idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-27.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == There are 2 instances of lines with non-ascii characters in the document. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == Using lowercase 'not' together with uppercase 'MUST', 'SHALL', 'SHOULD', or 'RECOMMENDED' is not an accepted usage according to RFC 2119. Please use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is what you mean). Found 'SHOULD not' in this paragraph: Note that due to the exclusion of QUIC protocol in the I2NSF documents, HTTP/3 is also excluded in the document and will be considered in the future I2NSF documents along with the QUIC protocol. HTTP/3 SHOULD not be interpreted as either HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2. -- The document date (23 March 2022) is 765 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4766 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6691 (Obsoleted by RFC 9293) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 8329 -- Possible downref: Normative reference to a draft: ref. 'I-D.ietf-httpbis-messaging' -- Possible downref: Normative reference to a draft: ref. 'I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics' == Outdated reference: A later version (-29) exists of draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-22 == Outdated reference: A later version (-20) exists of draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-15 == Outdated reference: A later version (-26) exists of draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm-14 -- Possible downref: Normative reference to a draft: ref. 'I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis' == Outdated reference: A later version (-28) exists of draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-18 == Outdated reference: A later version (-32) exists of draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-16 Summary: 3 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 8 warnings (==), 4 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 I2NSF Working Group S. Hares, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Huawei 4 Intended status: Standards Track J. Jeong, Ed. 5 Expires: 24 September 2022 J. Kim 6 Sungkyunkwan University 7 R. Moskowitz 8 HTT Consulting 9 Q. Lin 10 Huawei 11 23 March 2022 13 I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model 14 draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-27 16 Abstract 18 This document defines an information model and the corresponding YANG 19 data model for the capabilities of various Network Security Functions 20 (NSFs) in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) 21 framework to centrally manage the capabilities of the various NSFs. 23 Status of This Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 September 2022. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ 47 license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. 48 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 49 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components 50 extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as 51 described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are 52 provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. 54 Table of Contents 56 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 57 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 3. Requirements of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy Model . . . . . . . . . 5 60 3.2. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action . . . . 9 61 4. Overview of YANG Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 62 5. YANG Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 63 5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities . . . . . . 13 64 6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 17 65 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 66 8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 67 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 68 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 69 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 70 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 71 Appendix A. Configuration Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 72 A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General 73 Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 74 A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a 75 Time-based Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 76 A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web 77 Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 78 A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a VoIP/VoCN 79 Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 80 A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of an HTTP and 81 HTTPS Flood Mitigator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 82 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 83 Appendix C. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 84 Appendix D. Changes from 85 draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-26 . . . . . . . . 72 86 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 88 1. Introduction 90 As the industry becomes more sophisticated and network devices (e.g., 91 Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, autonomous vehicles, and 92 smartphones using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and Voice over 93 Cellular Network, such as LTE and 5G (VoCN)) require advanced 94 security protection in various scenarios, security service providers 95 have a lot of problems described in [RFC8192] to provide such network 96 devices with efficient and reliable security services in network 97 infrastructure. To resolve these problems, this document specifies 98 the information and data models of the capabilities of Network 99 Security Functions (NSFs) in a framework of the Interface to Network 100 Security Functions (I2NSF) [RFC8329]. 102 NSFs produced by multiple security vendors provide various security 103 capabilities to customers. Multiple NSFs can be combined to provide 104 security services over the given network traffic, regardless of 105 whether the NSFs are implemented as physical or virtual functions. 106 Security Capabilities describe the functions that Network Security 107 Functions (NSFs) can provide for security policy enforcement. 108 Security Capabilities are independent of the actual security policy 109 that will implement the functionality of the NSF. 111 Every NSF should be described with the set of capabilities it offers. 112 Security Capabilities enable security functionality to be described 113 in a vendor-neutral manner. Security Capabilities are a market 114 enabler, providing a way to define customized security protection by 115 unambiguously describing the security features offered by a given 116 NSF. Note that this YANG data model forms the basis of the NSF 117 Monitoring Interface YANG data model 118 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] and the NSF-Facing 119 Interface YANG data model [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm]. 121 This document provides an information model and the corresponding 122 YANG data model [RFC6020][RFC7950] that defines the capabilities of 123 NSFs to centrally manage the capabilities of those NSFs. The NSFs 124 can register their own capabilities into a Network Operator 125 Management (Mgmt) System (i.e., Security Controller) with this YANG 126 data model through the registration interface [RFC8329]. With the 127 database of the capabilities of those NSFs that are maintained 128 centrally, those NSFs can be more easily managed [RFC8329]. 130 This YANG data model uses an "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy 131 model that is used as the basis for the design of I2NSF Policy as 132 described in [RFC8329] and Section 3.1. This policy model is not 133 entirely perfect in which a conflict may happen between the 134 configured policies, thus the YANG data model also provides an 135 additional element of conflict resolution as described in 136 Section 3.2. The "ietf-i2nsf-capability" YANG module defined in this 137 document provides the following features: 139 * Definition for event capabilities of network security functions. 141 * Definition for condition capabilities of network security 142 functions. 144 * Definition for action capabilities of network security functions. 146 * Definition for resolution strategy capabilities of network 147 security functions. 149 * Definition for default action capabilities of network security 150 functions. 152 2. Terminology 154 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 155 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 156 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 157 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 158 capitals, as shown here. 160 This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329]. 162 This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common 163 YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management 164 Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. The meaning of the symbols 165 in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340]. 167 3. Requirements of I2NSF NSF Capability 169 This section provides the I2NSF Capability Information Model (CapIM). 170 A CapIM is a formalization of the functionality that an NSF 171 advertises. This enables the precise specification of what an NSF 172 can do in terms of security policy enforcement, so that computer- 173 based tasks can unambiguously refer to, use, configure, and manage 174 NSFs. Capabilities are defined in a vendor- and technology- 175 independent manner (i.e., regardless of the differences among vendors 176 and individual products). 178 Network security experts can refer to categories of security controls 179 and understand each other. For instance, network security experts 180 agree on what is meant by the terms "NAT", "filtering", and "VPN 181 concentrator". As a further example, network security experts 182 unequivocally refer to "packet filters" as devices that allow or deny 183 packet forwarding based on various conditions (e.g., source and 184 destination IP addresses, source and destination ports, and IP 185 protocol type fields) [Alshaer]. 187 However, more information is required in case of other devices, like 188 stateful firewalls or application layer filters. These devices 189 filter packets or communications, but there are differences in the 190 packets and communications that they can categorize and the states 191 they maintain. Network engineers deal with these differences by 192 asking more questions to determine the specific category and 193 functionality of the device. Machines can follow a similar approach, 194 which is commonly referred to as question-answering [Hirschman]. In 195 this context, the CapIM and the derived data model can provide 196 important and rich information sources. 198 Analogous considerations can be applied for channel protection 199 protocols, where we all understand that they will protect packets by 200 means of symmetric algorithms whose keys could have been negotiated 201 with asymmetric cryptography, but they may work at different layers 202 and support different algorithms and protocols. To ensure 203 protection, these protocols apply integrity, optionally 204 confidentiality, anti-reply protections, and authentication. 206 The CapIM is intended to clarify these ambiguities by providing a 207 formal description of NSF functionality. The set of functions that 208 are advertised MAY be restricted according to the privileges of the 209 user or application that is viewing those functions. I2NSF 210 Capabilities enable unambiguous specification of the security 211 capabilities available in a (virtualized) networking environment, and 212 their automatic processing by means of computer-based techniques. 