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Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (July 7, 2013) is 3945 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5751 (Obsoleted by RFC 8551) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 2822 (Obsoleted by RFC 5322) Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group P. Hoffman 3 Internet-Draft VPN Consortium 4 Updates: 6698 (if approved) J. Schlyter 5 Intended status: Standards Track Kirei AB 6 Expires: January 8, 2014 July 7, 2013 8 Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain Names For S/MIME 9 draft-ietf-dane-smime-02 11 Abstract 13 This document describes how to use secure DNS to associate an S/MIME 14 user's certificate with the intended domain name, similar to the way 15 that DANE (RFC 6698) does for TLS. 17 Status of this Memo 19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 22 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 23 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 24 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 25 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 27 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 28 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 29 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 30 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 32 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2014. 34 Copyright Notice 36 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 37 document authors. All rights reserved. 39 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 41 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 42 publication of this document. Please review these documents 43 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 44 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 45 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 46 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 47 described in the Simplified BSD License. 49 Table of Contents 51 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 52 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 53 2. The SMIMEA Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 3. Domain Names for S/MIME Certificate Associations . . . . . . . 4 55 4. Mandatory-to-Implement Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 56 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 57 5.1. SMIMEA RRtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 1. Introduction 67 S/MIME [RFC5751] messages often contain a certificate. This 68 certificate assists in authenticating the sender of the message and 69 can be used for encrypting messages that will be sent in reply. In 70 order for the S/MIME receiver to authenticate that a message is from 71 the sender whom is identified in the message, the receiver's mail 72 user agent (MUA) must validate that this certificate is associated 73 with the purported sender. Currently, the MUA must trust a trust 74 anchor upon which the sender's certificate is rooted, and must 75 successfully validate the certificate. 77 Some people want to authenticate the association of the sender's 78 certificate with the sender without trusting a configured trust 79 anchor. Given that the DNS administrator for a domain name is 80 authorized to give identifying information about the zone, it makes 81 sense to allow that administrator to also make an authoritative 82 binding between email messages purporting to come from the domain 83 name and a certificate that might be used by someone authorized to 84 send mail from those servers. The easiest way to do this is to use 85 the DNS. 87 This document describes a mechanism for associating a user's 88 certificate with the domain that is similar to that described in DANE 89 itself [RFC6698]. Most of the operational and security 90 considerations for using the mechanism in this document are described 91 in RFC 6698, and are not described here at all. Only the major 92 differences between this mechanism and those used in RFC 6698 are 93 described here. Thus, the reader must be familiar with RFC 6698 94 before reading this document. 96 1.1. Terminology 98 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 99 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 100 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 102 This document also makes use of standard PKIX, DNSSEC, and S/MIME 103 terminology. See PKIX [RFC5280], DNSSEC [RFC4033], [RFC4034], 104 [RFC4035], and SMIME [RFC5751] for these terms. 106 2. The SMIMEA Resource Record 108 The SMIMEA DNS resource record (RR) is used to associate an end 109 entity certificate or public key with the associated email address, 110 thus forming a "SMIMEA certificate association". The semantics of 111 how the SMIMEA RR is interpreted are given later in this document. 113 The type value for the SMIMEA RR type is defined in Section 5.1. The 114 SMIMEA RR is class independent. The SMIMEA RR has no special TTL 115 requirements. The SMIMEA wire format and presentation format are the 116 same as for the TLSA record. 118 3. Domain Names for S/MIME Certificate Associations 120 Domain names are prepared for requests in the following manner. 122 1. The user name (the "left-hand side" of the email address, called 123 the "local-part" in the mail message format definition [RFC2822] 124 and the "local part" in the specification for internationalized 125 email [RFC6530]), is encoded with Base32 [RFC4648], to become the 126 left-most label in the prepared domain name. This does not 127 include the "@" character that separates the left and right sides 128 of the email address. 130 2. The string "_smimecert" becomes the second left-most label in the 131 prepared domain name. 133 3. The domain name (the "right-hand side" of the email address, 134 called the "domain" in RFC 2822) is appended to the result of 135 step 2 to complete the prepared domain name. 137 For example, to request a SMIMEA resource record for a user whose 138 address is "chris@example.com", you would use 139 "MNUHE2LT._smimecert.example.com" in the request. The corresponding 140 RR in the example.com zone might look like: 142 MNUHE2LT._smimecert.example.com. IN SMIMEA ( 143 0 0 1 d2abde240d7cd3ee6b4b28c54df034b9 144 7983a1d16e8a410e4561cb106618e971 ) 146 Design note: Encoding the user name with Base32 allows local parts 147 that have characters that would prevent their use in domain names. 148 For example, a period (".") is a valid character in a local part, but 149 would wreak havoc in a domain name. Similarly, RFC 6530 allows non- 150 ASCII characters in local parts, and encoding a local part with non- 151 ASCII characters with Base32 renders the name usable in the DNS. 153 4. Mandatory-to-Implement Features 155 S/MIME MUAs conforming to this specification MUST be able to 156 correctly interpret SMIMEA records with certificate usages 0, 1, 2, 157 and 3. S/MIME MUAs conforming to this specification MUST be able to 158 compare a certificate association with a certificate offered by 159 another S/MIME MUA using selector types 0 and 1, and matching type 0 160 (no hash used) and matching type 1 (SHA-256), and SHOULD be able to 161 make such comparisons with matching type 2 (SHA-512). 163 5. IANA Considerations 165 5.1. SMIMEA RRtype 167 This document uses a new DNS RR type, SMIMEA, whose value will be 168 allocated by IANA from the Resource Record (RR) TYPEs subregistry of 169 the Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters registry. 171 TODO: there needs to be new registries for certificate usages, 172 selectors, and maching types, pre-populated with the values from 173 TLSA. 175 6. Security Considerations 177 DNS zones that are signed with DNSSEC using NSEC for denial of 178 existence are susceptible to zone-walking, a mechanism that allow 179 someone to enumerate all the names in the zone. Someone who wanted 180 to collect email addresses from a zone that uses SMIMEA might use 181 such a mechanism. DNSSEC-signed zones using NSEC3 for denial of 182 existence are significantly less susceptible to zone-walking. 183 Someone could still attempt a dictionary attack on the zone to find 184 SMIMEA records, just as they can use dictionary attacks on an SMTP 185 server to see which addresses are valid. 187 Client treatment of any information included in the trust anchor is a 188 matter of local policy. This specification does not mandate that 189 such information be inspected or validated by the domain name 190 administrator. 192 7. Acknowledgements 194 Miek Gieben and Martin Pels contributed technical ideas and support 195 to this document. 197 8. References 199 8.1. Normative References 201 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 202 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 204 [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 205 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", 206 RFC 4033, March 2005. 208 [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 209 Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", 210 RFC 4034, March 2005. 212 [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 213 Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security 214 Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. 216 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data 217 Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006. 219 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 220 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 221 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 222 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 224 [RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet 225 Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message 226 Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010. 228 [RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication 229 of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) 230 Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012. 232 8.2. Informative References 234 [RFC2822] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, 235 April 2001. 237 [RFC6530] Klensin, J. and Y. Ko, "Overview and Framework for 238 Internationalized Email", RFC 6530, February 2012. 240 Authors' Addresses 242 Paul Hoffman 243 VPN Consortium 245 Email: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org 246 Jakob Schlyter 247 Kirei AB 249 Email: jakob@kirei.se