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'I-D.ietf-dots-architecture') == Outdated reference: A later version (-21) exists of draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-10 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7525 (Obsoleted by RFC 9325) == Outdated reference: A later version (-22) exists of draft-ietf-dots-requirements-04 == Outdated reference: A later version (-41) exists of draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-01 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7159 (Obsoleted by RFC 8259) Summary: 5 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 12 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 DOTS T. Reddy 3 Internet-Draft Cisco 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair 5 Expires: October 20, 2017 Orange 6 K. Nishizuka 7 NTT Communications 8 L. Xia 9 Huawei 10 P. Patil 11 Cisco 12 A. Mortensen 13 Arbor Networks, Inc. 14 N. Teague 15 Verisign, Inc. 16 April 18, 2017 18 Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel 19 draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-00 21 Abstract 23 The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat 24 Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data not 25 easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel 26 under attack conditions. This is a companion document to the DOTS 27 signal channel specification. 29 Status of This Memo 31 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 32 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 34 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 35 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 36 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 37 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 39 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 40 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 41 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 42 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 44 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 20, 2017. 46 Copyright Notice 48 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 49 document authors. All rights reserved. 51 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 52 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 53 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 54 publication of this document. Please review these documents 55 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 56 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 57 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 58 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 59 described in the Simplified BSD License. 61 Table of Contents 63 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64 2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 3. DOTS Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 3.1. DOTS Data Channel YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 3.1.1. Identifier Model structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 3.1.2. Identifier Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 3.1.3. Filter Model and structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 70 3.2. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 3.2.1. Create Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 72 3.2.2. Delete Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 73 3.2.3. Retrieving Installed Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . 11 74 3.3. Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 75 3.3.1. Install Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 76 3.3.2. Remove Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 77 3.3.3. Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . 15 78 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 79 4.1. DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry . . . 16 80 4.2. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 81 4.3. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 82 5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 83 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 84 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 85 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 86 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 87 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 88 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 90 1. Introduction 92 A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make 93 machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. 94 In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising 95 enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and 96 amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application 97 server, a client, a router, a firewall, or an entire network. 99 DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) defines two channels: signal and 100 data channels [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] (Figure 1). The DOTS 101 signal channel used to convey that a network is under a DDOS attack 102 to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are 103 undertaken on the suspect traffic is further elaborated in 104 [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. The DOTS data channel is used for 105 infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents in the aim to 106 significantly augment attack response coordination. 108 +---------------+ +---------------+ 109 | | <------- Signal Channel ------> | | 110 | DOTS Client | | DOTS Server | 111 | | <======= Data Channel ======> | | 112 +---------------+ +---------------+ 114 Figure 1: DOTS Channels 116 Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] identifies that the DOTS 117 data channel is used to perform the tasks listed below: 119 o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or 120 remove traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic 121 and permitting white-listed traffic. Sample use cases for 122 populating black- or white-list filtering rules are detailed 123 hereafter: 125 A. If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS 126 attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its 127 servicing router (DOTS gateway) of all suspect IP addresses 128 that need to be blocked or black-listed for further 129 investigation. The DOTS client could also specify a list of 130 protocols and ports in the black-list rule. That DOTS gateway 131 in-turn propagates the black-listed IP addresses to the DOTS 132 server which will undertake appropriate action so that traffic 133 from these IP addresses to the target network (specified by 134 the DOTS client) is blocked. 