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2 Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck
3 Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
4 Intended status: Standards Track December 2, 2016
5 Expires: June 5, 2017
7 Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol
8 (RDAP) using OpenID Connect
9 draft-hollenbeck-regext-rdap-openid-02
11 Abstract
13 The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
14 services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
15 regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
16 control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
17 support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
18 Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Identification methods that require
19 clients to obtain and manage credentials from every RDAP server
20 operator present management challenges for both clients and servers,
21 whereas a federated authentication system would make it easier to
22 operate and use RDAP without the need to maintain server-specific
23 client credentials. This document describes a federated
24 authentication system for RDAP based on OpenID Connect.
26 Status of This Memo
28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
34 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
41 This Internet-Draft will expire on June 5, 2017.
43 Copyright Notice
45 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
46 document authors. All rights reserved.
48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
50 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
51 publication of this document. Please review these documents
52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
56 described in the Simplified BSD License.
58 Table of Contents
60 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
61 1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
62 1.2. Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
63 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
64 3. Federated Authentication for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
65 3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
66 3.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
67 3.1.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
68 3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps . . . . . 6
69 3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
70 3.1.3.2. Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
71 3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
72 3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation . . . . . . 7
73 3.1.3.5. Token Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
74 3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information . . . . . . . . . . 7
75 3.1.4. Specialized Parameters for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 7
76 3.1.4.1. Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
77 4. Protocol Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
78 4.1. Client Authentication Request and Response . . . . . . . 9
79 4.2. Token Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
80 4.3. Token Refresh and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
81 4.4. Parameter Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
82 5. Non-Browser Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
83 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
84 6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
85 6.2. RDAP Query Purpose Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
86 7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
87 7.1. Verisign Labs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
88 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
89 8.1. Authentication and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
90 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
91 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
92 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
93 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
94 10.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
95 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
96 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
98 1. Introduction
100 The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
101 services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
102 regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
103 control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
104 support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
105 Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC7230].
107 RDAP is specified in multiple documents, including "HTTP Usage in the
108 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7480], "Security
109 Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7481],
110 "Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" [RFC7482], and "JSON
111 Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
112 [RFC7483]. RFC 7481 describes client identification and
113 authentication services that can be used with RDAP, but it does not
114 specify how any of these services can (or should) be used with RDAP.
116 1.1. Problem Statement
118 The traditional "user name and password" authentication method does
119 not scale well in the RDAP ecosystem. Assuming that all domain name
120 and address registries will eventually provide RDAP service, it is
121 impractical and inefficient for users to secure login credentials
122 from the hundreds of different server operators. Authentication
123 methods based on user names and passwords do not provide information
124 that describes the user in sufficient detail (while protecting the
125 personal privacy of the user) for server operators to make fine-
126 grained access control decisions based on the user's identity. The
127 authentication system used for RDAP needs to address all of these
128 needs.
130 1.2. Proposal
132 A basic level of RDAP service can be provided to users who possess an
133 identifier issued by a recognized provider who is able to
134 authenticate and validate the user. The identifiers issued by social
135 media services, for example, can be used. Users who require higher
136 levels of service (and who are willing to share more information
137 about them self to gain access to that service) can secure
138 identifiers from specialized providers who are or will be able to
139 provide more detailed information about the user. Server operators
140 can then make access control decisions based on the identification
141 information provided by the user.
143 A federated authentication system would make it easier to operate and
144 use RDAP by re-using existing identifiers to provide a basic level of
145 access. It can also provide the ability to collect additional user
146 identification information, and that information can be shared with
147 the consent of the user. This document describes a federated
148 authentication system for RDAP based on OpenID Connect [OIDC] that
149 meets all of these needs.
151 2. Conventions Used in This Document
153 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
154 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
155 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
157 3. Federated Authentication for RDAP
159 RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
160 relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
161 provide needed security services including access control,
162 authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
163 data integrity, and identification. A description of each of these
164 security services can be found in "Internet Security Glossary,
165 Version 2" [RFC4949]. This document focuses on a federated
166 authentication system for RDAP that provides services for
167 authentication, authorization, and identification, allowing a server
168 operator to make access control decisions. Section 3 of RFC 7481
169 [RFC7481] describes general considerations for RDAP access control,
170 authentication, and authorization.
