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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group J. Laganier 3 Internet-Draft Luminate Wireless, Inc. 4 Obsoletes: 5204 (if approved) L. Eggert 5 Intended status: Standards Track NetApp 6 Expires: December 11, 2014 June 9, 2014 8 Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension 9 draft-ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis-04 11 Abstract 13 This document defines a rendezvous extension for the Host Identity 14 Protocol (HIP). The rendezvous extension extends HIP and the HIP 15 registration extension for initiating communication between HIP nodes 16 via HIP rendezvous servers. Rendezvous servers improve reachability 17 and operation when HIP nodes are multi-homed or mobile. This 18 document obsoletes RFC5204. 20 Status of This Memo 22 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 23 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 25 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 26 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 27 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 28 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 30 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 31 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 32 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 33 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 35 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 11, 2014. 37 Copyright Notice 39 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 40 document authors. All rights reserved. 42 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 43 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 44 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 45 publication of this document. Please review these documents 46 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 47 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 48 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 49 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 50 described in the Simplified BSD License. 52 Table of Contents 54 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 55 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. Overview of Rendezvous Server Operation . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 3.1. Diagram Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 3.2. Rendezvous Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 3.3. Relaying the Base Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 4. Rendezvous Server Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 4.1. RENDEZVOUS Registration Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 4.2. Parameter Formats and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 4.2.1. RVS_HMAC Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 4.2.2. FROM Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 4.2.3. VIA_RVS Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 4.3. Modified Packets Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 4.3.1. Processing Outgoing I1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 4.3.2. Processing Incoming I1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 4.3.3. Processing Outgoing R1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 4.3.4. Processing Incoming R1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 10 71 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 73 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 74 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 75 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 76 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 77 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5204 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 79 1. Introduction 81 The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Architecture 82 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] introduces the rendezvous mechanism to 83 help a HIP node to contact a frequently moving HIP node. The 84 rendezvous mechanism involves a third party, the rendezvous server 85 (RVS), which serves as an initial contact point ("rendezvous point") 86 for its clients. The clients of an RVS are HIP nodes that use the 87 HIP Registration Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] to register 88 their HIT->IP address mappings with the RVS. After this 89 registration, other HIP nodes can initiate a base exchange using the 90 IP address of the RVS instead of the current IP address of the node 91 they attempt to contact. Essentially, the clients of an RVS become 92 reachable at the RVS's IP address. Peers can initiate a HIP base 93 exchange with the IP address of the RVS, which will relay this 94 initial communication such that the base exchange may successfully 95 complete. 97 2. Terminology 99 This section defines terms used throughout the remainder of this 100 specification. 