135 B. An enterprise network has partner sites from which only 136 legitimate traffic arrives and the enterprise network wants to 137 ensure that the traffic from these sites is not penalized 138 during DDOS attacks. The DOTS client uses DOTS data channel 139 to convey the white-listed IP addresses or prefixes of the 140 partner sites to its DOTS server. The DOTS server uses this 141 information to white-list flows from such IP addresses or 142 prefixes reaching the enterprise network. 143 o Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for 144 which mitigation may be requested: 146 A. The DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server a collection of 147 prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when requesting 148 mitigation, to which the server would respond with a success 149 status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and 150 message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request 151 failed (see requirement OP-006 in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] 152 and Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]). 154 2. Notational Conventions and Terminology 156 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 157 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 158 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 160 The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in 161 [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. 163 For simplicity, all of the examples in this document use "/restconf" 164 as the discovered RESTCONF API root path. Many protocol header lines 165 and message-body text within examples throughout the document are 166 split into multiple lines for display purposes only. When a line 167 ends with backslash ('\') as the last character, the line is wrapped 168 for display purposes. It is to be considered to be joined to the 169 next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break, and 170 the leading whitespace of the next line. 172 3. DOTS Data Channel 174 The DOTS data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges 175 between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, which must operate 176 nominally even when confronted with despite signal degradation due to 177 packet loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to 178 deal with attack conditions. 180 As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a 181 reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect 182 data delivery success or failure. RESTCONF [RFC8040] over TLS 183 [RFC5246] over TCP is used for DOTS data channel (Figure 2). 184 RESTCONF uses HTTP methods to provide CRUD operations on a conceptual 185 datastore containing YANG-defined data, which is compatible with a 186 server which implements NETCONF datastores. The HTTP POST, PUT, 187 PATCH, and DELETE methods are used to edit data resources represented 188 by DOTS data channel YANG data models. These basic edit operations 189 allow the DOTS data channel running configuration to be altered by a 190 DOTS client. DOTS data channel configuration data and state data can 191 be retrieved with the GET method. HTTP status codes are used to 192 report success or failure for RESTCONF operations. The DOTS client 193 will perform the root resource discovery procedure discussed in 194 Section 3.1 of [RFC8040] to determine the root of the RESTCONF API. 195 After discovering the RESTCONF API root, the DOTS client MUST use 196 this value as the initial part of the path in the request URI, in any 197 subsequent request to the DOTS server. The DOTS server can 198 optionally support retrieval of the YANG modules it supports 199 (Section 3.7 in [RFC8040]), for example, DOTS client can use RESTCONF 200 to retreive the company proprietary YANG model supported by the DOTS 201 server. 203 Note: This document uses RESTCONF, a protocol based on HTTP 204 [RFC7230], for configuring data defined in YANG version 1 [RFC6020] 205 or YANG version 1.1 [RFC7950], using the datastore concepts defined 206 in the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241]. RESTCONF 207 combines the simplicity of the HTTP protocol with the predictability 208 and automation potential of a schema-driven API. RESTCONF offers a 209 simple subset of NETCONF functionality and provides a simplified 210 interface using REST-like API which addresses the needs of the DOTS 211 data channel and hence an optimal choice. 213 +--------------+ 214 | DOTS | 215 +--------------+ 216 | RESTCONF | 217 +--------------+ 218 | TLS | 219 +--------------+ 220 | TCP | 221 +--------------+ 222 | IP | 223 +--------------+ 225 Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS data channel over RESTCONF over 226 TLS 228 JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] payload is used to 229 propogate data channel specific payload messages that convey request 230 parameters and response information such as errors. This 231 specification uses the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951] for 232 representing DOTS data channel configuration data defined using YANG 233 (Section 3.1) as JSON text. 235 A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set 236 up DOTS data channel related configuration data on the DOTS server 237 and receive state data (i.e., non-configuration data) from the DOTS 238 server. A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used 239 to exchange multiple requests and multiple responses. To reduce DOTS 240 client and DOTS server workload, DOTS client SHOULD re-use the TLS 241 session. While the communication to the DOTS server is quiescent, 242 the DOTS client MAY probe the server to ensure it has maintained 243 cryptographic state. Such probes can also keep alive firewall or NAT 244 bindings. A TLS heartbeat [RFC6520] verifies the DOTS server still 245 has TLS state by returning a TLS message. 