172 The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
173 to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
174 situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
175 increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
176 one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
177 credential management complexity.
179 3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect
181 OpenID Connect 1.0 [OIDCC] is a decentralized, single sign-on (SSO)
182 federated authentication system that allows users to access multiple
183 web resources with one identifier instead of having to create
184 multiple server-specific identifiers. Users acquire identifiers from
185 OpenID Providers, or OPs. Relying Parties, or RPs, are applications
186 (such as RDAP) that outsource their user authentication function to
187 an OP. OpenID Connect is built on top of the authorization framework
188 provided by the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] protocol.
190 The OAuth authorization framework describes a method for users to
191 access protected web resources without having to hand out their
192 credentials. Instead, clients are issued Access Tokens by
193 authorization servers with the permission of the resource owners.
194 Using OpenID Connect and OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a
195 federation and clients can access any server in the federation by
196 providing one credential registered with any OP in that federation.
197 The OAuth authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and
198 thus can be used with RDAP.
200 3.1.1. Terminology
202 This document uses the terms "client" and "server" defined by RDAP
203 [RFC7480]. An RDAP client performs the role of an OpenID Connect
204 Core [OIDCC] Entity or End-User. An RDAP server performs the role of
205 an OpenID Connect Core Relying Party (RP). Additional terms from
206 Section 1.2 of the OpenID Connect Core specification are incorporated
207 by reference.
209 3.1.2. Overview
211 At a high level, RDAP authentication of a browser-based client using
212 OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps:
214 1. An RDAP client (acting as an OpenID End-User) sends an HTTP (or
215 HTTPS) query containing OAuth 2.0 request parameters to an RDAP
216 server.
217 2. The RDAP server (acting as an OpenID Relying Party (RP)) prepares
218 an Authentication Request containing the desired request
219 parameters.
220 3. The RDAP server sends the RDAP client and Authentication Request
221 to an Authorization Server operated by an OpenID Provider (OP)
222 using an HTTP redirect.
223 4. The Authorization Server authenticates the RDAP Client.
224 5. The Authorization Server obtains RDAP Client consent/
225 authorization.
226 6. The Authorization Server sends the RDAP Client back to the RDAP
227 server with an Authorization Code using an HTTP redirect.
228 7. The RDAP server requests a response using the Authorization Code
229 at the Token Endpoint.
230 8. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token and
231 Access Token in the response body.
232 9. The RDAP server validates the ID Token and retrieves the RDAP
233 client's Subject Identifier.
235 The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and
236 access control decisions based on local policies, the ID Token
237 received from the OP, and the received Claims. Note that OpenID
238 Connect describes different process flows for other types of clients,
239 such as script-based or command line clients.
241 3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps
243 End-Users MUST possess an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to
244 use OpenID Connect with RDAP. The OpenID Foundation maintains a list
245 of OPs on its web site [1]. Additional OPs are almost certainly
246 needed to fully realize the potential for federated authentication
247 with RDAP because RDAP has authorization and access control
248 requirements that go beyond the end-user authentication requirements
249 of a typical web site.
251 OpenID Connect requires RPs to register with OPs to use OpenID
252 Connect services for an End-User. That process is described by the
253 "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration" protocol [OIDCR].
255 3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery
257 An RDAP server/RP needs to receive an identifier from an End-User
258 that can be used to discover the End-User's OP. That process is
259 required and is documented in the "OpenID Connect Discovery" protocol
260 [OIDCD].
262 3.1.3.2. Authentication Request
264 Once the OP is known, an RP MUST form an Authentication Request and
265 send it to the OP as described in Section 3 of the OpenID Connect
266 Core protocol [OIDCC]. The authentication path followed
267 (authorization, implicit, or hybrid) will depend on the
268 Authentication Request response_type set by the RP. The remainder of
269 the processing steps described here assume that the Authorization
270 Code Flow is being used by setting "response_type=code" in the
271 Authentication Request.
273 The benefits of using the Authorization Code Flow for authenticating
274 a human user are described in Section 3.1 of the OpenID Connect Core
275 protocol. The Implicit Flow is more commonly used by clients
276 implemented in a web browser using a scripting language; it is
277 described in Section 3.2 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol. The
278 Hybrid Flow (described in Section 3.3 of the OpenID Connect Core
279 protocol) combines elements of the Authorization and Implicit Flows
280 by returning some tokens from the Authorization Endpoint and others
281 from the Token Endpoint.
