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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group E. McMurry 3 Internet-Draft B. Campbell 4 Intended status: Standards Track Tekelec 5 Expires: May 16, 2013 November 12, 2012 7 Diameter Overload Control Requirements 8 draft-ietf-dime-overload-reqs-01 10 Abstract 12 When a Diameter server or agent becomes overloaded, it needs to be 13 able to gracefully reduce its load, typically by informing clients to 14 reduce sending traffic for some period of time. Otherwise, it must 15 continue to expend resources parsing and responding to Diameter 16 messages, possibly resulting in congestion collapse. The existing 17 mechanisms provided by Diameter are not sufficient for this purpose. 18 This document describes the limitations of the existing mechanisms, 19 and provides requirements for new overload management mechanisms. 21 Status of this Memo 23 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 24 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 28 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 29 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 16, 2013. 38 Copyright Notice 40 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 41 document authors. All rights reserved. 43 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 44 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 45 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 46 publication of this document. Please review these documents 47 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 48 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 49 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 50 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 51 described in the Simplified BSD License. 53 Table of Contents 55 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 1.1. Causes of Overload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 1.2. Effects of Overload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 1.3. Overload vs. Network Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 1.4. Diameter Applications in a Broader Network . . . . . . . . 5 60 1.5. Documentation Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 2. Overload Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 2.1. Peer to Peer Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 2.2. Agent Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 64 2.3. Interconnect Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 65 3. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 66 4. Existing Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 67 5. Issues with the Current Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 68 5.1. Problems with Implicit Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 69 5.2. Problems with Explicit Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 70 6. Diameter Overload Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 71 6.1. Overload in Mobile Data Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 72 6.2. 3GPP Study on Core Network Overload . . . . . . . . . . . 17 73 7. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 74 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 75 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 76 9.1. Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 77 9.2. Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 78 9.3. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 79 9.4. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 80 9.5. Compromised Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 81 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 82 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 83 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 84 Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 85 Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 86 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 88 1. Introduction 90 When a Diameter [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] server or agent becomes 91 overloaded, it needs to be able to gracefully reduce its load, 92 typically by informing clients to reduce sending traffic for some 93 period of time. Otherwise, it must continue to expend resources 94 parsing and responding to Diameter messages, possibly resulting in 95 congestion collapse. The existing mechanisms provided by Diameter 96 are not sufficient for this purpose. This document describes the 97 limitations of the existing mechanisms, and provides requirements for 98 new overload management mechanisms. 100 This document draws on [RFC5390] and the work done on SIP overload 101 control as well as on overload practices in SS7 networks and studies 102 done by 3GPP. 104 Diameter is not typically an end-user protocol; rather it is 105 generally used as one component in support of some end-user activity. 106 For example, a WiFi access point might use Diameter to authenticate 107 and authorize user access via 802.11. Overload in a network that 108 uses Diameter applications will likely spill over into the end-user 109 application network. The impact of Diameter overload on the client 110 application (a client application may use the Diameter protocol and 111 other protocols to do its job) is beyond the scope of this document. 113 This document presents non-normative descriptions of causes of 114 overload along with related scenarios and studies. Finally, it 115 offers a set of normative requirements for an improved overload 116 indication mechanism. 118 1.1. Causes of Overload 120 Overload occurs when an element, such as a Diameter server or agent, 121 has insufficient resources to successfully process all of the traffic 122 it is receiving. Resources include all of the capabilities of the 123 element used to process a request, including CPU processing, memory, 124 I/O, and disk resources. It can also include external resources such 125 as a database or DNS server, in which case the CPU, processing, 126 memory, I/O, and disk resources of those elements are effectively 127 part of the logical element processing the request. 129 Overload can occur for many reasons, including: 131 Inadequate capacity: When designing Diameter networks, that is, 132 application layer multi-node Diameter deployments, it can be very 133 difficult to predict all scenarios that may cause elevated 134 traffic. It may also be more costly to implement support for some 135 scenarios than a network operator may deem worthwhile. This 136 results in the likelihood that a Diameter network will not have 137 adequate capacity to handle all situations. 