247 3.1. DOTS Data Channel YANG Model 249 3.1.1. Identifier Model structure 251 This document defines a YANG [RFC6020] data model for creating 252 identifers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which 253 mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may then be used in 254 subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to 255 the resources under attack. 257 This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-data-channel- 258 identifier", which has the following structure: 260 module: ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier 261 +--rw identifier 262 +--rw alias* [alias-name] 263 +--rw alias-name string 264 +--rw ip* inet:ip-address 265 +--rw prefix* inet:ip-prefix 266 +--rw port-range* [lower-port upper-port] 267 | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number 268 | +--rw upper-port inet:port-number 269 +--rw traffic-protocol* uint8 270 +--rw FQDN* inet:domain-name 271 +--rw URI* inet:uri 273 3.1.2. Identifier Model 275 file "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier@2016-11-28.yang" 277 module ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier { 278 namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier"; 279 prefix "alias"; 280 import ietf-inet-types { 281 prefix "inet"; 282 } 284 organization "Cisco Systems, Inc."; 285 contact "Tirumaleswar Reddy "; 287 description 288 "This module contains YANG definition for 289 configuring identifiers for resources using DOTS data channel"; 291 revision 2016-11-28 { 292 reference 293 "https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-data-channel"; 294 } 296 container identifier { 297 description "top level container for identifiers"; 298 list alias { 299 key alias-name; 300 description "list of identifiers"; 301 leaf alias-name { 302 type string; 303 description "alias name"; 304 } 305 leaf-list ip { 306 type inet:ip-address; 307 description "IP address"; 308 } 309 leaf-list prefix { 310 type inet:ip-prefix; 311 description "prefix"; 312 } 313 list port-range { 314 key "lower-port upper-port"; 315 description "Port range. When only lower-port is present, 316 it represents a single port."; 317 leaf lower-port { 318 type inet:port-number; 319 mandatory true; 320 description "lower port"; 321 } 322 leaf upper-port { 323 type inet:port-number; 324 must ". >= ../lower-port" { 325 error-message 326 "The upper-port must be greater than or 327 equal to lower-port"; 328 } 329 description "upper port"; 330 } 331 } 332 leaf-list traffic-protocol { 333 type uint8; 334 description "Internet Protocol number"; 335 } 336 leaf-list FQDN { 337 type inet:domain-name; 338 description "FQDN"; 339 } 340 leaf-list URI { 341 type inet:uri; 342 description "URI"; 343 } 344 } 345 } 346 } 347 349 3.1.3. Filter Model and structure 351 This document uses the Access Control List (ACL) YANG data model 352 [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] for the configuration of filtering rules. 353 ACL is explained in Section 1 of [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. 355 Examples of such configuration include: 357 o Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the 358 DOTS server about sources from which traffic should be suppressed. 359 o White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the 360 DOTS server about sources from which traffic should always be 361 accepted. 362 o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or 363 remove traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic 364 and permitting white-listed traffic. 366 3.2. Identifiers 368 3.2.1. Create Identifiers 370 A POST request is used to create identifiers, such as names or 371 aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested. Such 372 identifiers may then be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel 373 exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack 374 (Figure 3). 376 POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier HTTP/1.1 377 Host: {host}:{port} 378 Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json" 379 { 380 "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": { 381 "alias": [ 382 { 383 "alias-name": "string", 384 "ip": [ 385 "string" 386 ], 387 "prefix": [ 388 "string" 389 ], 390 "port-range": [ 391 { 392 "lower-port": integer, 393 "upper-port": integer 394 } 395 ], 396 "traffic-protocol": [ 397 integer 398 ], 399 "FQDN": [ 400 "string" 401 ], 402 "URI": [ 403 "string" 404 ] 405 } 406 ] 407 } 408 } 410 Figure 3: POST to create identifiers 412 The header parameters are described below: 414 alias-name: Name of the alias. This is a mandatory attribute. 415 traffic-protocol: Internet Protocol numbers. This is an optional 416 attribute. 417 port-range: The port range, lower-port for lower port number and 418 upper-port for upper port number. For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: 419 the range of ports (e.g., 80 to 8080). This is an optional 420 attribute. 421 ip: IP addresses are separated by commas. This is an optional 422 attribute. 424 prefix: Prefixes are separated by commas. This is an optional 425 attribute. 426 FQDN: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a system, 427 rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a 428 hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN. This is an optional 429 attribute. 430 URI: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This is an optional 431 attribute. 433 In the POST request at least one of the attributes ip or prefix or 434 FQDN or URI MUST be present. DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor- 435 Specific parameters they don't understand. 437 Figure 4 shows a POST request to create alias called "https1" for 438 HTTP(S) servers with IP addresses 2002:db8:6401::1 and 439 2002:db8:6401::2 listening on port 443. 