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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3315 (Obsoleted by RFC 8415) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5296 (Obsoleted by RFC 6696) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group G. Zorn 3 Internet-Draft Network Zen 4 Intended status: Standards Track Q. Wu 5 Expires: January 11, 2011 Y. Wang 6 Huawei 7 July 10, 2010 9 The Local Domain Name DHCP Option 10 draft-ietf-hokey-ldn-discovery-01 12 Abstract 14 In order to derive a Domain-Specific Root Key (DSRK) from the 15 Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) generated as a side-effect of an 16 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method, the EAP peer must 17 discover the name of the domain to which it is attached. 19 This document specifies a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 20 option designed to allow a DHCP server to inform clients of the name 21 of the local domain.. 23 Status of This Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 11, 2011. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 3. Option Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 3.1. DHCPv6 Local Domain Name Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 4. Appearance of the Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 5. Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 6. Relay Agent Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 7. Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 9. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 69 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 71 1. Introduction 73 The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [RFC5296] is designed to 74 allow faster re-authentication of a mobile device which was 75 previously authenticated by means of the Extensible Authentication 76 Protocol (EAP, [RFC3748]. Given that the local root key (e.g., DSRK 77 RFC 5295 [RFC5295]) is generated using the local domain name (LDN), 78 LDN discovery is an important part of re-authentication. As 79 described in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], the local domain name can be learned 80 by the mobile device through the ERP exchange or via a lower-layer 81 mechanism. However, no lower-layer mechanisms for LDN discovery have 82 yet been defined. 84 This document specifies an extension to DHCP for local domain name 85 discovery. 87 2. Terminology 89 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 90 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 91 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 93 3. Option Format 95 In DHCPv6-based local domain name discovery, the LDN option is used 96 by the DHCPv6 client (MD) to obtain the local domain name from the 97 DHCP Server after full EAP authentication has taken place. 99 3.1. DHCPv6 Local Domain Name Option 101 The format of this option is: 103 0 1 2 3 104 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 105 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 106 | OPTION_LOCAL_DOMAIN_NAME | option-length | 107 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 108 | local-domain-name ... 109 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 111 Figure 1 113 option code OPTION_LOCAL_DOMAIN_NAME (TBD) 115 option-length Length of the 'local domain name' field in octets 116 local-domain-name This field contains the name of the local domain 117 and MUST be encoded as specified in Section "8 of RFC 3315 118 [RFC3315] 120 4. Appearance of the Option 122 The LDN option MUST NOT appear in DHCPv6 messages other than the 123 types Solicit, Advertise, Request, Information-Request and Reply. 124 The option-code of the LDN option MAY be included in the Option 125 Request Option in the DHCPv6 message types Solicit, Request and 126 Information-Request. 128 5. Client Behavior 130 If a DHCPv6 client (MD) doesn't know the local domain name and 131 requires the DHCP Server to provide the DHCPv6 LDN option, it MUST 132 include an Option Request option requesting the DHCPv6 LDN option, as 133 described in Section 22.7 of RFC 3315 [RFC3315]. 135 When the DHCPv6 client recieves a LDN option with the local domain 136 name present in it, it MUST verify that the option length is no more 137 than 256 octets (the maximum length of a single FQDN allowed by DNS), 138 and that the local domain name is a properly encoded single FQDN, as 139 specified in Section 8 "Representation and Use of Domain Names" of 140 the RFC3315 [RFC3315]. 142 6. Relay Agent Behavior 144 If a DHCPv6 relay agent has pre-existing knowledge of the local 145 domain name (for example, from a previous AAA exchange), it SHOULD 146 include it in the DHCPv6 LDN option and forward to the DHPv6 server. 148 7. Server Behavior 150 If the option code for the LDN option is included in an Option 151 Request option, the server SHOULD return the DHCPv6 LDN option to the 152 client. If a DHCPv6 LDN option is received from a relay agent with a 153 non-empty local-domain-name field, the server SHOULD extract this 154 option and include it in the reply message. 156 8. Security Considerations 158 The communication between the DHCP client and the DHCP server for the 159 exchange of local domain name information is security sensitive and 160 requires authentication, integrity and replay protection. Either 161 lower-layer security (such as link layer security established as part 162 of the network access authentication protocol run) or DHCP security 163 [RFC3118] can be used. 165 9. IANA considerations 167 IANA is requested to allocate one DHCPv6 Option code, referencing 168 this document. 170 10. References 172 10.1. Normative References 174 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 175 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 177 [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., 178 and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for 179 IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. 181 [RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan, V., and M. Nakhjiri, 182 "Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an 183 Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)", RFC 5295, 184 August 2008. 186 [RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP Extensions for EAP Re- 187 authentication Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, August 2008. 189 10.2. Informative References 191 [RFC3118] Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP 192 Messages", RFC 3118, June 2001. 194 [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. 195 Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", 196 RFC 3748, June 2004. 198 Authors' Addresses 200 Glen Zorn 201 Network Zen 202 77/440 Soi Phoomjit, Rama IV Road 203 Phra Khanong, Khlong Toie 204 Bangkok 10110 205 Thailand 207 Phone: +66 (0) 87 502 4274 208 EMail: gwz@net-zen.net 209 Qin Wu 210 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 211 Site B, Floor 12, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd. 212 Nanjing, Jiangsu 21001 213 China 215 Phone: +86-25-84565892 216 EMail: sunseawq@huawei.com 218 Yungui Wang 219 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 220 Site B, Floor 10, HuiHong Mansion, No.91 BaiXia Rd. 221 Nanjing, Jiangsu 210001 222 P.R. China 224 Phone: +86 25 84565893 225 EMail: w52006@huawei.com