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Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == Line 1614 has weird spacing: '...command is no...' -- The document date (16 January 2020) is 1560 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7159 (Obsoleted by RFC 8259) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7231 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) Summary: 4 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group P. M. Hallam-Baker 3 Internet-Draft 16 January 2020 4 Intended status: Informational 5 Expires: 19 July 2020 7 Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part I: Architecture Guide 8 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12 10 Abstract 12 The Mathematical Mesh 'The Mesh' is an end-to-end secure 13 infrastructure that makes computers easier to use by making them more 14 secure. The Mesh provides a set of protocol and cryptographic 15 building blocks that enable encrypted data stored in the cloud to be 16 accessed, managed and exchanged between users with the same or better 17 ease of use than traditional approaches which leave the data 18 vulnerable to attack. 20 This document provides an overview of the Mesh data structures, 21 protocols and examples of its use. 23 [Note to Readers] 25 Discussion of this draft takes place on the MATHMESH mailing list 26 (mathmesh@ietf.org), which is archived at 27 https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=mathmesh. 29 This document is also available online at 30 http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh- 31 architecture.html. 33 Status of This Memo 35 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 36 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 38 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 39 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 40 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 41 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 43 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 44 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 45 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 46 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 48 This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 July 2020. 50 Copyright Notice 52 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 53 document authors. All rights reserved. 55 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 56 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ 57 license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. 58 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 59 and restrictions with respect to this document. 61 Table of Contents 63 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64 2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 2.1. Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 2.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 2.4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 3. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 70 3.1. A Personal PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 71 3.1.1. Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 3.1.2. Exchange of trusted credentials. . . . . . . . . . . 10 73 3.1.3. Application configuration management . . . . . . . . 10 74 3.1.4. The Mesh as platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 75 3.2. Mesh Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 76 3.2.1. Mesh Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 77 3.2.2. Mesh Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 3.2.3. Mesh Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 79 3.2.4. Mesh Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 80 3.3. Using the Mesh with Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 81 3.3.1. Contact Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 82 3.3.2. Confirmation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 83 3.3.3. Future Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 84 4. Mesh Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 85 4.1. Best Practice by Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 86 4.2. Multi-Level Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 87 4.3. Multi-Key Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 88 4.4. Multi-Party Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 89 4.5. Data At Rest Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 90 4.5.1. DARE Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 91 4.5.2. Dare Container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 92 4.6. Uniform Data Fingerprints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 93 4.6.1. Friendly Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 94 4.6.2. Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locators . . . . . . 23 95 4.6.3. Secure Internet Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 96 4.7. Personal Key Escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 97 5. User Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 98 5.1. Creating a Mesh Profile and Administration Device. . . . 26 99 5.2. Mesh Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 100 5.3. Using a Mesh Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 101 5.4. Connecting and Authorizing Additional Devices . . . . . . 28 102 5.4.1. Direct Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 103 5.4.2. Pin Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 104 5.4.3. EARL/QR Code Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 105 5.5. Contact Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 106 5.5.1. Remote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 107 5.5.2. Static QR Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 108 5.5.3. Dynamic QR Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 109 5.6. Sharing Confidential Data in the Cloud . . . . . . . . . 33 110 5.7. Escrow and Recovery of Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 111 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 112 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 113 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 114 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 116 1. Introduction 118 The Mathematical Mesh (Mesh) is a user centered Public Key 119 Infrastructure that uses cryptography to make computers easier to 120 use. The Mesh provides an infrastructure that addresses the three 121 concerns that have proved obstacles to the use of end-to-end security 122 in computer applications: 124 * Device management. 126 * Exchange of trusted credentials. 128 * Application configuration management. 130 The infrastructure developed to address these original motivating 131 concerns can be used to facilitate deployment and use of existing 132 security protocols (OpenPGP, S/MIME, SSH) and as a platform for 133 building end-to-end secure network applications. Current Mesh 134 applications include: 136 * Multi-factor authentication and confirmation 138 * Credential management 140 * Bookmark/Citation management 142 * Task and workflow management 144 A core principle of the design of the Mesh is that each person is 145 their own source of authority. They may choose to delegate that 146 authority to another to act on their behalf (i.e. a Trusted Third 147 Party) and they may choose to surrender parts of that authority to 148 others (e.g. an employer) for limited times and limited purposes. 150 Thus, from the user's point of view, the Mesh is divided into two 151 parts. The first and most important of these from their point of 152 view being their own personal Mesh. The second being the ensemble of 153 every Mesh to which their Mesh is connected. As with the Internet, 154 which is a network of networks, a Mesh of Meshes has certain 155 properties that are similar to those of its constituent parts and 156 some that are very different. 158 This document is not normative. It provides an overview of the Mesh 159 comprising a description of the architecture, and a discussion of 160 typical use cases and requirements. The remainder of the document 161 series provides a summary of the principal components of the Mesh 162 architecture and their relationship to each other. 164 Normative descriptions of the individual Mesh encodings, data 165 structures and protocols are provided in separate documents 166 addressing each component in turn. 168 The currently available Mesh document series comprises: 170 I. Architecture (This document.) Provides an overview of the Mesh 171 as a system and the relationship between its constituent parts. 173 II. Uniform Data Fingerprint [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf]. Describe 174 s the UDF format used to represent cryptographic nonces, keys and 175 content digests in the Mesh and the use of Encrypted Authenticated 176 Resource Locators (EARLs) and Strong Internet Names (SINs) that 177 build on the UDF platform. 179 III. Data at Rest Encryption [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare]. Describ 180 es the cryptographic message and append-only sequence formats used 181 in Mesh applications and the Mesh Service protocol. 183 IV. Schema Reference [draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema]. Describes the 184 syntax and semantics of Mesh Profiles, Container Entries and Mesh 185 Messages and their use in Mesh Applications. 187 V. Protocol Reference [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol]. Describes 188 the Mesh Service Protocol. 190 VI. The Trust Mesh [draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust]. Describes the 191 social work factor metric used to evaluate the effectiveness of 192 different approaches to exchange of credentials between users and 193 organizations in various contexts and argues for a hybrid approach 194 taking advantage of direct trust, Web of Trust and Trusted Third 195 Party models to provide introductions. 197 VII. Security Considerations [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security] Desc 198 ribes the security considerations for the Mesh protocol suite. 