441 POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier HTTP/1.1 442 Host: www.example.com 443 Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json" 444 { 445 "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": { 446 "alias": [ 447 { 448 "alias-name": "Server1", 449 "traffic-protocol": [ 450 6 451 ], 452 "ip": [ 453 "2002:db8:6401::1", 454 "2002:db8:6401::2" 455 ], 456 "port-range": [ 457 { 458 "lower-port": 443 459 } 460 ] 461 } 462 ] 463 } 464 } 466 Figure 4: POST to create identifiers 468 The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request 469 using HTTP response codes. HTTP 2xx codes are success, HTTP 4xx 470 codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5xx codes are returned if 471 the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of accepting the alias. 473 Response code 201 (Created) will be returned in the response if the 474 DOTS server has accepted the alias. If the request is missing one or 475 more mandatory attributes then 400 (Bad Request) will be returned in 476 the response or if the request contains invalid or unknown parameters 477 then 400 (Invalid query) will be returned in the response. The HTTP 478 response will include the JSON body received in the request. 480 The DOTS client can use the PUT request (Section 4.5 in [RFC8040]) to 481 create or modify the aliases in the DOTS server. 483 3.2.2. Delete Identifiers 485 A DELETE request is used to delete identifiers maintained by a DOTS 486 server (Figure 5). 488 DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier\ 489 /alias=Server1 HTTP/1.1 490 Host: {host}:{port} 492 Figure 5: DELETE identifier 494 In RESTCONF, URI-encoded path expressions are used. A RESTCONF data 495 resource identifier is encoded from left to right, starting with the 496 top-level data node, according to the "api-path" rule defined in 497 Section 3.5.3.1 of [RFC8040]. The data node in the above path 498 expression is a YANG list node and MUST be encoded according to the 499 rules defined in Section 3.5.1 of [RFC8040]. 501 If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the 502 DELETE request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404 503 (Not Found) error response code. The DOTS server successfully 504 acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the identifier using 505 204 (No Content) in the response. 507 3.2.3. Retrieving Installed Identifiers 509 A GET request is used to retrieve the set of installed identifiers 510 from a DOTS server (Section 3.3.1 in [RFC8040]). Figure 6 shows how 511 to retrieve all the identifiers that were instantiated by the DOTS 512 client. The content parameter and its permitted values are defined 513 in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC8040]. 515 GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier?\ 516 content=config HTTP/1.1 517 Host: {host}:{port} 518 Accept: application/yang-data+json 520 Figure 6: GET to retrieve all the installed identifiers 522 Figure 7 shows response for all identifiers on the DOTS server. 524 { 525 "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": [ 526 { 527 "alias": [ 528 { 529 "alias-name": "Server1", 530 "traffic-protocol": [ 531 6 532 ], 533 "ip": [ 534 "2002:db8:6401::1", 535 "2002:db8:6401::2" 536 ], 537 "port-range": [ 538 { 539 "lower-port": 443 540 } 541 ] 542 } 543 ] 544 }, 545 { 546 "alias": [ 547 { 548 "alias-name": "Server2", 549 "traffic-protocol": [ 550 6 551 ], 552 "ip": [ 553 "2002:db8:6401::10", 554 "2002:db8:6401::20" 555 ], 556 "port-range": [ 557 { 558 "lower-port": 80 559 } 560 ] 561 } 562 ] 563 } 564 ] 565 } 567 Figure 7: Response body 569 If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the GET 570 request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404 (Not 571 Found) error response code. 573 3.3. Filtering Rules 575 The DOTS server either receives the filtering rules directly from the 576 DOTS client or via the DOTS gateway. If the DOTS client signals the 577 filtering rules via the DOTS gateway then the DOTS gateway validates 578 if the DOTS client is authorized to signal the filtering rules and if 579 the client is authorized propagates the rules to the DOTS server. 580 Likewise, the DOTS server validates if the DOTS gateway is authorized 581 to signal the filtering rules. To create or purge filters, the DOTS 582 client sends HTTP requests to the DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway 583 validates the rules in the requests and proxies the requests 584 containing the filtering rules to a DOTS server. When the DOTS 585 gateway receives the associated HTTP response from the DOTS server, 586 it propagates the response back to the DOTS client. 588 The following APIs define means for a DOTS client to configure 589 filtering rules on a DOTS server. 591 3.3.1. Install Filtering Rules 593 A POST request is used to push filtering rules to a DOTS server. 594 Figure 8 shows a POST request example to block traffic from 595 10.10.10.1/24, destined to 11.11.11.1/24. The ACL JSON configuration 596 for the filtering rule is generated using the ACL YANG data model 597 defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] and the ACL configuration XML 598 for the filtering rule is specified in Section 4.3 of 599 [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. This specification updates the ACL YANG 600 data model defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] to support rate- 601 limit action. 603 POST /restconf/data/ietf-access-control-list HTTP/1.1 604 Host: www.example.com 605 Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json" 606 { 607 "ietf-access-control-list:access-lists": { 608 "acl": [ 609 { 610 "acl-name": "sample-ipv4-acl", 611 "acl-type": "ipv4", 612 "access-list-entries": { 613 "ace": [ 614 { 615 "rule-name": "rule1", 616 "matches": { 617 "source-ipv4-network": "10.10.10.1/24", 618 "destination-ipv4-network": "11.11.11.1/24" 619 }, 620 "actions": { 621 "deny": [null] 622 } 623 } 624 ] 625 } 626 } 627 ] 628 } 629 } 631 Figure 8: POST to install filterng rules 633 The header parameters defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] are 634 discussed below: 636 acl-name: The name of access-list. This is a mandatory attribute. 