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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2617 (Obsoleted by RFC 7235, RFC 7615, RFC 7616, RFC 7617) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2818 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) == Outdated reference: A later version (-40) exists of draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-05 == Outdated reference: A later version (-41) exists of draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-05 Summary: 3 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck 3 Internet-Draft Verisign Labs 4 Intended status: Standards Track August 31, 2012 5 Expires: March 4, 2013 7 Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol 8 draft-hollenbeck-weirds-rdap-sec-00 10 Abstract 12 The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web 13 services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and 14 regional internet registries. This document describes information 15 security services and their application to RDAP. 17 Status of this Memo 19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 22 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 23 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 24 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 25 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 27 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 28 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 29 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 30 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 32 This Internet-Draft will expire on March 4, 2013. 34 Copyright Notice 36 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 37 document authors. All rights reserved. 39 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 41 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 42 publication of this document. Please review these documents 43 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 44 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 45 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 46 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 47 described in the Simplified BSD License. 49 Table of Contents 51 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 52 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 53 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3.2. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 3.3. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 3.4. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 3.5. Non-repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 1. Introduction 70 The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two 71 documents: "Unified Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" 72 [I-D.hollenbeck-weirds-unified-rdap-query] and "JSON Responses to 73 RESTful URL Queries for RIRs and DNRs" 74 [I-D.newton-weirds-unified-json-response]. One goal of RDAP is to 75 provide security services that do not exist in the WHOIS [RFC3912] 76 protocol, including authentication, availability, data 77 confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation (note: some of 78 these might be a stretch). 80 This document describes each of these security services from the 81 perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability. Where 82 applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS 83 replacement service [RFC3707] are noted. 85 2. Conventions Used in This Document 87 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 88 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 89 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 91 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations 93 DNR: Domain Name Registry 95 RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol 97 RIR: Regional Internet Registry 99 3. Information Security Services and RDAP 101 RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP 102 relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to 103 provide needed security services including authentication, 104 availability, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non- 105 repudiation. A description of each of these security services can be 106 found in RFC 4949 [RFC4949]. 108 3.1. Authentication 110 WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. 111 As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility 112 in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access 113 depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and 114 authenticated to provide that utility. 116 There are multiple ways to identify and authenticate RDAP clients. 117 Examples include: 119 - HTTP Basic Authentication [RFC2617]: The "basic" scheme can be 120 used to send a client's user name and password to a server in 121 plaintext, based64-encoded form. If this scheme is used another 122 protocol (such as HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]) MUST be used to protect 123 the client's credentials from disclosure while in transit. 125 - HTTP Digest Authentication [RFC2617]: The "digest" scheme can be 126 used to authenticate a client without exposing the client's 127 plaintext password. 129 - X.509 Digital Certificates [RFC5280]: The Transport Layer Security 130 Protocol [RFC5246] includes an option to identify and authenticate 131 clients who possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate. 132 Web clients do not typically possess digital certificates so this 133 option is likely impractical. 135 - (What else? We've talked about OAuth, but it's a bit more 136 complicated.) 138 3.2. Availability 140 An RDAP service has to be available to be useful (need to talk about 141 denial of service, anycasting, and anything else that addresses 142 availability). 144 3.3. Data Confidentiality 146 WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit 147 to protect it from inadvertent disclosure. Web services commonly use 148 HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection. Examples of data 149 confidentiality utility include: 151 - Encryption to protect plaintext passwords exchanged when using the 152 HTTP "basic" authentication scheme. 154 - Encryption to protect personal or otherwise sensitive data 155 returned in response to RDAP queries. 157 - (What else?) 159 If data confidentiality is useful, we should also plan to review the 160 JSON Web Encryption draft [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption]. 162 3.4. Data Integrity 164 TBD: is there value in signed responses? If so, the work being done 165 in the JOSE working group (such as what's described in the JSON Web 166 Signature draft [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature]) may be useful. 167 There's no mention of a "signed response" requirement in RFC 3707. 169 3.5. Non-repudiation 171 TBD: does it make sense to talk about proof of integrity and data 172 origin authentication for responses? It might in the context of law 173 enforcement actions. Again, there's no requirement mentioned in RFC 174 3707. 176 4. IANA Considerations 178 This document does not specify any IANA actions. 180 5. Security Considerations 182 TBD 184 6. Acknowledgements 186 The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for 187 their contributions to this document: Andrew Newton. 189 7. References 191 7.1. Normative References 193 [I-D.hollenbeck-weirds-unified-rdap-query] 194 Newton, A., Hollenbeck, S., Ranjbar, K., Servin, A., and 195 B. Ellacott, "Unified Registration Data Access Protocol 196 Query Format", 197 draft-hollenbeck-weirds-unified-rdap-query-00 (work in 198 progress), August 2012. 200 [I-D.newton-weirds-unified-json-response] 201 Newton, A., Hollenbeck, S., Ranjbar, K., Servin, A., and 202 B. Ellacott, "JSON Responses to RESTful URL Queries for 203 RIRs and DNRs", 204 draft-newton-weirds-unified-json-response-00 (work in 205 progress), August 2012. 207 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 208 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 210 [RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., 211 Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP 212 Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication", 213 RFC 2617, June 1999. 215 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. 217 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 218 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. 220 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 221 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 222 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 223 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 225 7.2. Informative References 227 [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption] 228 Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web 229 Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-05 230 (work in progress), July 2012. 232 [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature] 233 Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web 234 Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-05 235 (work in progress), July 2012. 237 [RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol 238 (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004. 240 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 241 September 2004. 243 [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", 244 RFC 4949, August 2007. 246 Author's Address 248 Scott Hollenbeck 249 Verisign Labs 250 12061 Bluemont Way 251 Reston, VA 20190 252 US 254 Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com 255 URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/