200 VIII Cryptographic Algorithms 201 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography]. Describes the recommended and 202 required algorithm suites for Mesh applications and the 203 implementation of the multi-party cryptography techniques used in 204 the Mesh. 206 The following documents describe technologies that are used in the 207 Mesh but do not form part of the Mesh specification suite: 209 JSON-BCD Encoding [draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd]. Describes extensions 210 to the JSON serialization format to allow direct encoding of 211 binary data (JSON-B), compressed encoding (JSON-C) and extended 212 binary data encoding (JSON-D). Each of these encodings is a 213 superset of the previous one so that JSON-B is a superset of JSON, 214 JSON-C is a superset of JSON-B and JSON-D is a superset of JSON-C. 216 DNS Web Service Discovery 217 [draft-hallambaker-web-service-discovery]. Describes the means by 218 which prefixed DNS SRV and TXT records are used to perform 219 discovery of Web Services. 221 The following documents describe aspects of the Mesh Reference 222 implementation: 224 Mesh Developer [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]. Describes the 225 reference code distribution license terms, implementation status 226 and currently supported functions. 228 Mesh Platform [draft-hallambaker-mesh-platform]. Describes how 229 platform specific functionality such as secure key storage and 230 trustworthy computing features are employed in the Mesh. 232 2. Definitions 234 This section presents the related specifications and standards on 235 which the Mesh is built, the terms that are used as terms of art 236 within the Mesh protocols and applications and the terms used as 237 requirements language. 239 2.1. Related Specifications 241 Besides the documents that form the Mesh core, the Mesh makes use of 242 many existing Internet standards, including: 244 Cryptographic Algorithms The RECOMMENDED and REQUIRED cryptographic 245 algorithms for Mesh implementations are specified in 246 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography]. 248 In addition Mesh Devices used to administer non-Mesh applications 249 must support the cryptographic algorithm suites specified by the 250 application. 252 Transport All Mesh Services make use of multiple layers of security. 253 Protection against traffic analysis and metadata attacks are 254 provided by use of Transport Layer Security [RFC5246]. At 255 present, the HTTP/1.1 [RFC7231] protocol is used to provide 256 framing of transaction messages. 258 Encoding All Mesh protocols and data structures are expressed in the 259 JSON data model and all Mesh applications accept data in standard 260 JSON encoding [RFC7159]. The JOSE Signature [RFC7515] and 261 Encryption [RFC7516] standards are used as the basis for object 262 signing and encryption. 264 2.2. Defined Terms 266 TBS 268 2.3. Requirements Language 270 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 271 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 272 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 274 2.4. Implementation Status 276 The implementation status of the reference code base is described in 277 the companion document [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer]. 279 The examples in this document were created on 1/6/2020 5:19:39 PM. 280 Out of 170 examples, 70 were not functional. 282 [Note: Example data is now being produced using the mesh command line 283 tool which is currently substantially less complete than the Mesh 284 reference code it is intended to provide an interface to. As a 285 result, the documentation currently lags the code by more than is 286 usual.] 288 3. Architecture 290 The Mathematical Mesh (Mesh) is a user centered Public Key 291 Infrastructure that uses cryptography to make computers easier to 292 use. This document describes version 3.0 of the Mesh architecture 293 and protocols. 295 For several decades, it has been widely noted that most users are 296 either unwilling or unable to make even the slightest efforts to 297 protect their security, still less those of other parties. Yet 298 despite this observation being widespread, the efforts of the IT 299 security community have largely focused on changing this user 300 behavior rather that designing applications that respect it. Real 301 users have real work to do and have neither the time nor the 302 inclination to use tools that will negatively impact their 303 performance. 305 The Mesh is based on the principle that if the Internet is to be 306 secure, if must become effortless to use applications securely. 307 Rather than beginning the design process by imagining all the 308 possible modes of attack and working out how to address these with 309 the least possible inconvenience, we must reverse the question and 310 ask how much security can be provided without requiring any effort on 311 the user's part to address it. 313 Today's technology requires users to put their trust in an endless 314 variety of devices, software and services they cannot fully 315 understand let alone control. Even the humble television of the 316 20^(th) century has been replaced by a 'smart' TV with 15 million 317 lines of code. Whose undeclared capabilities may well include 318 placing the room in which it is placed under continuous audio and 319 video surveillance. 321 Every technology deployment by necessity requires some degree of 322 trust on the owner/user's part. But this trust should be limited and 323 subject to accountability. If manufacturers continue to fail in this 324 regard, they risk a backlash in which users seek to restore their 325 rights through litigation, legislation or worst of all, simply not 326 buying more technology that they have learned to distrust through 327 their own experience. 329 The Mesh is based on the principle of radical distrust, that is, if a 330 party is capable of defecting, we assume that they will. As the 331 Russian proverb goes: ???????, ?? ????????: trust, but verify. 333 In the 1990s, the suggestion that 'hackers' might seek to make 334 financial gains from their activities was denounced as 'fear- 335 mongering'. The suggestion that email or anonymous currencies might 336 be abused received a similar response. Today malware, ransomware and 337 spam have become so ubiquitous that they are no longer news unless 338 the circumstances are particularly egregious. 340 We must dispense with the notion that it is improper or impolite to 341 question the good faith of technology suppliers of any kind whether 342 they be manufacturers, service providers, software authors or 343 reviewers. Modern supply chains are complex, typically involving 344 hundreds if not thousands of potential points of deliberate or 345 accidental compromise. The technology provider who relies on the 346 presumption of good faith on their part risks serious damage to their 347 reputation when others assert that a capability added to their 348 product may have malign uses. 350 Radical distrust means that we apply the principles of least 351 principle and accountability at every level in the design: 353 * Cryptographic keys installed in a product during manufacture are 354 only used for the limited purpose of putting that device under 355 control of the user. 357 * Cryptographic keys and assertions related to management of devices 358 are only visible to the user they belong to and are never exposed 359 to external parties. 361 * Mesh Accounts belong to and are under control of the user they 362 belong to and not the Mesh Service provider which the user can 363 change at will with minimal inconvenience. 365 * Mesh Services do not have access to the plaintext of any Mesh 366 Messages or Mesh Catalog data except for the Contacts catalog. 368 * All Mesh Messages are subject to access control by both the 369 inbound and outbound Mesh Service to mitigate messaging abuse. 371 Security is risk management and not the elimination of all 372 possibility of any risk. Radical distrust means that we raise the 373 bar for attackers to the point where for most attackers the risk is 374 greater than the reward. 376 In addition to distrusting technology providers the Mesh Architecture 377 allows the user to limit the degree of trust they place in 378 themselves. In the real world, devices are lost or stolen, passwords 379 and activation codes are forgotten, natural or man-made catastrophes 380 cause property and data to be lost. The Mesh permits but does not 381 require use of escrow techniques that allow recovery from such 382 situations. 384 3.1. A Personal PKI 386 The Mesh is a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is designed to 387 address the three major obstacles to deployment of end-to-end secure 388 applications: 390 * Device management. 392 * Exchange of trusted credentials. 394 * Application configuration management. 396 Each Mesh user is the ultimate source of authority in their Personal 397 Mesh which specifies the set of devices, contacts and applications 398 that they trust and for what purposes. 400 The Mesh 1.0 architecture described a PKI designed to meet these 401 limited requirements to enable use of existing end-to-end secure 402 Internet protocols such as OpenPGP, S/MIME and SSH. Since these 403 protocols only secure data in transit and the vast majority of data 404 breaches involve data at rest, the Data At Rest Encryption (DARE) was 405 added as a layered application resulting in the Mesh 2.0 406 architecture. This document describes the Mesh 3.0 architecture 407 which has been entirely re-worked so that DARE provides the platform 408 on which all other Mesh functions are built. 410 3.1.1. Device Management 412 Existing PKIs were developed in an era when the 'personal computer' 413 was still coming into being. Only a small number of people owned a 414 computer and an even smaller number owned more than one. Today, 415 computers are ubiquitous and a typical home in the developed world 416 contains several hundred of which a dozen or more may have some form 417 of network access. 419 The modern consumer faces a problem of device management that is 420 considerably more complex than the IT administrator of a small 421 business might have faced in the 1990s but without any of the network 422 management tools such an administrator would expect to have 423 available. 425 One important consequence of the proliferation of devices is that 426 end-to-end security is no longer sufficient. To be acceptable to 427 users, a system must be ends-to-ends secure. That is, a user must be 428 able to read their encrypted email message on their laptop, tablet, 429 phone, or watch with exactly the same ease of use as if the mail was 430 unencrypted. 