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Blacka 10 Verisign 11 March 11, 2019 13 Multi Provider DNSSEC models 14 draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-01 16 Abstract 18 Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers 19 to distribute their authoritative DNS service. Deploying DNSSEC in 20 such an environment may present some challenges depending on the 21 configuration and feature set in use. This document will present 22 several deployment models that may be suitable. 24 Status of This Memo 26 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 27 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 29 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 30 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 31 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 32 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 34 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 35 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 36 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 37 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 39 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019. 41 Copyright Notice 43 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 44 document authors. All rights reserved. 46 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 47 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 48 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 49 publication of this document. Please review these documents 50 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 51 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 52 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 53 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 54 described in the Simplified BSD License. 56 Table of Contents 58 1. Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 59 2. Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 2.1. Multiple Signer models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 2.1.1. Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider . . . . 4 62 2.1.2. Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider . . . . . . 4 63 3. Validating Resolver Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 4. Signing Algorithm Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 5. Authenticated Denial Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 5.1. Single Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 5.2. Mixing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 68 6. Key Rollover Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 69 6.1. Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider . . . . . . 8 70 6.2. Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider . . . . . . . . 8 71 7. Inter Provider Handoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 8. Key Management Mechanism Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 73 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 74 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 75 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 76 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 77 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 78 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 79 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 81 1. Introduction and Motivation 83 RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING: 84 The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub at: 85 https://github.com/shuque/multi-provider-dnssec 87 Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers 88 to distribute their authoritative DNS service. This allows the DNS 89 service to survive a complete failure of any single provider. 90 Additionally, enterprises or providers occasionally have requirements 91 that preclude standard zone transfer techniques [RFC1995] [RFC5936] : 92 either non-standardized DNS features are in use that are incompatible 93 with zone transfer, or operationally a provider must be able to 94 (re)sign DNS records using their own keys. This document outlines 95 some possible models of DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] 96 deployment in such an environment. 98 2. Deployment Models 100 If a zone owner is able to use standard zone transfer techniques, 101 then the presence of multiple providers does not present any need to 102 substantially modify normal deployment models. In these deployments 103 there is a single signing entity (which may be the zone owner, one of 104 the providers, or a separate entity), while the providers act as 105 secondary authoritative servers for the zone. 107 Occasionally, however, standard zone transfer techniques cannot be 108 used. This could be due to the use of non-standard DNS features, or 109 due to operational requirements of a given provider (e.g., a provider 110 that only supports "online signing".) In these scenarios, the 111 multiple providers each act like primary servers, independently 112 signing data received from the zone owner and serving it to DNS 113 queriers. This configuration presents some novel challenges and 114 requirements. 