139 Dependency failures: A Diameter node can become overloaded because a 140 resource on which it is dependent has failed or become overloaded, 141 greatly reducing the logical capacity of the node. In these 142 cases, even minimal traffic might cause the node to go into 143 overload. Examples of such dependency overloads include DNS 144 servers, databases, disks, and network interfaces. 146 Component failures: A Diameter node can become overloaded when it is 147 a member of a cluster of servers that each share the load of 148 traffic, and one or more of the other members in the cluster fail. 149 In this case, the remaining nodes take over the work of the failed 150 nodes. Normally, capacity planning takes such failures into 151 account, and servers are typically run with enough spare capacity 152 to handle failure of another node. However, unusual failure 153 conditions can cause many nodes to fail at once. This is often 154 the case with software failures, where a bad packet or bad 155 database entry hits the same bug in a set of nodes in a cluster. 157 Network Initiated Traffic Flood: Issues with the radio access 158 network in a mobile network such as radio overlays with frequent 159 handovers, and operational changes are examples of network events 160 that can precipitate a flood of Diameter signaling traffic, such 161 as an avalanche restart. Failure of a Diameter proxy may also 162 result in a large amount of signaling as connections and sessions 163 are reestablished. 165 Subscriber Initiated Traffic Flood: Large gatherings of subscribers 166 or events that result in many subscribers interacting with the 167 network in close time proximity can result in Diameter signaling 168 traffic floods. For example, the finale of a large fireworks show 169 could be immediately followed by many subscribers posting 170 messages, pictures, and videos concentrated on one portion of a 171 network. Subscriber devices, such as smartphones, may use 172 aggressive registration strategies that generate unusually high 173 Diameter traffic loads. 175 DoS attacks: An attacker, wishing to disrupt service in the network, 176 can cause a large amount of traffic to be launched at a target 177 element. This can be done from a central source of traffic or 178 through a distributed DoS attack. In all cases, the volume of 179 traffic well exceeds the capacity of the element, sending the 180 system into overload. 182 1.2. Effects of Overload 184 Modern Diameter networks, comprised of application layer multi-node 185 deployments of Diameter elements, may operate at very large 186 transaction volumes. If a Diameter node becomes overloaded, or even 187 worse, fails completely, a large number of messages may be lost very 188 quickly. Even with redundant servers, many messages can be lost in 189 the time it takes for failover to complete. While a Diameter client 190 or agent should be able to retry such requests, an overloaded peer 191 may cause a sudden large increase in the number of transaction 192 transactions needing to be retried, rapidly filling local queues or 193 otherwise contributing to local overload. Therefore Diameter devices 194 need to be able to shed load before critical failures can occur. 196 Diameter depends heavily on The "Authentication, Authorization, 197 and Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile" [RFC3539], which states 198 assumptions about the scale of AAA services which may be incorrect 199 for current uses of Diameter. In particular, the document 200 suggests that AAA services will typically be low volume and that 201 traffic will typically be application-driven. Section 2.1 of that 202 document uses an example of a 48 port NAS. However, Diameter is 203 commonly used in large-scale mobile data environments, where a 204 typical client could be a packet gateway that serves millions of 205 users, and generates Diameter messages at network-driven rates. 207 1.3. Overload vs. Network Congestion 209 This document uses the term "overload" to refer to application-layer 210 overload at Diameter nodes. This is distinct from "network 211 congestion", that is, congestion that occurs at the lower networking 212 layers that may impact the delivery of Diameter messages between 213 nodes. The authors recognize that element overload and network 214 congestion are interrelated, and that overload can contribute to 215 network congestion and vice versa. 217 Network congestion issues are better handled by the transport 218 protocols. Diameter uses TCP and SCTP, both of which include 219 congestion management features. Analysis of whether those features 220 are sufficient for transport level congestion between Diameter nodes, 221 and any work to further mitigate network congestion is out of scope 222 both for this document, and for the work proposed by this document. 224 1.4. Diameter Applications in a Broader Network 226 Most elements using Diameter applications do not use Diameter 227 exclusively. It is important to realize that overload of an element 228 can be caused by a number of factors that may be unrelated to the 229 processing of Diameter or Diameter applications. 231 A element communicating via protocols other than Diameter that is 232 also using a Diameter application needs to be able to signal to 233 Diameter peers that it is experiencing overload regardless of the 234 cause of the overload, since the overload will affect that element's 235 ability to process Diameter transactions. The element may also need 236 to signal this on other protocols depending on its function and the 237 architecture of the network and application it is providing services 238 for. Whether that is necessary can only be decided within the 239 context of that architecture and application. A mechanism for 240 signaling overload with Diameter, which this specification details 241 the requirements for, provides applications the ability to signal 242 their Diameter peers of overload, mitigating that part of the issue. 243 Applications may need to use this, as well as other mechanisms, to 244 solve their broader overload issues. Indicating overload on 245 protocols other than Diameter is out of scope for this document, and 246 for the work proposed by this document. 248 1.5. Documentation Conventions 250 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 251 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 252 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 254 The terms "client", "server", "agent", "node", "peer", "upstream", 255 and "downstream" are used as defined in [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis]. 