214 This CapIM enables a security controller in an I2NSF framework 215 [RFC8329] to properly identify and manage NSFs, and allow NSFs to 216 properly declare their functionality through a Developer's Management 217 System (DMS) [RFC8329], so that they can be used in the correct way. 219 3.1. Design Principles and ECA Policy Model 221 This document defines an information model for representing NSF 222 capabilities. Some basic design principles for security capabilities 223 and the systems that manage them are: 225 * Independence: Each security capability (e.g., events, conditions, 226 and actions) SHOULD be an independent function, with minimum 227 overlap or dependency on other capabilities. This enables each 228 security capability to be utilized and assembled with other 229 security capabilities together freely. More importantly, changes 230 to one capability SHOULD NOT affect other capabilities. This 231 follows the Single Responsibility Principle [Martin] [OODSRP]. 233 * Abstraction: Each capability MUST be defined in a vendor- 234 independent manner. 236 * Advertisement: The Registration Interface 237 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm] MUST be used to 238 advertise and register the capabilities of each NSF. This same 239 interface MUST be used by other I2NSF Components to determine what 240 Capabilities are currently available to them. 242 * Execution: The NSF-Facing Interface 243 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm] and NSF Monitoring 244 Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] MUST be used 245 to configure the use of a capability into an NSF and monitor the 246 NSF, respectively. These provide a standardized ability to 247 describe its functionality, and report its processing results, 248 respectively. These facilitate multivendor interoperability. 250 * Automation: The system MUST have the ability to auto-discover, 251 auto-negotiate, and auto-update the information of an NSF's 252 registered security capabilities without human intervention. 253 These features are especially useful for the management of a large 254 number of NSFs. They are essential for adding smart services 255 (e.g., refinement, analysis, capability reasoning, and 256 optimization) to the security scheme employed. These features are 257 supported by many design patterns, including the Observer Pattern 258 [OODOP], the Mediator Pattern [OODMP], and a set of Message 259 Exchange Patterns [Hohpe]. The Registration Interface 260 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm] can register the 261 capabilities of NSFs with the security controller from the request 262 of a Developer's Management System, providing a list of available 263 NSFs, the corresponding security capabilities, and access 264 information to the security controller. Also, this interface can 265 send a query to Developer's Management System in order to find an 266 NSF to satisfy the requested security capability from the security 267 controller that receives a security policy. 269 * Scalability: The management system SHOULD have the capability to 270 scale up/down or scale in/out. Thus, it can meet various 271 performance requirements derived from changeable network traffic 272 or service requests. In addition, security capabilities that are 273 affected by scalability changes SHOULD support reporting 274 statistics to the security controller to assist its decision on 275 whether it needs to invoke scaling or not. The NSF Monitoring 276 Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] can observe 277 the performance of NSFs to let the security controller decide 278 scalability changes of the NSFs. 280 Based on the above principles, this document defines a capability 281 model that enables an NSF to register (and hence advertise) its set 282 of capabilities that other I2NSF Components can use. These 283 capabilities MUST have their access control restricted by a policy 284 and the mechanism of access control is RECOMMENDED to follow the 285 mechanism described in Network Configuration Access Control Model 286 (NACM) [RFC8341]; the policy that determines which components are 287 granted which access is out of scope for this document. The set of 288 capabilities provided by a given set of NSFs defines the security 289 services offered by the set of NSFs used. The security controller 290 can compare the requirements of users and applications with the set 291 of capabilities that are currently available in order to choose which 292 capabilities of which NSFs are needed to meet those requirements. 293 Note that this choice is independent of vendor, and instead relies 294 specifically on the capabilities (i.e., the description) of the 295 functions provided. 297 Furthermore, NSFs are subject to the updates of security capabilities 298 and software to cope with newly found security attacks or threats, 299 hence new capabilities may be created, and/or existing capabilities 300 may be updated (e.g., by updating its signature and algorithm). New 301 capabilities may be sent to and stored in a centralized repository, 302 or stored separately in a vendor's local repository. In either case, 303 the Registration Interface can facilitate this update process so the 304 Developer's Management System can let the security controller update 305 its repository for NSFs and their security capabilities. 307 The "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model in [RFC8329] is used 308 as the basis for the design of the capability model; The following 309 three terms define the structure and behavior of an I2NSF imperative 310 policy rule: 312 * Event: An Event is defined as any important occurrence in time of 313 a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of 314 the system being managed. When used in the context of I2NSF 315 Policy Rules, it is used to determine whether the condition clause 316 of an I2NSF Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. Examples of an 317 I2NSF Event include time and user actions (e.g., logon, logoff, 318 and actions that violate an ACL). 320 * Condition: A condition is defined as a set of attributes, 321 features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of 322 known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine 323 whether the set of actions in that (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule 324 can be executed or not. Examples of I2NSF conditions include 325 matching attributes of a packet or flow, and comparing the 326 internal state of an NSF with a desired state. 328 * Action: An action is used to control and monitor aspects of NSFs 329 to handle packets or flows when the event and condition clauses 330 are satisfied. NSFs provide security functions by executing 331 various Actions. Examples of I2NSF actions include providing 332 intrusion detection and/or protection, web filtering (i.e., URL 333 filtering) and flow filtering, and deep packet inspection for 334 packets and flows. 336 An I2NSF Policy Rule is made up of three clauses: an Event clause, a 337 Condition clause, and an Action clause. This structure is also 338 called an ECA (Event-Condition-Action) Policy Rule. A Boolean clause 339 is a logical statement that evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. It 340 may be made up of one or more terms; if more than one term is 341 present, then each term in the Boolean clause is combined using 342 logical connectives (i.e., AND, OR, and NOT). 344 An I2NSF ECA Policy Rule has the following semantics: 346 IF is TRUE 348 IF is TRUE 350 THEN execute [constrained by metadata] 352 END-IF 354 END-IF 356 Technically, the "Policy Rule" is really a container that aggregates 357 the above three clauses, as well as metadata which describe the 358 characteristics and behaviors of a capability (or an NSF). One 359 example of metadata that has been well-associated with a network 360 access control list is priority. Priority information is usually 361 given to a rule as a numerical value to control the execution order 362 of the rules. Associating a priority value an ECA policy enables a 363 business logic to be used to prescribe a behavior. For example, 364 suppose that a particular ECA Policy Rule contains three actions (A1, 365 A2, and A3 in order). Action A2 has a priority of 10; actions A1 and 366 A3 have no priority specified. Then, metadata may be used to 367 restrict the set of actions that can be executed when the event and 368 condition clauses of this ECA Policy Rule are evaluated to be TRUE; 369 two examples are: (1) only the first action (A1) is executed, and 370 then the policy rule returns to its caller, or (2) all actions are 371 executed, starting with the highest priority. 373 The above ECA policy model is very general and easily extensible. 375 For example, when an NSF has both url filtering capability and packet 376 filtering capability for protocol headers, it means that it can match 377 the URL as well as the Ethernet header, IP header, and Transport 378 header for packet filtering. The condition capability for url 379 filtering and packet filtering is not tightly linked to the action 380 capability due to the independence of our ECA design principle. The 381 action capability only lists the type of action that the NSF can take 382 to handle the matched packets. 384 3.2. Conflict, Resolution Strategy and Default Action 386 Formally, two I2NSF Policy Rules conflict with each other if: 388 * the Event Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE; 390 * the Condition Clauses of each evaluate to TRUE; 392 * the Action Clauses affect the same object in different ways. 394 For example, if we have two Policy Rules called R1 and R2 in the same 395 Policy: 397 R1: During 8am-6pm, if traffic is external, then run through 398 firewall 400 R2: During 7am-8pm, run antivirus 402 There is no conflict between the two policy rules R1 and R2, since 403 the policy rules act on different conditions, where firewall verifies 404 the packet header while antivirus verifies the contents. However, 405 consider these two rules called R3 and R4: 407 R3: During 9am-6pm, allow John to access social networking service 408 websites 410 R4: During 9am-6pm, disallow all users to access social networking 411 service websites 413 The two policy rules R3 and R4 are now in conflict, between the hours 414 of 9am and 6pm, because the actions of R3 and R4 are different and 415 apply to the same user (i.e., John). 417 Conflicts theoretically compromise the correct functioning of 418 devices. However, NSFs have been designed to cope with these issues. 419 Since conflicts are originated by simultaneously matching rules, an 420 additional process decides the action to be applied, e.g., among the 421 actions which the matching rule would have enforced. This process is 422 described by means of a resolution strategy for conflicts. The 423 finding and handling of conflicted matching rules is performed by 424 resolution strategies. 426 Some concrete examples of a resolution strategy are: 428 * First Matching Rule (FMR) 430 * Last Matching Rule (LMR) 431 * Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR) with Errors (PMRE) 433 * Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN) 435 In the above, a PMR strategy is defined as follows: 437 1. Order all actions by their Priority (highest is first, no 438 priority is last); actions that have the same priority may be 439 appear in any order in their relative location. 