432 Each personal Mesh contains a device catalog in which the 433 cryptographic credentials and device specific application 434 configurations for each connected device are stored. 436 Management of the device catalog is restricted to a subset of devices 437 that the owner of the Mesh has specifically authorized for that 438 purpose as administration devices. Only a device with access to a 439 duly authorized administration key can add or remove devices from a 440 personal Mesh. 442 3.1.2. Exchange of trusted credentials. 444 One of the most challenging, certainly the most contentious issues in 445 PKI is the means by which cryptographic credentials are published and 446 validated. 448 The Mesh does not attempt to impose criteria for accepting 449 credentials as valid as no such set of criteria can be comprehensive. 450 Rather the Mesh allows users to make use of the credential validation 451 criteria that are appropriate to the purpose for which they intend to 452 use them and Mesh Services provides protocol support for exchange of 453 credentials between users and to synchronize credential information 454 between all the devices belonging to a user. 456 In some circumstances, only a direct trust model is acceptable, in 457 others, only a trusted third-party model is possible and in the vast 458 majority of cases opportunistic approaches are more than sufficient. 459 Both approaches may be reinforced by use of chained notary 460 certificate (e.g. BlockChain) technology affords a means of 461 establishing that a particular assertion was made before a certain 462 date. The management of Trust in the Mesh is described in detail in 463 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust]. 465 3.1.3. Application configuration management 467 Configuration of cryptographic applications is typically worse than 468 an afterthought. Configuration of one popular mail user agent to use 469 S/MIME security requires 17 steps to be performed using four separate 470 application programs. And since S/MIME certificates expire, the user 471 is required to repeat these steps every few years. Contrary to the 472 public claims made by one major software vendor it is not necessary 473 to perform 'usability testing' to recognize abject stupidity. 475 Rather than writing down configuration steps and giving them to the 476 user, we should turn them into code and give them to a machine. 477 Users should never be required to do the work of the machine. Nor 478 should any programmer be allowed to insult the user by casting their 479 effort aside and requiring it to be re-entered. 481 While most computer professionals who are required to do such tasks 482 on a regular basis will create a tool for the purpose, most users do 483 not have that option. And of those who do write their own tools, 484 only a few have the time and the knowledge to do the job without 485 introducing security vulnerabilities. 487 3.1.4. The Mesh as platform 489 Meeting the core objectives of the Mesh required new naming, 490 communication and cryptographic capabilities provided to be 491 developed. These capabilities may in turn be used to develop new 492 end-to-end secure applications. 494 For example, a DARE Catalog is a cryptographic container in which the 495 entries represent a set of objects which may be added, updated and 496 deleted over time. The Mesh Service protocol allows DARE Catalogs to 497 be synchronized between devices connected to a Mesh Account. DARE 498 Catalogs are used as the basis for the device and contacts catalogs 499 referred to above. 501 The Mesh Credentials Catalog uses the same DARE Catalog format and 502 Mesh Service protocol to share passwords between devices with end-to- 503 end encryption so that no password data is ever left unencrypted in 504 the cloud. 506 3.2. Mesh Architecture 508 The Mesh has four principal components: 510 Mesh Device Management Each user has a personal Mesh profile that is 511 used for management of their personal devices. A user may connect 512 devices to or remove devices from their personal Mesh by use of a 513 connected device that has been granted the 'administration' role. 515 Mesh Account A Mesh account is similar in concept to a traditional 516 email or messaging account but with the important difference that 517 it belongs to the user and not a service provider. Users may 518 maintain multiple Mesh accounts for different purposes. 520 Mesh Service A Mesh Service provides a service identifier (e.g. 521 "alice@example.com") through which devices and other Mesh users 522 may interact with a Mesh Account. It is not necessary for a Mesh 523 Account to be connected to a Mesh Service and users may change 524 their Mesh service provider at any time. It is even possible for 525 a Mesh Account to be connected to multiple services at the same 526 time but only one such account is regarded as the primary account 527 at a given time. 529 Mesh Messaging Mesh Messaging allows short messages (less than 32KB) 530 to be exchanged between Mesh devices connected to an account and 531 between Mesh Accounts. One of the key differences between Mesh 532 Messaging and legacy services such as SMTP is that every message 533 received is subjected to access control. 535 A user's Personal Mesh is the set of their Personal Mesh Profiles, 536 Mesh Accounts and the Mesh Services to which they are bound. 538 For example, Figure X shows Alice's personal Mesh which have separate 539 accounts for her personal and business affairs. She has many 540 devices, two of which are shown here. Both are linked to her 541 personal account but only one is linked to her business account. 542 Besides allowing Alice to separate work and pleasure, this separation 543 means that she does not need to worry about her business affairs 544 being compromised if the device "Alice2" is stolen. 546 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 547 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 549 Figure 1 551 Alice's ProfileMaster contains a Master Signature Key used to sign 552 the profile itself and one or more Administrator Signature Keys used 553 to sign assertions binding devices and/or assertions to her Mesh. 555 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 556 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 558 Figure 2 560 If desired, Alice can escrow the master key associated with her 561 Profile Master and delete it from her device(s), thus ensuring that 562 compromise of the device does not result in a permanent compromise of 563 her personal Mesh. Recovery of the Master Signature Key and the 564 associated Master Encryption Escrow keys (not shown) allows Alice to 565 recover her entire digital life. 567 To eliminate the risk of hardware failure, the escrow scheme offered 568 by the Mesh itself uses key shares printed on paper and an encrypted 569 escrow record stored in the cloud. Mesh users are of course free to 570 use alternative escrow means of their choice. 572 3.2.1. Mesh Device Management 574 Mesh devices are added to or removed from a user's personal Mesh by 575 adding or removing Device catalog entries from the CatalogDevice 576 associated with the Master Profile. 578 Device catalog entries are created by devices that have been 579 provisioned with an administration key specified in the corresponding 580 ProfileMaster 582 The keying material used by a device in the context of a user's 583 personal Mesh comes from two separate sources: 585 * Keying material specified in the ProfileDevice which is either 586 generated on the device itself or installed during manufacture. 588 * Keying material provided by the Administration Device during the 589 connection process. 591 This approach mitigates the risk of keying material used by the 592 device being compromised during or after manufacture and the risks 593 associated with use of weak keys. The key combination mechanism is 594 shown in section XX below and described in detail in 595 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography]. 597 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 598 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 600 Figure 3 602 In accordance with the principle of maintaining cryptographic 603 hygiene, separate keys are generated for signature, authentication 604 and encryption purposes. 606 3.2.2. Mesh Account 608 Mesh Accounts comprise a collection of persistent data stores 609 associated with a particular persona associated with a personal Mesh. 610 The connection between a Mesh Account and the personal Mesh to which 611 it belongs may or may not be public. For example, Alice might allow 612 her contacts to know that her business and personal accounts belong 613 to the same personal Mesh and thus the same person but Bob might not. 615 Mesh Accounts afford similar functionality to the accounts provided 616 by traditional Internet protocols and applications but with the 617 important distinction that they belong to the user and not the 618 service provider. A Mesh Account may be connected to one, many or no 619 Mesh Services and the user may add or delete service providers at any 620 time. 622 A Mesh Account that is not connected to a Service is called an 623 offline account. Offline accounts cannot send or receive Mesh 624 Messages and cannot be synchronized using the Mesh Service protocol 625 (but may be synchronized through other means). 627 When a Mesh Account is connected to multiple services, only the first 628 service is normally regarded as being primary with the others being 629 secondary accounts for use in case of need. 631 Alice's personal account is connected to two devices and two services 632 ("alice@example.com" and "alice@example.net"). 634 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 635 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 637 Figure 4 639 As with the connection of the device to Alice's personal Mesh, the 640 connection of each device to each account requires the creation of a 641 separate set of keying using the same key combination mechanism 642 described above. This information is contained in the 643 ActivationAccount record corresponding to the account in the 644 CatalogEntryDevice. 