283 An Authentication Request can contain several parameters. REQUIRED
284 parameters are specified in Section 3.1.2.1 of the OpenID Connect
285 Core protocol [OIDCC]. Other parameters MAY be included.
287 The OP receives the Authentication Request and attempts to validate
288 it as described in Section 3.1.2.2 of the OpenID Connect Core
289 protocol [OIDCC]. If the request is valid, the OP attempts to
290 authenticate the End-User as described in Section 3.1.2.3 of the
291 OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC]. The OP returns an error
292 response if the request is not valid or if any error is encountered.
294 3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization
296 After the End-User is authenticated, the OP MUST obtain authorization
297 information from the End-User before releasing information to the
298 RDAP Server/RP. This process is described in Section 3.1.2.4 of the
299 OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
301 3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation
303 After the End-User is authenticated, the OP will send a response to
304 the RP that describes the result of the authorization process in the
305 form of an Authorization Grant. The RP MUST validate the response.
306 This process is described in Sections 3.1.2.5 - 3.1.2.7 of the OpenID
307 Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
309 3.1.3.5. Token Processing
311 The RP sends a Token Request using the Authorization Grant to a Token
312 Endpoint to obtain a Token Response containing an Access Token, ID
313 Token, and an OPTIONAL Refresh Token. The RP MUST validate the Token
314 Response. This process is described in Section 3.1.3 of the OpenID
315 Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
317 3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information
319 The set of Claims can be retrieved by sending a request to a UserInfo
320 Endpoint using the Access Token. The Claims MAY be returned in the
321 ID Token. The process of retrieving Claims from a UserInfo Endpoint
322 is described in Section 5.3 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol
323 [OIDCC].
325 OpenID Connect specified a set of standard Claims in Section 5.1.
326 Additional Claims for RDAP are described in Section 3.1.4.1.
328 3.1.4. Specialized Parameters for RDAP
330 3.1.4.1. Claims
332 OpenID Connect claims are pieces of information used to make
333 assertions about an entity. Section 5 of the OpenID Connect Core
334 protocol [OIDCC] describes a set of standard claims that can be used
335 to identify a person. Section 5.1.2 notes that additional claims MAY
336 be used, and it describes a method to create them.
338 3.1.4.1.1. Stated Purpose
340 There are communities of RDAP users and operators who wish to make
341 and validate claims about a user's "need to know" when it comes to
342 requesting access to a resource. For example, a law enforcement
343 agent or a trademark attorney may wish to be able to assert that they
344 have a legal right to access a protected resource, and a server
345 operator will need to be able to receive and validate that claim.
346 These needs can be met by defining and using an additional "purpose"
347 claim.
349 The "purpose" claim identifies the purpose for which access to a
350 protected resource is being requested. Use of the "purpose" claim is
351 OPTIONAL; processing of this claim is subject to server acceptance of
352 the purpose and successful authentication of the End-User.
353 Unrecognized purpose values MUST be ignored and the associated query
354 MUST be processed as if the unrecognized purpose value was not
355 present at all.
357 The "purpose" value is a case-sensitive string containing a
358 StringOrURI value as specified in Section 2 of the JSON Web Token
359 (JWT) specification ([RFC7519]). An example:
361 {"purpose" : "domainNameControl"}
363 Purpose values are themselves registered with IANA. Each entry in
364 the registry contains the following fields:
366 Value: the purpose string value being registered. Value strings can
367 contain upper case characters from "A" to "Z", lower case ASCII
368 characters from "a" to "z", and the underscore ("_") character.
369 Value strings contain at least one character and no more than 64
370 characters.
372 Description: a one- or two-sentence description of the meaning of the
373 purpose value, how it might be used, and/or how it should be
374 interpreted by clients and servers.
