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Is this intentional? -- Found something which looks like a code comment -- if you have code sections in the document, please surround them with '' and '' lines. Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3588 (Obsoleted by RFC 6733) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5226 (Obsoleted by RFC 8126) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5296 (Obsoleted by RFC 6696) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group G. Zorn, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Network Zen 4 Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu, Ed. 5 Expires: November 2, 2010 Huawei 6 V. Cakulev 7 Alcatel Lucent 8 May 1, 2010 10 Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport 11 draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-03 13 Abstract 15 Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications 16 require the transport of cryptographic keying material; this document 17 specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing native 18 Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery. 20 Status of this Memo 22 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 23 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 25 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 26 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 27 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 28 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 30 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 31 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 32 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 33 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 35 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 2, 2010. 37 Copyright Notice 39 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 40 document authors. All rights reserved. 42 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 43 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 44 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 45 publication of this document. Please review these documents 46 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 47 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 48 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 49 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 50 described in the Simplified BSD License. 52 Table of Contents 54 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 73 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 75 1. Introduction 77 The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master- 78 Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting 79 cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain 80 EAP [RFC3748] methods (for example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one 81 instance of either of these AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message. 83 However, recent work (see, for example, [RFC5295]) has specified 84 methods to derive other keys from the keying material created during 85 EAP method execution that may require transport in addition to the 86 MSK. In addition, ERP [RFC5296] specifies new keys that may need to 87 be transported between Diameter nodes. 89 This note specifies a set of AVPs allowing the transport of multiple 90 cryptographic keys in a single Diameter message. 92 2. Terminology 94 2.1. Standards Language 96 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 97 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 98 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 100 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms 102 DER 103 Diameter EAP request [RFC4072]. 105 DEA 106 Diameter EAP Answer [RFC4072]. 108 DSRK 109 Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 111 DSUSRK 112 Domain-Specific Usage-Specific Root Key. This is a Usage-Specific 113 Root Key derived from a DSRK [RFC5295]. 115 EAP 116 Extensible Authentication Protocol [RFC3748]. 118 EMSK 119 Extended Master Session Key [RFC3748]. 121 ERP 122 EAP Re-authentication Protocol [RFC5296]. 124 MSK 125 Master Session Key [RFC3748]. 127 rMSK 128 reauthentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key, 129 derived from the rRK (see below). 131 rRK 132 reauthentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK or DSRK 133 [RFC5296]. 135 USRK 136 Usage-Specific Root Key [RFC5295] 138 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions 140 This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys 141 in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter 142 applications. 144 3.1. Key AVP 146 The Key AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Grouped [RFC3588] It contains 147 the name, type and optionally, the usable lifetime of the key, as 148 well as the keying material itself. 150 Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 > 151 < Key-Type > 152 { Keying-Material } 153 [ Key-Lifetime ] 154 [ Key-Name ] 155 [ Key-SPI ] 156 * [ AVP ] 158 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP 160 The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Enumerated and signifies 161 the type of the key being sent. The following values are defined in 162 this document: 164 MSK (0) 165 The EAP Master Session Key [RFC3748] 167 DSRK (1) 168 A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 170 USRK (2) 171 A Usage Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 173 rRK (3) 174 A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296]. 176 rMSK (4) 177 A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296]. 179 DSUSRK (5) A Domain-Specific Usage-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 181 If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA 182 according to the policy stated in Section 5.2 184 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP 186 The Key-Name AVP is of type OctetString. It contains an opaque key 187 identifier. Exactly how this name is generated and used depends on 188 the key type and link layer in question, and is beyond the scope of 189 this document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for discussions of key 190 name generation in the context of EAP). 192 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP 194 The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code ) is of type OctetString. The 195 exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors, 196 including the link layer in use and the type of the key; it is beyond 197 the scope of this document. 199 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 201 The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Integer64 [RFC3588] 202 and represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents 203 of the Keying-Material AVP Section 3.1.3 is valid. 205 NOTE: 206 Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the 207 lifetime to be the point in time when the keying material is first 208 used. 210 3.1.5. Key-SPI 212 The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a 213 Security Parameter Index (SPI) value that can be used with other 214 parameters for identifying associated keying material. 216 4. Security Considerations 218 The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol 219 [RFC3588] are also applicable to this document, as are those in 220 Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. 222 5. IANA Considerations 224 Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign 225 values as described in the following sections. 227 5.1. AVP Codes 229 Codes must be assigned for the following AVPs using the policy 230 specified in RFC 3588, Section 11.1.1: 232 o Key (, Section 3.1) 234 o Key-Type (, Section 3.1.1) 236 o Keying-Material (, Section 3.1.3) 238 o Key-Lifetime (, Section 3.1.4) 240 o Key-SPI (, Section 3.1.5) 242 5.2. AVP Values 244 IANA is requested to create a new registry for values assigned to the 245 Key-Type AVP and populated with the values defined in this document 246 (Section 3.1.1). New values may be assigned for the Key-Type AVP 247 using the "Expert Review" policy [RFC5226]; once values have been 248 assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced, modified or deprecated. 250 6. Acknowledgements 252 Thanks to Semyon Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig and Sebastien Decugis 253 for useful comments. 255 7. References 257 7.1. Normative References 259 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 260 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 262 [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. 263 Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. 265 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. 266 Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", 267 RFC 3748, June 2004. 269 [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible 270 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, 271 August 2005. 273 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 274 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, 275 May 2008. 277 7.2. Informative References 279 [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS 280 Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. 282 [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible 283 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", 284 RFC 5247, August 2008. 286 [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, 287 "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an 288 Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, 289 August 2008. 291 [RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re- 292 authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008. 294 Authors' Addresses 296 Glen Zorn (editor) 297 Network Zen 298 1463 East Republican Street 299 #358 300 Seattle, Washington 98112 301 US 303 Email: gwz@net-zen.net 304 Qin Wu (editor) 305 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 306 Site B, Floor 12F, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd. 307 Nanjing, JiangSu 210001 308 China 310 Phone: +86-25-84565892 311 Email: Sunseawq@huawei.com 313 Violeta Cakulev 314 Alcatel Lucent 315 600 Mountain Ave. 316 3D-517 317 Murray Hill, NJ 07974 318 US 320 Phone: +1 908 582 3207 321 Email: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com