102 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 103 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 104 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 106 In addition to the terminology defined in the HIP specification 107 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] and the HIP Registration Extension 108 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis], this document defines and uses the 109 following terms: 111 Rendezvous Service 112 A HIP service provided by a rendezvous server to its rendezvous 113 clients. The rendezvous server offers to relay some of the 114 arriving base exchange packets between the initiator and 115 responder. 117 Rendezvous Server (RVS) 118 A HIP registrar providing rendezvous service. 120 Rendezvous Client 121 A HIP requester that has registered for rendezvous service at a 122 rendezvous server. 124 Rendezvous Registration 125 A HIP registration for rendezvous service, established between a 126 rendezvous server and a rendezvous client. 128 3. Overview of Rendezvous Server Operation 130 Figure 1 shows a simple HIP base exchange without a rendezvous 131 server, in which the initiator initiates the exchange directly with 132 the responder by sending an I1 packet to the responder's IP address, 133 as per the HIP specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. 135 +-----+ +-----+ 136 | |-------I1------>| | 137 | I |<------R1-------| R | 138 | |-------I2------>| | 139 | |<------R2-------| | 140 +-----+ +-----+ 142 Figure 1: HIP base exchange without rendezvous server. 144 The End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity Protocol 145 specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis] allows a HIP node to notify 146 its peers about changes in its set of IP addresses. This 147 specification presumes initial reachability of the two nodes with 148 respect to each other. 150 However, such a HIP node MAY also want to be reachable to other 151 future correspondent peers that are unaware of its location change. 152 The HIP Architecture [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] introduces rendezvous 153 servers with whom a HIP node MAY register its host identity tags 154 (HITs) and current IP addresses. An RVS relays HIP packets arriving 155 for these HITs to the node's registered IP addresses. When a HIP 156 node has registered with an RVS, it SHOULD record the IP address of 157 its RVS in its DNS record, using the HIP DNS resource record type 158 defined in the HIP DNS Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis]. 160 +-----+ 161 +--I1--->| RVS |---I1--+ 162 | +-----+ | 163 | v 164 +-----+ +-----+ 165 | |<------R1-------| | 166 | I |-------I2------>| R | 167 | |<------R2-------| | 168 +-----+ +-----+ 170 Figure 2: HIP base exchange with a rendezvous server. 172 Figure 2 shows a HIP base exchange involving a rendezvous server. It 173 is assumed that HIP node R previously registered its HITs and current 174 IP addresses with the RVS, using the HIP Registration Extension 175 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis]. When the initiator I tries to establish 176 contact with the responder R, it must send the I1 of the base 177 exchange either to one of R's IP addresses (if known via DNS or other 178 means) or to one of R's rendezvous servers. Here, I obtains the IP 179 address of R's rendezvous server from R's DNS record and then sends 180 the I1 packet of the HIP base exchange to RVS. RVS, noticing that 181 the HIT contained in the arriving I1 packet is not one of its own, 182 MUST check its current registrations to determine if it needs to 183 relay the packets. Here, it determines that the HIT belongs to R and 184 then relays the I1 packet to the registered IP address. R then 185 completes the base exchange without further assistance from RVS by 186 sending an R1 directly to the I's IP address, as obtained from the I1 187 packet. In this specification, the client of the RVS is always the 188 responder. However, there might be reasons to allow a client to 189 initiate a base exchange through its own RVS, like NAT and firewall 190 traversal. This specification does not address such scenarios, which 191 should be specified in other documents. 193 3.1. Diagram Notation 195 Notation Significance 196 -------- ------------ 198 I, R I and R are the respective source and destination IP 199 addresses in the IP header. 201 HIT-I, HIT-R HIT-I and HIT-R are the initiator's and the 202 responder's HITs in the packet, respectively. 204 REG_REQ A REG_REQUEST parameter is present in the HIP header. 206 REG_RES A REG_RESPONSE parameter is present in the HIP header. 208 FROM:I A FROM parameter containing the IP address I is 209 present in the HIP header. 211 RVS_HMAC An RVS_HMAC parameter containing an HMAC keyed with 212 the appropriate registration key is present in the HIP 213 header. 215 VIA:RVS A VIA_RVS parameter containing the IP address RVS of 216 a rendezvous server is present in the HIP header. 