116 2.1. Multiple Signer models 118 In this category of models, multiple providers each independently 119 sign and serve the same zone. The zone owner typically uses 120 provider-specific APIs to update zone content at each of the 121 providers, and relies on the provider to perform signing of the data. 122 A key requirement here is to manage the contents of the DNSKEY and DS 123 RRset in such a way that validating resolvers always have a viable 124 path to authenticate the DNSSEC signature chain no matter which 125 provider is queried. This requirement is achieved by having each 126 provider import the public Zone Signing Keys (ZSKs) of all other 127 providers into their DNSKEY RRsets. 129 These models can support DNSSEC even for the non-standard features 130 mentioned previously, if the DNS providers have the capability of 131 signing the response data generated by those features. Since these 132 responses are often generated dynamically at query time, one method 133 is for the provider to perform online signing (also known as on-the- 134 fly signing). However, another possible approach is to pre-compute 135 all the possible response sets and associated signatures and then 136 algorithmically determine at query time which response set needs to 137 be returned. 139 In the models presented, the function of coordinating the DNSKEY or 140 DS RRset does not involve the providers communicating directly with 141 each other. Feedback from several commercial managed DNS providers 142 indicates that they may be unlikely to directly communicate since 143 they typically have a contractual relationship only with the zone 144 owner. However, if the parties involved are agreeable, it may be 145 possible to devise a protocol mechanism by which the providers 146 directly communicate to share keys. 148 The following descriptions consider the case of two DNS providers, 149 but the model is generalizable to any number. 151 2.1.1. Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider 153 o Zone owner holds the KSK, manages the DS record, and is 154 responsible for signing the DNSKEY RRset and distributing the 155 signed DNSKEY RRset to the providers. 157 o Each provider has their own ZSK which is used to sign data. 159 o Providers have an API that owner uses to query the ZSK public key, 160 and insert a combined DNSKEY RRset that includes both ZSKs and the 161 KSK, signed by the KSK. 163 o Note that even if the contents of the DNSKEY RRset don't change, 164 the Zone owner of course needs to periodically re-sign it as 165 signature expiration approaches. The provider API is also used to 166 thus periodically redistribute the refreshed DNSKEY RRset. 168 o Key rollovers need coordinated participation of the zone owner to 169 update the DNSKEY RRset (for KSK or ZSK), and the DS RRset (for 170 KSK). 172 2.1.2. Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider 174 o Each provider has their own KSK and ZSK. 176 o Each provider offers an API that the Zone Owner uses to import the 177 ZSK of the other provider into their DNSKEY RRset. 179 o DNSKEY RRset is signed independently by each provider using their 180 own KSK. 182 o Zone Owner manages the DS RRset that includes both KSKs. 184 o Key rollovers need coordinated participation of the zone owner to 185 update the DS RRset (for KSK), and the DNSKEY RRset (for ZSK). 187 3. Validating Resolver Behavior 189 The central requirement for both of the Multiple Signer models 190 (Section 2.1) is to ensure that the ZSKs from all providers are 191 present in each provider's apex DNSKEY RRset, and is vouched for by 192 either the single KSK (in model 1) or each provider's KSK (in model 193 2.) If this is not done, the following situation can arise (assuming 194 two providers A and B): 196 o The validating resolver follows a referral (delegation) to the 197 zone in question. 199 o It retrieves the zone's DNSKEY RRset from one of provider A's 200 nameservers. 202 o At some point in time, the resolver attempts to resolve a name in 203 the zone, while the DNSKEY RRset received from provider A is still 204 viable in its cache. 206 o It queries one of provider B's nameservers to resolve the name, 207 and obtains a response that is signed by provider B's ZSK, which 208 it cannot authenticate because this ZSK is not present in its 209 cached DNSKEY RRset for the zone that it received from provider A. 211 o The resolver will not accept this response. It may still be able 212 to ultimately authenticate the name by querying other nameservers 213 for the zone until it elicits a response from one of provider A's 214 nameservers. But it has incurred the penalty of additional 215 roundtrips with other nameservers, with the corresponding latency 216 and processing costs. The exact number of additional roundtrips 217 depends on details of the resolver's nameserver selection 218 algorithm and the number of nameservers configured at provider B. 220 o It may also be the case that a resolver is unable to provide an 221 authenticated response because it gave up after a certain number 222 of retries or a certain amount of delay. Or that downstream 223 clients of the resolver that originated the query timed out 224 waiting for a response. 