441 2. For PMRE: if any action fails to execute properly, temporarily 442 stop the execution of all actions. Invoke the error handler of 443 the failed action. If the error handler is able to recover from 444 the error, then continue the execution of any remaining actions; 445 else, terminate the execution of the ECA Policy Rule having those 446 all actions. 448 3. For PMRN: if any action fails to execute properly, stop the 449 execution of all actions. Invoke the error handler of the failed 450 action, but regardless of the result, the execution of the ECA 451 Policy Rule having those all actions MUST be terminated. 453 On the other hand, it may happen that, if an event is caught, none of 454 the policy rules matches the condition. Note that a packet or flow 455 is handled only when it matches both the event and condition of a 456 policy rule according to the ECA policy model. As a simple case, no 457 condition in the rules may match a packet arriving at the border 458 firewall. In this case, the packet is usually dropped, that is, the 459 firewall has a default behavior of packet dropping in order to manage 460 the cases that are not covered by specific rules. 462 Therefore, this document introduces two further capabilities for an 463 NSF to handle security policy conflicts with resolution strategies 464 and enforce a default action if no rules match. 466 * Resolution Strategies: They can be used to specify how to resolve 467 conflicts that occur between the actions of the similar or 468 different policy rules that are matched and contained in this 469 particular NSF; note that a badly written policy rule may cause a 470 conflict of actions with another similar policy rule. 472 * Default Action: It provides the default behavior to be executed 473 when there are no other alternatives. This action can be either 474 an explicit action or a set of actions. 476 4. Overview of YANG Data Model 478 This section provides an overview of how the YANG data model can be 479 used in the I2NSF framework described in [RFC8329]. Figure 1 shows 480 the capabilities (e.g., firewall and web filter) of NSFs in the I2NSF 481 Framework. As shown in this figure, a Developer's Management System 482 (DMS) can register NSFs and their capabilities with a Security 483 Controller. To register NSFs in this way, the DMS utilizes the 484 standardized capability YANG data model in this document through the 485 I2NSF Registration Interface [RFC8329]. That is, this Registration 486 Interface uses the YANG module described in this document to describe 487 the capabilities of an NSF that is registered with the Security 488 Controller. As described in [RFC8192], with the usage of the 489 Registration Interface and the YANG module in this document, the 490 capabilities registration of NSFs manufactured by multiple vendors 491 can be done together by the Security Controller in a centralized way, 492 and the information of the registered Capabilities in the Security 493 Controller information should be updated dynamically by each vendor 494 as the NSF may have software or hardware updates. 496 In Figure 1, a new NSF at a Developer's Management System has 497 capabilities of Firewall (FW) and Web Filter (WF), which are denoted 498 as (Cap = {FW, WF}), to support Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policy 499 rules where 'E', 'C', and 'A' mean "Event", "Condition", and 500 "Action", respectively. The condition involves IPv4 or IPv6 501 datagrams, and the action includes "Allow" and "Deny" for those 502 datagrams. Note that "E = {}" means that the event boolean will 503 always evaluate to true. 505 Note that the NSF-Facing Interface [RFC8329] is used by the Security 506 Controller to configure the security policy rules of NSFs (e.g., 507 firewall and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigator) 508 with the capabilities of the NSFs registered with the Security 509 Controller. 511 +------------------------------------------------------+ 512 | I2NSF User (e.g., Overlay Network Mgmt, Enterprise | 513 | Network Mgmt, another network domain's mgmt, etc.) | 514 +--------------------+---------------------------------+ 515 I2NSF ^ 516 Consumer-Facing Interface| 517 | 518 v I2NSF 519 +-----------------+------------+ Registration +-------------+ 520 | Network Operator Mgmt System | Interface | Developer's | 521 | (i.e., Security Controller) |<------------>| Mgmt System | 522 +-----------------+------------+ +-------------+ 523 ^ New NSF 524 | Cap = {FW, WF} 525 I2NSF | E = {} 526 NSF-Facing Interface | C = {IPv4, IPv6} 527 | A = {Allow, Deny} 528 v 529 +---------------+----+------------+-----------------+ 530 | | | | 531 +---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+ +---+---+ 532 | NSF-1 | ... | NSF-m | | NSF-1 | ... | NSF-n | 533 +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ 534 NSF-1 NSF-m NSF-1 NSF-n 535 Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} Cap = {FW, WF} 536 E = {} E = {user} E = {dev} E = {} 537 C = {IPv4} C = {IPv6} C = {IPv4, IPv6} C = {IPv4, time} 538 A = {Allow,Deny} A = {Allow,Deny} A = {Allow,Deny} A = {Allow,Deny} 540 Developer's Mgmt System A Developer's Mgmt System B 542 Figure 1: Capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF Framework 544 A use case of an NSF with the capabilities of firewall and web filter 545 is described as follows. 547 * If a network administrator wants to apply security policy rules to 548 block malicious users with firewall and web filter, it is a 549 tremendous burden for a network administrator to apply all of the 550 needed rules to NSFs one by one. This problem can be resolved by 551 managing the capabilities of NSFs as described in this document. 553 * If a network administrator wants to block IPv4 or IPv6 packets 554 from malicious users, the network administrator sends a security 555 policy rule to the Network Operator Management System (i.e., 556 Security Controller) using the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, 557 directing the system to block the users in question. 559 * When the Network Operator Management System receives the security 560 policy rule, it automatically sends that security policy rule to 561 appropriate NSFs (i.e., NSF-m in Developer's Management System A 562 and NSF-1 in Developer's Management System B) which can support 563 the capabilities (i.e., IPv6). This lets an I2NSF User not 564 consider which specific NSF(s) will work for the security policy 565 rule. 567 * If NSFs encounter the suspicious IPv4 or IPv6 packets of malicious 568 users, they can filter the packets out according to the configured 569 security policy rule. Therefore, the security policy rule against 570 the malicious users' packets can be automatically applied to 571 appropriate NSFs without human intervention. 573 5. YANG Tree Diagram 575 This section shows a YANG tree diagram of capabilities of network 576 security functions, as defined in the Section 3. 578 5.1. Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities 580 This section explains a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities and its 581 features. Figure 2 shows a YANG tree diagram of NSF capabilities. 582 The NSF capabilities in the tree include directional capabilities, 583 event capabilities, condition capabilities, action capabilities, 584 resolution strategy capabilities, and default action capabilities. 585 Those capabilities can be tailored or extended according to a 586 vendor's specific requirements. Refer to the NSF capabilities 587 information model for detailed discussion in Section 3. 589 module: ietf-i2nsf-capability 590 +--rw nsf* [nsf-name] 591 +--rw nsf-name string 592 +--rw directional-capabilities* identityref 593 +--rw event-capabilities 594 | +--rw system-event-capability* identityref 595 | +--rw system-alarm-capability* identityref 596 +--rw condition-capabilities 597 | +--rw generic-nsf-capabilities 598 | | +--rw ethernet-capability* identityref 599 | | +--rw ipv4-capability* identityref 600 | | +--rw ipv6-capability* identityref 601 | | +--rw icmpv4-capability* identityref 602 | | +--rw icmpv6-capability* identityref 603 | | +--rw tcp-capability* identityref 604 | | +--rw udp-capability* identityref 605 | | +--rw sctp-capability* identityref 606 | | +--rw dccp-capability* identityref 607 | +--rw advanced-nsf-capabilities 608 | | +--rw anti-ddos-capability* identityref 609 | | +--rw ips-capability* identityref 610 | | +--rw anti-virus-capability* identityref 611 | | +--rw url-filtering-capability* identityref 612 | | +--rw voip-vocn-filtering-capability* identityref 613 | +--rw context-capabilities 614 | +--rw time-capabilities* identityref 615 | +--rw application-filter-capabilities* identityref 616 | +--rw device-type-capabilities* identityref 617 | +--rw user-condition-capabilities* identityref 618 | +--rw geographic-capabilities* identityref 619 +--rw action-capabilities 620 | +--rw ingress-action-capability* identityref 621 | +--rw egress-action-capability* identityref 622 | +--rw log-action-capability* identityref 623 +--rw resolution-strategy-capabilities* identityref 624 +--rw default-action-capabilities* identityref 626 Figure 2: YANG Tree Diagram of Capabilities of Network Security 627 Functions 629 The data model in this document provides identities for the 630 capabilities of NSFs. Every identity in the data model represents 631 the capability of an NSF. Each identity is explained in the 632 description of the identity. 634 Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe 635 an event that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of 636 the I2NSF Policy Rule. The defined event capabilities are system 637 event and system alarm. 639 Condition capabilities are used to specify capabilities of a set of 640 attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a 641 set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to 642 determine whether a set of actions needs to be executed or not so 643 that an imperative I2NSF policy rule can be executed. In this 644 document, two kinds of condition capabilities are used to classify 645 different capabilities of NSFs such as generic-nsf-capabilities and 646 advanced-nsf-capabilities. First, the generic-nsf-capabilities 647 define NSFs that operate on packet header for layer 2 (i.e., Ethernet 648 capability), layer 3 (i.e., IPv4 capability, IPv6 capability, ICMPv4 649 capability, and ICMPv6 capability.), and layer 4 (i.e., TCP 650 capability, UDP capability, SCTP capability, and DCCP capability). 651 Second, the advanced-nsf-capabilities define NSFs that operate on 652 features different from the generic-nsf-capabilities, e.g., the 653 payload, cross flow state, application layer, traffic statistics, 654 network behavior, etc. This document defines the advanced-nsf into 655 two categories such as content-security-control and attack- 656 mitigation-control. 658 * Content security control is an NSF that evaluates the payload of a 659 packet, such as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), URL-Filtering, 660 Antivirus, and VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) / VoCN (Voice 661 over Cellular Network) Filter. 663 * Attack mitigation control is an NSF that mitigates an attack such 664 as anti-DDoS (DDoS-mitigator). 666 The advanced-nsf can be extended with other types of NSFs. This 667 document only provides five advanced-nsf capabilities, i.e., IPS 668 capability, URL-Filtering capability, Antivirus capability, VoIP/VoCN 669 Filter capability, and Anti-DDoS capability. Note that VoIP and VoCN 670 are merged into a single capability in this document because VoIP and 671 VoCN use the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] for a call 672 setup. See Section 3.1 for more information about the condition in 673 the ECA policy model. Also note that QUIC protocol [RFC9000] is 674 excluded in the data model as it is not considered in the initial 675 I2NSF documents [RFC8329]. The QUIC traffic should not be treated as 676 UDP traffic and will be considered in the future I2NSF documents. 