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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group Q. Wu, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Huawei 4 Intended status: Standards Track G. Zorn, Ed. 5 Expires: August 1, 2010 Network Zen 6 January 28, 2010 8 Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport 9 draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-01 11 Abstract 13 Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications 14 require the transport of cryptographic keying material; this document 15 specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing native 16 Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery. 18 Status of this Memo 20 This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the 21 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 23 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 24 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 25 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 26 Drafts. 28 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 29 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 30 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 31 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 33 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 34 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 36 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 37 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 39 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2010. 41 Copyright Notice 43 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 44 document authors. All rights reserved. 46 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 47 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 48 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 49 publication of this document. Please review these documents 50 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 51 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 52 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 53 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 54 described in the BSD License. 56 Table of Contents 58 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 69 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 73 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 74 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 75 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 76 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 78 1. Introduction 80 The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master- 81 Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting 82 cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain 83 EAP [RFC3748] methods (for example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one 84 instance of either of these AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message. 86 However, recent work [RFC5295] has specified methods to derive other 87 keys from the keying material created during EAP method execution 88 that may require transport in addition to the MSK. In addition, ERP 89 [RFC5296] specifies new keys that may need to be transported between 90 Diameter nodes. 92 This note specifies a set of AVPs allowing the transport of multiple 93 cryptographic keys in a single Diameter message. 95 2. Terminology 97 2.1. Standards Language 99 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 100 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 101 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 103 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms 105 DER 106 Diameter EAP request [RFC4072]. 108 DEA 109 Diameter EAP Answer [RFC4072]. 111 DSRK 112 Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 114 DSUSRK 115 Domain-Specific Usage-Specific Root Key. This is a Usage-Specific 116 Root Key derived from a DSRK [RFC5295]. 118 EAP 119 Extensible Authentication Protocol [RFC3748]. 121 EMSK 122 Extended Master Session Key [RFC3748]. 124 ERP 125 EAP Re-authentication Protocol [RFC5296]. 127 MSK 128 Master Session Key [RFC3748]. 130 rMSK 131 reauthentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key, 132 derived from the rRK (see below). 134 rRK 135 reauthentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK or DSRK 136 [RFC5296]. 138 USRK 139 Usage-Specific Root Key [RFC5295] 141 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions 143 This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys 144 in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter 145 applications. 147 3.1. Key AVP 149 The Key AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Grouped [RFC3588] It contains 150 the name, type and optionally, the usable lifetime of the key, as 151 well as the keying material itself. 153 Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 > 154 < Key-Type > 155 { Keying-Material } 156 [ Key-Lifetime ] 157 [ Key-Name ] 158 * [ AVP ] 160 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP 162 The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Enumerated and signifies 163 the type of the key being sent. The following values are defined in 164 this document: 166 MSK (0) 167 The EAP Master Session Key [RFC3748] 169 DSRK (1) 170 A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 172 USRK (2) 173 A Usage Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 175 rRK (3) 176 A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296]. 178 rMSK (4) 179 A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296]. 181 DSUSRK (5) A Domain-Specific Usage-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 183 If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA 184 according to the policy stated in Section 5.2 186 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP 188 The Key-Name AVP is of type OctetString. It contains an opaque key 189 identifier. Exactly how this name is generated and used depends on 190 the key type and link layer in question, and is beyond the scope of 191 this document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for discussions of key 192 name generation in the context of EAP). 194 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP 196 The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code ) is of type OctetString. The 197 exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors, 198 including the link layer in use and the type of the key; it is beyond 199 the scope of this document. 201 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 203 The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Integer64 [RFC3588] 204 and represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents 205 of the Keying-Material AVP Section 3.1.3 is valid. 207 NOTE: 208 Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the 209 lifetime to be the point in time when the keying material is first 210 used. 212 4. Security Considerations 214 The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol 215 [RFC3588] are also applicable to this document, as are those in 216 Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. 218 5. IANA Considerations 220 Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign 221 values as described in the following sections. 223 5.1. AVP Codes 225 Codes must be assigned for the following AVPs using the policy 226 specified in RFC 3588, Section 11.1.1: 228 o Key (, Section 3.1) 230 o Key-Type (, Section 3.1.1) 232 o Keying-Material (, Section 3.1.3 234 o Key-Lifetime (, Section 3.1.4 236 5.2. AVP Values 238 IANA is requested to create a new registry for values assigned to the 239 Key-Type AVP and populated with the values defined in this document 240 (Section 3.1.1. New values may be assigned for the Key-Type AVP 241 using the "Expert Review" policy [RFC5226]. 243 6. Acknowledgements 245 Thanks to Semyon Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig and Sebastien Decugis 246 for useful comments. 248 7. References 250 7.1. Normative References 252 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 253 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 255 [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. 256 Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. 258 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. 259 Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", 260 RFC 3748, June 2004. 262 [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible 263 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, 264 August 2005. 266 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 267 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, 268 May 2008. 270 7.2. Informative References 272 [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS 273 Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. 275 [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible 276 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", 277 RFC 5247, August 2008. 279 [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, 280 "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an 281 Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, 282 August 2008. 284 [RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re- 285 authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008. 287 Authors' Addresses 289 Qin Wu (editor) 290 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 291 Site B, Floor 12F, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd. 292 Nanjing, JiangSu 210001 293 China 295 Phone: +86-25-84565892 296 Email: Sunseawq@huawei.com 298 Glen Zorn (editor) 299 Network Zen 300 1463 East Republican Street 301 #358 302 Seattle, Washington 98112 303 USA 305 Email: gwz@net-zen.net