257 2. Overload Scenarios 259 Several Diameter deployment scenarios exist that may impact overload 260 management. The following scenarios help motivate the requirements 261 for an overload management mechanism. 263 These scenarios are by no means exhaustive, and are in general 264 simplified for the sake of clarity. In particular, the authors 265 assume for the sake of clarity that the client sends Diameter 266 requests to the server, and the server sends responses to client, 267 even though Diameter supports bidirectional applications. Each 268 direction in such an application can be modeled separately. 270 In a large scale deployment, many of the nodes represented in these 271 scenarios would be deployed as clusters of servers. The authors 272 assume that such a cluster is responsible for managing its own 273 internal load balancing and overload management so that it appears as 274 a single Diameter node. That is, other Diameter nodes can treat it 275 as single, monolithic node for the purposes of overload management. 277 These scenarios do not illustrate the client application. As 278 mentioned in Section 1, Diameter is not typically an end-user 279 protocol; rather it is generally used in support of some other client 280 application. These scenarios do not consider the impact of Diameter 281 overload on the client application. 283 2.1. Peer to Peer Scenarios 285 This section describes Diameter peer-to-peer scenarios. That is, 286 scenarios where a Diameter client talks directly with a Diameter 287 server, without the use of a Diameter agent. 289 Figure 1 illustrates the simplest possible Diameter relationship. 290 The client and server share a one-to-one peer-to-peer relationship. 291 If the server becomes overloaded, either because the client exceeds 292 the server's capacity, or because the server's capacity is reduced 293 due to some resource dependency, the client needs to reduce the 294 amount of Diameter traffic it sends to the server. Since the client 295 cannot forward requests to another server, it must either queue 296 requests until the server recovers, or itself become overloaded in 297 the context of the client application and other protocols it may also 298 use. 300 +------------------+ 301 | | 302 | | 303 | Server | 304 | | 305 +--------+---------+ 306 | 307 | 308 +--------+---------+ 309 | | 310 | | 311 | Client | 312 | | 313 +------------------+ 315 Figure 1: Basic Peer to Peer Scenario 317 Figure 2 shows a similar scenario, except in this case the client has 318 multiple servers that can handle work for a specific realm and 319 application. If server 1 becomes overloaded, the client can forward 320 traffic to server 2. Assuming server 2 has sufficient reserve 321 capacity to handle the forwarded traffic, the client should be able 322 to continue serving client application protocol users. If server 1 323 is approaching overload, but can still handle some number of new 324 request, it needs to be able to instruct the client to forward a 325 subset of its traffic to server 2. 327 +------------------+ +------------------+ 328 | | | | 329 | | | | 330 | Server 1 | | Server 2 | 331 | | | | 332 +--------+-`.------+ +------.'+---------+ 333 `. .' 334 `. .' 335 `. .' 336 `. .' 337 +-------`.'--------+ 338 | | 339 | | 340 | Client | 341 | | 342 +------------------+ 344 Figure 2: Multiple Server Peer to Peer Scenario 346 Figure 3 illustrates a peer-to-peer scenario with multiple Diameter 347 realm and application combinations. In this example, server 2 can 348 handle work for both applications. Each application might have 349 different resource dependencies. For example, a server might need to 350 access one database for application A, and another for application B. 351 This creates a possibility that Server 2 could become overloaded for 352 application A but not for application B, in which case the client 353 would need to divert some part of its application A requests to 354 server 1, but should not divert any application B requests. This 355 requires server 2 to be able to distinguish between applications when 356 it indicates an overload condition to the client. 358 On the other hand, it's possible that the servers host many 359 applications. If server 2 becomes overloaded for all applications, 360 it would be undesirable for it to have to notify the client 361 separately for each application. Therefore it also needs a way to 362 indicate that it is overloaded for all possible applications. 364 +----------------------------------------------+ 365 | Application A +------------------------+----------------------+ 366 |+------------------+ | +------------------+ | +------------------+| 367 || | | | | | | || 368 || | | | | | | || 369 || Server 1 | | | Server 2 | | | Server 3 || 370 || | | | | | | || 371 |+--------+---------+ | +--------+---------+ | +-+----------------+| 372 | | | | | | | 373 +---------+-----------+-----------+------------+ | | 374 | | | | | 375 | | | | Application B | 376 | +-----------+-----------------+-----------------+ 377 ``-.._ | | 378 `-..__ | _.-'' 379 `--._ | _.-'' 380 ``-.__ | _.-'' 381 +------`-.-''------+ 382 | | 383 | | 384 | Client | 385 | | 386 +------------------+ 388 Figure 3: Multiple Application Peer to Peer Scenario 390 2.2. Agent Scenarios 392 This section describes scenarios that include a Diameter agent, 393 either in the form of a Diameter relay or Diameter proxy. These 394 scenarios do not consider Diameter redirect agents, since they are 395 more readily modeled as end-servers. 397 Figure 4 illustrates a simple Diameter agent scenario with a single 398 client, agent, and server. In this case, overload can occur at the 399 server, at the agent, or both. But in most cases, client behavior is 400 the same whether overload occurs at the server or at the agent. From 401 the client's perspective, server overload and agent overload is the 402 same thing. 404 +------------------+ 405 | | 406 | | 407 | Server | 408 | | 409 +--------+---------+ 410 | 411 | 412 +--------+---------+ 413 | | 414 | | 415 | Agent | 416 | | 417 +--------+---------+ 418 | 419 | 420 +--------+---------+ 421 | | 422 | | 423 | Client | 424 | | 425 +------------------+ 427 Figure 4: Basic Agent Scenario 429 Figure 5 shows an agent scenario with multiple servers. If server 1 430 becomes overloaded, but server 2 has sufficient reserve capacity, the 431 agent may be able to transparently divert some or all Diameter 432 requests originally bound for server 1 to server 2. 