646 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 647 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 649 Figure 5 651 Note that even though Alice's personal account is connected to two 652 separate Mesh Services, the same cryptographic keys are used for 653 both. However separate keys are used for her personal and business 654 accounts so as to prevent these accounts being linked through use of 655 the same device keys. 657 3.2.2.1. Account Catalogs 659 Mesh Catalogs are a DARE Containers whose entries represent a set of 660 objects with no inherent ordering. Examples of Mesh catalogs 661 include: 663 Devices The devices connected to the corresponding Mesh profile. 665 Contacts Logical and physical contact information for people and 666 organizations. 668 Application 670 Bookmarks Web bookmarks and citations. 672 Credentials Username and password information for network resources. 674 Calendar Appointments and tasks. 676 Network Network access configuration information allowing access to 677 WiFi networks and VPNs. 679 Configuration information for applications including mail (SMTP, 680 IMAP, OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc) and SSH. 682 The Devices and Contacts catalogues have special functions in the 683 Mesh as they describe the set of devices and other users that a Mesh 684 user interacts with. 686 These catalogs are also used as the basis for providing a consistent 687 set of friendly names to the users devices and contacts that is 688 accessible to all her devices. This (in principle) allows Alice to 689 give a voice command to her car or her watch or her phone to call a 690 person or open a door and expect consistent results. 692 3.2.3. Mesh Service 694 Each Mesh Service is described by a ProfileService signed by a long- 695 lived signature key. As with the ProfileMaster, a separate set of 696 Administrator keys is used to sign the Assertion Host objects used to 697 credential Service Hosts. 699 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 700 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 702 Figure 6 704 Note that the Mesh Service Authentication mechanism only provides 705 trust after first use. It does not provide a mechanism for secure 706 introduction. A Mesh Service SHOULD be credentialed by means of a 707 validation process that establishes the accountability. For example, 708 the CA-Browser Forum Extended Validation Requirements. 710 3.2.4. Mesh Messaging 712 The Mesh Messaging layer supports the exchange of short (less than 713 32KB) messages. Mesh devices connected to the same Mesh profile may 714 exchange Mesh Messages directly. Messages exchanged between Mesh 715 Users MUST be mediated by a Mesh Service for both sending and 716 receipt. This 'four corner' pattern permits ingress and egress 717 controls to be enforced on the messages and that every message is 718 properly recorded in the appropriate spools. 720 For example, To send a message to Alice, Bob posts it to one of the 721 Mesh Services connected to the Mesh Account from which the message is 722 to be sent. The Mesh Service checks to see that both the message and 723 Bob's pattern of behavior comply with their acceptable use policy and 724 if satisfactory, forwards the message to the receiving service 725 example.com. 727 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 728 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 730 Figure 7 732 The receiving service uses the recipient's contact catalog and other 733 information to determine if the message should be accepted. If 734 accepted, the message is added to the recipient's inbound message 735 spool to be collected by her device(s) when needed. 737 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 738 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 740 Figure 8 742 For efficiency and to limit the scope for abuse, all inbound Mesh 743 Messages are subject to access control and limited in size to 32KB or 744 less. This limit has proved adequate to support transfer of complex 745 control messages and short content messages. Transfer of data 746 objects of arbitrary size may be achieved by sending a control 747 message containing a URI for the main content which may then be 748 fetched using a protocol such as HTTP. 750 This approach makes transfers of very large data sets (i.e. multiple 751 Terabytes) practical as the 'push' phase of the protocol is limited 752 to the transfer of the initial control message. The bulk transfer is 753 implemented as a 'pull' protocol allowing support for features such 754 as continuous integrity checking and resumption of an interrupted 755 transfer. 757 3.3. Using the Mesh with Applications 759 The Mesh provides an infrastructure for supporting existing Internet 760 security applications and a set security features that may be used to 761 build new ones. 763 For example, Alice uses the Mesh to provision and maintain the keys 764 she uses for OpenPGP, S/MIME, SSH and IPSEC. She also uses the 765 credential catalog for end-to-end secure management of the usernames 766 and passwords for her Web browsing and other purposes: 768 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 769 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 771 Figure 9 773 The Mesh design is highly modular allowing components that were 774 originally designed to support a specific requirement within the Mesh 775 to be applied generally. 777 3.3.1. Contact Exchange 779 One of the chief concerns in any PKI is the means by which the public 780 keys of other users are obtained and validated. This is of 781 particular importance in the Mesh since every Mesh Message is subject 782 to access control and it is thus necessary for Alice to accept Bob's 783 credentials before Bob send most types of message to Alice. 785 The Mesh supports multiple mechanisms for credential exchange. If 786 Alice and Bob meet in person and are carrying their smart phones, a 787 secure mutual exchange of credentials can be achieved by means of a 788 QR code mechanism. If they are at separate locations, Alice can 789 choose between accepting Bob's contact information with or without 790 additional verification according to the intended use. 792 3.3.2. Confirmation Protocol 794 The basic device connection protocol requires the ability for one 795 device to send a connection request to the Mesh service hosting the 796 user's profile. To accept the device connection, the user connects 797 to the service using an administration device, reviews the pending 798 requests and creates the necessary device connection assertion if it 799 is accepted. 801 The confirmation protocol generalizes this communication pattern 802 allowing any authorized party to post a short accept/reject question 803 to the user who may (or may not) return a signed response. This 804 feature can be used as improvement on traditional second factor 805 authentication providing resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks and 806 providing a permanent non-repudiable indication of the user's 807 specific intent. 809 3.3.3. Future Applications 811 Since a wide range of network applications may be reduced to 812 synchronization of sets and lists, the basic primitives of Catalogs 813 and Spools may be applied to achieve end-to-end security in an even 814 wider variety of applications. 816 For example, a Spool may be used to maintain a mailing list, track 817 comments on a Web forum or record annotations on a document. 818 Encrypting the container entries under a multi-party encryption group 819 allows such communications to be shared with a group of users while 820 maintaining full end-to-end security and without requiring every 821 party writing to the spool to know the public encryption key of every 822 recipient. 824 Another interesting possibility is the use of DARE Containers as a 825 file archive mechanism. A single signature on the final Merkle Tree 826 digest value would be sufficient to authenticate every file in the 827 archive. Updates to the archive might be performed using the same 828 container synchronization primitives provided by a Mesh Service. 829 This approach could afford a robust, secure and efficient mechanism 830 for software distribution and update. 832 4. Mesh Cryptography 834 All the cryptographic algorithms used in the Mesh are either industry 835 standards or present a work factor that is provably equivalent to an 836 industry standard approach. 838 Existing Internet security protocols are based on approaches 839 developed in the 1990s when performance tradeoffs were a prime 840 consideration in the design of cryptographic protocols. Security was 841 focused on the transport layer as it provided the best security 842 possible given the available resources. 844 With rare exceptions, most computing devices manufactured in the past 845 ten years offer either considerably more computing power than was 846 typical of 1990s era Internet connected machines or considerably 847 less. The Mesh architecture is designed to provide security 848 infrastructure both classes of machine but with the important 849 constraint that the less capable 'constrained' devices are considered 850 to be 'network capable' rather than 'Internet capable' and that the 851 majority of Mesh related processing will be offloaded to another 852 device. 854 For example, Alice uses her Desktop and Laptop to exchange end-to-end 855 secure Mesh Messages and documents but her Internet-of-Things food 856 blender and light bulb are limited in the range of functions they 857 support and the telemetry information they provide. The IoT devices 858 connect to a Mesh Hub which acts as an always-on point of presence 859 for the device state and allows complex cryptographic operations to 860 be offloaded if necessary. 862 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 863 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 865 Figure 10 867 4.1. Best Practice by Default 869 Except where support for external applications demand otherwise, the 870 Mesh requires that the following 'best practices' be followed: 872 Industry Standard Algorithms All cryptographic protocols make use of 873 the most recently adopted industry standard algorithms. 875 Strongest Work Factor Only the strongest modes of each cipher 876 algorithm are used. All symmetric encryption is performed with 877 256-bit session keys and all digest algorithms are used in 512-bit 878 output length mode. 880 Key Hygiene Separate public key pairs are used for all cryptographic 881 functions: Encryption, Signature and Authentication. This enables 882 separate control regimes for the separate functions and 883 partitioning of cryptographic functions within the application 884 itself. 