678 The context capabilities provide extra information for the condition. 679 The given context conditions are application filter, target, user 680 condition, and geographic location. Time capabilities are used to 681 specify the capabilities which describe when to execute the I2NSF 682 policy rule. The time capabilities are defined in terms of absolute 683 time and periodic time, where the absolute time means the exact time 684 to start or end, and the periodic time means repeated time like day, 685 week, month, or year. The application filter capability is the 686 capability for matching the packet based on the application protocol, 687 such as HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, etc. The device type capability is the 688 capability for matching the type of the destination devices, such as 689 PC, IoT, Network Infrastructure devices, etc. The user condition is 690 the capability for matching the users of the network by mapping each 691 user ID to an IP address. Users can be combined into groups. The 692 geographic location capability is the capability for matching the 693 geographical location of a source or destination of a packet. 695 Note that due to the exclusion of QUIC protocol in the I2NSF 696 documents, HTTP/3 is also excluded in the document and will be 697 considered in the future I2NSF documents along with the QUIC 698 protocol. HTTP/3 SHOULD not be interpreted as either HTTP/1.1 or 699 HTTP/2. 701 Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that 702 describe the control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when 703 the event and condition clauses are satisfied. The action 704 capabilities are defined as ingress-action capability, egress-action 705 capability, and log-action capability. See Section 3.1 for more 706 information about the action in the ECA policy model. Also, see 707 Section 7.2 (NSF-Facing Flow Security Policy Structure) in [RFC8329] 708 for more information about the ingress and egress actions. In 709 addition, see Section 9.1 (Flow-Based NSF Capability 710 Characterization) in [RFC8329] and Section 6.5 (NSF Logs) in 711 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] for more information about 712 logging at NSFs. 714 Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities 715 that describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the similar 716 or different policy rules that are matched and contained in this 717 particular NSF; note that a badly written policy rule may cause a 718 conflict of actions with another similar policy rule. The resolution 719 strategy capabilities are defined as First Matching Rule (FMR), Last 720 Matching Rule (LMR), Prioritized Matching Rule with Error (PMRE), and 721 Prioritized Matching with No Errors (PMRN). See Section 3.2 for more 722 information about the resolution strategy. 724 Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that 725 describe how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a 726 packet. The default action capabilities are defined as pass, drop, 727 reject, rate-limit, and mirror. See Section 3.2 for more information 728 about the default action. 730 6. YANG Data Model of I2NSF NSF Capability 732 This section introduces a YANG module for NSFs' capabilities, as 733 defined in the Section 3. 735 It makes references to 737 * [RFC0768] 739 * [RFC0791] 741 * [RFC0792] 743 * [RFC0854] 745 * [RFC0959] 747 * [RFC1939] 749 * [RFC2474] 751 * [RFC2595] 753 * [RFC3168] 755 * [RFC3261] 757 * [RFC4250] 759 * [RFC4340] 761 * [RFC4443] 763 * [RFC4766] 765 * [RFC5103] 767 * [RFC5321] 769 * [RFC5595] 771 * [RFC6335] 773 * [RFC6437] 775 * [RFC6691] 777 * [RFC6864] 778 * [RFC7323] 780 * [RFC8075] 782 * [RFC8200] 784 * [RFC8311] 786 * [RFC8329] 788 * [RFC8805] 790 * [RFC9051] 792 * [IEEE802.3-2018] 794 * [IANA-Protocol-Numbers] 796 * [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2bis] 798 * [I-D.ietf-httpbis-messaging] 800 * [I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics] 802 * [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis] 804 * [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] 806 * [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis] 808 * [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options] 810 * [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] 812 file "ietf-i2nsf-capability@2022-03-23.yang" 813 module ietf-i2nsf-capability { 814 yang-version 1.1; 815 namespace 816 "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability"; 817 prefix 818 nsfcap; 820 organization 821 "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions) 822 Working Group"; 824 contact 825 "WG Web: 826 WG List: 828 Editor: Susan Hares 829 831 Editor: Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong 832 834 Editor: Jinyong (Tim) Kim 835 837 Editor: Robert Moskowitz 838 840 Editor: Qiushi Lin 841 843 Editor: Patrick Lingga 844 "; 846 description 847 "This module is a YANG module for I2NSF Network Security 848 Functions (NSFs)'s Capabilities. 850 Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as 851 authors of the code. All rights reserved. 853 Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or 854 without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to 855 the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set 856 forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions 857 Relating to IETF Documents 858 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). 860 This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX 861 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself 862 for full legal notices."; 864 // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove 865 // this note. 867 revision "2022-03-23"{ 868 description "Initial revision."; 869 reference 870 "RFC XXXX: I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model"; 872 // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove 873 // this note. 875 } 877 /* 878 * Identities 879 */ 881 identity event { 882 description 883 "Base identity for I2NSF events."; 884 reference 885 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 886 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - Event"; 887 } 889 identity system-event { 890 base event; 891 description 892 "Base identity for system event. System event (also called 893 alert) is defined as a warning about any changes of 894 configuration, any access violation, the information of 895 sessions and traffic flows."; 896 reference 897 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 898 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System event"; 899 } 901 identity system-alarm { 902 base event; 903 description 904 "Base identity for system alarm. System alarm is defined as a 905 warning related to service degradation in system hardware."; 906 reference 907 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 908 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm"; 909 } 911 identity access-violation { 912 base system-event; 913 description 914 "Identity for access violation event. Access-violation system 915 event is an event when a user tries to access (read, write, 916 create, or delete) any information or execute commands 917 above their privilege (i.e., not-conformant with the 918 access profile)."; 919 reference 920 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 921 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System event for access 922 violation"; 924 } 926 identity configuration-change { 927 base system-event; 928 description 929 "Identity for configuration change event. Configuration change 930 is a system event when a new configuration is added or an 931 existing configuration is modified."; 932 reference 933 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 934 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System event for 935 configuration change"; 936 } 938 identity memory-alarm { 939 base system-alarm; 940 description 941 "Memory is the hardware to store information temporarily or for 942 a short period, i.e., Random Access Memory (RAM). A 943 memory-alarm is emitted when the memory usage is exceeding 944 the threshold."; 945 reference 946 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 947 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for 948 memory"; 949 } 951 identity cpu-alarm { 952 base system-alarm; 953 description 954 "CPU is the Central Processing Unit that executes basic 955 operations of the system. A cpu-alarm is emitted when the CPU 956 usage is exceeding a threshold."; 957 reference 958 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 959 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for CPU"; 960 } 962 identity disk-alarm { 963 base system-alarm; 964 description 965 "Disk or storage is the hardware to store information for a 966 long period, i.e., Hard Disk and Solid-State Drive. A 967 disk-alarm is emitted when the disk usage is exceeding a 968 threshold."; 969 reference 970 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 971 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for disk"; 973 } 975 identity hardware-alarm { 976 base system-alarm; 977 description 978 "A hardware alarm is emitted when a hardware failure (e.g., 979 CPU, memory, disk, or interface) is detected. A hardware 980 failure is a malfunction within the electronic circuits or 981 electromechanical components of the hardware that makes it 982 unusable."; 983 reference 984 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 985 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for 986 hardware"; 987 } 989 identity interface-alarm { 990 base system-alarm; 991 description 992 "Interface is the network interface for connecting a device 993 with the network. The interface-alarm is emitted when the 994 state of the interface is changed."; 995 reference 996 "draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF NSF 997 Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System alarm for 998 interface"; 999 } 1001 identity time { 1002 description 1003 "Base identity for time capabilities"; 1004 } 1006 identity absolute-time { 1007 base time; 1008 description 1009 "absolute time capabilities. 1010 If a network security function has the absolute time 1011 capability, the network security function supports 1012 rule execution according to absolute time."; 1013 } 1015 identity periodic-time { 1016 base time; 1017 description 1018 "periodic time capabilities. 1019 If a network security function has the periodic time 1020 capability, the network security function supports 1021 rule execution according to periodic time."; 1022 } 1024 identity device-type { 1025 description 1026 "Base identity for device type condition capability. The 1027 capability for matching the source or destination device 1028 type."; 1029 } 1031 identity computer { 1032 base device-type; 1033 description 1034 "Identity for computer such as personal computer (PC) 1035 and server"; 1036 } 1038 identity mobile-phone { 1039 base device-type; 1040 description 1041 "Identity for mobile-phone such as smartphone and 1042 cellphone"; 1043 } 1045 identity voip-vocn-phone { 1046 base device-type; 1047 description 1048 "Identity for VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) or VoCN 1049 (Voice over Cellular Network, such as Voice over LTE or 5G) 1050 phone"; 1051 } 1053 identity tablet { 1054 base device-type; 1055 description 1056 "Identity for tablet"; 1057 } 1059 identity network-infrastructure-device { 1060 base device-type; 1061 description 1062 "Identity for network infrastructure devices 1063 such as switch, router, and access point"; 1064 } 1066 identity iot { 1067 base device-type; 1068 description 1069 "Identity for Internet of Things (IoT) devices 1070 such as sensors, actuators, and low-power 1071 low-capacity computing devices"; 1072 } 1074 identity ot { 1075 base device-type; 1076 description 1077 "Identity for Operational Technology (OT) devices (also 1078 known as industrial control systems) that interact 1079 with the physical environment and detect or cause direct 1080 change through the monitoring and control of devices, 1081 processes, and events such as programmable logic 1082 controllers (PLCs), digital oscilloscopes, building 1083 management systems (BMS), and fire control systems"; 1084 } 1086 identity vehicle { 1087 base device-type; 1088 description 1089 "Identity for transportation vehicles that connect to and 1090 share data through the Internet over Vehicle-to-Everything 1091 (V2X) communications."; 1092 } 1094 identity user-condition { 1095 description 1096 "Base identity for user condition capability. This is the 1097 capability of mapping user(s) into their corresponding IP 1098 address"; 1099 } 1101 identity user { 1102 base user-condition; 1103 description 1104 "Identity for user condition capability. 