218 3.2. Rendezvous Client Registration 220 Before a rendezvous server starts to relay HIP packets to a 221 rendezvous client, the rendezvous client needs to register with it to 222 receive rendezvous service by using the HIP Registration Extension 223 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] as illustrated in the following schema: 225 +-----+ +-----+ 226 | | I1 | | 227 | |--------------------------->| | 228 | |<---------------------------| | 229 | I | R1(REG_INFO) | RVS | 230 | | I2(REG_REQ) | | 231 | |--------------------------->| | 232 | |<---------------------------| | 233 | | R2(REG_RES) | | 234 +-----+ +-----+ 236 Rendezvous client registering with a rendezvous server. 238 3.3. Relaying the Base Exchange 240 If a HIP node and one of its rendezvous servers have a rendezvous 241 registration, the rendezvous servers relay inbound I1 packets (that 242 contain one of the client's HITs) by rewriting the IP header. They 243 replace the destination IP address of the I1 packet with one of the 244 IP addresses of the owner of the HIT, i.e., the rendezvous client. 245 They MUST also recompute the IP checksum accordingly. 247 Because of egress filtering on the path from the RVS to the client 248 [RFC2827][RFC3013], a HIP rendezvous server SHOULD replace the source 249 IP address, i.e., the IP address of I, with one of its own IP 250 addresses. The replacement IP address SHOULD be chosen according to 251 relevant IPv4 and IPv6 specifications [RFC1122][RFC6724]. Because 252 this replacement conceals the initiator's IP address, the RVS MUST 253 append a FROM parameter containing the original source IP address of 254 the packet. This FROM parameter MUST be integrity protected by an 255 RVS_HMAC keyed with the corresponding rendezvous registration 256 integrity key [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis]. 258 I1(RVS, R, HIT-I, HIT-R 259 I1(I, RVS, HIT-I, HIT-R) +---------+ FROM:I, RVS_HMAC) 260 +----------------------->| |--------------------+ 261 | | RVS | | 262 | | | | 263 | +---------+ | 264 | V 265 +-----+ R1(R, I, HIT-R, HIT-I, VIA:RVS) +-----+ 266 | |<---------------------------------------------| | 267 | | | | 268 | I | I2(I, R, HIT-I, HIT-R) | R | 269 | |--------------------------------------------->| | 270 | |<---------------------------------------------| | 271 +-----+ R2(R, I, HIT-R, HIT-I) +-----+ 273 Rendezvous server rewriting IP addresses. 275 This modification of HIP packets at a rendezvous server can be 276 problematic because the HIP protocol uses integrity checks. Because 277 the I1 does not include HMAC or SIGNATURE parameters, these two end- 278 to-end integrity checks are unaffected by the operation of rendezvous 279 servers. 281 The RVS SHOULD verify the checksum field of an I1 packet before doing 282 any modifications. After modification, it MUST recompute the 283 checksum field using the updated HIP header, which possibly included 284 new FROM and RVS_HMAC parameters, and a pseudo-header containing the 285 updated source and destination IP addresses. This enables the 286 responder to validate the checksum of the I1 packet "as is", without 287 having to parse any FROM parameters. 289 4. Rendezvous Server Extensions 291 This section describes extensions to the HIP Registration Extension 292 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis], allowing a HIP node to register with a 293 rendezvous server for rendezvous service and notify the RVS aware of 294 changes to its current location. It also describes an extension to 295 the HIP specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] itself, allowing 296 establishment of HIP associations via one or more HIP rendezvous 297 server(s). 299 4.1. RENDEZVOUS Registration Type 301 This specification defines an additional registration for the HIP 302 Registration Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] that allows 303 registering with a rendezvous server for rendezvous service. 305 Number Registration Type 306 ------ ----------------- 307 1 RENDEZVOUS 309 4.2. Parameter Formats and Processing 311 4.2.1. RVS_HMAC Parameter 313 The RVS_HMAC is a non-critical parameter whose only difference with 314 the HMAC parameter defined in the HIP specification 315 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] is its "type" code. This change causes it 316 to be located after the FROM parameter (as opposed to the HMAC): 318 Type 65500 319 Length Variable. Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and 320 Padding. 321 HMAC HMAC computed over the HIP packet, excluding the 322 RVS_HMAC parameter and any following parameters. The 323 HMAC is keyed with the appropriate HIP integrity key 324 (HIP-lg or HIP-gl) established when rendezvous 325 registration happened. The HIP "checksum" field MUST be 326 set to zero, and the HIP header length in the HIP common 327 header MUST be calculated not to cover any excluded 328 parameter when the HMAC is calculated. The size of the 329 HMAC is the natural size of the hash computation 330 output depending on the used hash function. 332 To allow a rendezvous client and its RVS to verify the integrity of 333 packets flowing between them, both SHOULD protect packets with an 334 added RVS_HMAC parameter keyed with the HIP-lg or HIP-gl integrity 335 key established while registration occurred. A valid RVS_HMAC SHOULD 336 be present on every packet flowing between a client and a server and 337 MUST be present when a FROM parameter is processed. 