886 Bound Device Keys Each device has a separate set of Encryption, 887 Signature and Authentication key pairs. These MAY be bound to the 888 device to which they are assigned using hardware or other 889 techniques to prevent or discourage export. 891 No Optional Extras Traditional approaches to security have treated 892 many functions as being 'advanced' and thus suited for use by only 893 the most sophisticated users. The Mesh rejects this approach 894 noting that all users operate in precisely the same environment 895 facing precisely the same threats. 897 4.2. Multi-Level Security 899 All Mesh protocol transactions are protected at the Transport, 900 Message and Data level. This provides security in depth that cannot 901 be achieved by applying security at the separate levels 902 independently. Data level encryption provides end-to-end 903 confidentiality and non-repudiation, Message level authentication 904 provides the basis for access control and Transport level encryption 905 provides a degree of protection against traffic analysis. 907 4.3. Multi-Key Decryption 909 Traditional public key encryption algorithms have two keys, one for 910 encryption and another for decryption. The Mesh makes use of 911 threshold cryptography techniques to allow the decryption key to be 912 split into two or more parts. 914 For example, if we have a private key _z_, we can use this to perform 915 a key agreement with a public key _S_ to obtain the key agreement 916 value A. But if _z_ = (_x+y_) mod _g_ (where g is the order of the 917 group). we can obtain the exact same result by applying the private 918 keys _x_ and _y_ to _S_ separately and combining the results: 920 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 921 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 923 Figure 11 925 The approach to Multi-Key Decryption used in the Mesh was originally 926 inspired by the work of Matt Blaze et. al. on proxy re-encryption. 927 But the approach used may also be considered a form of Torben 928 Pedersen's Distributed Key generation. 930 This technique is used in the Mesh to allow use of decryption key 931 held by a user to be controlled by a cloud service without giving the 932 cloud service the ability to decrypt by itself. 934 4.4. Multi-Party Key Generation 936 The mathematics that support multi-key decryption are also the basis 937 for the multi-party key generation mechanism that is applied at 938 multiple levels in the Mesh. The basis for the multi-party key 939 generation used in the Mesh is that for any Diffie-Hellman type 940 cryptographic scheme, given two keypairs { _x_, _X_ }, { _y_, _Y_ }, 941 we calculate the public key corresponding to the private key _x_+ _y_ 942 using just the public key values _X_and _Y_. 944 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 945 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 947 Figure 12 949 Multi-party key generation ensures that keys used to bind devices to 950 a personal Mesh or within a Mesh account are 'safe' if any of the 951 contributions to the generation process are safe. 953 4.5. Data At Rest Encryption 955 The Data At Rest Encryption (DARE) format is used for all 956 confidentiality and integrity enhancements. The DARE format is based 957 on the JOSE Signature and Encryption formats and the use of an 958 extended version of the JSON encoding allowing direct encoding of 959 binary objects. 961 4.5.1. DARE Envelope 963 The DARE Envelope format offers similar capabilities to existing 964 formats such as OpenPGP and CMS without the need for onerous encoding 965 schemes. DARE Assertions are presented as DARE Envelopes. 967 A feature of the DARE Envelope format not supported in existing 968 schemes is the ability to encrypt and authenticate sets of data 969 attributes separately from the payload. This allows features such as 970 the ability to encrypt a subject line or content type for a message 971 separately from the payload. 973 4.5.2. Dare Container 975 A DARE Container is an append-only sequence of DARE Envelopes. A key 976 feature of the DARE Container format is that entries MAY be encrypted 977 and/or authenticated incrementally. Individual entries MAY be 978 extracted from a DARE Container to create a stand-alone DARE 979 Envelope. 981 Containers may be authenticated by means of a Merkle tree of digest 982 values on the individual frames. This allows similar demonstrations 983 of integrity to those afforded by Blockchain to be provided but with 984 much greater efficiency. 986 Unlike traditional encryption formats which require a new public key 987 exchange for each encrypted payload, the DARE Container format allows 988 multiple entries to be encrypted under a single key exchange 989 operation. This is particularly useful in applications such as 990 encrypting server transaction logs. The server need only perform a 991 single key exchange operation is performed each time it starts to 992 establish a master key. The master key is then used to create fresh 993 symmetric keying material for each entry in the log using a unique 994 nonce per entry. 996 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 997 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 999 Figure 13 1001 Integrity is provided by a Merkle tree calculated over the sequence 1002 of log entries. The tree apex is signed at regular intervals to 1003 provide non-repudiation. 1005 Three types of DARE Containers are used in the mesh 1007 Catalogs A DARE Container whose entries track the status of a set of 1008 related objects which may be added, updated or deleted. 1010 Spools A DARE Container whose entries track the status of a series 1011 of Mesh Messages. 1013 Archives A DARE Container used to provide a file archive with 1014 optional confidentiality and/or integrity enhancements. 1016 4.6. Uniform Data Fingerprints. 1018 The Uniform Data Fingerprint (UDF) format provides a compact means of 1019 presenting cryptographic nonces, keys and digest values using Base32 1020 encoding that resists semantic substitution attacks. UDF provides a 1021 convenient format for data entry. Since the encoding used is case- 1022 insensitive, UDFs may if necessary be read out over a voice link 1023 without excessive inconvenience. 1025 The following are examples of UDF values: 1027 NDDI-FY6J-IOGW-Z6WZ-QBKV-FDNY-ALDQ 1028 EA3P-NYHM-5E36-QNRK-NDB3-WJT6-YHCA 1029 SAQB-TIMR-OIPM-CVGV-3WQA-726M-WLDR-6 1030 MB5S-R4AJ-3FBT-7NHO-T26Z-2E6Y-WFH4 1031 KCM5-7VB6-IJXJ-WKHX-NZQF-OKGZ-EWVN 1032 AA7B-A4WX-KRJE-LVPL-XEDA-36PQ-RRQ3 1034 UDF content digests are used to support a direct trust model similar 1035 to that of OpenPGP. Every Mesh Profile is authenticated by the UDF 1036 fingerprint of its signature key. Mesh Friendly Names and UDF 1037 Fingerprints thus serve analogous functions to DNS names and IP 1038 Addresses. Like DNS names, Friendly Names provide the basis for 1039 application-layer interactions while the UDF Fingerprints are used as 1040 to provide the foundation for security. 1042 4.6.1. Friendly Names 1044 Internet addressing schemes are designed to provide a globally unique 1045 (or at minimum unambiguous) name for a host, service or account. In 1046 the early days of the Internet, this resulted in addresses such as 1047 10.2.3.4 and alice@example.com which from a usability point of view 1048 might be considered serviceable if not ideal. Today the Internet is 1049 a global infrastructure servicing billions of users and tens of 1050 billions of devices and accounts are more likely to be 1051 alice.lastname.1934@example.com than something memorable. 1053 Friendly names provide a user or community specific means of 1054 identifying resources that may take advantage of geographic location 1055 or other cues to resolve possible ambiguity. If Alice says to her 1056 voice activated device "close the garage door" it is implicit that it 1057 is her garage door that she wishes to close. And should Alice be 1058 fortunate enough to own two houses with a garage, it is implicit that 1059 it is the garage door of the house she is presently using that she 1060 wishes to close. 1062 The Mesh Device Catalog provides a directory mapping friendly names 1063 to devices that is available to all Alice's connected devices so that 1064 she may give and instruction to any of her devices using the same 1065 friendly name and expect consistent results. 1067 4.6.2. Encrypted Authenticated Resource Locators 1069 Various schemes have been used to employ QR Codes as a means of 1070 device and/or user authentication. In many of these schemes a QR 1071 code contains a challenge nonce that is used to authenticate the 1072 connection request. 1074 The Mesh supports a QR code connection mode employing the Encrypted 1075 Authenticated Resource Locator (EARL) format. An EARL is an 1076 identifier which allows an encrypted data object to be retrieved and 1077 decrypted. In this case, the encrypted data object contains the 1078 information needed to complete the interaction. 1080 An EARL contains the domain name of the service providing the 1081 resolution service and an encryption master key: 1083 udf://example.com/EC4X-PWKB-JNOA-FRW7-DBBT-ZAYU-3EVA-FR 1085 The EARL may be expressed as a QR code: 1087 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 1088 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 1090 Figure 14 1092 An EARL is resolved by presenting the content digest fingerprint of 1093 the encryption key to a Web service hosted at the specified domain. 1094 The service returns a DARE Envelope whose payload is encrypted and 1095 authenticated under the specified master key. Since the content is 1096 stored on the service under the fingerprint of the key and not the 1097 key itself, the service cannot decrypt the plaintext. Only a party 1098 that has access to the encryption key in the QR code can decrypt the 1099 message. 1101 4.6.3. Secure Internet Names 1103 Secure Internet Names bind an Internet address such as a URL or an 1104 email address to a Security Policy by means of a UDF content digest 1105 of a document describing the security policy. This binding enables a 1106 SIN-aware Internet client to ensure that the security policy is 1107 applied when connecting to the address. For example, ensuring that 1108 an email sent to an address must be end-to-end encrypted under a 1109 particular public key or that access to a Web Service requires a 1110 particular set of security enhancements. 