1105 A user (e.g., employee) can be mapped to an IP address of 1106 a computing device (e.g., computer, laptop, and virtual 1107 machine) which the user is using."; 1108 } 1110 identity group { 1111 base user-condition; 1112 description 1113 "Identity for group condition capability. 1114 A group (e.g., employees) can be mapped to multiple IP 1115 addresses of computing devices (e.g., computers, laptops, 1116 and virtual machines) which the group is using."; 1118 } 1120 identity geographic-location { 1121 description 1122 "Base identity for geographic location condition capability"; 1123 reference 1124 "RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds - 1125 An access control for a geographical location (i.e., 1126 geolocation) that has the corresponding IP prefix."; 1127 } 1129 identity source-location { 1130 base geographic-location; 1131 description 1132 "Identity for source geographic location condition capability"; 1133 reference 1134 "RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds - 1135 An access control for a geographical location (i.e., 1136 geolocation) that has the corresponding IP prefix."; 1137 } 1139 identity destination-location { 1140 base geographic-location; 1141 description 1142 "Identity for destination geographic location condition 1143 capability"; 1144 reference 1145 "RFC 8805: A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds - 1146 An access control for a geographical location (i.e., 1147 geolocation) that has the corresponding IP prefix."; 1148 } 1150 identity directional { 1151 description 1152 "Base identity for directional traffic flow export capability"; 1153 reference 1154 "RFC 5103: Bidirectional Flow Export Using IP Flow Information 1155 Export (IPFIX) - Terminology Unidirectional and Bidirectional 1156 Flow"; 1157 } 1159 identity unidirectional { 1160 base directional; 1161 description 1162 "Identity for unidirectional traffic flow export."; 1163 reference 1164 "RFC 5103: Bidirectional Flow Export Using IP Flow Information 1165 Export (IPFIX) - Terminology Unidirectional Flow"; 1167 } 1169 identity bidirectional { 1170 base directional; 1171 description 1172 "Identity for bidirectional traffic flow export."; 1173 reference 1174 "RFC 5103: Bidirectional Flow Export Using IP Flow Information 1175 Export (IPFIX) - Terminology Bidirectional Flow"; 1176 } 1178 identity protocol { 1179 description 1180 "Base identity for protocols"; 1181 } 1183 identity ethernet { 1184 base protocol; 1185 description 1186 "Base identity for Ethernet protocol."; 1187 } 1189 identity source-mac-address { 1190 base ethernet; 1191 description 1192 "Identity for the capability of matching Media Access Control 1193 (MAC) source address(es) condition capability."; 1194 reference 1195 "IEEE 802.3 - 2018: IEEE Standard for Ethernet"; 1196 } 1198 identity destination-mac-address { 1199 base ethernet; 1200 description 1201 "Identity for the capability of matching Media Access Control 1202 (MAC) destination address(es) condition capability."; 1203 reference 1204 "IEEE 802.3 - 2018: IEEE Standard for Ethernet"; 1205 } 1207 identity ether-type { 1208 base ethernet; 1209 description 1210 "Identity for the capability of matching the EtherType in 1211 Ethernet II and Length in Ethernet 802.3 of a packet."; 1212 reference 1213 "IEEE 802.3 - 2018: IEEE Standard for Ethernet"; 1214 } 1215 identity ip { 1216 base protocol; 1217 description 1218 "Base identity for internet/network layer protocol, 1219 e.g., IPv4, IPv6, and ICMP."; 1220 } 1222 identity ipv4 { 1223 base ip; 1224 description 1225 "Base identity for IPv4 condition capability"; 1226 reference 1227 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol"; 1228 } 1230 identity ipv6 { 1231 base ip; 1232 description 1233 "Base identity for IPv6 condition capabilities"; 1234 reference 1235 "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1236 Specification"; 1237 } 1239 identity dscp { 1240 base ipv4; 1241 base ipv6; 1242 description 1243 "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 annd IPv6 1244 Differentiated Services Codepoint (DSCP) condition"; 1245 reference 1246 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Type of Service 1247 RFC 2474: Definition of the Differentiated 1248 Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and 1249 IPv6 Headers 1250 RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1251 Specification - Traffic Class"; 1252 } 1254 identity ecn { 1255 base ipv4; 1256 base ipv6; 1257 description 1258 "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 annd IPv6 1259 Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) condition"; 1260 reference 1261 "RFC 3168: The Addition of Explicit Congestion 1262 Notification (ECN) to IP. 1264 RFC 8311: Relaxing Restrictions on Explicit Congestion 1265 Notification (ECN) Experimentation"; 1266 } 1268 identity total-length { 1269 base ipv4; 1270 base ipv6; 1271 description 1272 "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 Total Length 1273 header field or IPv6 Payload Length header field. 1275 IPv4 Total Length is the length of datagram, measured in 1276 octets, including internet header and data. 1278 IPv6 Payload Length is the length of the IPv6 payload, i.e., 1279 the rest of the packet following the IPv6 header, measured in 1280 octets."; 1281 reference 1282 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Total Length 1283 RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1284 Specification - Payload Length"; 1285 } 1287 identity ttl { 1288 base ipv4; 1289 base ipv6; 1290 description 1291 "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 Time-To-Live 1292 (TTL) or IPv6 Hop Limit."; 1293 reference 1294 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Time To Live (TTL) 1295 RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1296 Specification - Hop Limit"; 1297 } 1299 identity next-header { 1300 base ipv4; 1301 base ipv6; 1302 description 1303 "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 Protocol field 1304 and IPv6 Next Header field. Note that IPv4 Protocol field is 1305 equivalent to IPv6 Next Header field."; 1306 reference 1307 "IANA Website: Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers 1308 - Protocol Numbers 1309 RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Protocol 1310 RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1311 Specification - Next Header"; 1313 } 1315 identity source-address { 1316 base ipv4; 1317 base ipv6; 1318 description 1319 "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 or IPv6 source 1320 address(es) condition capability."; 1321 reference 1322 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Address 1323 RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1324 Specification - Source Address"; 1325 } 1327 identity destination-address { 1328 base ipv4; 1329 base ipv6; 1330 description 1331 "Identity for the capability of matching IPv4 or IPv6 1332 destination address(es) condition capability."; 1333 reference 1334 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Address 1335 RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1336 Specification - Destination Address"; 1337 } 1339 identity flow-direction { 1340 base ipv4; 1341 base ipv6; 1342 description 1343 "Identity for flow direction of matching IPv4/IPv6 source 1344 or destination address(es) condition capability where a flow's 1345 direction is either unidirectional or bidirectional"; 1346 reference 1347 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol 1348 RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1349 Specification"; 1350 } 1352 identity ihl { 1353 base ipv4; 1354 description 1355 "Identity for matching IPv4 header-length (IHL) 1356 condition capability"; 1357 reference 1358 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Header Length"; 1359 } 1360 identity identification { 1361 base ipv4; 1362 description 1363 "Identity for IPv4 identification condition capability. 1364 IPv4 ID field is used for fragmentation and reassembly."; 1365 reference 1366 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Identification 1367 RFC 6864: Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field - 1368 Fragmentation and Reassembly"; 1369 } 1371 identity fragment-offset { 1372 base ipv4; 1373 description 1374 "Identity for matching IPv4 fragment offset 1375 condition capability"; 1376 reference 1377 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Fragmentation Offset"; 1378 } 1380 identity flow-label { 1381 base ipv6; 1382 description 1383 "Identity for matching IPv6 flow label 1384 condition capability"; 1385 reference 1386 "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1387 Specification - Flow Label 1388 RFC 6437: IPv6 Flow Label Specification"; 1389 } 1391 identity header-order { 1392 base ipv6; 1393 description 1394 "Identity for IPv6 extension header order condition 1395 capability"; 1396 reference 1397 "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1398 Specification - Extension Header Order"; 1399 } 1401 identity hop-by-hop { 1402 base ipv6; 1403 description 1404 "Identity for IPv6 hop by hop options header 1405 condition capability"; 1406 reference 1407 "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1408 Specification - Hop-by-Hop Options Header"; 1409 } 1411 identity routing-header { 1412 base ipv6; 1413 description 1414 "Identity for IPv6 routing header condition capability. This 1415 capability supports only a set of core IPv6 routing headers, 1416 not all defined routing headers and deprecated."; 1417 reference 1418 "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1419 Specification - Routing Header"; 1420 } 1422 identity fragment-header { 1423 base ipv6; 1424 description 1425 "Identity for IPv6 fragment header condition 1426 capability"; 1427 reference 1428 "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1429 Specification - Fragment Header"; 1430 } 1432 identity destination-options { 1433 base ipv6; 1434 description 1435 "Identity for IPv6 destination options condition 1436 capability"; 1437 reference 1438 "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 1439 Specification - Destination Options"; 1440 } 1442 identity transport-protocol { 1443 base protocol; 1444 description 1445 "Base identity for Layer 4 protocol condition capabilities, 1446 e.g., TCP, UDP, SCTP, and DCCP"; 1447 } 1449 identity tcp { 1450 base transport-protocol; 1451 description 1452 "Base identity for TCP condition capabilities"; 1453 reference 1454 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1455 (TCP) Specification"; 1457 } 1459 identity udp { 1460 base transport-protocol; 1461 description 1462 "Base identity for UDP condition capabilities"; 1463 reference 1464 "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol"; 1465 } 1467 identity sctp { 1468 base transport-protocol; 1469 description 1470 "Base identity for SCTP condition capabilities"; 1471 reference 1472 "draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control Transmission 1473 Protocol"; 1474 } 1476 identity dccp { 1477 base transport-protocol; 1478 description 1479 "Base identity for DCCP condition capabilities"; 1480 reference 1481 "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; 1482 } 1484 identity source-port-number { 1485 base tcp; 1486 base udp; 1487 base sctp; 1488 base dccp; 1489 description 1490 "Identity for matching TCP, UDP, SCTP, and DCCP source port 1491 number condition capability"; 1492 reference 1493 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1494 (TCP) Specification 1495 RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol 1496 draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control Transmission 1497 Protocol 1498 RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; 1499 } 1501 identity destination-port-number { 1502 base tcp; 1503 base udp; 1504 base sctp; 1505 base dccp; 1506 description 1507 "Identity for matching TCP, UDP, SCTP, and DCCP destination 1508 port number condition capability"; 1509 reference 1510 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1511 (TCP) Specification"; 1512 } 1514 identity flags { 1515 base ipv4; 1516 base tcp; 1517 description 1518 "Identity for IPv4 flags and TCP control bits (flags) condition 1519 capability. Note that this should not be interpreted such that 1520 IPv4 flags and TCP flags are similar. 