637 acl-type: Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria 638 (e.g. IPv4, IPv6). This is a mandatory attribute. 639 protocol: Internet Protocol numbers. This is an optional 640 attribute. 641 source-ipv4-network: The source IPv4 prefix. This is an optional 642 attribute. 643 destination-ipv4-network: The destination IPv4 prefix. This is an 644 optional attribute. 645 actions: "deny" or "permit" or "rate-limit". "permit" action is 646 used to white-list traffic. "deny" action is used to black-list 647 traffic. "rate-limit" action is used to rate-limit traffic, the 648 allowed traffic rate is represented in bytes per second indicated 649 in IEEE floating point format [IEEE.754.1985]. If actions 650 attribute is not specified in the request then the default action 651 is "deny". This is an optional attribute. 653 The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request 654 using HTTP response codes. HTTP 2xx codes are success, HTTP 4xx 655 codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5xx codes are returned if 656 the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of configuring the 657 filtering rules. Response code 201 (Created) will be returned in the 658 response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules. If the 659 request is missing one or more mandatory attributes then 400 (Bad 660 Request) will be returned in the response or if the request contains 661 invalid or unknown parameters then 400 (Invalid query) will be 662 returned in the response. 664 The DOTS client can use the PUT request to create or modify the 665 filtering rules in the DOTS server. 667 3.3.2. Remove Filtering Rules 669 A DELETE request is used to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server 670 (Figure 9). 672 DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-access-control-list:access-lists/acl-name\ 673 =sample-ipv4-acl&acl-type=ipv4 HTTP/1.1 674 Host: {host}:{port} 676 Figure 9: DELETE to remove the filtering rules 678 If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list 679 type conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then 680 it responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code. The DOTS 681 server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw 682 the filtering rules using 204 (No Content) response code, and removes 683 the filtering rules as soon as possible. 685 3.3.3. Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules 687 The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the 688 counters for installed filtering rules. A GET request is used to 689 retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server. Figure 10 shows how to 690 retrieve all the filtering rules programmed by the DOTS client and 691 the number of matches for the installed filtering rules. 693 GET /restconf/data/ietf-access-control-list:access-lists?content=all HTTP/1.1 694 Host: {host}:{port} 695 Accept: application/yang-data+json 697 Figure 10: GET to retrieve the configuration data and state data for 698 the filtering rules 700 If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list 701 type conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data, then it 702 responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code. 704 4. IANA Considerations 706 This specification registers new parameters for the DOTS data channel 707 and establishes registries for mappings to JSON attributes. 709 4.1. DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry 711 A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "DOTS data 712 channel JSON attribute Mappings Registry". The registry is to be 713 created as Expert Review Required. 715 4.2. Registration Template 717 JSON Attribute: 718 JSON attribute name. 719 Description: 720 Brief description of the attribute. 721 Change Controller: 722 For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the 723 name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal 724 address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. 725 Specification Document(s): 726 Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, 727 preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of 728 the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be 729 included but is not required. 731 4.3. Initial Registry Contents 733 o JSON Attribute: "alias-name" 734 o Description: Name of alias. 735 o Change Controller: IESG 736 o Specification Document(s): this document 738 o JSON Attribute: "traffic-protocol" 739 o Description: Internet protocol numbers. 740 o Change Controller: IESG 741 o Specification Document(s): this document 743 o JSON Attribute: "port-range" 744 o Description: The port range, lower-port for lower port number and 745 upper-port for upper port number. For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: 746 the range of ports (e.g., 80 to 8080). 747 o Change Controller: IESG 748 o Specification Document(s): this document 750 o JSON Attribute: "lower-port" 751 o Description: Lower port number for port range. 752 o Change Controller: IESG 753 o Specification Document(s): this document 755 o JSON Attribute: "upper-port" 756 o Description: Upper port number for port range. 757 o Change Controller: IESG 758 o Specification Document(s): this document 760 o JSON Attribute: "ip" 761 o Description: IP address. 762 o Change Controller: IESG 763 o Specification Document(s): this document 765 o JSON Attribute: "prefix" 766 o Description: IP prefix 767 o Change Controller: IESG 768 o Specification Document(s): this document 770 o JSON Attribute: "FQDN" 771 o Description: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a 772 system, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a 773 hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN. 774 o Change Controller: IESG 775 o Specification Document(s): this document 777 o JSON Attribute: "URI" 778 o Description: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). 