434 In most cases, the client does not have detailed knowledge of the 435 Diameter topology upstream of the agent. If the agent uses dynamic 436 discovery to find eligible servers, the set of eligible servers may 437 not be enumerable from the perspective of the client. Therefore, in 438 most cases the agent needs to deal with any upstream overload issues 439 in a way that is transparent to the client. If one server notifies 440 the agent that it has become overloaded, the notification should not 441 be passed back to the client in a way that the client could 442 mistakenly perceive the agent itself as being overloaded. If the set 443 of all possible destinations upstream of the agent no longer has 444 sufficient capacity for incoming load, the agent itself becomes 445 effectively overloaded. 447 On the other hand, there are cases where the client needs to be able 448 to select a particular server from behind an agent. For example, if 449 a Diameter request is part of a multiple-round-trip authentication, 450 or is otherwise part of a Diameter "session", it may have a 451 DestinationHost AVP that requires the request to be served by server 452 1. Therefore the agent may need to inform a client that a particular 453 upstream server is overloaded or otherwise unavailable. Note that 454 there can be many ways a server can be specified, which may have 455 different implications (e.g. by IP address, by host name, etc). 457 +------------------+ +------------------+ 458 | | | | 459 | | | | 460 | Server 1 | | Server 2 | 461 | | | | 462 +--------+-`.------+ +------.'+---------+ 463 `. .' 464 `. .' 465 `. .' 466 `. .' 467 +-------`.'--------+ 468 | | 469 | | 470 | Agent | 471 | | 472 +--------+---------+ 473 | 474 | 475 | 476 +--------+---------+ 477 | | 478 | | 479 | Client | 480 | | 481 +------------------+ 483 Figure 5: Multiple Server Agent Scenario 485 Figure 6 shows a scenario where an agent routes requests to a set of 486 servers for more than one Diameter realm and application. In this 487 scenario, if server 1 becomes overloaded or unavailable, the agent 488 may effectively operate at reduced capacity for application A, but at 489 full capacity for application B. Therefore, the agent needs to be 490 able to report that it is overloaded for one application, but not for 491 another. 493 +----------------------------------------------+ 494 | Application A +------------------------+----------------------+ 495 |+------------------+ | +------------------+ | +------------------+| 496 || | | | | | | || 497 || | | | | | | || 498 || Server 1 | | | Server 2 | | | Server 3 || 499 || | | | | | | || 500 |+---------+--------+ | +--------+---------+ | +--+---------------+| 501 | | | | | | | 502 +----------+----------+-----------+------------+ | | 503 | | | | | 504 | | | | Application B | 505 | +-----------+------------------+----------------+ 506 | | | 507 ``--.__ | _. 508 ``-.__ | __.--'' 509 `--.._ | _..--' 510 +-----``-+.-''-----+ 511 | | 512 | | 513 | Agent | 514 | | 515 +--------+---------+ 516 | 517 | 518 +--------+---------+ 519 | | 520 | | 521 | Client | 522 | | 523 +------------------+ 525 Figure 6: Multiple Application Agent Scenario 527 2.3. Interconnect Scenario 529 Another scenario to consider when looking at Diameter overload is 530 that of multiple network operators using Diameter components 531 connected through an interconnect service, e.g. using IPX. Figure 7 532 shows two network operators with an interconnect network in-between. 533 There could be any number of these networks between any two network 534 operator's networks. 536 +-------------------------------------------+ 537 | Interconnect | 538 | | 539 | +--------------+ +--------------+ | 540 | | Server 3 |------| Server 4 | | 541 | +--------------+ +--------------+ | 542 | .' `. | 543 +------.-'--------------------------`.------+ 544 .' `. 545 .-' `. 546 ------------.'-----+ +----`.--------------- 547 +----------+ | | +----------+ 548 | Server 1 | | | | Server 2 | 549 +----------+ | | +----------+ 550 | | 551 Network Operator 1 | | Network Operator 2 552 -------------------+ +--------------------- 554 Figure 7: Two Network Interconnect Scenario 556 The characteristics of the information that an operator would want to 557 share over such a connection are different from the information 558 shared between components within a network operator's network. 559 Network operators may not want to convey topology or operational 560 information, which limits how much overload and loading information 561 can be sent. For the interconnect scenario shown, Server 2 may want 562 to signal overload to Server 1, to affect traffic coming from Network 563 Operator 1. 565 This case is distinct from those internal to a network operator's 566 network, where there may be many more elements in a more complicated 567 topology. Also, the elements in the interconnect network may not 568 support diameter overload control, and the network operators may not 569 want the interconnect network to use overload or loading information. 570 They may only want the information to pass through the interconnect 571 network without further processing or action by the interconnect 572 network even if the elements in the interconnect network do support 573 diameter overload control. 575 3. Extensibility 577 Given the variety of scenarios diameter elements can be deployed in, 578 and the variety of roles they can fulfill with diameter and other 579 technologies, a single algorithm for handling overload may not be 580 sufficient. This effort cannot anticipate all possible future 581 scenarios and roles. Extensibility, particularly of algorithms used 582 to deal with overload, will be important to cover these cases. 584 4. Existing Mechanisms 586 Diameter offers both implicit and explicit mechanisms for a Diameter 587 node to learn that a peer is overloaded or unreachable. The implicit 588 mechanism is simply the lack of responses to requests. If a client 589 fails to receive a response in a certain time period, it assumes the 590 upstream peer is unavailable, or overloaded to the point of effective 591 unavailability. The watchdog mechanism [RFC3539] ensures that a 592 certain rate of transaction responses occur even when there is 593 otherwise little or no other Diameter traffic. 595 The explicit mechanism involves specific protocol error responses, 596 where an agent or server can tell a downstream peer that it is either 597 too busy to handle a request (DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY) or unable to route a 598 request to an upstream destination (DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER), 599 perhaps because that destination itself is overloaded to the point of 600 unavailability. 