376 This registry is operated under the "Specification Required" policy
377 defined in RFC 5226 ([RFC5226]). The set of initial values used to
378 populate the registry as described in Section 6.2 are taken from the
379 final report [2] produced by the Expert Working Group on gTLD
380 Directory Services chartered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
381 Names and Numbers (ICANN).
383 4. Protocol Parameters
385 This specification adds the following protocol parameters to RDAP:
387 1. A query parameter to request authentication for a specific end-
388 user identity.
389 2. A path segment to request an ID Token and an Access Token for a
390 specific end-user identity.
391 3. A query parameter to deliver an ID Token and an Access Token for
392 use with an RDAP query.
394 4.1. Client Authentication Request and Response
396 Client authentication is requested by adding a query component to an
397 RDAP request URI using the syntax described in Section 3.4 of RFC
398 3986 [RFC3986]. The query used to request client authentication is
399 represented as a "key=value" pair using a key value of "id" and a
400 value component that contains the client identifier issued by an OP.
401 An example:
403 https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?id=user.idp.example
405 The response to an authenticated query MUST use the response
406 structures specified in RFC 7483 [RFC7483]. Information that the
407 end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be omitted from the
408 response.
410 4.2. Token Request and Response
412 Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to authenticate an end-
413 user and return an ID Token and an Access Token from an OP that can
414 be then be passed to the RP/RDAP server to authenticate and process
415 subsequent queries. Identity provider authentication is requested
416 using a "tokens" path segment and a query parameter with key value of
417 "id" and a value component that contains the client identifier issued
418 by an OP. An example:
420 https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example
422 In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response to this
423 query MUST contain four name-value pairs, in any order, representing
424 the returned ID Token and Access Token. The ID Token is represented
425 using a key value of "id_token". The Access Token is represented
426 using a key value of "access_token". The access token type is
427 represented using a key value of "token_type" and a value of "bearer"
428 as described in Sections 4.2.2 and 7.1 of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. The
429 lifetime of the access token is represented using a key value of
430 "expires_in" and a numerical value that describes the lifetime in
431 seconds of the access token as described in Section 4.2.2 of RFC 6749
432 [RFC6749]. The token values returned in the RDAP server response
433 MUST be Base64url encoded as described in RFCs 7515 [RFC7515] and
434 7519 [RFC7519].
436 An example (the encoded tokens have been abbreviated for clarity):
438 {
439 "access_token" : "eyJ0...NiJ9",
440 "id_token" : "eyJ0...EjXk",
441 "token_type" : "bearer",
442 "expires_in" : "3600"
443 }
445 Figure 1
447 An RDAP server that processes this type of query MUST determine if
448 the identifier is associated with an OP that is recognized and
449 supported by the server. Servers MUST reject queries that include an
450 identifier associated with an unsupported OP with an HTTP 501 (Not
451 Implemented) response. An RDAP server that receives a query
452 containing an identifier associated with a recognized OP MUST perform
453 the steps required to authenticate the user with the OP using a
454 browser or browser-like client and return encoded tokens to the
455 client. Note that tokens are typically valid for a limited period of
456 time and new tokens will be required when an existing token's
457 validity period has expired.
459 The tokens can then be passed to the server for use with an RDAP
460 query using a query parameter with key values of "id_token" and
461 "access_token" and values that represent the encoded tokens. An
462 example (the encoded tokens have been abbreviated and the URI split
463 across multiple lines for clarity):
465 https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com
466 ?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk
467 &access_token=eyJ0...NiJ9
469 The response to an authenticated query MUST use the response
470 structures specified in RFC 7483 [RFC7483]. Information that the
471 end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be omitted from the
472 response.
474 4.3. Token Refresh and Revocation
476 An access token can be refreshed as described in Section 12 of the
477 OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC] and Section 6 of OAuth 2.0
479 [RFC6749]. Clients can take advantage of this functionality if it is
480 supported by the OP and accepted by the RDAP server.
482 A refresh token is requested using a "tokens" path segment and two
483 query parameters. The first query parameter includes a key value of
484 "id" and a value component that contains the client identifier issued
485 by an OP. The second query parameter includes a key value of
486 "refresh" and a value component of "true". A value component of
487 "false" MUST be processed to return a result that is consistent with
488 not including a "refresh" parameter at all as described in
489 Section 4.2. An example using "refresh=true":
491 https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example
492 &refresh=true
494 The response to this query MUST contain all of the response elements
495 described in Section 4.2. In addition, the response MUST contain a
496 name-value pair that represents a refresh token. The name-value pair
497 includes a key value of "refresh_token" and a Base64url-encoded value
498 that represents the refresh token.