226 Zone owners will want to deploy a DNS service that responds as 227 efficiently as possible with validatable answers only, and hence it 228 is important that the DNSKEY RRset at each provider is maintained 229 with the active ZSKs of all participating providers. This ensures 230 that resolvers can validate a response no matter which provider's 231 nameservers it came from. 233 Details of how the DNSKEY RRset itself is validated differs. In 234 model 1 (Section 2.1.1), one unique KSK managed by the Zone Owner 235 signs an identical DNSKEY RRset deployed at each provider, and the 236 signed DS record in the parent zone refers to this KSK. In model 2 237 (Section 2.1.2), each provider has a distinct KSK and signs the 238 DNSKEY RRset with it. The Zone Owner deploys a DS RRset at the 239 parent zone that contains multiple DS records, each referring to a 240 distinct provider's KSK. Hence it does not matter which provider's 241 nameservers the resolver obtains the DNSKEY RRset from, the signed DS 242 record in each model can authenticate the associated KSK. 244 4. Signing Algorithm Considerations 246 It is RECOMMENDED that the providers use a common signing algorithm 247 (and common keysizes for algorithms that support variable key sizes). 248 This ensures that the multiple providers have identical security 249 postures and no provider is more vulnerable to cryptanalytic attack 250 than the others. 252 It may however be possible to deploy a configuration where different 253 providers use different signing algorithms. The main impediment is 254 that current DNSSEC specifications require that if there are multiple 255 algorithms in the DNSKEY RRset, then RRsets in the zone need to be 256 signed with at least one DNSKEY of each algorithm, as described in 257 RFC 4035 [RFC4035], Section 2.2. However RFC 6781 [RFC6781], 258 Section 4.1.4, also describes both a conservative and liberal 259 interpretation of this requirement. When validating DNS resolvers 260 follow the liberal approach, they do not expect that zone RRsets are 261 signed by every signing algorithm in the DNSKEY RRset, and responses 262 with single algorithm signatures can be validated corectly assuming a 263 valid chain of trust exists. In fact, testing by the .BR Top Level 264 domain for their recent algorithm rollover [BR-ROLLOVER], 265 demonstrates that the liberal approach does in fact work with current 266 resolvers deployed on the Internet. 268 5. Authenticated Denial Considerations 270 Authentiated denial of existence enables a resolver to validate that 271 a record does not exist. For this purpose, an authoritative server 272 presents, in a response to the resolver, NSEC (Section 3.1.3 of 273 [RFC4035]) or NSEC3 (Section 7.2 of [RFC5155]) records. The NSEC3 274 method enhances NSEC by providing opt-out for signing insecure 275 delegations and also adds limited protection against zone enumeration 276 attacks. 278 An authoritative server response carrying records for authenticated 279 denial is always self-contained and the receiving resolver doesn't 280 need to send additional queries to complete the denial proof data. 281 For this reason, no rollover is needed when switching between NSEC 282 and NSEC3 for a signed zone. 284 Since authenticated denial responses are self-contained, NSEC and 285 NSEC3 can be used by different providers to serve the same zone. 286 Doing so however defeats the protection against zone enumeration 287 provided by NSEC3. A better configuration involves multiple 288 providers using different authenticated denial of existence 289 mechanisms that all provide zone enumeration defense, such as pre- 290 computed NSEC3, NSEC3 White Lies [RFC7129], NSEC Black Lies 291 [BLACKLIES], etc. Note however that having multiple providers 292 offering different authenticated denial mechanisms may impact how 293 effectively resolvers are able to make use of the caching of negative 294 responses. 296 5.1. Single Method 298 Usually, the NSEC and NSEC3 methods are used exclusively (i.e. the 299 methods are not used at the same time by different servers). This 300 configuration is prefered because the behavior is well-defined and 301 it's closest to the current operational practice. 303 5.2. Mixing Methods 305 Compliant resolvers should be able to validate zone data when 306 different authoritative servers for the same zone respond with 307 different authentiated denial methods because this is normally 308 observed when NSEC and NSEC3 are being switched or when NSEC3PARAM is 309 updated. 311 Resolver software may be however designed to handle a single 312 transition between two authenticated denial configurations more 313 optimally than permanent setup with mixed authenticated denial 314 methods. This could make caching on the resolver side less efficient 315 and the authoritative servers may observe higher number of queries. 