1521 The IPv4 flags is the three-bit field in IPv4 header to 1522 control and identify fragments. 1523 The TCP flags is the multiple one-bit fields after the 1524 reserved field in TCP header that indicates the connection 1525 states or provides additional information."; 1526 reference 1527 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol - Flags 1528 draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1529 (TCP) Specification - TCP Header Flags 1530 RFC 3168: The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification 1531 (ECN) to IP - ECN-Echo (ECE) Flag and Congestion Window 1532 Reduced (CWR) Flag 1533 draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-15: More Accurate ECN Feedback 1534 in TCP - ECN-Echo (ECE) Flag and Congestion Window Reduced 1535 (CWR) Flag"; 1536 } 1538 identity options { 1539 base tcp; 1540 description 1541 "Identity for matching TCP options header field condition 1542 capability. When an NSF claims to have this capability, the 1543 NSF should be able to match the TCP options header field in 1544 binary."; 1545 reference 1546 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1547 (TCP) Specification 1548 RFC 6691: TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size 1549 RFC 7323: TCP Extensions for High Performance"; 1550 } 1552 identity data-offset { 1553 base tcp; 1554 base dccp; 1555 description 1556 "Identity for matching TCP and DCCP Data Offset condition 1557 capability. 1558 The TCP Data Offset header field represents the size of the 1559 TCP header, expressed in 32-bit words. 1560 The DCCP Data Offset is the offset from the start of the 1561 packet's DCCP header to the start of its application data 1562 area, in 32-bit words."; 1563 reference 1564 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1565 (TCP) Specification - Data Offset 1566 RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; 1567 } 1569 identity reserved { 1570 base tcp; 1571 description 1572 "Identity for TCP header reserved field condition capability. 1573 The set of control bits reserved for future used. The control 1574 bits are also known as flags. Must be zero in generated 1575 segments and must be ignored in received segments, if 1576 corresponding future features are unimplemented by the 1577 sending or receiving host."; 1578 reference 1579 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1580 (TCP) Specification"; 1581 } 1583 identity window-size { 1584 base tcp; 1585 description 1586 "Identity for TCP header Window field condition capability. 1587 The number of data octets beginning with the one indicated 1588 in the acknowledgment field that the sender of this segment 1589 is willing to accept."; 1590 reference 1591 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1592 (TCP) Specification"; 1593 } 1595 identity urgent-pointer { 1596 base tcp; 1597 description 1598 "Identity for TCP Urgent Pointer header field condition 1599 capability. The Urgent Pointer field in TCP describes the 1600 current value of urgent pointer as a positive offset from 1601 the sequence number in this segment. The urgent pointer 1602 points to the sequence number of the octet following the 1603 urgent data. This field is only be interpreted in segments 1604 with the URG control bit set."; 1605 reference 1606 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control Protocol 1607 (TCP) Specification"; 1608 } 1610 identity length { 1611 base udp; 1612 base sctp; 1613 description 1614 "Identity for matching UDP length and SCTP chunk length 1615 condition capability. 1616 The UDP length is the length in octets of this user datagram 1617 including this header and the datagram. The UDP length can be 1618 smaller than the IP transport length for UDP transport layer 1619 options. 1620 The SCTP chunk length represents the size of the chunk in 1621 bytes including the SCTP Chunk type, Chunk flags, Chunk flags, 1622 and Chunk Value fields."; 1623 reference 1624 "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - Length 1625 draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options: Transport Options for UDP 1626 draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control Transmission 1627 Protocol - Chunk Length"; 1628 } 1630 identity chunk-type { 1631 base sctp; 1632 description 1633 "Identity for SCTP chunk type condition capability"; 1634 reference 1635 "draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control Transmission 1636 Protocol - Chunk Type"; 1637 } 1639 identity service-code { 1640 base dccp; 1641 description 1642 "Identity for DCCP Service Code condition capability"; 1643 reference 1644 "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol 1645 RFC 5595: The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) 1646 Service Codes 1647 RFC 6335: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) 1648 Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and 1649 Transport Protocol Port Number Registry - Service Code"; 1650 } 1652 identity icmp { 1653 base protocol; 1654 description 1655 "Base identity for ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 condition capability"; 1656 reference 1657 "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol 1658 RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) 1659 for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification 1660 - ICMPv6"; 1661 } 1663 identity icmpv4 { 1664 base icmp; 1665 description 1666 "Base identity for ICMPv4 condition capability"; 1667 reference 1668 "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol"; 1669 } 1671 identity icmpv6 { 1672 base icmp; 1673 description 1674 "Base identity for ICMPv6 condition capability"; 1675 reference 1676 "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) 1677 for the Internet Protocol Ver sion 6 (IPv6) Specification 1678 - ICMPv6"; 1679 } 1681 identity type { 1682 base icmpv4; 1683 base icmpv6; 1684 base dccp; 1685 description 1686 "Identity for ICMPv4, ICMPv6, and DCCP type condition 1687 capability"; 1688 reference 1689 "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol 1690 RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) 1691 for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification 1692 - ICMPv6 1693 RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol"; 1694 } 1696 identity code { 1697 base icmpv4; 1698 base icmpv6; 1699 description 1700 "Identity for ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 code condition capability"; 1701 reference 1702 "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol 1703 RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) 1704 for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification 1705 - ICMPv6"; 1706 } 1708 identity application-protocol { 1709 base protocol; 1710 description 1711 "Base identity for Application protocol. Note that a subset of 1712 application protocols (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, POP3, and 1713 IMAP) are handled in this YANG module, rather than all 1714 the existing application protocols."; 1715 } 1717 identity http { 1718 base application-protocol; 1719 description 1720 "The identity for Hypertext Transfer Protocol version 1.1 1721 (HTTP/1.1)."; 1722 reference 1723 "draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-19: HTTP Semantics 1724 draft-ietf-httpbis-messaging-19: HTTP/1.1"; 1725 } 1727 identity https { 1728 base application-protocol; 1729 description 1730 "The identity for Hypertext Transfer Protocol version 1.1 1731 (HTTP/1.1) over TLS."; 1732 reference 1733 "draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics-19: HTTP Semantics 1734 draft-ietf-httpbis-messaging-19: HTTP/1.1"; 1735 } 1737 identity http2 { 1738 base application-protocol; 1739 description 1740 "The identity for Hypertext Transfer Protocol version 2 1741 (HTTP/2)."; 1742 reference 1743 "draft-ietf-httpbis-http2bis-07: HTTP/2"; 1744 } 1745 identity https2 { 1746 base application-protocol; 1747 description 1748 "The identity for Hypertext Transfer Protocol version 2 1749 (HTTP/2) over TLS."; 1750 reference 1751 "draft-ietf-httpbis-http2bis-07: HTTP/2"; 1752 } 1754 identity ftp { 1755 base application-protocol; 1756 description 1757 "The identity for File Transfer Protocol."; 1758 reference 1759 "RFC 959: File Transfer Protocol (FTP)"; 1760 } 1762 identity ssh { 1763 base application-protocol; 1764 description 1765 "The identity for Secure Shell (SSH) protocol."; 1766 reference 1767 "RFC 4250: The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol"; 1768 } 1770 identity telnet { 1771 base application-protocol; 1772 description 1773 "The identity for telnet."; 1774 reference 1775 "RFC 854: Telnet Protocol"; 1776 } 1778 identity smtp { 1779 base application-protocol; 1780 description 1781 "The identity for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol."; 1782 reference 1783 "RFC 5321: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)"; 1784 } 1786 identity pop3 { 1787 base application-protocol; 1788 description 1789 "The identity for Post Office Protocol 3 (POP3)."; 1790 reference 1791 "RFC 1939: Post Office Protocol - Version 3 (POP3)"; 1792 } 1793 identity pop3s { 1794 base application-protocol; 1795 description 1796 "The identity for Post Office Protocol 3 (POP3) over TLS"; 1797 reference 1798 "RFC 1939: Post Office Protocol - Version 3 (POP3) 1799 RFC 2595: Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP"; 1800 } 1802 identity imap { 1803 base application-protocol; 1804 description 1805 "The identity for Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)."; 1806 reference 1807 "RFC 9051: Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 1808 4rev2"; 1809 } 1811 identity imaps { 1812 base application-protocol; 1813 description 1814 "The identity for Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) over 1815 TLS"; 1816 reference 1817 "RFC 9051: Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 1818 4rev2 1819 RFC 2595: Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP"; 1820 } 1822 identity action { 1823 description 1824 "Base identity for action capability"; 1825 } 1827 identity log-action { 1828 