500 Example refresh token request response (the encoded tokens have been
501 abbreviated for clarity):
503 {
504 "access_token" : "eyJ0...NiJ9",
505 "id_token" : "eyJ0...EjXk",
506 "token_type" : "bearer",
507 "expires_in" : "3600",
508 "refresh_token" : "eyJ0...c8da"
509 }
511 Figure 2
513 Once acquired, a refresh token can be used to refresh an access
514 token. An access token is refreshed using a "tokens" path segment
515 and two query parameters. The first query parameter includes a key
516 value of "id" and a value component that contains the client
517 identifier issued by an OP. The second query parameter includes a
518 key value of "refresh_token" and a Base64url-encoded value that
519 represents the refresh token. An example:
521 https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example
522 &refresh_token=eyJ0...f3jE
524 In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the response to this
525 query MUST contain four name-value pairs, in any order, representing
526 a returned Refresh Token and Access Token. The Refresh Token is
527 represented using a key value of "refresh_token". The Access Token
528 is represented using a key value of "access_token". The access token
529 type is represented using a key value of "token_type" and a value of
530 "bearer" as described in Sections 4.2.2 and 7.1 of RFC 6749
531 [RFC6749]. The lifetime of the access token is represented using a
532 key value of "expires_in" and a numerical value that describes the
533 lifetime in seconds of the access token as described in Section 4.2.2
534 of RFC 6749 [RFC6749]. The token values returned in the RDAP server
535 response MUST be Base64url encoded as described in RFCs 7515
536 [RFC7515] and 7519 [RFC7519].
538 Example access token refresh response (the encoded tokens have been
539 abbreviated for clarity):
541 {
542 "access_token" : "0dac...13b0",
543 "refresh_token" : "f735...d30c",
544 "token_type" : "bearer",
545 "expires_in" : "3600"
546 }
548 Figure 3
550 Access and refresh tokens can be revoked as described in RFC 7009
551 [RFC7009] by sending a request to an RDAP server that contains a
552 "tokens/revoke" path segment and two query parameters. The first
553 query parameter includes a key value of "id" and a value component
554 that contains the client identifier issued by an OP. The second
555 query parameter includes a key value of "token" and a Base64url-
556 encoded value that represents either the current refresh token or the
557 associated access token. An example:
559 https://example.com/rdap/tokens/revoke?id=user.idp.example
560 &token=f735...d30c
562 Note that this command will revoke both access and refresh tokens at
563 the same time. In addition to any core RDAP response elements, the
564 response to this query MUST contain a description of the result of
565 processing the revocation request within the RDAP "notices" data
566 structure.
568 Example token revocation success:
570 "notices" :
571 [
572 {
573 "title" : "Token Revocation Result",
574 "description" : "Token revocation succeeded.",
575 }
576 ],
577 "lang" : "en-US"
579 Figure 4
581 Example token revocation failure:
583 "notices" :
584 [
585 {
586 "title" : "Token Revocation Result",
587 "description" : "Token revocation failed.",
588 }
589 ],
590 "errorCode" : 400,
591 "lang" : "en-US"
593 Figure 5
595 4.4. Parameter Processing
597 Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP request that
598 does not include an "id" query component MUST be processed as an
599 unauthenticated query. An RDAP server that processes an
600 authenticated query MUST determine if the identifier is associated
601 with an OP that is recognized and supported by the server. Servers
602 MUST reject queries that include an identifier associated with an
603 unsupported OP with an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) response. An RDAP
604 server that receives a query containing an identifier associated with
605 a recognized OP MUST perform the steps required to authenticate the
606 user with the OP, process the query, and return an RDAP response that
607 is appropriate for the end user's level of authorization and access.