602 Once a Diameter node learns that an upstream peer has become 603 overloaded via one of these mechanisms, it can then attempt to take 604 action to reduce the load. This usually means forwarding traffic to 605 an alternate destination, if available. If no alternate destination 606 is available, the node must either reduce the number of messages it 607 originates (in the case of a client) or inform the client to reduce 608 traffic (in the case of an agent.) 610 Diameter requires the use of a congestion-managed transport layer, 611 currently TCP or SCTP, to mitigate network congestion. It is 612 expected that these transports manage network congestion and that 613 issues with transport (e.g. congestion propagation and window 614 management) are managed at that level. But even with a congestion- 615 managed transport, a Diameter node can become overloaded at the 616 Diameter protocol or application layers due to the causes described 617 in Section 1.1 and congestion managed transports do not provide 618 facilities (and are at the wrong level) to handle server overload. 619 Transport level congestion management is also not sufficient to 620 address overload in cases of multi-hop and multi-destination 621 signaling. 623 5. Issues with the Current Mechanisms 625 The currently available Diameter mechanisms for indicating an 626 overload condition are not adequate to avoid service outages due to 627 overload. This inadequacy may, in turn, contribute to broader 628 congestion collapse due to unresponsive Diameter nodes causing 629 application or transport layer retransmissions. In particular, they 630 do not allow a Diameter agent or server to shed load as it approaches 631 overload. At best, a node can only indicate that it needs to 632 entirely stop receiving requests, i.e. that it has effectively 633 failed. Even that is problematic due to the inability to indicate 634 durational validity on the transient errors available in the base 635 Diameter protocol. Diameter offers no mechanism to allow a node to 636 indicate different overload states for different categories of 637 messages, for example, if it is overloaded for one Diameter 638 application but not another. 640 5.1. Problems with Implicit Mechanism 642 The implicit mechanism doesn't allow an agent or server to inform the 643 client of a problem until it is effectively too late to do anything 644 about it. The client does not know to take action until the upstream 645 node has effectively failed. A Diameter node has no opportunity to 646 shed load early to avoid collapse in the first place. 648 Additionally, the implicit mechanism cannot distinguish between 649 overload of a Diameter node and network congestion. Diameter treats 650 the failure to receive an answer as a transport failure. 652 5.2. Problems with Explicit Mechanisms 654 The Diameter specification is ambiguous on how a client should handle 655 receipt of a DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY response. The base specification 656 [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] indicates that the sending client should 657 attempt to send the request to a different peer. It makes no 658 suggestion that a the receipt of a DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY response should 659 affect future Diameter messages in any way. 661 The Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Transport 662 Profile [RFC3539] recommends that a AAA node that receives a "Busy" 663 response failover all remaining requests to a different agent or 664 server. But while the Diameter base specification explicitly depends 665 on RFC3539 to define transport behavior, it does not refer to RFC3539 666 in the description of behavior on receipt of DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY. 667 There's a strong likelihood that at least some implementations will 668 continue to send Diameter requests to an upstream peer even after 669 receiving a DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY error. 671 BCP 41 [RFC2914] describes, among other things, how end-to-end 672 application behavior can help avoid congestion collapse. In 673 particular, an application should avoid sending messages that will 674 never be delivered or processed. The DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY behavior as 675 described in the Diameter base specification fails at this, since if 676 an upstream node becomes overloaded, a client attempts each request, 677 and does not discover the need to failover the request until the 678 initial attempt fails. 680 The situation is improved if implementations follow the [RFC3539] 681 recommendation and keep state about upstream peer overload. But even 682 then, the Diameter specification offers no guidance on how long a 683 client should wait before retrying the overloaded destination. If an 684 agent or server supports multiple realms and/or applications, 685 DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY offers no way to indicate that it is overloaded for 686 one application but not another. A DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY error can only 687 indicate overload at a "whole server" scope. 689 Agent processing of a DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY response is also problematic 690 as described in the base specification. DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY is defined 691 as a protocol error. If an agent receives a protocol error, it may 692 either handle it locally or it may forward the response back towards 693 the downstream peer. (The Diameter specification is inconsistent 694 about whether a protocol error MAY or SHOULD be handled by an agent, 695 rather than forwarded downstream.) If a downstream peer receives the 696 DIAMETER_TOO_BUSY response, it may stop sending all requests to the 697 agent for some period of time, even though the agent may still be 698 able to deliver requests to other upstream peers. 700 DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER also has no mechanisms for specifying the 701 scope or cause of the failure, or the durational validity. 