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Is this intentional? -- Found something which looks like a code comment -- if you have code sections in the document, please surround them with '' and '' lines. Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3588 (Obsoleted by RFC 6733) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5226 (Obsoleted by RFC 8126) == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-02 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5296 (Obsoleted by RFC 6696) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group G. Zorn, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Network Zen 4 Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu, Ed. 5 Expires: January 2, 2011 Huawei 6 V. Cakulev 7 Alcatel Lucent 8 July 1, 2010 10 Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport 11 draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-07 13 Abstract 15 Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications 16 require the transport of cryptographic keying material; this document 17 specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing native 18 Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery. 20 Status of this Memo 22 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 23 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 25 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 26 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 27 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 28 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 30 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 31 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 32 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 33 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 35 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2011. 37 Copyright Notice 39 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 40 document authors. All rights reserved. 42 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 43 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 44 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 45 publication of this document. Please review these documents 46 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 47 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 48 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 49 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 50 described in the Simplified BSD License. 52 Table of Contents 54 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 73 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 75 1. Introduction 77 The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master- 78 Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting 79 cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain 80 The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] methods (for 81 example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one instance of either of these 82 AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message. 84 However, recent work (see, for example, [RFC5295]) has specified 85 methods to derive other keys from the keying material created during 86 EAP method execution that may require transport in addition to the 87 MSK. In addition, the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [RFC5296] 88 specifies new keys that may need to be transported between Diameter 89 nodes. 91 This note specifies a set of AVPs allowing the transport of multiple 92 cryptographic keys in a single Diameter message. 94 2. Terminology 96 2.1. Standards Language 98 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 99 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 100 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 102 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms 104 DSRK 105 Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 107 MSK 108 Master Session Key [RFC3748]. 110 rMSK 111 reauthentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key, 112 derived from the rRK (below). 114 rRK 115 reauthentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK Extended Master 116 Session Key [RFC3748] or DSRK [RFC5296]. 118 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions 120 This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys 121 in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter 122 applications. 124 3.1. Key AVP 126 The Key AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Grouped [RFC3588]. It 127 contains the type and keying material and, optionally, an indication 128 of the usable lifetime of the key, the name of the key and a Security 129 Parameter Index (SPI) with which the key is associated. 131 Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 > 132 < Key-Type > 133 { Keying-Material } 134 [ Key-Lifetime ] 135 [ Key-Name ] 136 [ Key-SPI ] 137 * [ AVP ] 139 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP 141 The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Enumerated and signifies 142 the type of the key being sent. The following decimal values are 143 defined in this document: 145 MSK (0) 146 The EAP Master Session Key [RFC3748] 148 DSRK (1) 149 A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 151 rRK (2) 152 A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296]. 154 rMSK (3) 155 A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296]. 157 IKEv2-PSK (4) 158 A pre-shared key for use in IKE-V2 key exchange 159 [I-D.ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter]. 161 RSA-KEM (5) 162 A symmetric keying material encrypted using the RSA public key of 163 the recipient [I-D.ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem]. 165 If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA 166 according to the policy stated in Section 5.2, 168 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP 170 The Key-Name AVP is of type OctetString. It contains an opaque key 171 identifier. Exactly how this name is generated and used depends on 172 the key type and usage in question, and is beyond the scope of this 173 document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for discussions of key name 174 generation in the context of EAP). 176 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP 178 The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code ) is of type OctetString. The 179 exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors, 180 including the link layer in use and the type of the key; it is beyond 181 the scope of this document. 183 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 185 The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Integer64 [RFC3588] 186 and represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents 187 of the Keying-Material AVP (Section 3.1.3) is valid. 189 NOTE: 190 Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the 191 lifetime to be the point in time when the message containing the 192 keying material is received. 194 3.1.5. Key-SPI 196 The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a 197 SPI value that can be used with other parameters for identifying 198 associated keying material. 200 4. Security Considerations 202 The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol 203 [RFC3588] are also applicable to this document, as are those in 204 Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. 206 5. IANA Considerations 208 Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign 209 values as described in the following sections. 211 5.1. AVP Codes 213 Codes must be assigned for the following AVPs using the policy 214 specified in RFC 3588, Section 11.1.1: 216 o Key (, Section 3.1) 218 o Key-Type (, Section 3.1.1) 220 o Keying-Material (, Section 3.1.3) 222 o Key-Lifetime (, Section 3.1.4) 224 o Key-SPI (, Section 3.1.5) 226 5.2. AVP Values 228 IANA is requested to create a new registry for values assigned to the 229 Key-Type AVP and populated with the decimal values defined in this 230 document (Section 3.1.1). New values may be assigned for the Key- 231 Type AVP using the "Expert Review" policy [RFC5226]; once values have 232 been assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced, modified or 233 deprecated. 235 6. Acknowledgements 237 Thanks to Semyon Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig, Joe Salowey, Tom 238 Taylor, Frank Xia and Sebastien Decugis for useful comments. 240 7. References 242 7.1. Normative References 244 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 245 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 247 [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. 248 Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. 250 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. 251 Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", 252 RFC 3748, June 2004. 254 [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible 255 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, 256 August 2005. 258 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 259 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, 260 May 2008. 262 7.2. Informative References 264 [I-D.ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter] 265 Cakulev, V. and A. Lior, "Diameter IKEv2 PSK: Pre-Shared 266 Secret-based Support for IKEv2 Server to Diameter Server 267 Interaction", draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-02 (work 268 in progress), March 2010. 270 [I-D.ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem] 271 Brainard, J., Turner, S., Randall, J., and B. Kaliski, 272 "Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in CMS", 273 draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-13 (work in progress), 274 May 2010. 276 [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS 277 Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. 279 [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible 280 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", 281 RFC 5247, August 2008. 283 [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, 284 "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an 285 Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, 286 August 2008. 288 [RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re- 289 authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008. 291 Authors' Addresses 293 Glen Zorn (editor) 294 Network Zen 295 1463 East Republican Street 296 #358 297 Seattle, Washington 98112 298 US 300 Email: gwz@net-zen.net 301 Qin Wu (editor) 302 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 303 Site B, Floor 12F, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd. 304 Nanjing, JiangSu 210001 305 China 307 Phone: +86-25-84565892 308 Email: Sunseawq@huawei.com 310 Violeta Cakulev 311 Alcatel Lucent 312 600 Mountain Ave. 313 3D-517 314 Murray Hill, NJ 07974 315 US 317 Phone: +1 908 582 3207 318 Email: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com