609 An RDAP server that receives a query containing tokens associated
610 with a recognized OP and authenticated end user MUST process the
611 query and return an RDAP response that is appropriate for the end
612 user's level of authorization and access. Errors based on processing
613 either the ID Token or the Access Token MUST be signaled with an
614 appropriate HTTP status code as described in Section 3.1 of RFC 6750
615 [RFC6750].
617 On receiving a query containing tokens, the RDAP server MUST validate
618 the ID Token. It can do this independently of the OP, because the ID
619 Token is a JWT that contains all the data necessary for validation.
620 The Access Token, however, is an opaque value, and can only be
621 validated by sending a request using it to the UserInfo Endpoint and
622 confirming that a successful response is received. This is different
623 from the OpenID Connect Authorization Code and Implicit flows, where
624 the Access Token can be validated against the at_hash claim from the
625 ID Token. With a query containing tokens, the Access Token might not
626 validate against the at_hash claim because the Access Token may have
627 been refreshed since the ID Token was issued.
629 An RDAP server that processes requests without needing the UserInfo
630 claims does not need to retrieve the claims merely in order to
631 validate the Access Token. Similarly, an RDAP server that has cached
632 the UserInfo claims for an end user, in accordance with the HTTP
633 headers of a previous UserInfo Endpoint response, does not need to
634 retrieve those claims again in order to revalidate the Access Token.
636 5. Non-Browser Clients
638 The flow described in Section 3.1.3 requires a client to interact
639 with a server using a web browser. This will not work well in
640 situations where the client is automated or an end-user is using a
641 command line client such as curl [3] or wget [4]. This is a known
642 issue with OpenID Connect, and is typically addressed using a two-
643 step process:
645 1. Authenticate with the OP using a browser or browser-like client
646 and store the ID Token and Access Token locally.
647 2. Send a request to the content provider/RP along with the ID Token
648 and Access Token received from the OP.
650 The Access Token MAY be passed to the RP in an HTTP "Authorization"
651 header [RFC7235] or as a query parameter. The Access Token MUST be
652 specified using the "Bearer" authentication scheme [RFC6750] if it is
653 passed in an "Authorization" header. The ID Token MUST be passed to
654 the RP as a query parameter.
656 Here are two examples using the curl and wget utilities. Start by
657 authenticating with the OP:
659 https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example
661 Save the token information and pass it to the RP along with the URI
662 representing the RDAP query. Using curl (encoded tokens have been
663 abbreviated for clarity:
665 curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9"\
666 -k https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\
667 ?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk
669 curl -k https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\
670 ?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk&access_token=eyJ0...NiJ9
672 Using wget:
674 wget --header="Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9"\
675 https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\
676 ?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk
678 wget https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\
679 ?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk&access_token=eyJ0...NiJ9
681 Refresh tokens can be useful to automated or command line clients who
682 wish to continue a session without explicitly re-authenticating an
683 end user. See Section 4.3 for more information.
685 6. IANA Considerations
687 6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registry
689 IANA is requested to register the following value in the JSON Web
690 Token Claims Registry:
692 Claim Name: "purpose"
693 Claim Description: The stated purpose for submitting a request to
694 access a protected RDAP resource.
695 Change Controller: IESG
696 Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4.1.1 of this document.
698 6.2. RDAP Query Purpose Registry
700 IANA is requested to create a new protocol registry to manage RDAP
701 query purpose values. This registry should appear under its own
702 heading on IANA's protocol listings, using the same title as the name
703 of the registry. The information to be registered and the procedures
704 to be followed in populating the registry are described in
705 Section 3.1.4.1.1.
707 Name of registry: Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
708 Purpose Values
710 Section at http://www.iana.org/protocols:
712 Registry Title: Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
713 Purpose Values
715 Registry Name: Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Purpose
716 Values
718 Registration Procedure: Specification Required
720 Reference: This draft
722 Required information: See Section 3.1.4.1.1.
724 Review process: "Specification Required" as described in RFC 5226
725 [RFC5226].
727 Size, format, and syntax of registry entries: See Section 3.1.4.1.1.
729 Initial assignments and reservations:
731 -----BEGIN FORM-----
732 Value: domainNameControl
733 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include creating
734 and managing and monitoring a registrant's own domain name, including
735 creating the domain name, updating information about the domain name,
736 transferring the domain name, renewing the domain name, deleting the
737 domain name, maintaining a domain name portfolio, and detecting
738 fraudulent use of the Registrant's own contact information.