316 This aspect should be considered especially in context of Aggresive 317 Use of DNSSEC-Validated Cache [RFC8198]. 319 In case all providers cannot be configured for a matching 320 authentiated denial, it is advised to find lowest number of possible 321 configurations possible across all used providers. 323 Note that NSEC3 configuration on all providers with different 324 NSEC3PARAM values is considered a mixed setup. 326 6. Key Rollover Considerations 328 The Multiple Signer (Section 2.1) models introduce some new 329 requirements for DNSSEC key rollovers. Since this process 330 necessarily involves coordinated actions on the part of providers and 331 the Zone Owner, one reasonable strategy is for the Zone Owner to 332 initiate key rollover operations. But other operationally plausible 333 models may also suit, such as a DNS provider initiating a key 334 rollover and signaling their intent to the Zone Owner in some manner. 336 The descriptions in this section assume that KSK rollovers employ the 337 commonly used Double Signature KSK Rollover Method, and that ZSK 338 rollovers employ the Pre-Publish ZSK Rollover Method, as described in 339 detail in [RFC6781]. With minor modifications, they can also be 340 easily adapted to other models, such as Double DS KSK Rollover or 341 Double Signature ZSK rollover, if desired. 343 6.1. Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider 345 o Key Signing Key Rollover: In this model, the two managed DNS 346 providers share a common KSK which is held by the Zone Owner. To 347 initiate the rollover, the Zone Owner generates a new KSK and 348 obtains the DNSKEY RRset of each DNS provider using their 349 respective APIs. The new KSK is added to each provider's DNSKEY 350 RRset and the RRset is re-signed with both the new and the old 351 KSK. This new DNSKEY RRset is then transferred to each provider. 352 The Zone Owner then updates the DS RRset in the parent zone to 353 point to the new KSK, and after the necessary DS record TTL period 354 has expired, proceeds with updating the DNSKEY RRSet to remove the 355 old KSK. 357 o Zone Signing Key Rollover: In this model, each DNS provider has 358 separate Zone Signing Keys. Each provider can choose to roll 359 their ZSK independently by co-ordinating with the Zone Owner. 360 Provider A would generate a new ZSK and communicate their intent 361 to perform a rollover (note that Provider A cannot immediately 362 insert this new ZSK into their DNSKEY RRset because the RRset has 363 to be signed by the Zone Owner). The Zone Owner obtains the new 364 ZSK from Provider A. It then obtains the current DNSKEY RRset 365 from each provider (including Provider A), inserts the new ZSK 366 into each DNSKEY RRset, re-signs the DNSKEY RRset, and sends it 367 back to each provider for deployment via their respective key 368 management APIs. Once the necessary time period is elapsed (i.e. 369 all zone data has been re-signed by the new ZSK and propagated to 370 all authoritative servers for the zone, plus the maximum zone TTL 371 value of any of the data in the zone signed by the old ZSK), 372 Provider A and the zone owner can initiate the next phase of 373 removing the old ZSK. 375 6.2. Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider 377 o Key Signing Key Rollover: In Model 2, each managed DNS provider 378 has their own KSK. A KSK roll for provider A does not require any 379 change in the DNSKEY RRset of provider B, but does require co- 380 ordination with the Zone Owner in order to get the DS record set 381 in the parent zone updated. The KSK roll starts with Provider A 382 generating a new KSK and including it in their DNSKEY RRSet. The 383 DNSKey RRset would then be signed by both the new and old KSK. 385 The new KSK is communicated to the Zone Owner, after which the 386 Zone Owner updates the DS RRset to replace the DS record for the 387 old KSK with a DS record for the new KSK. After the necessary DS 388 RRset TTL period has elapsed, the old KSK can be removed from 389 provider A's DNSKEY RRset. 391 o Zone Signing Key Rollover: In Model 2, each managed DNS provider 392 has their own ZSK. The ZSK roll for provider A would start with 393 them generating new ZSK and including it in their DNSKEY RRset and 394 re-signing the new DNSKEY RRset with their KSK. The new ZSK of 395 provider A would then be communicated to the Zone Owner, who will 396 initiate the process of importing this ZSK into the DNSKEY RRsets 397 of the other providers, using their respective APIs. Once the 398 necessary Pre-Publish key rollover time periods have elapsed, 399 provider A and the Zone Owner can initiate the process of removing 400 the old ZSK from the DNSKEY RRset of all providers. 402 7. Inter Provider Handoff 404 The primary use case for the models presented in this draft are for 405 steady state operation of multiple concurrent signing providers. But 406 they can also be leveraged in a fairly straightforward manner to 407 perform non-disruptive transfer of a signed DNS domain from one 408 provider to another. This involves initially bringing the new 409 provider into a multi-provider configuration, and then at a later 410 time detaching the old provider. [TBD: flesh out this use case in 411 more detail.] 