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Hardt 3 Internet-Draft Amazon 4 Intended status: Informational January 16, 2018 5 Expires: July 20, 2018 7 Reciprocal OAuth 8 draft-hardt-oauth-mutual-02 10 Abstract 12 There are times when a user has a pair of protected resources that 13 would like to request access to each other. While OAuth flows 14 typically enable the user to grant a client access to a protected 15 resource, granting the inverse access requires an additional flow. 16 Reciprocal OAuth enables a more seemless experience for the user to 17 grant access to a pair of protected resources. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2018. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 1. Introduction 53 In the usual three legged, authorization code grant, the OAuth flow 54 enables a resource owner (user) to enable a client (party A) to be 55 granted authorization to access a protected resource (party B). If 56 party A also has a protected resource that the user would like to let 57 party B access, then a complete OAuth flow, but in the reverse 58 direction, must be performed. 60 Reciprocal OAuth enables party A to obtain constent from the user to 61 grant access to a protected resource at party A, and to short circuit 62 the OAuth flow by passing an authorization code to party B using the 63 acces token party A obtained from party B to provide party B the 64 context of the user. This simplifies the user experience for each 65 party to obtain acces tokens from the other. 67 1.1. Terminology 69 In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", 70 "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", 71 and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 72 [RFC2119]. 74 2. Reciprocal Authorization Flow 76 The reciprocal authorization flow starts after the client (party A) 77 has obtained an access token from the authorization server (party B) 78 per [RFC6749] 4.1 Authorization Code Grant. 80 2.1. User Consent 82 Party A obtains consent from the user to grant access to protected 83 resources at party A. The consent represents the scopes party B had 84 preconfigured at party A. 86 2.2. Reciprocal Authorization Code 88 Party A generates an authorization code representing the access 89 granted to party B by the user. Party A then makes a request to 90 party B's token endpoint authenticating per [RFC6749] 2.3 and sending 91 the following parameters using the "application/x-www-form- 92 urlencoded" format per [RFC6749] Appendix B with a character encoding 93 of UTF-8 in the HTTP request entity-body: 95 grant_type REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to 96 "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:reciprocal". 98 code REQUIRED. The authorization code generated by party A. 100 client_id REQUIRED, party A'a client ID. 102 access_token REQUIRED, the access token obtained from Party B. Used 103 to provide user context. [DH: security concern passing the access 104 token in the body?] 106 For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using TLS 107 (with extra line breaks for display purposes only): 109 POST /token HTTP/1.1 110 Host: server.example.com 111 Authorization: Basic ej4hsyfishwssjdusisdhkjsdksusdhjkjsdjk 112 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded 114 grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3reciprocal&code=hasdyubasdjahsbdkjbasd&client_id=example.com&access_token=sadadojsadlkjasdkljxxlkjdas 116 Party B MUST then verify the access token was granted to the client 117 identified by the client_id. 119 Party B MUST respond with either an HTTP 200 (OK) response if the 120 request is valid, or an HTTP 400 "Bad Request" if it is not. 122 Party B then plays the role of the client to make an access token 123 request per [RFC6749] 4.1.3. 125 3. IANA Considerations 127 TBD. 129 4. Acknowledgements 131 TBD. 133 5. Normative References 135 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 136 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 137 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 138 . 140 [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", 141 RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, 142 . 144 [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization 145 Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, 146 DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, 147 . 149 Appendix A. Document History 151 A.1. draft-hardt-oauth-mutual-00 153 o Initial version. 155 A.2. draft-hardt-oauth-mutual-01 157 o renamed to Reciprocal OAuth 159 o clarified user consent in reciprocal flow 161 o changed authentication to be client authentication per [RFC6749] 162 2.3 164 A.3. draft-hardt-oauth-mutual-02 166 o changed grant type to URI 168 o added valid request response codes in 2.2 170 Author's Address 172 Dick Hardt 173 Amazon 175 Email: dick.hardt@gmail.com