339 4.2.2. FROM Parameter 341 0 1 2 3 342 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 343 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 344 | Type | Length | 345 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 346 | | 347 | Address | 348 | | 349 | | 350 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 352 Type 65498 353 Length 16 354 Address An IPv6 address or an IPv4-in-IPv6 format IPv4 address. 356 A rendezvous server MUST add a FROM parameter containing the original 357 source IP address of a HIP packet whenever the source IP address in 358 the IP header is rewritten. If one or more FROM parameters are 359 already present, the new FROM parameter MUST be appended after the 360 existing ones. 362 Whenever an RVS inserts a FROM parameter, it MUST insert an RVS_HMAC 363 protecting the packet integrity, especially the IP address included 364 in the FROM parameter. 366 4.2.3. VIA_RVS Parameter 367 0 1 2 3 368 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 369 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 370 | Type | Length | 371 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 372 | | 373 | Address | 374 | | 375 | | 376 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 377 . . . 378 . . . 379 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 380 | | 381 | Address | 382 | | 383 | | 384 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 386 Type 65502 387 Length Variable 388 Address An IPv6 address or an IPv4-in-IPv6 format IPv4 address. 390 After the responder receives a relayed I1 packet, it can begin to 391 send HIP packets addressed to the initiator's IP address, without 392 further assistance from an RVS. For debugging purposes, it MAY 393 include a subset of the IP addresses of its RVSs in some of these 394 packets. When a responder does so, it MUST append a newly created 395 VIA_RVS parameter at the end of the HIP packet. The main goal of 396 using the VIA_RVS parameter is to allow operators to diagnose 397 possible issues encountered while establishing a HIP association via 398 an RVS. 400 4.3. Modified Packets Processing 402 The following subsections describe the differences of processing of 403 I1 and R1 while a rendezvous server is involved in the base exchange. 405 4.3.1. Processing Outgoing I1 Packets 407 An initiator SHOULD NOT send an opportunistic I1 with a NULL 408 destination HIT to an IP address that is known to be a rendezvous 409 server address, unless it wants to establish a HIP association with 410 the rendezvous server itself and does not know its HIT. 412 When an RVS rewrites the source IP address of an I1 packet due to 413 egress filtering, it MUST add a FROM parameter to the I1 that 414 contains the initiator's source IP address. This FROM parameter MUST 415 be protected by an RVS_HMAC keyed with the integrity key established 416 at rendezvous registration. 418 4.3.2. Processing Incoming I1 Packets 420 When a rendezvous server receives an I1 whose destination HIT is not 421 its own, it consults its registration database to find a registration 422 for the rendezvous service established by the HIT owner. If it finds 423 an appropriate registration, it relays the packet to the registered 424 IP address. If it does not find an appropriate registration, it 425 drops the packet. 427 A rendezvous server SHOULD interpret any incoming opportunistic I1 428 (i.e., an I1 with a NULL destination HIT) as an I1 addressed to 429 itself and SHOULD NOT attempt to relay it to one of its clients. 431 When a rendezvous client receives an I1, it MUST validate any present 432 RVS_HMAC parameter. If the RVS_HMAC cannot be verified, the packet 433 SHOULD be dropped. If the RVS_HMAC cannot be verified and a FROM 434 parameter is present, the packet MUST be dropped. 436 A rendezvous client acting as responder SHOULD drop opportunistic I1s 437 that include a FROM parameter, because this indicates that the I1 has 438 been relayed. 440 4.3.3. Processing Outgoing R1 Packets 442 When a responder replies to an I1 relayed via an RVS, it MUST append 443 to the regular R1 header a VIA_RVS parameter containing the IP 444 addresses of the traversed RVSs. 446 4.3.4. Processing Incoming R1 Packets 448 The HIP specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] mandates that a 449 system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent an I1 450 to the originator of the R1 (i.e., the system is in state I1-SENT). 451 When the R1 is replying to a relayed I1, this check SHOULD be based 452 on HITs only. In case the IP addresses are also checked, then the 453 source IP address MUST be checked against the IP address included in 454 the VIA_RVS parameter. 456 5. Security Considerations 458 This section discusses the known threats introduced by these HIP 459 extensions and the implications on the overall security of HIP. In 460 particular, it argues that the extensions described in this document 461 do not introduce additional threats to the Host Identity Protocol. 