base action; 1829 description 1830 "Base identity for log-action capability"; 1831 } 1833 identity ingress-action { 1834 base action; 1835 description 1836 "Base identity for ingress-action capability"; 1837 reference 1838 "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security 1839 Functions - Section 7.2"; 1840 } 1841 identity egress-action { 1842 base action; 1843 description 1844 "Base identity for egress-action capability"; 1845 reference 1846 "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security 1847 Functions - Section 7.2"; 1848 } 1850 identity default-action { 1851 base action; 1852 description 1853 "Base identity for default-action capability"; 1854 } 1856 identity rule-log { 1857 base log-action; 1858 description 1859 "Identity for rule log. Log the policy rule that has been 1860 triggered."; 1861 } 1863 identity session-log { 1864 base log-action; 1865 description 1866 "Identity for session log. A session is a connection (i.e., 1867 traffic flow) of a data plane that includes source and 1868 destination of IP addresses and transport port numbers with 1869 the protocol used. Log the session that triggered a policy 1870 rule."; 1871 } 1873 identity pass { 1874 base ingress-action; 1875 base egress-action; 1876 base default-action; 1877 description 1878 "Identity for pass action capability. The pass action allows 1879 packet or flow to go through the NSF entering or exiting the 1880 internal network."; 1881 } 1883 identity drop { 1884 base ingress-action; 1885 base egress-action; 1886 base default-action; 1887 description 1888 "Identity for drop action capability. The drop action denies 1889 a packet to go through the NSF entering or exiting the 1890 internal network without sending any response back to the 1891 source."; 1892 } 1894 identity reject { 1895 base ingress-action; 1896 base egress-action; 1897 base default-action; 1898 description 1899 "Identity for reject action capability. The reject action 1900 denies a packet to go through the NSF entering or exiting the 1901 internal network and sends a response back to the source. 1902 The response depends on the packet and implementation. 1903 For example, a TCP packet is rejected with TCP RST response 1904 or a UDP packet may be rejected with an ICMPv4 response 1905 message with Type 3 Code 3 or ICMPv6 response message 1906 Type 1 Code 4 (i.e., Destination Unreachable: Destination 1907 port unreachable) "; 1908 } 1910 identity mirror { 1911 base ingress-action; 1912 base egress-action; 1913 base default-action; 1914 description 1915 "Identity for mirror action capability. The mirror action 1916 copies packet and send it to the monitoring entity while still 1917 allow the packet or flow to go through the NSF."; 1918 } 1920 identity rate-limit { 1921 base ingress-action; 1922 base egress-action; 1923 base default-action; 1924 description 1925 "Identity for rate limiting action capability. The rate limit 1926 action limits the number of packets or flows that can go 1927 through the NSF by dropping packets or flows (randomly or 1928 systematically)."; 1929 } 1931 identity invoke-signaling { 1932 base egress-action; 1933 description 1934 "Identity for invoke signaling action capability. The invoke 1935 signaling action is used to convey information of the event 1936 triggering this action to a monitoring entity"; 1938 } 1940 identity tunnel-encapsulation { 1941 base egress-action; 1942 description 1943 "Identity for tunnel encapsulation action capability. The 1944 tunnel encapsulation action is used to encapsulate the packet 1945 to be tunneled across the network to enable a secure 1946 connection."; 1947 } 1949 identity forwarding { 1950 base egress-action; 1951 description 1952 "Identity for forwarding action capability. The forwarding 1953 action is used to relay the packet from one network segment 1954 to another node in the network."; 1955 } 1957 identity transformation { 1958 base egress-action; 1959 description 1960 "Identity for transformation action capability. The 1961 transformation action is used to transform a packet by 1962 modifying it (e.g., HTTP-to-CoAP packet translation). 1963 Note that a subset of transformation (e.g., HTTP-to-CoAP) is 1964 handled in this YANG module, rather than all the existing 1965 transformations. Specific algorithmic transformations can be 1966 executed by a middlebox (e.g., NSF) for a given transformation 1967 name."; 1968 reference 1969 "RFC 8075: Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to the 1970 Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) - Translation between 1971 HTTP and CoAP."; 1972 } 1974 identity resolution-strategy { 1975 description 1976 "Base identity for resolution strategy capability"; 1977 } 1979 identity fmr { 1980 base resolution-strategy; 1981 description 1982 "Identity for First Matching Rule (FMR) resolution 1983 strategy capability"; 1984 } 1985 identity lmr { 1986 base resolution-strategy; 1987 description 1988 "Identity for Last Matching Rule (LMR) resolution 1989 strategy capability"; 1990 } 1992 identity pmre { 1993 base resolution-strategy; 1994 description 1995 "Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with Errors (PMRE) 1996 resolution strategy capability"; 1997 } 1999 identity pmrn { 2000 base resolution-strategy; 2001 description 2002 "Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule with No Errors (PMRN) 2003 resolution strategy capability"; 2004 } 2006 identity advanced-nsf { 2007 description 2008 "Base identity for advanced Network Security Function (NSF) 2009 capability."; 2010 } 2012 identity content-security-control { 2013 base advanced-nsf; 2014 description 2015 "Base identity for content security control. Content security 2016 control is an NSF that evaluates a packet's payload such as 2017 Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), URL-Filtering, Antivirus, 2018 and VoIP/CN Filter."; 2019 } 2021 identity attack-mitigation-control { 2022 base advanced-nsf; 2023 description 2024 "Base identity for attack mitigation control. Attack mitigation 2025 control is an NSF that mitigates an attack such as anti-DDoS 2026 or DDoS-mitigator."; 2027 } 2029 identity ips { 2030 base content-security-control; 2031 description 2032 "Base identity for IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) capability 2033 that prevents malicious activity within a network"; 2034 } 2036 identity url-filtering { 2037 base content-security-control; 2038 description 2039 "Base identity for url filtering capability that limits access 2040 by comparing the web traffic's URL with the URLs for web 2041 filtering in a database"; 2042 } 2044 identity anti-virus { 2045 base content-security-control; 2046 description 2047 "Base identity for antivirus capability to protect the network 2048 by detecting and removing viruses."; 2049 } 2051 identity voip-vocn-filtering { 2052 base content-security-control; 2053 description 2054 "Base identity for an advanced NSF for VoIP (Voice over 2055 Internet Protocol) and VoCN (Voice over Cellular Network, 2056 such as Voice over LTE or 5G) Security Service capability 2057 to filter the VoIP/VoCN packets or flows."; 2058 reference 2059 "RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"; 2060 } 2062 identity anti-ddos { 2063 base attack-mitigation-control; 2064 description 2065 "Base identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS Attack or DDoS 2066 Mitigator capability."; 2067 } 2069 identity packet-rate { 2070 base anti-ddos; 2071 description 2072 "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS detecting Packet Rate 2073 Capability where a packet rate is defined as the arrival rate 2074 of Packets toward a victim destination node. The NSF with 2075 this capability can detect the incoming packet rate and create 2076 an alert if the rate exceeds the threshold."; 2078 } 2080 identity flow-rate { 2081 base anti-ddos; 2082 description 2083 "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS detecting Flow Rate 2084 Capability where a flow rate is defined as the arrival rate of 2085 flows towards a victim destination node. The NSF with this 2086 capability can detect the incoming flow rate and create an 2087 alert if the rate exceeds the threshold."; 2088 } 2090 identity byte-rate { 2091 base anti-ddos; 2092 description 2093 "Identity for advanced NSF Anti-DDoS detecting Byte Rate 2094 Capability where a byte rate is defined as the arrival rate of 2095 Bytes toward a victim destination node. The NSF with this 2096 capability can detect the incoming byte rate and create an 2097 alert if the rate exceeds the threshold."; 2098 } 2100 identity signature-set { 2101 base ips; 2102 description 2103 "Identity for the capability of IPS to set the signature. 2104 Signature is a set of rules to detect an intrusive activity."; 2105 reference 2106 "RFC 4766: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements - 2107 Section 2.2.13"; 2108 } 2110 identity exception-signature { 2111 base ips; 2112 description 2113 "Identity for the capability of IPS to exclude signatures from 2114 detecting the intrusion."; 2115 reference 2116 "RFC 4766: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements - 2117 Section 2.2.13"; 2118 } 2120 identity detect { 2121 base anti-virus; 2122 description 2123 "Identity for advanced NSF Antivirus capability to detect 2124 viruses using a security profile. The security profile is used 2125 to scan threats, such as virus, malware, and spyware. The NSF 2126 should be able to update the security profile."; 2127 } 2128 identity exception-files { 2129 base anti-virus; 2130 description 2131 "Identity for advanced NSF Antivirus capability to exclude a 2132 certain file type or name from detection."; 2133 } 2135 identity pre-defined { 2136 base url-filtering; 2137 description 2138 "Identity for pre-defined URL Database condition capability 2139 where URL database is a public database for URL filtering."; 2140 } 2142 identity user-defined { 2143 base url-filtering; 2144 description 2145 "Identity for user-defined URL Database condition capability 2146 that allows a user's manual addition of URLs for URL 2147 filtering."; 2148 } 2150 identity call-id { 2151 base voip-vocn-filtering; 2152 description 2153 "Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoCN Call Identifier (ID) 2154 capability."; 2155 } 2157 identity user-agent { 2158 base voip-vocn-filtering; 2159 description 2160 "Identity for advanced NSF VoIP/VoCN User Agent capability."; 2161 } 2163 /* 2164 * Grouping 2165 */ 2167 grouping nsf-capabilities { 2168 description 2169 "Network Security Function (NSF) Capabilities"; 2170 reference 2171 "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security 2172 Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure."; 2174 leaf-list directional-capabilities { 2175 type identityref { 2176 base directional; 2177 } 2178 description 2179 "The capability of an NSF for handling directional traffic 2180 flow (i.e., unidirectional or bidirectional traffic flow)."; 2181 } 2183 container event-capabilities { 2184 description 2185 "Capabilities of events. 2186 If a network security function has the event capabilities, 2187 the network security function supports rule execution 2188 according to system event and system alarm."; 2190 reference 2191 "RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security 2192 Functions - Section 7. 2193 draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-14: I2NSF 2194 NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model - System Alarm and 2195 System Events."; 2197 leaf-list system-event-capability { 2198 type identityref { 2199 base system-event; 2200 } 2201 description 2202 "System event capabilities"; 2203 } 2205 leaf-list system-alarm-capability { 2206 type identityref { 2207 base system-alarm; 2208 } 2209 description 2210 "System alarm capabilities"; 2211 } 2212 } 2214 container condition-capabilities { 2215 description 2216 "Conditions capabilities."; 2217 container generic-nsf-capabilities { 2218 description 2219 "Conditions capabilities. 