739 -----END FORM-----
741 -----BEGIN FORM-----
742 Value: personalDataProtection
743 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
744 identifying the accredited privacy/proxy provider associated with a
745 domain name and reporting abuse, requesting reveal, or otherwise
746 contacting the provider.
747 -----END FORM-----
749 -----BEGIN FORM-----
750 Value: technicalIssueResolution
751 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include (but are
752 not limited to) working to resolve technical issues, including email
753 delivery issues, DNS resolution failures, and web site functional
754 issues.
755 -----END FORM-----
757 -----BEGIN FORM-----
758 Value: domainNameCertification
759 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include a
760 Certification Authority (CA) issuing an X.509 certificate to a
761 subject identified by a domain name.
762 -----END FORM-----
764 -----BEGIN FORM-----
765 Value: individualInternetUse
766 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
767 identifying the organization using a domain name to instill consumer
768 trust, or contacting that organization to raise a customer complaint
769 to them or file a complaint about them.
770 -----END FORM-----
772 -----BEGIN FORM-----
773 Value: businessDomainNamePurchaseOrSale
774 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include making
775 purchase queries about a domain name, acquiring a domain name from a
776 registrant, and enabling due diligence research.
777 -----END FORM-----
779 -----BEGIN FORM-----
780 Value: academicPublicInterestDNSRResearch
781 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include academic
782 public interest research studies about domain names published in the
783 registration data service, including public information about the
784 registrant and designated contacts, the domain name's history and
785 status, and domain names registered by a given registrant (reverse
786 query).
787 -----END FORM-----
789 -----BEGIN FORM-----
790 Value: legalActions
791 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
792 investigating possible fraudulent use of a registrant's name or
793 address by other domain names, investigating possible trademark
794 infringement, contacting a registrant/licensee's legal representative
795 prior to taking legal action and then taking a legal action if the
796 concern is not satisfactorily addressed.
797 -----END FORM-----
799 -----BEGIN FORM-----
800 Value: regulatoryAndContractEnforcement
801 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include tax
802 authority investigation of businesses with online presence, Uniform
803 Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) investigation, contractual
804 compliance investigation, and registration data escrow audits.
805 -----END FORM-----
806 -----BEGIN FORM-----
807 Value: criminalInvestigationAndDNSAbuseMitigation
808 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include reporting
809 abuse to someone who can investigate and address that abuse, or
810 contacting entities associated with a domain name during an offline
811 criminal investigation.
812 -----END FORM-----
814 -----BEGIN FORM-----
815 Value: dnsTransparency
816 Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose involve querying
817 the registration data made public by registrants to satisfy a wide
818 variety of use cases around informing the general public.
819 -----END FORM-----
821 7. Implementation Status
823 NOTE: Please remove this section and the reference to RFC 7942 prior
824 to publication as an RFC.
826 This section records the status of known implementations of the
827 protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
828 Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942
829 [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is
830 intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing
831 drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual
832 implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
833 Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information
834 presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not
835 intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available
836 implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that
837 other implementations may exist.
839 According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
840 to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
841 running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
842 and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
843 It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
844 they see fit".
846 7.1. Verisign Labs
848 Responsible Organization: Verisign Labs
849 Location: https://rdap.verisignlabs.com/
850 Description: This implementation includes support for domain
851 registry RDAP queries using live data from the .cc and .tv country
852 code top-level domains. Three access levels are provided based on
853 the authenticated identity of the client:
855 1. Unauthenticated: Limited information is returned in response
856 to queries from unauthenticated clients.
857 2. Basic: Clients who authenticate using a publicly available
858 identity provider like Google Gmail or Microsoft Hotmail will
859 receive all of the information available to an unauthenticated
860 client plus additional registration metadata, but no
861 personally identifiable information associated with entities.
862 3. Advanced: Clients who authenticate using a more restrictive
863 identity provider will receive all of the information
864 available to a Basic client plus whatever information the
865 server operator deems appropriate for a fully authorized
866 client. Currently supported identity providers include those
867 developed by Verisign Labs
868 (https://testprovider.rdap.verisignlabs.com/) and CZ.NIC
869 (https://www.mojeid.cz/).