463 It is difficult to encompass the whole scope of threats introduced by 464 rendezvous servers because their presence has implications both at 465 the IP and HIP layers. In particular, these extensions might allow 466 for redirection, amplification, and reflection attacks at the IP 467 layer, as well as attacks on the HIP layer itself, for example, man- 468 in-the-middle attacks against the HIP base exchange. 470 If an initiator has a priori knowledge of the responder's host 471 identity when it first contacts the responder via an RVS, it has a 472 means to verify the signatures in the HIP base exchange, which 473 protects against man-in-the-middle attacks. 475 If an initiator does not have a priori knowledge of the responder's 476 host identity (so-called "opportunistic initiators"), it is almost 477 impossible to defend the HIP exchange against these attacks, because 478 the public keys exchanged cannot be authenticated. The only approach 479 would be to mitigate hijacking threats on HIP state by requiring an 480 R1 answering an opportunistic I1 to come from the same IP address 481 that originally sent the I1. This procedure retains a level of 482 security that is equivalent to what exists in the Internet today. 484 However, for reasons of simplicity, this specification does not allow 485 the establishment of a HIP association via a rendezvous server in an 486 opportunistic manner. 488 6. IANA Considerations 490 This section is to be interpreted according to the Guidelines for 491 Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs [RFC5226]. 493 This document updates the IANA Registry for HIP Parameters Types by 494 assigning new HIP Parameter Types values for the new HIP Parameters 495 defined in Section 4.2: 497 o RVS_HMAC (defined in Section 4.2.1) 499 o FROM (defined in Section 4.2.2) 501 o VIA_RVS (defined in Section 4.2.3) 502 This document defines an additional registration for the HIP 503 Registration Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] that allows 504 registering with a rendezvous server for rendezvous service. 506 Number Registration Type 507 ------ ----------------- 508 1 RENDEZVOUS 510 7. Acknowledgments 512 The following people have provided thoughtful and helpful discussions 513 and/or suggestions that have improved this document: Marcus Brunner, 514 Tom Henderson, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Pekka Nikander, Justino 515 Santos, Simon Schuetz, Tim Shepard, Kristian Slavov, Martin 516 Stiemerling, and Juergen Quittek. 518 8. References 520 8.1. Normative References 522 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] 523 Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, 524 "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", draft-ietf- 525 hip-rfc5201-bis-14 (work in progress), October 2013. 527 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] 528 Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) 529 Registration Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis-05 530 (work in progress), March 2014. 532 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis] 533 Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name 534 System (DNS) Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis-04 535 (work in progress), January 2014. 537 [RFC1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - 538 Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, October 1989. 540 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 541 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 543 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 544 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, 545 May 2008. 547 [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, 548 "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 549 (IPv6)", RFC 6724, September 2012. 551 8.2. Informative References 553 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] 554 Moskowitz, R. and M. Komu, "Host Identity Protocol 555 Architecture", draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-08 (work in 556 progress), April 2014. 558 [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis] 559 Henderson, T., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko, "Host Mobility with 560 the Host Identity Protocol", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis-06 561 (work in progress), July 2013. 563 [RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: 564 Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source 565 Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000. 567 [RFC3013] Killalea, T., "Recommended Internet Service Provider 568 Security Services and Procedures", BCP 46, RFC 3013, 569 November 2000. 571 Appendix A. Changes from RFC 5204 573 o Updated HIP references to revised HIP specifications. 575 o Added relaying of UPDATE packets to support double jump mobility 576 scenario. 578 Authors' Addresses 580 Julien Laganier 581 Luminate Wireless, Inc. 582 Cupertino, CA 583 USA 585 EMail: julien.ietf@gmail.com 587 Lars Eggert 588 NetApp 589 Sonnenallee 1 590 Kirchheim 85551 591 Germany 593 Phone: +49 151 12055791 594 EMail: lars@netapp.com 595 URI: http://eggert.org