idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-dane-registry-acronyms-00.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- The draft header indicates that this document updates RFC6698, but the abstract doesn't seem to mention this, which it should. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The exact meaning of the all-uppercase expression 'MAY NOT' is not defined in RFC 2119. If it is intended as a requirements expression, it should be rewritten using one of the combinations defined in RFC 2119; otherwise it should not be all-uppercase. == The expression 'MAY NOT', while looking like RFC 2119 requirements text, is not defined in RFC 2119, and should not be used. Consider using 'MUST NOT' instead (if that is what you mean). Found 'MAY NOT' in this paragraph: It is expected that DANE parser's in applications and DNS software MAY adopt parsing the acronyms for each field, installed base MAY NOT get updated. -- The document date (September 19, 2013) is 3865 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 DANE O. Gudmundsson 3 Internet-Draft Shinkuro Inc. 4 Updates: 6698 (if approved) September 19, 2013 5 Intended status: Standards Track 6 Expires: March 23, 2014 8 Adding acronyms to simplify DANE conversations 9 draft-ietf-dane-registry-acronyms-00 11 Abstract 13 Experience has show that people get confused using the three numeric 14 fields the TLSA record. This document specifies descriptive acronyms 15 for the three numeric fields in the TLSA records. 17 Status of This Memo 19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 22 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 23 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 24 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 25 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 27 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 28 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 29 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 30 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 32 This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, 2014. 34 Copyright Notice 36 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 37 document authors. All rights reserved. 39 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 41 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 42 publication of this document. Please review these documents 43 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 44 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 45 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 46 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 47 described in the Simplified BSD License. 49 Table of Contents 51 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 52 1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 53 2. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 2.1. TLSA Certificate Usages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2.2. TLSA Selectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 2.3. TLSA Matching types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 3. Examples of usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 4. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 Appendix A. Document history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 1. Introduction 66 During discussions on how to add DANE [RFC6698] technology to new 67 protocols/services people repeatedly have got confused as what the 68 numeric values stand for and even the order of the fields of a TLSA 69 record. This document updates the IANA registry definition for TLSA 70 record to add a column with acronym for each specified field, in 71 order to reduce confusion. This document does not change the DANE 72 protocol in any way. 74 It is expected that DANE parser's in applications and DNS software 75 MAY adopt parsing the acronyms for each field, installed base MAY NOT 76 get updated. 78 1.1. Requirements notation 80 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 81 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 82 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 84 2. IANA considerations 86 This document applies to "DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities 87 (DANE) Parameters" located at "http://www.iana.org/assignments/dane- 88 parameters/dane-parameters.xhtml". Each one of the Sub-registries 89 will add a column with an acronym for that field. 91 [RFC6698] and this document are both to be the reference documents 92 for the three sub-registries. 94 As these acronyms are offered for human consumption, case does not 95 matter, it is expected that software the parses TLSA records will 96 handle any case use in the input> The expectation is that by using 97 the acronyms in production systems fewer bad TLSA records will be 98 published. 100 2.1. TLSA Certificate Usages 102 +-------+----------+--------------------------------+-------------+ 103 | Value | Acronym | Short Description | Reference | 104 +-------+----------+--------------------------------+-------------+ 105 | 0 | PKIX-CA | CA constraint | [RFC6698] | 106 | 1 | PKIX-EE | Service certificate constraint | [RFC6698] | 107 | 2 | DANE-TA | Trust anchor assertion | [RFC6698] | 108 | 3 | DANE-EE | Domain-issued certificate | [RFC6698] | 109 | 4-254 | | Unassigned | | 110 | 255 | PrivCert | Reserved for Private Use | [RFC6698] | 111 +-------+----------+--------------------------------+-------------+ 113 Table 1: TLSA Certificate Usages 115 Note: should the short description be updated to be more expressive ? 117 Other options suggested for 0: PKIX-TA 119 2.2. TLSA Selectors 121 +-------+---------+--------------------------+-------------+ 122 | Value | Acronym | Short Description | Reference | 123 +-------+---------+--------------------------+-------------+ 124 | 0 | Cert | Full certificate | [RFC6698] | 125 | 1 | SPKI | SubjectPublicKeyInfo | [RFC6698] | 126 | 2-254 | | Unassigned | | 127 | 255 | PrivSel | Reserved for Private Use | [RFC6698] | 128 +-------+---------+--------------------------+-------------+ 130 Table 2: TLSA Selectors 132 2.3. TLSA Matching types 134 +-------+-----------+--------------------------+-------------+ 135 | Value | Acronym | Short Description | Reference | 136 +-------+-----------+--------------------------+-------------+ 137 | 0 | Full | No hash used | [RFC6698] | 138 | 1 | SHA2-256 | 256 bit hash by SHA2 | [RFC6698] | 139 | 2 | SHA2-512 | 512 bit hash by SHA2 | [RFC6698] | 140 | 3-254 | | Unassigned | | 141 | 255 | PrivMatch | Reserved for Private Use | [RFC6698] | 142 +-------+-----------+--------------------------+-------------+ 144 Table 3: TLSA Matching types 146 3. Examples of usage 148 TLSA records using/displaying the acronyms: 149 _666._tcp.first.example. TLSA PKIX-CA CERT SHA2-512 {blob} 150 _666._tcp.second.example. TLSA DANE-TA SPKI SHA2-256 {blob} 152 Acronym use in a specification example: "Protocol FOO only allows 153 TLSA records using PKIX-EE and DANE-EE, with selector SPKI and using 154 SHA2-512." 156 4. Security considerations 158 This document only changes registry fields and does not change the 159 behavior of any protocol. The hope is to reduce confusion and lead 160 to better specification and operations. 162 5. Acknowledgements 164 Scott Schmit offered real good suggestions to decrease the 165 possibility of confusion. Viktor Dukhovni provided comments from 166 expert point of view. 168 6. Normative References 170 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 171 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 173 [RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication 174 of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) 175 Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012. 177 Appendix A. Document history 179 [RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication ] 181 00 Initial version 183 01 Updated version based on some comments ready for WGLC 185 00 WG version almost identical to 01 187 Author's Address 188 Olafur Gudmundsson 189 Shinkuro Inc. 190 4922 Fairmont Av, Suite 250 191 Bethesda, MD 20814 192 USA 194 Email: ogud@ogud.com