870 Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research
871 implementation.
872 Coverage: This implementation includes all of the features
873 described in this specification.
874 Contact Information: Scott Hollenbeck, shollenbeck@verisign.com
876 8. Security Considerations
878 Security considerations for RDAP can be found in RFC 7481 [RFC7481].
879 Security considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth 2.0
880 [RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications. OpenID
881 Connect defines optional mechanisms for robust signing and encryption
882 that can be used to provide data integrity and data confidentiality
883 services as needed. Security services for ID Tokens and Access
884 Tokens (with references to the JWT specification) are described in
885 the OpenID Connect Core protocol.
887 8.1. Authentication and Access Control
889 Having completed the client identification, authorization, and
890 validation process, an RDAP server can make access control decisions
891 based on a comparison of client-provided information and local
892 policy. For example, a client who provides an email address (and
893 nothing more) might be entitled to receive a subset of the
894 information that would be available to a client who provides an email
895 address, a full name, and a stated purpose. Development of these
896 access control policies is beyond the scope of this document.
898 9. Acknowledgements
900 The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
901 their contributions to the development of this document: Tom
902 Harrison, Russ Housley, Rhys Smith, Jaromir Talir, and Alessandro
903 Vesely. In addition, the Verisign Registry Services Lab development
904 team of Andrew Kaizer, Sai Mogali, Anurag Saxena, Swapneel Sheth,
905 Nitin Singh, and Zhao Zhao provided critical "proof of concept"
906 implementation experience that helped demonstrate the validity of the
907 concepts described in this document.
909 10. References
911 10.1. Normative References
913 [OIDC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect",
914 .
916 [OIDCC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Core incorporating
917 errata set 1", November 2014,
918 .
920 [OIDCD] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
921 incorporating errata set 1", November 2014,
922 .
925 [OIDCR] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
926 Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", November
927 2014, .
930 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
931 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
932 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
933 .
935 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
936 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
937 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
938 .
940 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
941 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
942 DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
943 .
945 [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
946 RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
947 .
949 [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
950 Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
951 DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
952 .
954 [RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
955 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
956 August 2013, .
958 [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
959 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
960 RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
961 .
963 [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
964 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
965 DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
966 .
968 [RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
969 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480,
970 DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
971 .
973 [RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the
974 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7481,
975 DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
976 .
978 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
979 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482,
980 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015,
981 .
983 [RFC7483] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
984 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483,
985 DOI 10.17487/RFC7483, March 2015,
986 .
988 [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
989 Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
990 2015, .
992 [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
993 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
994 .
996 10.2. Informative References
998 [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
999 FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
1000 .
1002 [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
1003 Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
1004 RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
1005 .
1007 10.3. URIs
1009 [1] http://openid.net/get-an-openid/
1011 [2] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-report-
1012 06jun14-en.pdf
1014 [3] http://curl.haxx.se/
1016 [4] https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/
1018 Appendix A. Change Log
1020 00: Initial version.
1021 01: Updated flow description (Section 3.1.2) and description of the
1022 registration process (Section 3.1.3). Thanks to Jaromir Talir.
1023 02: Updated flow description.
1024 03: Added description of query parameters and non-browser clients.
1025 Updated security considerations to note issues associated with
1026 access control.
1027 04: Updated references for JSON Web Token, OpenID Connect Core, and
1028 OpenID Connect Discovery. Added acknowledgement to the Verisign
1029 Labs developers. Changed intended status to Standards Track.
1030 Added text to describe protocol parameters and processing. Other
1031 minor edits.
1032 05: Added examples for curl and wget. Added a reference to RFC
1033 7235.
1034 00: Changed WG reference in file name from weirds to regext.
1035 Described support for refresh tokens. Editorial updates.
1036 Corrected several examples. Added registry of purpose values.
1037 01: Added Implementation Status section (Section 7).
1038 02: Updated section Section 4.4 to clarify ID Token validation
1039 requirements.
1041 Author's Address
1043 Scott Hollenbeck
1044 Verisign Labs
1045 12061 Bluemont Way
1046 Reston, VA 20190
1047 USA
1049 Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
1050 URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/