413 8. Key Management Mechanism Requirements 415 Managed DNS providers often have their own proprietary zone 416 configuration and data management APIs, typically utilizing HTTPS/ 417 REST interfaces. So, rather than outlining a new API for key 418 management here, we describe the specific functions that the provider 419 API needs to support in order to enable the multi-signer models. The 420 Zone owner is expected to use these API functions to perform key 421 management tasks. Other mechanisms that can offer these functions, 422 if supported by the providers, include the DNS UPDATE protocol 423 [RFC2136] and EPP [RFC5731]. 425 o The API must offer a way to query the current DNSKEY RRset of the 426 provider 428 o For model 1, the API must offer a way to import a signed DNSKEY 429 RRset and replace the current one at the provider. 431 o For model 2, the API must offer a way to import a DNSKEY record 432 from an external provider into the current DNSKEY RRset 434 In model 2, once initially bootstrapped with each others zone signing 435 keys via these API mechanisms, providers could, if desired, 436 periodically query each others DNSKEY RRsets and automatically import 437 or withdraw ZSKs in the keyset as key rollover events happen. 439 9. IANA Considerations 441 This document includes no request to IANA. 443 10. Security Considerations 445 The Zone key import APIs required by these models need to be strongly 446 authenticated to prevent tampering of key material by malicious third 447 parties. Many providers today offer REST/HTTPS APIs that utilize a 448 number of authentication mechanisms (username/password, API keys 449 etc). If DNS protocol mechanisms like UPDATE are being used for key 450 insertion and deletion, they should similarly be strongly 451 authenticated, e.g. by employing Transaction Signatures (TSIG) 452 [RFC2845]. 454 11. Acknowledgments 456 The initial version of this document benefited from discussions with 457 and review from Duane Wessels. Additional helpful comments were 458 provided by Steve Crocker, Ulrich Wisser, Tony Finch, and Olafur 459 Gudmundsson. 461 12. References 463 12.1. Normative References 465 [RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound, 466 "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", 467 RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997, 468 . 470 [RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B. 471 Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS 472 (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000, 473 . 475 [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 476 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", 477 RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, 478 . 480 [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 481 Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", 482 RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, 483 . 485 [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 486 Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security 487 Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005, 488 . 490 [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS 491 Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of 492 Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008, 493 . 495 [RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) 496 Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, 497 DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009, . 500 [RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC 501 Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781, 502 DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012, . 505 [RFC8198] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of 506 DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198, 507 July 2017, . 509 12.2. Informative References 511 [BLACKLIES] 512 Valsorda, F. and O. Gudmundsson, "Compact DNSSEC Denial of 513 Existence or Black Lies", . 516 [BR-ROLLOVER] 517 Neves, F., ".br DNSSEC Algorithm Rollover Update", 518 in ICANN 62 DNSSEC Workshop, June 2018, 519 . 522 [RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995, 523 DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996, . 526 [RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol 527 (AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010, 528 . 530 [RFC7129] Gieben, R. and W. Mekking, "Authenticated Denial of 531 Existence in the DNS", RFC 7129, DOI 10.17487/RFC7129, 532 February 2014, . 534 Authors' Addresses 536 Shumon Huque 537 Salesforce 539 Email: shuque@gmail.com 541 Pallavi Aras 542 Salesforce 544 Email: paras@salesforce.com 546 John Dickinson 547 Sinodun 549 Email: jad@sinodun.com 551 Jan Vcelak 552 NS1 554 Email: jvcelak@ns1.com 556 David Blacka 557 Verisign 559 Email: davidb@verisign.com