House software 709 Contact: epp@centralnic.com 711 URL: https://www.centralnic.com 713 6. Security Considerations 715 TBD 717 7. Acknowledgements 719 The authors wish to thank the following persons for their feedback 720 and suggestions: 722 o Scott Hollenbeck 723 o Matthew Pozun 724 o Srikanth Veeramachaneni 726 8. References 728 8.1. Normative References 730 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 731 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 732 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . 735 [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, 736 "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, 737 DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, . 740 [RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", 741 STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009, 742 . 744 [RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) 745 Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, 746 DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009, . 749 [RFC5733] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) 750 Contact Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5733, DOI 10.17487/RFC5733, 751 August 2009, . 753 [RFC5734] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) 754 Transport over TCP", STD 69, RFC 5734, 755 DOI 10.17487/RFC5734, August 2009, . 758 [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running 759 Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, 760 RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, 761 . 763 [RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS 764 Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499, 765 January 2019, . 767 8.2. URIs 769 [1] https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/final 771 Appendix A. Change History 773 A.1. Change from 00 to 01 775 1. Filled in the "Implementation Status" section with the inclusion 776 of the "Verisign EPP SDK" and "RegistryEngine EPP Service" 777 implementations. 778 2. Made small wording corrections based on private feedback. 779 3. Added content to the "Acknowledgements" section. 781 Authors' Addresses 783 James Gould 784 VeriSign, Inc. 785 12061 Bluemont Way 786 Reston, VA 20190 787 US 789 Email: jgould@verisign.com 790 URI: http://www.verisign.com 791 Richard Wilhelm 792 VeriSign, Inc. 793 12061 Bluemont Way 794 Reston, VA 20190 795 US 797 Email: rwilhelm@verisign.com 798 URI: http://www.verisign.com