703 6. Diameter Overload Case Studies 705 6.1. Overload in Mobile Data Networks 707 As the number of Third Generation (3G) and Long Term Evolution (LTE) 708 enabled smartphone devices continue to expand in mobility networks, 709 there have been situations where high signaling traffic load led to 710 overload events at the Diameter-based Home Location Registries (HLR) 711 and/or Home Subscriber Servers (HSS). The root causes of the HLR 712 congestion events were manifold but included hardware failure and 713 procedural errors. The result was high signaling traffic load on the 714 HLR and HSS. 716 The 3GPP standards specification[need citation] for the end-to-end 717 signaling call flows in 3G and LTE, from the end user device 718 traversing through the radio and the core networks to the HLR/HSS, 719 did not have an equivalent load control mechanism to those provided 720 in the more traditional SS7 elements in GSM [need citation]. The 721 capabilities specified in the 3GPP standards do not adequately 722 address the abnormal condition where excessively high signaling 723 traffic load situations are experienced. 725 Smartphones contribute much more heavily, relative to non- 726 smartphones, to the continuation of a registration surge due to their 727 very aggressive registration algorithms. The aggressive smartphone 728 logic is designed to: 730 a. always have voice and data registration, and 732 b. constantly try to be on 3G or LTE data (and thus on 3G voice or 733 VoLTE) for their added benefits. 735 Non-smartphones typically have logic to wait for a time period after 736 registering successfully on voice and data. 738 The smartphone aggressive registration is problematic in two ways: 740 o first by generating excessive signaling load towards the HLR that 741 is ten times that from a non-smartphone, 743 o and second by causing continual registration attempts when a 744 network failure affects registrations through the 3G data network. 746 6.2. 3GPP Study on Core Network Overload 748 A study in 3GPP SA2 on core network overload has produced the 749 technical report [TR23.843]. This enumerates several causes of 750 overload in mobile core networks including portions that are signaled 751 using Diameter. This document is a work in progress and is not 752 complete. However, it is useful for pointing out scenarios and the 753 general need for an overload control mechanism for Diameter. 755 It is common for mobile networks to employ more than one radio 756 technology and to do so in an overlay fashion with multiple 757 technologies present in the same location (such as GSM, UMTS or CDMA 758 along with LTE). This presents opportunities for traffic storms when 759 issues occur on one overlay and not another as all devices that had 760 been on the overlay with issues switch. This causes a large amount 761 of Diameter traffic as locations and policies are updated. 763 Another scenario called out by this study is a flood of registration 764 and mobility management events caused by some element in the core 765 network failing. This flood of traffic from end nodes falls under 766 the network initiated traffic flood category. There is likely to 767 also be traffic resulting directly from the component failure in this 768 case. A similar flood can occur when elements or components recover 769 as well. 771 Subscriber initiated traffic floods are also indicated in this study 772 as an overload mechanism where a large number of mobile devices 773 attempting to access services at the same time, such as in response 774 to an entertainment event or a catastrophic event. 776 While this 3GPP study is concerned with the broader effects of these 777 scenarios on wireless networks and their elements, they have 778 implications specifically for Diameter signaling. One of the goals 779 of this document is to provide guidance for a core mechanism that can 780 be used to mitigate the scenarios called out by this study. 782 7. Solution Requirements 784 This section proposes requirements for an improved mechanism to 785 control Diameter overload, with the goals of improving the issues 786 described in Section 5 and supporting the scenarios described in 787 Section 2 789 REQ 1: The overload mechanism MUST provide a communication method 790 for Diameter nodes to exchange overload information. 792 REQ 2: The overload mechanism MUST be useable with any existing or 793 future Diameter application. It MUST NOT require 794 specification changes for existing Diameter applications. 796 REQ 3: The overload mechanism MUST limit the impact of overload on 797 the overall useful throughput of a Diameter server, even 798 when the incoming load on the network is far in excess of 799 its capacity. The overall useful throughput under load is 800 the ultimate measure of the value of an overload control 801 mechanism. 803 REQ 4: Diameter allows requests to be sent from either side of a 804 connection and either side of a connection may have need to 805 provide its overload status. The mechanism MUST allow each 806 side of a connection to independently inform the other of 807 its overload status. 809 REQ 5: Diameter allows nodes to determine their peers via dynamic 810 discovery or manual configuration. The mechanism MUST work 811 consistently without regard to how peers are determined. 813 REQ 6: The mechanism designers SHOULD seek to minimize the amount 814 of new configuration required in order to work. For 815 example, it is better to allow peers to advertise or 816 negotiate support for the mechanism, rather than to require 817 this knowledge to be configured at each node. 819 REQ 7: The overload mechanism MUST ensure that the system remains 820 stable. When the offered load drops from above the overall 821 capacity of the network to below the overall capacity, the 822 throughput MUST stabilize and become equal to the offered 823 load. Note that this also requires that the mechanism MUST 824 allow nodes to shed load without introducing oscillations. 826 REQ 8: Supporting nodes MUST be able to distinguish current 827 overload information from stale information, and SHOULD make 828 decisions using the most currently available information. 830 REQ 9: The mechanism MUST function across fully loaded as well as 831 quiescent transport connections. This is partially derived 832 from the requirements for stability and hysteresis control 833 above. 835 REQ 10: Consumers of overload state indications MUST be able to 836 determine when the overload condition improves or ends. 838 REQ 11: The overload mechanism MUST be scalable. That is, it MUST 839 be able to operate in different sized networks. 841 REQ 12: When a single network node fails, goes into overload, or 842 suffers from reduced processing capacity, the mechanism MUST 843 make it possible to limit the impact of this on other nodes 844 in the network. This helps to prevent a small-scale failure 845 from becoming a widespread outage. 