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Is this intentional? -- Found something which looks like a code comment -- if you have code sections in the document, please surround them with '' and '' lines. Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3588 (Obsoleted by RFC 6733) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5226 (Obsoleted by RFC 8126) == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-02 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5296 (Obsoleted by RFC 6696) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group G. Zorn, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Network Zen 4 Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu, Ed. 5 Expires: November 26, 2010 Huawei 6 V. Cakulev 7 Alcatel Lucent 8 May 25, 2010 10 Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport 11 draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-04 13 Abstract 15 Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications 16 require the transport of cryptographic keying material; this document 17 specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing native 18 Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery. 20 Status of this Memo 22 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 23 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 25 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 26 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 27 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 28 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 30 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 31 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 32 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 33 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 35 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2010. 37 Copyright Notice 39 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 40 document authors. All rights reserved. 42 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 43 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 44 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 45 publication of this document. Please review these documents 46 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 47 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 48 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 49 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 50 described in the Simplified BSD License. 52 Table of Contents 54 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 71 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 72 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 73 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 75 1. Introduction 77 The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master- 78 Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting 79 cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain 80 EAP [RFC3748] methods (for example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one 81 instance of either of these AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message. 83 However, recent work (see, for example, [RFC5295]) has specified 84 methods to derive other keys from the keying material created during 85 EAP method execution that may require transport in addition to the 86 MSK. In addition, ERP [RFC5296] specifies new keys that may need to 87 be transported between Diameter nodes. 89 This note specifies a set of AVPs allowing the transport of multiple 90 cryptographic keys in a single Diameter message. 92 2. Terminology 94 2.1. Standards Language 96 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 97 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 98 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 100 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms 102 DER 103 Diameter EAP request [RFC4072]. 105 DEA 106 Diameter EAP Answer [RFC4072]. 108 DSRK 109 Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 111 DSUSRK 112 Domain-Specific Usage-Specific Root Key. This is a Usage-Specific 113 Root Key derived from a DSRK [RFC5295]. 115 EAP 116 Extensible Authentication Protocol [RFC3748]. 118 EMSK 119 Extended Master Session Key [RFC3748]. 121 ERP 122 EAP Re-authentication Protocol [RFC5296]. 124 MSK 125 Master Session Key [RFC3748]. 127 rMSK 128 reauthentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key, 129 derived from the rRK (see below). 131 rRK 132 reauthentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK or DSRK 133 [RFC5296]. 135 USRK 136 Usage-Specific Root Key [RFC5295] 138 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions 140 This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys 141 in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter 142 applications. 144 3.1. Key AVP 146 The Key AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Grouped [RFC3588]. It 147 contains the type and keying material and, optionally, an indication 148 of the usable lifetime of the key, the name of the key and a Security 149 Parameter Index (SPI) with which the key is associated. 151 Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 > 152 < Key-Type > 153 { Keying-Material } 154 [ Key-Lifetime ] 155 [ Key-Name ] 156 [ Key-SPI ] 157 * [ AVP ] 159 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP 161 The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Enumerated and signifies 162 the type of the key being sent. The following values are defined in 163 this document: 165 MSK (0) 166 The EAP Master Session Key [RFC3748] 168 DSRK (1) 169 A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 171 rRK (2) 172 A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296]. 174 rMSK (3) 175 A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296]. 177 IKEv2-PSK (4) A pre-shared key for use in IKE-V2 key exchange 178 [I-D.ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter]. 180 If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA 181 according to the policy stated in Section 5.2 183 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP 185 The Key-Name AVP is of type OctetString. It contains an opaque key 186 identifier. Exactly how this name is generated and used depends on 187 the key type and usage in question, and is beyond the scope of this 188 document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for discussions of key name 189 generation in the context of EAP). 191 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP 193 The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code ) is of type OctetString. The 194 exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors, 195 including the link layer in use and the type of the key; it is beyond 196 the scope of this document. 198 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 200 The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Integer64 [RFC3588] 201 and represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents 202 of the Keying-Material AVP Section 3.1.3 is valid. 204 NOTE: 205 Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the 206 lifetime to be the point in time when the message containing the 207 keying material is received. 209 3.1.5. Key-SPI 211 The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a 212 SPI value that can be used with other parameters for identifying 213 associated keying material. 215 4. Security Considerations 217 The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol 218 [RFC3588] are also applicable to this document, as are those in 219 Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. 221 5. IANA Considerations 223 Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign 224 values as described in the following sections. 226 5.1. AVP Codes 228 Codes must be assigned for the following AVPs using the policy 229 specified in RFC 3588, Section 11.1.1: 231 o Key (, Section 3.1) 233 o Key-Type (, Section 3.1.1) 235 o Keying-Material (, Section 3.1.3) 237 o Key-Lifetime (, Section 3.1.4) 239 o Key-SPI (, Section 3.1.5) 241 5.2. AVP Values 243 IANA is requested to create a new registry for values assigned to the 244 Key-Type AVP and populated with the values defined in this document 245 (Section 3.1.1). New values may be assigned for the Key-Type AVP 246 using the "Expert Review" policy [RFC5226]; once values have been 247 assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced, modified or deprecated. 249 6. Acknowledgements 251 Thanks to Semyon Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig, Joe Salowey, Tom 252 Taylor, Frank Xia and Sebastien Decugis for useful comments. 254 7. References 256 7.1. Normative References 258 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 259 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 261 [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. 262 Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. 264 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. 265 Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", 266 RFC 3748, June 2004. 268 [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible 269 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, 270 August 2005. 272 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 273 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, 274 May 2008. 276 7.2. Informative References 278 [I-D.ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter] 279 Cakulev, V. and A. Lior, "Diameter IKEv2 PSK: Pre-Shared 280 Secret-based Support for IKEv2 Server to Diameter Server 281 Interaction", draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-02 (work 282 in progress), March 2010. 284 [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS 285 Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. 287 [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible 288 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", 289 RFC 5247, August 2008. 291 [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, 292 "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an 293 Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, 294 August 2008. 296 [RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re- 297 authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008. 299 Authors' Addresses 301 Glen Zorn (editor) 302 Network Zen 303 1463 East Republican Street 304 #358 305 Seattle, Washington 98112 306 US 308 Email: gwz@net-zen.net 310 Qin Wu (editor) 311 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 312 Site B, Floor 12F, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd. 313 Nanjing, JiangSu 210001 314 China 316 Phone: +86-25-84565892 317 Email: Sunseawq@huawei.com 319 Violeta Cakulev 320 Alcatel Lucent 321 600 Mountain Ave. 322 3D-517 323 Murray Hill, NJ 07974 324 US 326 Phone: +1 908 582 3207 327 Email: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com