1112 alice@example.com Alice's regular email address (not a SIN). 1114 alice@mm--uuuu-uuuu-uuuu.example.com A strong email address for 1115 Alice that can be used by a regular email client. 1117 alice@example.com.mm--uuuu-uuuu-uuuu A strong email address for 1118 Alice that can only used by an email client that can process SINs. 1120 Using an email address that has the Security Policy element as a 1121 prefix allows a DNS wildcard element to be defined that allows the 1122 address to be used with any email client. Presenting the Security 1123 Policy element as a suffix means it can only be resolved by a SIN- 1124 aware client. 1126 4.7. Personal Key Escrow 1128 One of the core objectives of the Mesh is to make data level 1129 encryption ubiquitous. While data level encryption provides robust 1130 protection of data confidentiality, loss of the ability to decrypt 1131 means data loss. 1133 For many Internet users, data availability is a considerably greater 1134 concern than confidentiality. Ten years later, there is no way to 1135 replace pictures of the children at five years old. Recognizing the 1136 need to guarantee data recovery, the Mesh provides a robust personal 1137 key escrow and recovery mechanism. Lawful access is not supported as 1138 a requirement. 1140 Besides supporting key recovery in the case of loss, the Mesh 1141 protocols potentially support key recovery in the case of the key 1142 holder's death. The chief difficulty faced in implementing such a 1143 scheme being developing an acceptable user interface which allows the 1144 user to specify which of their data should survive them and which 1145 should not. As the apothegm goes: Mallet wants his beneficiaries to 1146 know where he buried Aunt Agatha's jewels but not where he buried 1147 Aunt Agatha. 1149 The Mesh supports use of Shamir Secret Sharing to split a secret key 1150 into a set of shares, a predetermined number of which may be used to 1151 recover the original secret. For convenience secret shares are 1152 represented using UDF allowing presentation in Base32 (i.e. text 1153 format) for easy transcription or QR code presentation if preferred. 1155 A Mesh Profile is escrowed by creating a recovery record containing 1156 the private keys corresponding to the master signature and master 1157 escrow keys associated with the profile. A master secret is then 1158 generated which is used to generate a symmetric encryption key used 1159 to encrypt the recovery record and to generate the desired number of 1160 recovery shares. For example, Alice escrows her Mesh Profile 1161 creating three recovery shares, two of which are required to recover 1162 the master secret: 1164 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 1165 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 1167 Figure 15 1169 To recover the master secret, Alice presents the necessary number of 1170 key shares. These are used to recover the master secret which is 1171 used to generate the decryption key. 1173 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 1174 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 1176 Figure 16 1178 A user may choose to store their encrypted recovery record themselves 1179 or make use of the EARL mechanism to store the information at one or 1180 more cloud services using the fingerprint of the master secret as the 1181 locator. 1183 5. User Experience 1185 This section describes the Mesh in use. These use cases described 1186 here are re-visited in the companion Mesh Schema Reference 1187 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema] and Mesh Protocol Reference 1188 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol] with additional examples and 1189 details. 1191 For clarity and for compactness, these use cases are illustrated 1192 using the command line tool meshman. 1194 The original design brief for the Mesh was to make it easier to use 1195 the Internet securely. Over time, it was realized that users are 1196 almost never prepared to sacrifice usability or convenience for 1197 security. It is therefore insufficient to minimize the cost of 1198 security, if secure applications are to be used securely they must be 1199 at least as easy to use as those they replace. If security features 1200 are to be used, they must not require the user to make any additional 1201 effort whatsoever. 1203 The key to meeting this constraint is that any set of instructions 1204 that can be written down to be followed by a user can be turned into 1205 code and executed by machine. Provided that the necessary 1206 authentication, integrity and confidentiality controls are provided. 1207 Thus, the Mesh is not just a cryptographic infrastructure that makes 1208 use of computer systems more secure, it is a usability infrastructure 1209 that makes computers easier to use by providing security. 1211 The user experience is thus at the heart of the design of the Mesh 1212 and a description of the Mesh Architecture properly begins with 1213 consideration of the view of the system that matters most: that of 1214 the user. 1216 The principle security protocols in use today were designed at a time 1217 when most Internet users made use of either a single machine or one 1218 of a number of shared machines connected to a shared file store. The 1219 problem of transferring cryptographic keys and configuration data 1220 between machines was rarely considered and when it was considered was 1221 usually implemented badly. Today the typical user owns or makes use 1222 of multiple devices they recognize as a computer (laptop, tablet) and 1223 an even greater number of devices that they do not recognize as 1224 computers but are (almost any device with a display). 1226 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 1227 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 1229 Figure 17 1231 5.1. Creating a Mesh Profile and Administration Device. 1233 The first step in using the Mesh is to create a personal profile. 1234 From the user's point of view a profile is a collection of all the 1235 configuration data for all the Mesh enabled devices and services that 1236 they interact with. 1238 Alice> mesh create 1239 Device Profile UDF=MBPL-MIIT-KOHN-FC6P-6V5Y-ZQ4R-3NKY 1240 Personal Profile UDF=MCSC-2POG-PH7T-ODJX-HOCA-B4XY-AFSK 1242 Note that the user does not specify the cryptographic algorithms to 1243 use. Choice of cryptographic algorithm is primarily the concern of 1244 the protocol designer, not the user. The only circumstance in which 1245 users would normally be involved in algorithm selection is when there 1246 is a transition in progress from one algorithm suite to another. 1248 5.2. Mesh Accounts 1250 Add an account to the personal Mesh: 1252 Alice> account create personal 1253 Account=MC23-X3CT-EUNB-DR3M-QIBI-W2IJ-ATEP 1255 A Mesh Catalog contains a set of entries, each of which has a unique 1256 object identifier. Catalog entries may be added, updated or deleted. 1258 By default, all catalog entries are encrypted. Applying the Default 1259 Deny principle, in normal circumstances, the Mesh Service is not 1260 capable of decrypting any catalog excepting the Contacts catalog 1261 which is used as a source of authorization data in the Access Control 1262 applied to inbound messaging requests. 1264 For example, the entries in the credentials catalog specify username 1265 and password credentials used to access Internet services. Adding 1266 credentials to her catalog allows Alice to write scripts that access 1267 password protected resources without including the passwords in the 1268 scripts themselves: 1270 Alice> password add ftp.example.com alice1 password 1271 alice1@ftp.example.com = [password] 1272 Alice> password add www.example.com alice@example.com newpassword 1273 alice@example.com@www.example.com = [newpassword] 1274 Alice> password list 1275 alice1@ftp.example.com = [password] 1276 alice@example.com@www.example.com = [newpassword] 1277 Alice> password add ftp.example.com alice1 newpassword 1278 alice1@ftp.example.com = [newpassword] 1279 Alice> password get ftp.example.com 1280 alice1@ftp.example.com = [newpassword] 1282 5.3. Using a Mesh Service 1284 A Mesh Service provides an 'always available' point of presence that 1285 is used to exchange data between devices connected to the connected 1286 profile and send and receive Mesh Messages to and from other Mesh 1287 users. 1289 To use a Mesh Service, a user creates a Mesh Service account. This 1290 is analogous to an SMTP email service but with the important 1291 distinction that the protocol is designed to allow users to change 1292 their Mesh Service provider at any time they choose with minimal 1293 impact. 1295 The account is created by sending an account registration request to 1296 the chosen Mesh Service. If accepted, the Mesh Service creates a new 1297 account and creates containers to hold the associated catalogs and 1298 spools: 1300 Alice> account register alice@example.com 1301 Account=MC23-X3CT-EUNB-DR3M-QIBI-W2IJ-ATEP 1303 As with any other Internet service provision, Mesh Service providers 1304 may impose constraints on the use of their service such as the amount 1305 of data they send, store and receive and charge a fee for their 1306 service. 1308 5.4. Connecting and Authorizing Additional Devices 1310 Having established a Mesh profile, a user may connect any number of 1311 devices to it. Connecting a device to a Mesh profile allows it to 1312 share data with, control and be controlled by other devices connected 1313 to the profile. 1315 Although any type of network capable device may be connected to a 1316 Mesh profile, some devices are better suited for use with certain 1317 applications than others. Connecting an oven to a Mesh profile could 1318 allow it to be controlled through entries to the user's recipe and 1319 calendar catalogs and alert the user when the meal is ready but 1320 attempting to use it to read emails or manage Mesh profiles. 1322 Three connection mechanisms are currently specified, each of which 1323 provides strong mutual authentication: Direct, PIN and QR. 1325 Since approval of a connection request requires the creation of a 1326 signed Connection Assertion, requests must be approved by a device 1327 that has access to an administration key authorized by the user's 1328 Master Profile. Such devices are referred to as Administration 1329 devices. Administration devices must have data entry (e.g. keyboard) 1330 and output (e.g. display) affordances to support any of the currently 1331 defined connection mechanisms. The QR code connection mechanism also 1332 requires a suitable camera. 