847 REQ 13: The mechanism MUST NOT introduce substantial additional work 848 for node in an overloaded state. For example, a requirement 849 for an overloaded node to send overload information every 850 time it received a new request would introduce substantial 851 work. Existing messaging is likely to have the 852 characteristic of increasing as an overload condition 853 approaches, allowing for the possibility of increased 854 feedback for information piggybacked on it. 856 REQ 14: Some scenarios that result in overload involve a rapid 857 increase of traffic with little time between normal levels 858 and overload inducing levels. The mechanism SHOULD provide 859 for rapid feedback when traffic levels increase. 861 REQ 15: The mechanism MUST NOT interfere with the congestion control 862 mechanisms of underlying transport protocols. For example, 863 a mechanism that opened additional TCP connections when the 864 network is congested would reduce the effectiveness of the 865 underlying congestion control mechanisms. 867 REQ 16: The mechanism MUST operate without malfunction in an 868 environment with a mix of nodes that do, and nodes that do 869 not, support the mechanism. 871 REQ 17: In a mixed environment with nodes that support the overload 872 control mechanism and that do not, the mechanism MUST result 873 in at least as much useful throughput as would have resulted 874 if the mechanism were not present. It SHOULD result in less 875 severe congestion in this environment. 877 REQ 18: In a mixed environment of nodes that support the overload 878 control mechanism and that do not, users and operators of 879 nodes that do not support the mechanism MUST NOT benefit 880 from the mechanism more than users and operators of nodes 881 that support the mechanism. 883 REQ 19: It MUST be possible to use the mechanism between nodes in 884 different realms and in different administrative domains. 886 REQ 20: Any explicit overload indication MUST distinguish between 887 actual overload, as opposed to other, non-overload related 888 failures. 890 REQ 21: In cases where a network node fails, is so overloaded that 891 it cannot process messages, or cannot communicate due to a 892 network failure, it may not be able to provide explicit 893 indications of the nature of the failure or its levels of 894 congestion. The mechanism MUST properly function in these 895 cases. 897 REQ 22: The mechanism MUST provide a way for an node to throttle the 898 amount of traffic it receives from an peer node. This 899 throttling SHOULD be graded so that it can be applied 900 gradually as offered load increases. Overload is not a 901 binary state; there may be degrees of overload. 903 REQ 23: The mechanism MUST enable a supporting node to minimize the 904 chance that retries due to an overloaded or failed node 905 result in additional traffic to other overloaded nodes, or 906 cause additional nodes to become overloaded. Moreover, the 907 mechanism SHOULD provide unambiguous directions to clients 908 on when they should retry a request and when they should not 909 considering the various causes of overload such as avalanche 910 restart. 912 REQ 24: The mechanism MUST provide sufficient information to enable 913 a load balancing node to divert messages that are rejected 914 or otherwise throttled by an overloaded upstream node to 915 other upstream nodes that are the most likely to have 916 sufficient capacity to process them. 918 REQ 25: The mechanism MUST provide a mechanism for indicating load 919 levels even when not in an overloaded condition, to assist 920 nodes making decisions to prevent overload conditions from 921 occurring. 923 REQ 26: The specification for the overload mechanism SHOULD offer 924 guidance on which message types might be desirable to send 925 or process over others during times of overload, based on 926 Diameter-specific considerations. For example, it may be 927 more beneficial to process messages for existing sessions 928 ahead of new sessions. 930 REQ 27: The mechanism MUST NOT prevent a node from prioritizing 931 requests based on any local policy, so that certain requests 932 are given preferential treatment, given additional 933 retransmission, not throttled, or processed ahead of others. 935 REQ 28: The overload mechanism MUST NOT provide new vulnerabilities 936 to malicious attack, or increase the severity of any 937 existing vulnerabilities. This includes vulnerabilities to 938 DoS and DDoS attacks as well as replay and man-in-the middle 939 attacks. 941 REQ 29: The mechanism MUST provide a means to match an overload 942 indication with the node that originated it. In particular, 943 the mechanism MUST allow a node to distinguish between 944 overload at a next-hop peer from overload at a node upstream 945 of the peer. For example, in Figure 5, the client must not 946 mistake overload at server 1 for overload at the agent, 947 whether or not the agent supports the mechanism.( see REQ 948 4). 950 REQ 30: The mechanism MUST NOT depend on being deployed in 951 environments where all Diameter nodes are completely 952 trusted. It SHOULD operate as effectively as possible in 953 environments where other nodes are malicious; this includes 954 preventing malicious nodes from obtaining more than a fair 955 share of service. Note that this does not imply any 956 responsibility on the mechanism to detect, or take 957 countermeasures against, malicious nodes. 959 REQ 31: It MUST be possible for a supporting node to make 960 authorization decisions about what information will be sent 961 to peer nodes based on the identity of those nodes. This 962 allows a domain administrator who considers the load of 963 their nodes to be sensitive information to restrict access 964 to that information. Of course, in such cases, there is no 965 expectation that the overload mechanism itself will help 966 prevent overload from that peer node. 968 REQ 32: The mechanism MUST NOT interfere with any Diameter compliant 969 method that a node may use to protect itself from overload 970 from non-supporting nodes, or from denial of service 971 attacks. 973 REQ 33: There are multiple situations where a Diameter node may be 974 overloaded for some purposes but not others. For example, 975 this can happen to an agent or server that supports multiple 976 applications, or when a server depends on multiple external 977 resources, some of which may become overloaded while others 978 are fully available. The mechanism MUST allow Diameter 979 nodes to indicate overload with sufficient granularity to 980 allow clients to take action based on the overloaded 981 resources without forcing available capacity to go unused. 