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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Outdated reference: A later version (-34) exists of draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis-25 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5226 (Obsoleted by RFC 8126) == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-03 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5296 (Obsoleted by RFC 6696) Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group G. Zorn 3 Internet-Draft Network Zen 4 Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu 5 Expires: April 20, 2011 Huawei 6 V. Cakulev 7 Alcatel Lucent 8 October 17, 2010 10 Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for Cryptographic Key Transport 11 draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-08 13 Abstract 15 Some Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) applications 16 require the transport of cryptographic keying material. This 17 document specifies a set of Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs) providing 18 native Diameter support of cryptographic key delivery. 20 Status of this Memo 22 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 23 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 25 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 26 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 27 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 28 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 30 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 31 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 32 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 33 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 35 This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2011. 37 Copyright Notice 39 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 40 document authors. All rights reserved. 42 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 43 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 44 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 45 publication of this document. Please review these documents 46 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 47 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 48 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 49 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 50 described in the Simplified BSD License. 52 Table of Contents 54 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 3.1. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 3.1.5. Key-SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 5.1. AVP Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 5.2. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 73 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 75 1. Introduction 77 The Diameter EAP application [RFC4072] defines the EAP-Master- 78 Session-Key and EAP-Key-Name AVPs for the purpose of transporting 79 cryptographic keying material derived during the execution of certain 80 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] methods (for 81 example, EAP-TLS [RFC5216]). At most one instance of either of these 82 AVPs is allowed in any Diameter message. 84 However, recent work (see, for example, [RFC5295]) has specified 85 methods to derive other keys from the keying material created during 86 EAP method execution that may require transport in addition to the 87 MSK. In addition, the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [RFC5296] 88 specifies new keys that may need to be transported between Diameter 89 nodes. 91 This note specifies a set of AVPs allowing the transport of multiple 92 cryptographic keys in a single Diameter message. 94 2. Terminology 96 2.1. Standards Language 98 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 99 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 100 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 102 2.2. Technical Terms and Acronyms 104 DSRK 105 Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 107 MSK 108 Master Session Key [RFC3748]. 110 rMSK 111 reauthentication MSK [RFC5296]. This is a per-authenticator key, 112 derived from the rRK (below). 114 rRK 115 reauthentication Root Key, derived from the EMSK Extended Master 116 Session Key [RFC3748] or DSRK [RFC5296]. 118 3. Attribute-Value Pair Definitions 120 This section defines new AVPs for the transport of cryptographic keys 121 in the Diameter EAP application [RFC4072], as well as other Diameter 122 applications. 124 3.1. Key AVP 126 The Key AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Grouped. It contains the 127 type and keying material and, optionally, an indication of the usable 128 lifetime of the key, the name of the key and a Security Parameter 129 Index (SPI) with which the key is associated. 131 Key ::= < AVP Header: AC1 > 132 < Key-Type > 133 { Keying-Material } 134 [ Key-Lifetime ] 135 [ Key-Name ] 136 [ Key-SPI ] 137 * [ AVP ] 139 3.1.1. Key-Type AVP 141 The Key-Type AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Enumerated. This AVP 142 identifies the type of the key being sent. The following decimal 143 values are defined in this document: 145 MSK (0) 146 The EAP Master Session Key [RFC3748] 148 DSRK (1) 149 A Domain-Specific Root Key [RFC5295]. 151 rRK (2) 152 A reauthentication Root Key [RFC5296]. 154 rMSK (3) 155 A reauthentication Master Session Key [RFC5296]. 157 IKEv2-PSK (4) 158 A pre-shared key for use in IKE-V2 key exchange 159 [I-D.ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter]. 161 RSA-KEM (5) 162 A symmetric key encrypted using the RSA public key of the 163 recipient [RFC5990]. 165 If additional values are needed, they are to be assigned by IANA 166 according to the policy stated in Section 5.2, 168 3.1.2. Key-Name AVP 170 The Key-Name AVP (AVP Code ) is of type OctetString. It 171 contains an opaque key identifier. Exactly how this name is 172 generated and used depends on the key type and usage in question, and 173 is beyond the scope of this document (see [RFC5247] and [RFC5295] for 174 discussions of key name generation in the context of EAP). 176 3.1.3. Keying-Material AVP 178 The Keying-Material AVP (AVP Code ) is of type OctetString. The 179 exact usage of this keying material depends upon several factors, 180 including the link layer in use and the type of the key and is beyond 181 the scope of this document. 183 3.1.4. Key-Lifetime AVP 185 The Key-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Unsigned32 and 186 represents the period of time (in seconds) for which the contents of 187 the Keying-Material AVP (Section 3.1.3) is valid. 189 NOTE: 190 Applications using this value SHOULD consider the beginning of the 191 lifetime to be the point in time when the message containing the 192 keying material is received. 194 3.1.5. Key-SPI 196 The Key-SPI AVP (AVP Code ) is of type Unsigned32 and contains a 197 SPI value that can be used with other parameters for identifying 198 associated keying material. 200 4. Security Considerations 202 The security considerations applicable to the Diameter Base Protocol 203 [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] are also applicable to this document, as 204 are those in Section 8.4 of RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. 206 5. IANA Considerations 208 Upon publication of this memo as an RFC, IANA is requested to assign 209 values as described in the following sections. 211 5.1. AVP Codes 213 Codes must be assigned for the following AVPs using the policy 214 specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis], Section 11.1.1: 216 o Key (, Section 3.1) 218 o Key-Type (, Section 3.1.1) 220 o Keying-Material (, Section 3.1.3) 222 o Key-Lifetime (, Section 3.1.4) 224 o Key-SPI (, Section 3.1.5) 226 o Key-Name (, Section 3.1.2) 228 5.2. AVP Values 230 IANA is requested to create a new registry for values assigned to the 231 Key-Type AVP and populated with the decimal values defined in this 232 document (Section 3.1.1). New values may be assigned for the Key- 233 Type AVP using the "Expert Review" policy [RFC5226]; once values have 234 been assigned, they MUST NOT be deleted, replaced, modified or 235 deprecated. 237 6. Acknowledgements 239 Thanks to Semyon Mizikovsky, Hannes Tschofenig, Joe Salowey, Tom 240 Taylor, Frank Xia, Lionel Morand and Sebastien Decugis for useful 241 comments. 243 7. References 245 7.1. Normative References 247 [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] 248 Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, 249 "Diameter Base Protocol", draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis-25 250 (work in progress), September 2010. 252 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 253 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 255 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. 256 Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", 257 RFC 3748, June 2004. 259 [RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible 260 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, 261 August 2005. 263 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 264 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, 265 May 2008. 267 7.2. Informative References 269 [I-D.ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter] 270 Cakulev, V. and A. Lior, "Diameter IKEv2 PSK: Pre-Shared 271 Secret-based Support for IKEv2 Server to Diameter Server 272 Interaction", draft-ietf-dime-ikev2-psk-diameter-03 (work 273 in progress), August 2010. 275 [RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS 276 Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008. 278 [RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible 279 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", 280 RFC 5247, August 2008. 282 [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, 283 "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an 284 Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, 285 August 2008. 287 [RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re- 288 authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008. 290 [RFC5990] Randall, J., Kaliski, B., Brainard, J., and S. Turner, 291 "Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in the 292 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5990, 293 September 2010. 295 Authors' Addresses 297 Glen Zorn 298 Network Zen 299 227/358 Thanon Sanphawut 300 Bang Na, Bangkok 10260 301 Thailand 303 Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617 304 Email: gwz@net-zen.net 306 Qin Wu 307 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 308 101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District 309 Nanjing, Jiangsu 21001 310 China 312 Phone: +86-25-56623633 313 Email: sunseawq@huawei.com 315 Violeta Cakulev 316 Alcatel Lucent 317 600 Mountain Ave. 318 3D-517 319 Murray Hill, NJ 07974 320 US 322 Phone: +1 908 582 3207 323 Email: violeta.cakulev@alcatel-lucent.com