1334 It will be noted that the process of connecting a device that 1335 contains a preconfigured set of device keys might in principle expose 1336 the user to the risk that the manufacturer has retained knowledge of 1337 these keys and that this might be used to create a 'backdoor'. 1339 This risk is controlled using the key co-generation technique 1340 described earlier. The original device profile is combined with a 1341 device profile provided by the user to create a composite device 1342 profile. This ensures that every device uses a unique profile even 1343 if they are initialized from a shared firmware image containing a 1344 fixed set of device key pairs. 1346 5.4.1. Direct Connection 1348 The direct connection mechanism requires that both the administration 1349 device and the device originating the connection request have data 1350 entry and output affordances and that it is possible for the user to 1351 compare the authentication codes presented by the two devices to 1352 check that they are identical. 1354 The connection request is initiated on the device being connected: 1356 Alice2> device request alice@example.com 1357 Witness value = NGPY-QAYV-OCQD-W6JD-U3HP-3OAQ-57OW 1358 Personal Mesh = MCSC-2POG-PH7T-ODJX-HOCA-B4XY-AFSK 1360 Using her administration device, Alice gets a list of pending 1361 requests. Seeing that there is a pending request matching the 1362 witness value presented by the device, Alice accepts it: 1364 Alice> device pending 1365 Alice> device accept NCPO-L452-CMZY-MLQO-TM52-KQYW-EFGP 1367 The new device will now synchronize automatically in response to any 1368 Mesh commands. For example, listing the password catalog: 1370 Alice2> password list 1371 ERROR - Object reference not set to an instance of an object. 1373 5.4.2. Pin Connection 1375 The PIN Connection mechanism is similar to the Direct connection 1376 mechanism except that the process is initiated on an administration 1377 device by requesting assignment of a new authentication PIN. The PIN 1378 is then input to the connecting device to authenticate the request. 1380 The PIN connection mechanism begins with the issue of the PIN: 1382 Alice> account pin 1383 PIN=NCAX-BVXY-5O3Y-CPZS-OU (Expires=2020-01-07T17:19:33Z) 1385 The PIN code is transmitted out of band to the device being 1386 connected: 1388 Alice3> device request alice@example.com /pin=NCAX-BVXY-5O3Y-CPZS-OU 1389 Witness value = RDPZ-WAM2-QD3P-YNJE-R3BV-NXOF-OEFC 1390 Personal Mesh = MCSC-2POG-PH7T-ODJX-HOCA-B4XY-AFSK 1392 Since the request was pre-authorized, it is not necessary for Alice 1393 to explicitly accept the connection request but the administration 1394 device is needed to create the connection assertion: 1396 Alice> device pending 1398 We can check the device connection by attempting to synchronize to 1399 the profile account: 1401 Alice3> account sync 1402 ERROR - Object reference not set to an instance of an object. 1404 Note that this connection mechanism could be addapted to allow a 1405 device with a camera affordance to connect by scanning a QR code on 1406 the administration device. 1408 If the Device Profile fingerprint is known at the time the PIN is 1409 generated, this can be bound to the PIN authorization assertion to 1410 permit connection of a specific device. 1412 5.4.3. EARL/QR Code Connection 1414 The EARL/QR code connection mechanisms are used to connect a 1415 constrained device to a Mesh profile by means of an Encrypted 1416 Authenticated Resource Locator, typically presented as a QR code on 1417 the device itself or its packaging. 1419 Since the meshman tool does not support QR input, it is decoded using 1420 a separate tool to recover the UDF EARL which is presented as a 1421 command line parameter: 1423 To use the device QR code connection mechanism, we require a Web 1424 service that will host the connection document example.com and a 1425 MeshService account that the device will attempt to complete the 1426 connection by requesting synchronization devices@example.com. 1428 To begin the process we generate a new random key and combine it with 1429 the service to create an EARL: 1431 udf://example.com/EC4X-PWKB-JNOA-FRW7-DBBT-ZAYU-3EVA-FR 1433 Next a device profile is created and preregistered on with the Mesh 1434 Service that will provide the hailing service. Since we are only 1435 preparing one device it is convenient to do this on the device 1436 itself. In a manufacturing scenario, these steps would typically be 1437 performed offline in bulk. 1439 Alice4> device pre devices@example.com /key=udf://example.com/EC4X-PW 1440 KB-JNOA-FRW7-DBBT-ZAYU-3EVA-FR 1441 ERROR - Object reference not set to an instance of an object. 1443 Once initialized the device attempts to poll the service for a 1444 connection each time it is powered on, when a connection button 1445 affordance on the device is pressed or at other times as agreed with 1446 the Mesh Service Provider: 1448 Alice4> account sync 1449 ERROR - Object reference not set to an instance of an object. 1451 To connect the device to her profile, Alice scans the device with her 1452 administration device to obtain the UDF. The administration device 1453 retrieves the connection description, decrypts it and then uses the 1454 information in the description to create the necessary Device 1455 Connection Assertion and connect to the device hailing Mesh Service 1456 Account to complete the process: 1458 Alice> device earl udf://example.com/EC4X-PWKB-JNOA-FRW7-DBBT-ZAYU-3E 1459 VA-FR 1460 ERROR - Object reference not set to an instance of an object. 1462 When the device next attempts to connect to the hailing service, it 1463 receives the Device Connection Assertion: 1465 Alice4> account sync 1466 ERROR - Object reference not set to an instance of an object. 1468 5.5. Contact Requests 1470 As previously stated, every inbound Mesh message is subject to access 1471 control. The user's contact catalog is used as part of the access 1472 control authentication and authorization mechanism. 1474 By default, the only form of inbound message that is accepted without 1475 authorization in the contact catalog is a contact request. Though 1476 for certain Mesh users (e.g. politicians, celebrities) even contact 1477 requests might require some form of prior approval (e.g. endorsement 1478 by a mutual friend). 1480 A Mesh Contact Assertion may be limited to stating the user's profile 1481 fingerprint and Mesh Service Account(s). For most purposes however, 1482 it is more convenient to present a Contact Assertion that contains at 1483 least as much information as is typically provided on a business or 1484 calling card: 1486 Alice creates a contact entry for herself: 1488 Alice> contact self email alice@example.com 1489 { 1490 "Self": true, 1491 "Key": "NDMW-OM2B-66IV-DWFH-MQXO-X322-IP74", 1492 "EnvelopedContact": [{}, 1493 "ewogICJDb250YWN0IjogewogICAgIkFkZHJlc3Nlcy 1494 I6IFt7CiAgICAgICAgIlVSSSI6ICJtYWlsdG86e2VtYWlsfSJ9XX19"]} 1496 User's may create multiple Contact Assertions for use in different 1497 circumstances. A user might not want to give their home address to a 1498 business contact or their business address to a personal friend. 1500 5.5.1. Remote 1502 In the most general case, the participants are remote from each other 1503 and one user must make a contact request of the other: 1505 Bob requests Alice add him to her contacts catalog: 1507 Bob> message contact alice@example.com 1509 When Alice next checks her messages, she sees the pending contact 1510 request from Bob and accepts it. Bob's contact details are added to 1511 her catalog and Bob receives a response containing Alice's 1512 credentials: 1514 Alice> message pending 1515 Alice> message accept tbs 1517 5.5.2. Static QR Code 1519 A DARE contact entry may be exchanged by means of an EARL UDF. This 1520 is typically presented by means of a QR code which may be created 1521 using the "meshman" tool and a QR code generator. The resulting QR 1522 code may be printed on a business card, laser engraved on a luggage 1523 tag, etc. 1525 To accept the contact request, the recipient merely scans the code 1526 with a Mesh capable QR code reader. They are asked if they wish to 1527 accept the contact request and what privileges they wish to authorize 1528 for the new contact. 1530 5.5.3. Dynamic QR Code 1532 If it is possible for the device to generate a new QR code for the 1533 contact request, it is possible to support bi-directional exchange of 1534 credentials with strong mutual authentication. 1536 For example, Alice selects the contact credential she wishes to pass 1537 to Bob on her mobile device which presents an EARL as a QR code. Bob 1538 scans the QR code with his mobile device which retrieves Alice's 1539 credential and asks if Bob wishes to accept it and if he wishes to 1540 share his credential with Alice. If Bob agrees, his device makes a 1541 Remote Contact request authenticated under a key passed to his device 1542 with Alice's Contact Assertion. 1544 The Dynamic QR Code protocol may be applied to support exchange of 1545 credentials between larger groups. Enrolling the contact assertions 1546 collected in such circumstances in a notarized append only log (e.g. 1547 a DARE Container) provides a powerful basis for building a Web of 1548 Trust that is equivalent to but considerably more convenient than 1549 participation in PGP Key Signing parties. 1551 5.6. Sharing Confidential Data in the Cloud 1553 As previously discussed, the Mesh makes use of multi-party encryption 1554 techniques to mitigate the risk of a device compromise leading to 1555 disclosure of confidential data. The Mesh also allows these 1556 techniques to be applied to provide Confidential Document Control. 1557 This provides data encryption capabilities that are particularly 1558 suited to 'cloud computing' environments. 1560 A Mesh Encryption Group is a special type of Mesh Service Account 1561 that is controlled by one of more group administrators. The 1562 Encryption Group Key is a normal ECDH public key used in the normal 1563 manner. The decryption key is held by the group administrator. To 1564 add a user to the group, the administrator splits the group private 1565 key into two parts, a service key and a user key. These parts are 1566 encrypted under the public encryption keys of their assigned parties. 