779 o Change Controller: IESG 780 o Specification Document(s): this document 782 5. Contributors 784 The following individuals have contributed to this document: 786 Dan Wing Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com 788 6. Security Considerations 790 Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and 791 message integrity. TLS based on client certificate MUST be used for 792 mutual authentication. The interaction between the DOTS agents 793 requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering 794 confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST 795 be followed to avoid attacks on TLS. 797 An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application 798 segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. 799 Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result 800 in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS 801 on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO 802 [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an 803 attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore 804 will never reach the TLS layer. 806 Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation 807 of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of 808 the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that 809 network). 811 Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish 812 exchange instructions and notification over a secure and 813 authenticated channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid 814 that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as 815 deleting filtering rules. Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated 816 from within the trusted domain if an entity has been corrupted. 817 Adequate means to monitor trusted nodes should also be enabled. 819 7. Acknowledgements 821 Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Andrew Mortensen, 822 Roman Danyliw, Ehud Doron and Gilbert Clark for the discussion and 823 comments. 825 8. References 827 8.1. Normative References 829 [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] 830 Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T., 831 christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and 832 N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat 833 Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots- 834 architecture-01 (work in progress), October 2016. 836 [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] 837 Bogdanovic, D., Koushik, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair, 838 "Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model", 839 draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-10 (work in progress), March 840 2017. 842 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 843 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 844 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 845 . 847 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 848 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 849 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, 850 . 852 [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP 853 Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925, 854 June 2010, . 856 [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, 857 "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer 858 Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security 859 (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 860 2015, . 862 [RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG", 863 RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016, 864 . 866 [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF 867 Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, 868 . 870 8.2. Informative References 872 [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] 873 Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed 874 Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling 875 Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-04 (work in 876 progress), March 2017. 878 [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] 879 Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N. 880 Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat 881 Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel", draft-ietf-dots-signal- 882 channel-01 (work in progress), April 2017. 884 [IEEE.754.1985] 885 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 886 "Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic", August 887 1985. 889 [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for 890 the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, 891 DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, 892 . 894 [RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport 895 Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security 896 (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520, 897 DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012, 898 . 900 [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 901 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 902 2014, . 904 Authors' Addresses 906 Tirumaleswar Reddy 907 Cisco Systems, Inc. 908 Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli 909 Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road 910 Bangalore, Karnataka 560103 911 India 913 Email: kondtir@gmail.com 915 Mohamed Boucadair 916 Orange 917 Rennes 35000 918 France 920 Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com 922 Kaname Nishizuka 923 NTT Communications 924 GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku 925 Tokyo 108-8118 926 Japan 928 Email: kaname@nttv6.jp 929 Liang Xia 930 Huawei 931 101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District 932 Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 933 China 935 Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com 937 Prashanth Patil 938 Cisco Systems, Inc. 940 Email: praspati@cisco.com 942 Andrew Mortensen 943 Arbor Networks, Inc. 944 2727 S. State St 945 Ann Arbor, MI 48104 946 United States 948 Email: amortensen@arbor.net 950 Nik Teague 951 Verisign, Inc. 952 United States 954 Email: nteague@verisign.com