982 The mechanism MUST support specification of overload 983 information with granularities of at least "Diameter node", 984 "realm", "Diameter application", and "Diameter session", and 985 SHOULD allow extensibility for others to be added in the 986 future. 988 REQ 34: The mechanism MUST provide a method for extending the 989 information communicated and the algorithms used for 990 overload control. 992 REQ 35: The mechanism SHOULD provide a method for exchanging 993 overload and load information between elements that are 994 connected by intermediaries that do not support the 995 mechanism. A separate mechanism or extension of the 996 mechanism to support this may be warranted for this. 998 8. IANA Considerations 1000 This document makes no requests of IANA. 1002 9. Security Considerations 1004 A Diameter overload control mechanism is primarily concerned with the 1005 load and overload related behavior of nodes in a Diameter network, 1006 and the information used to affect that behavior. Load and overload 1007 information is shared between nodes and directly affects the behavior 1008 and thus is potentially vulnerable to a number of methods of attack. 1010 Load and overload information may also be sensitive from both 1011 business and network protection viewpoints. Operators of Diameter 1012 equipment want to control visibility to load and overload information 1013 to keep it from being used for competitive intelligence or for 1014 targeting attacks. It is also important that the Diameter overload 1015 control mechanism not introduce any way in which any other 1016 information carried by Diameter is sent inappropriately. 1018 This document includes requirements intended to mitigate the effects 1019 of attacks and to protect the information used by the mechanism. 1021 9.1. Access Control 1023 To control the visibility of load and overload information, sending 1024 should be subject to some form of authentication and authorization of 1025 the receiver. It is also important to the receivers that they are 1026 confident the load and overload information they receive is from a 1027 legitimate source. Note that this implies a certain amount of 1028 configurability on the nodes supporting the Diameter overload control 1029 mechanism. 1031 9.2. Denial-of-Service Attacks 1033 An overload control mechanism provides a very attractive target for 1034 denial-of-service attacks. A small number of messages may affect a 1035 large service disruption by falsely reporting overload conditions. 1036 Alternately, attacking servers nearing, or in, overload may also be 1037 facilitated by disrupting their overload indications, potentially 1038 preventing them from mitigating their overload condition. 1040 A design goal for the Diameter overload control mechanism is to 1041 minimize or eliminate the possibility of using the mechanism for this 1042 type of attack. 1044 As the intent of some denial-of-service attacks is to induce overload 1045 conditions, an effective overload control mechanism should help to 1046 mitigate the effects of an such an attack. 1048 9.3. Replay Attacks 1050 An attacker that has managed to obtain some messages from the 1051 overload control mechanism may attempt to affect the behavior of 1052 nodes supporting the mechanism by sending those messages at 1053 potentially inopportune times. In addition to time shifting, replay 1054 attacks may send messages to other nodes as well (target shifting). 1056 A design goal for the Diameter overload control mechanism is to 1057 minimize or eliminate the possibility of causing disruption by using 1058 a replay attack on the Diameter overload control mechanism. 1060 9.4. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 1062 By inserting themselves in between two nodes supporting the Diameter 1063 overload control mechanism, an attacker may potentially both access 1064 and alter the information sent between those nodes. This can be used 1065 for information gathering for business intelligence and attack 1066 targeting, as well as direct attacks. 1068 A design goal for the Diameter overload control mechanism is to 1069 minimize or eliminate the possibility of causing disruption man-in- 1070 the-middle attacks on the Diameter overload control mechanism. A 1071 transport using TLS and/or IPSEC may be desirable for this. 1073 9.5. Compromised Hosts 1075 A compromised host that supports the Diameter overload control 1076 mechanism could be used for information gathering as well as for 1077 sending malicious information to any Diameter node that would 1078 normally accept information from it. While is is beyond the scope of 1079 the Diameter overload control mechanism to mitigate any operational 1080 interruption to the compromised host, a reasonable design goal is to 1081 minimize the impact that a compromised host can have on other nodes 1082 through the use of the Diameter overload control mechanism. Of 1083 course, a compromised host could be used to cause damage in a number 1084 of other ways. This is out of scope for a Diameter overload control 1085 mechanism. 1087 10. References 1089 10.1. Normative References 1091 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 1092 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 1094 [I-D.ietf-dime-rfc3588bis] 1095 Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn, 1096 "Diameter Base Protocol", draft-ietf-dime-rfc3588bis-34 1097 (work in progress), June 2012. 1099 [RFC2914] Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", BCP 41, 1100 RFC 2914, September 2000. 1102 [RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and 1103 Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539, June 2003. 1105 10.2. Informative References 1107 [RFC5390] Rosenberg, J., "Requirements for Management of Overload in 1108 the Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 5390, December 2008. 1110 [TR23.843] 1111 3GPP, "Study on Core Network Overload Solutions", 1112 TR 23.843 0.6.0, October 2012. 1114 Appendix A. Contributors 1116 Significant contributions to this document were made by Adam Roach 1117 and Eric Noel. 1119 Appendix B. Acknowledgements 1121 Review of, and contributions to, this specification by Martin Dolly, 1122 Carolyn Johnson, Jianrong Wang, Imtiaz Shaikh, Jouni Korhonen, Robert 1123 Sparks, Dieter Jacobsohn, and Janet Gunn were most appreciated. We 1124 would like to thank them for their time and expertise. 1126 Authors' Addresses 1128 Eric McMurry 1129 Tekelec 1130 17210 Campbell Rd. 1131 Suite 250 1132 Dallas, TX 75252 1133 US 1135 Email: eric.mcmurry@tekelec.com 1136 Ben Campbell 1137 Tekelec 1138 17210 Campbell Rd. 1139 Suite 250 1140 Dallas, TX 75252 1141 US 1143 Email: ben@nostrum.com