1567 The encrypted key parts form a decryption entry for the user is added 1568 to the Members Catalog of the Encryption Group at the Mesh Service. 1570 (Artwork only available as svg: No external link available, see 1571 draft-hallambaker-mesh-architecture-12.html for artwork.) 1573 Figure 18 1575 When a user needs to decrypt a document encrypted under the group 1576 key, they make a request to the Mesh Service which checks to see that 1577 they are authorized to read that particular document, have not 1578 exceeded their decryption quota, etc. If the request is approved, 1579 the service returns the partial decryption result obtained from the 1580 service's key part together with the encrypted user key part. To 1581 complete the decryption process, the user decrypts their key part and 1582 uses it to create a second partial decryption result which is 1583 combined with the first to obtain the key agreement value needed to 1584 complete the decryption process. 1586 Alice creates the recryption group groupw@example.com to share 1587 confidential information with her closest friends: 1589 Alice> group create groupw@example.com 1590 { 1591 "Profile": { 1592 "KeyOfflineSignature": { 1593 "UDF": "MB2A-I332-A75U-OHD7-WLHR-XRZK-CLRU", 1594 "PublicParameters": { 1595 "PublicKeyECDH": { 1596 "crv": "Ed448", 1597 "Public": "V9z0yscYdi-vi2cqWrehpdZhy45EjB-AIaXWC7iIVtmHckZA 1598 xSlK 1599 pDd-vDVDwBgF50egU0gEvMUA"}}}, 1600 "KeyEncryption": { 1601 "UDF": "MB2W-EYG3-EFXZ-QGEL-BCFJ-BA76-IF6H", 1602 "PublicParameters": { 1603 "PublicKeyECDH": { 1604 "crv": "Ed448", 1605 "Public": "8XTv_F07n1odENFoyPvc8gXF95iZoOp1sLZ3HeO4jwxy42Qe 1606 TfE8 1607 2HtQWT59vPV5X8uSg0iKdloA"}}}}} 1609 Bob encrypts a test file but he can't decrypt it because he isn't in 1610 the group: 1612 Bob> dare encodeTestFile1.txt /out=TestFile1-group.dare /encrypt=grou 1613 pw@example.com 1614 ERROR - The command is not known. 1615 Bob> dare decode TestFile1-group.dare 1616 ERROR - Could not find file 'C:\Users\hallam\Test\WorkingDirectory\Te 1617 stFile1-group.dare'. 1619 Since she is the group administrator, Alice can decrypt the test file 1620 using the group decryption key: 1622 Alice> dare decode TestFile1-group.dare 1623 ERROR - Could not find file 'C:\Users\hallam\Test\WorkingDirectory\Te 1624 stFile1-group.dare'. 1626 Adding Bob to the group gives him immediate access to any file 1627 encrypted under the group key without making any change to the 1628 encrypted files: 1630 Alice> dare decode TestFile1-group.dare 1631 ERROR - Could not find file 'C:\Users\hallam\Test\WorkingDirectory\Te 1632 stFile1-group.dare'. 1634 Removing Bob from the group immediately withdraws his access. 1636 Alice> group delete groupw@example.com bob@example.com 1637 ERROR - The feature has not been implemented 1639 Bob cannot decrypt any more files (but he may have kept copies of 1640 files he decrypted earlier). 1642 Alice> dare decode TestFile1-group.dare 1643 ERROR - Could not find file 'C:\Users\hallam\Test\WorkingDirectory\Te 1644 stFile1-group.dare'. 1646 Should requirements demand, the same principle may be applied to 1647 achieve separation of duties in the administration roles. Instead of 1648 provisioning the group private key to a single administrator, it may 1649 be split into two or more parts. Adding a user to the group requires 1650 each of the administrators to create a decryption entry for the user 1651 and for the service and user to apply the appropriate operations to 1652 combine the key parts available to them before use. 1654 These techniques could even be extended to support complex 1655 authorization requirements such as the need for 2 out of 3 1656 administrators to approve membership of the group. A set of 1657 decryption entries is complete if the sum of the key parts is equal 1658 to the private key (modulo the order of the curve). 1660 Thus, if the set of administrators is A, B and C and the private key 1661 is _k_, we can ensure that it requires exactly two administrators to 1662 create a complete set of decryption entries by issuing key set { _a_ 1663 } to A, the key set {_k-a_ , _b_ } to B and the key set {_k-a_ , _k- 1664 b_ } to C (where _a_ and _b_ are randomly generated keys). 1666 5.7. Escrow and Recovery of Keys 1668 One of the chief objections made against deployment of Data Level 1669 encryption is that although it provides the strongest possible 1670 protection of the confidentiality of the data, loss of the decryption 1671 keys means loss of the encrypted data. Thus, a robust and effective 1672 key escrow mechanism is essential if use of encryption is to ever 1673 become commonplace for stored data. 1675 The use of a 'life-long' Mesh profiles raises a similar concern. 1676 Loss of a Master Signature Key potentially means the loss of the 1677 ability to control devices connected to the profile and the 1678 accumulated trust endorsements of other users. 1680 Because of these requirements, Mesh users are strongly advised but 1681 not required to create a backup copy of the private keys 1682 corresponding to their Master Profile Signature and Escrow keys. 1684 Users may use the key escrow mechanism of their choice including the 1685 escrow mechanism supported by the Mesh itself which uses Shamir 1686 Secret Sharing to escrow the encryption key for a DARE Envelope 1687 containing the private key information. 1689 To escrow a key set, the user specifies the number of key shares to 1690 be created and the number required for recovery. 1692 Alice> mesh escrow 1693 ERROR - The cryptographic provider does not permit export of the priv 1694 ate key parameters 1696 Recovery of the key data requires the key recovery record and a 1697 quorum of the key shares: 1699 Having recovered the Master Signature Key, the user can now create a 1700 new master profile authorizing a new administration device which can 1701 be used to authenticate access to the Mesh Service Account(s) 1702 connected to the master profile. 1704 6. Security Considerations 1706 The security considerations for use and implementation of Mesh 1707 services and applications are described in the Mesh Security 1708 Considerations guide . [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security] 1710 7. IANA Considerations 1712 This document does not contain actions for IANA 1714 8. Acknowledgements 1716 Comodo Group: Egemen Tas, Melhi Abdulhayo?lu, Rob Stradling, Robin 1717 Alden. 1719 9. Normative References 1721 [draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd] 1722 Hallam-Baker, P., "Binary Encodings for JavaScript Object 1723 Notation: JSON-B, JSON-C, JSON-D", Work in Progress, 1724 Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd-15, 23 October 1725 2019, . 1728 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography] 1729 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VIII: 1730 Cryptographic Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet- 1731 Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-cryptography-04, 1 November 1732 2019, . 1735 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare] 1736 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part III : Data 1737 At Rest Encryption (DARE)", Work in Progress, Internet- 1738 Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare-05, 23 October 2019, 1739 . 1742 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-developer] 1743 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Reference 1744 Implementation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- 1745 hallambaker-mesh-developer-09, 23 October 2019, 1746 . 1749 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-platform] 1750 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh: Platform 1751 Configuration", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- 1752 hallambaker-mesh-platform-05, 23 October 2019, 1753 . 1756 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-protocol] 1757 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part V: Protocol 1758 Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- 1759 hallambaker-mesh-protocol-03, 23 October 2019, 1760 . 1763 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-schema] 1764 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part IV: Schema 1765 Reference", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- 1766 hallambaker-mesh-schema-04, 23 October 2019, 1767 . 1770 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-security] 1771 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VII: 1772 Security Considerations", Work in Progress, Internet- 1773 Draft, draft-hallambaker-mesh-security-02, 23 October 1774 2019, . 1777 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-trust] 1778 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part VI: The 1779 Trust Mesh", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- 1780 hallambaker-mesh-trust-03, 23 October 2019, 1781 . 1784 [draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf] 1785 Hallam-Baker, P., "Mathematical Mesh 3.0 Part II: Uniform 1786 Data Fingerprint.", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, 1787 draft-hallambaker-mesh-udf-08, 6 January 2020, 1788 . 1791 [draft-hallambaker-web-service-discovery] 1792 Hallam-Baker, P., "DNS Web Service Discovery", Work in 1793 Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hallambaker-web-service- 1794 discovery-03, 23 October 2019, 1795 . 1798 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 1799 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 1800 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 1801 . 1803 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 1804 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 1805 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, 1806 . 1808 [RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 1809 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 1810 2014, . 1812 [RFC7231] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol 1813 (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, 1814 DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, 1815 . 1817 [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web 1818 Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 1819 2015, . 1821 [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", 1822 RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, 1823 .