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Mahoney 4 Intended status: Informational ISC 5 Expires: January 27, 2020 July 26, 2019 7 Moving DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV) to Historic Status 8 draft-ietf-dnsop-obsolete-dlv-00 10 Abstract 12 This document obsoletes DNSSEC lookaside validation (DLV) and 13 reclassifies RFCs 4431 and 5074 as Historic. 15 Status of This Memo 17 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 18 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 20 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 21 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 22 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 23 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 25 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 26 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 27 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 28 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 30 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 27, 2020. 32 Copyright Notice 34 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 35 document authors. All rights reserved. 37 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 38 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 39 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 40 publication of this document. Please review these documents 41 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 42 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 43 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 44 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 45 described in the Simplified BSD License. 47 Table of Contents 49 1. Introduction 50 2. Discussion 51 3. Moving DLV to Historic Status 52 3.1. Documents that reference the DLV RFCs 53 3.1.1. Documents that reference RFC 4431 54 3.1.2. Documents that reference RFC 5074 55 4. IANA Considerations 56 5. Security considerations 57 6. Acknowledgements 58 7. Normative References 59 Authors' Addresses 61 1. Introduction 63 DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV) was introduced to assist with the 64 adoption of DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] in a time where the 65 root zone and many top level domains (TLDs) were unsigned, to help 66 entities with signed zones under an unsigned parent zone, or that 67 have registrars that don't accept DS records. The root zone is 68 signed since July 2010 and as of May 2019, 1389 out of 1531 TLDs have 69 a secure delegation from the root; thus DLV has served its purpose 70 and can now retire. 72 2. Discussion 74 One could argue that DLV is still useful because there are still some 75 unsigned TLDs and entities under those zones will not benefit from 76 signing their zone. However, keeping the DLV mechanism also has 77 disadvantages: 79 o It reduces the pressure to get the parent zone signed. 81 o It reduces the pressure on registrars to accept DS records. 83 o It complicates validation code. 85 In addition, not every validator actually implements DLV (only BIND 9 86 and Unbound) so even if an entity can use DLV to set up an alternate 87 path to its trust anchor, its effect is limited. Furthermore, there 88 was one well-known DLV registry (dlv.isc.org) and that has been 89 deprecated (replaced with a signed empty zone) on September 30, 2017. 90 With the absence of a well-known DLV registry service it is unlikely 91 that there is a real benefit for the protocol on the Internet 92 nowadays. 94 One other possible reason to keep DLV is to distribute trust anchors 95 for private enterprises. The authors are not aware of any such use 96 of DLV. 98 All things considered it is probably not worth the effort of 99 maintaining the DLV mechanism. 101 3. Moving DLV to Historic Status 103 There are two RFCs that specify DLV: 105 1. RFC 4431 [RFC4431] specifies the DLV resource record. 107 2. RFC 5074 [RFC5074] specifies the DLV mechanism for publishing 108 trust anchors outside the DNS delegation chain and how validators 109 can use them to validate DNSSEC-signed data. 111 This document moves both RFC 4431 [RFC4431] and RFC 5074 [RFC5074] to 112 Historic status. This is a clear signal to implementers that the DLV 113 resource record and the DLV mechanism SHOULD NOT be implemented or 114 deployed. 116 3.1. Documents that reference the DLV RFCs 118 The RFCs that are being moved to Historic status are referenced by a 119 couple of other documents. The sections below describe what changes 120 when the DLV RFCs have been reclassified as Historic. 122 3.1.1. Documents that reference RFC 4431 124 One RFC makes reference to RFC 4431 [RFC4431]. 126 3.1.1.1. RFC 5074 128 RFC 5074 [RFC5074], "DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV)" describes the 129 DLV mechanism itself, and is being moved to Historic status too. 131 3.1.2. Documents that reference RFC 5074 133 Three RFCs make reference to RFC 5074 [RFC5074]. 135 3.1.2.1. RFC 6698 137 RFC 6698, "The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) 138 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA" [RFC6698] specifies: 140 DNSSEC forms certificates (the binding of an identity to a key) by 141 combining a DNSKEY, DS, or DLV resource record with an associated 142 RRSIG record. These records then form a signing chain extending from 143 the client's trust anchors to the RR of interest. 145 This document updates RFC 6698 to exclude the DLV resource record 146 from certificates. 148 3.1.2.2. RFC 6840 150 RFC 6840, "Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNS Security 151 (DNSSEC)" [RFC6840] says that when trust anchors come from different 152 sources, a validator may choose between them based on the perceived 153 reliability of those sources. But in reality this does not happen in 154 validators (both BIND 9 and Unbound have a option for a DLV trust 155 anchor that can be used solely as a fallback). 157 This document updates RFC 6840 to exclude the DLV registries from the 158 trust anchor selection. 160 3.1.2.3. RFC 8198 162 RFC 8198, "Aggressive Use of DNSSEC-Validated Cache" [RFC8198] only 163 references RFC 5074 because aggressive negative caching was first 164 proposed there. 166 4. IANA Considerations 168 IANA should update the annotation of the DLV RR type (code 32769) to 169 "Obsolete" in the DNS Parameters registry. 171 5. Security considerations 173 When the DLV mechanism goes away, zones that rely on DLV for their 174 validation will be treated as insecure. The chance that this 175 scenario actually occurs is very low, since no well-known DLV 176 registry exists. 178 6. Acknowledgements 180 Ondrej Sury for initial review. 182 7. Normative References 184 [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 185 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", 186 RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, 187 . 189 [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 190 Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", 191 RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, 192 . 194 [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 195 Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security 196 Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005, 197 . 199 [RFC4431] Andrews, M. and S. Weiler, "The DNSSEC Lookaside 200 Validation (DLV) DNS Resource Record", RFC 4431, 201 DOI 10.17487/RFC4431, February 2006, 202 . 204 [RFC5074] Weiler, S., "DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV)", RFC 5074, 205 DOI 10.17487/RFC5074, November 2007, 206 . 208 [RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication 209 of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) 210 Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August 211 2012, . 213 [RFC6840] Weiler, S., Ed. and D. Blacka, Ed., "Clarifications and 214 Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)", RFC 6840, 215 DOI 10.17487/RFC6840, February 2013, 216 . 218 [RFC8198] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of 219 DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198, 220 July 2017, . 222 Authors' Addresses 224 Matthijs Mekking 225 ISC 226 950 Charter St 227 Redwood City, CA 94063 228 Netherlands 230 Email: matthijs@isc.org 232 Dan Mahoney 233 ISC 234 950 Charter St 235 Redwood City, CA 94063 236 USA 238 Email: dmahoney@isc.org