2220 If a network security function has the condition 2221 capabilities, the network security function 2222 supports rule execution according to conditions of 2223 IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, ICMP, or ICMPv6."; 2225 reference 2226 "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP. 2227 RFC 791: Internet Protocol - IPv4. 2228 RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP. 2229 RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) 2230 for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification 2231 - ICMPv6. 2232 draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control 2233 Transmission Protocol - SCTP. 2234 RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 2235 Specification - IPv6. 2236 RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security 2237 Functions - I2NSF Flow Security Policy Structure. 2238 draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control 2239 Protocol (TCP) Specification"; 2241 leaf-list ethernet-capability { 2242 type identityref { 2243 base ethernet; 2244 } 2245 description 2246 "Media Access Control (MAC) capabilities"; 2247 reference 2248 "IEEE 802.3: IEEE Standard for Ethernet"; 2249 } 2251 leaf-list ipv4-capability { 2252 type identityref { 2253 base ipv4; 2254 } 2255 description 2256 "IPv4 packet capabilities"; 2257 reference 2258 "RFC 791: Internet Protocol"; 2259 } 2261 leaf-list ipv6-capability { 2262 type identityref { 2263 base ipv6; 2264 } 2265 description 2266 "IPv6 packet capabilities"; 2267 reference 2268 "RFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) 2269 Specification - IPv6"; 2270 } 2272 leaf-list icmpv4-capability { 2273 type identityref { 2274 base icmpv4; 2275 } 2276 description 2277 "ICMPv4 packet capabilities"; 2278 reference 2279 "RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol - ICMP"; 2280 } 2282 leaf-list icmpv6-capability { 2283 type identityref { 2284 base icmpv6; 2285 } 2286 description 2287 "ICMPv6 packet capabilities"; 2288 reference 2289 "RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) 2290 for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification 2291 - ICMPv6"; 2292 } 2294 leaf-list tcp-capability { 2295 type identityref { 2296 base tcp; 2297 } 2298 description 2299 "TCP packet capabilities"; 2300 reference 2301 "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25: Transmission Control 2302 Protocol (TCP) Specification"; 2303 } 2305 leaf-list udp-capability { 2306 type identityref { 2307 base udp; 2308 } 2309 description 2310 "UDP packet capabilities"; 2311 reference 2312 "RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol - UDP"; 2313 } 2315 leaf-list sctp-capability { 2316 type identityref { 2317 base sctp; 2318 } 2319 description 2320 "SCTP packet capabilities"; 2322 reference 2323 "draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-18: Stream Control 2324 Transmission Protocol - SCTP"; 2325 } 2327 leaf-list dccp-capability { 2328 type identityref { 2329 base dccp; 2330 } 2331 description 2332 "DCCP packet capabilities"; 2333 reference 2334 "RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol - DCCP"; 2335 } 2336 } 2338 container advanced-nsf-capabilities { 2339 description 2340 "Advanced Network Security Function (NSF) capabilities, 2341 such as Anti-DDoS, IPS, and VoIP/VoCN. 2342 This container contains the leaf-lists of advanced 2343 NSF capabilities"; 2345 leaf-list anti-ddos-capability { 2346 type identityref { 2347 base anti-ddos; 2348 } 2349 description 2350 "Anti-DDoS Attack capabilities"; 2351 } 2353 leaf-list ips-capability { 2354 type identityref { 2355 base ips; 2356 } 2357 description 2358 "IPS capabilities"; 2359 } 2361 leaf-list anti-virus-capability { 2362 type identityref { 2363 base anti-virus; 2364 } 2365 description 2366 "Antivirus capabilities"; 2367 } 2369 leaf-list url-filtering-capability { 2370 type identityref { 2371 base url-filtering; 2372 } 2373 description 2374 "URL Filtering capabilities"; 2375 } 2377 leaf-list voip-vocn-filtering-capability { 2378 type identityref { 2379 base voip-vocn-filtering; 2380 } 2381 description 2382 "VoIP/VoCN capabilities"; 2383 } 2384 } 2386 container context-capabilities { 2387 description 2388 "Security context capabilities"; 2390 leaf-list time-capabilities { 2391 type identityref { 2392 base time; 2393 } 2394 description 2395 "The capabilities for activating the policy within a 2396 specific time."; 2397 } 2399 leaf-list application-filter-capabilities{ 2400 type identityref { 2401 base application-protocol; 2402 } 2403 description 2404 "Context capabilities based on the application protocol"; 2405 } 2407 leaf-list device-type-capabilities { 2408 type identityref { 2409 base device-type; 2410 } 2411 description 2412 "Context capabilities based on the device attribute that 2413 can identify a device type 2414 (i.e., router, switch, pc, ios, or android)."; 2415 } 2417 leaf-list user-condition-capabilities { 2418 type identityref { 2419 base user-condition; 2420 } 2421 description 2422 "Context capabilities based on user condition, such as 2423 user-id and user-name. The users can be collected into a 2424 user group (i.e., a group of users) and identified with 2425 group-id or group-name. An NSF is aware of the IP 2426 address of the user provided by a unified user 2427 management system via network. Based on name-address 2428 association, an NSF is able to enforce the security 2429 functions over the given user (or user group)"; 2430 } 2432 leaf-list geographic-capabilities { 2433 type identityref { 2434 base geographic-location; 2435 } 2436 description 2437 "Context condition capabilities based on the geographical 2438 location of the source or destination"; 2439 } 2440 } 2441 } 2443 container action-capabilities { 2444 description 2445 "Action capabilities. 2446 If a network security function has the action capabilities, 2447 the network security function supports the attendant 2448 actions for policy rules."; 2450 leaf-list ingress-action-capability { 2451 type identityref { 2452 base ingress-action; 2453 } 2454 description 2455 "Ingress-action capabilities"; 2456 } 2458 leaf-list egress-action-capability { 2459 type identityref { 2460 base egress-action; 2461 } 2462 description 2463 "Egress-action capabilities"; 2464 } 2465 leaf-list log-action-capability { 2466 type identityref { 2467 base log-action; 2468 } 2469 description 2470 "Log-action capabilities"; 2471 } 2472 } 2474 leaf-list resolution-strategy-capabilities { 2475 type identityref { 2476 base resolution-strategy; 2477 } 2478 description 2479 "Resolution strategy capabilities. 2480 The resolution strategies can be used to specify how 2481 to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions 2482 of the similar or different policy rules that are matched 2483 for the same packet and by particular NSF; note that a 2484 badly written policy rule may cause a conflict of actions 2485 with another similar policy rule."; 2486 } 2488 leaf-list default-action-capabilities { 2489 type identityref { 2490 base default-action; 2491 } 2492 description 2493 "Default action capabilities. 2494 A default action is used to execute I2NSF policy rules 2495 when no rule matches a packet. The default action is 2496 defined as pass, drop, reject, rate-limit, or mirror."; 2497 } 2498 } 2500 /* 2501 * Data nodes 2502 */ 2504 list nsf { 2505 key "nsf-name"; 2506 description 2507 "The list of Network Security Functions (NSFs)"; 2508 leaf nsf-name { 2509 type string; 2510 mandatory true; 2511 description 2512 "The name of Network Security Function (NSF)"; 2514 } 2515 uses nsf-capabilities; 2516 } 2517 } 2518 2520 Figure 3: YANG Data Module of I2NSF Capability 2522 7. IANA Considerations 2524 This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the 2525 "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]: 2527 ID: yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability 2528 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability 2529 Registrant Contact: The IESG. 2530 XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace. 2531 Filename: [ TBD-at-Registration ] 2532 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] 2534 This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in 2535 the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]: 2537 Name: ietf-i2nsf-capability 2538 Maintained by IANA? N 2539 Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability 2540 Prefix: nsfcap 2541 Module: 2542 Reference: [ RFC-to-be ] 2544 8. Privacy Considerations 2546 This YANG module specifies the capabilities of NSFs. These 2547 capabilities are consistent with the diverse set of network security 2548 functions in common use in enterprise security operations. The 2549 configuration of the capabilities may entail privacy-sensitive 2550 information as explicitly outlined in Section 9. The NSFs 2551 implementing these capabilities may inspect, alter or drop user 2552 traffic; and be capable of attributing user traffic to individual 2553 users. 2555 Due to the sensitivity of these capabilities, notice must be provided 2556 to and consent must be received from the users of the network. 2557 Additionally, the collected data and associated infrastructure must 2558 be secured to prevent the leakage or unauthorized disclosure of this 2559 private data. 2561 9. Security Considerations 2563 The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema 2564 designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as 2565 NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest layer of NETCONF 2566 protocol layers MUST use Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4254][RFC6242] as a 2567 secure transport layer. The lowest layer of RESTCONF protocol layers 2568 MUST use HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446], that is, 2569 HTTPS as a secure transport layer. 2571 The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] 2572 provides a means of restricting access to specific NETCONF or 2573 RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or 2574 RESTCONF protocol operations and contents. Thus, NACM SHOULD be used 2575 to restrict the NSF registration from unauthorized users. 2577 There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are 2578 writable, creatable, and deletable (i.e., config true, which is the 2579 default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable 2580 in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes 2581 could have a negative effect on network and security operations. 2582 These data nodes are collected into a single list node. This list 2583 node is defined by list nsf with the following sensitivity/ 2584 vulnerability: 2586 * list nsf: An attacker could alter the security capabilities 2587 associated with an NSF in the database maintained by the security 2588 controller. Such changes could result in security functionality 2589 going unused due to the controller not having a record of it, and 2590 could also result in falsely claiming security capabilities that 2591 the controller would then attempt to use but would not actually be 2592 provided. 2594 Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered 2595 sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus 2596 important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or 2597 notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data 2598 nodes with their sensitivity/vulnerability: 2600 * list nsf: The leak of this node to an attacker could reveal the 2601 specific configuration of security controls to an attacker. An 2602 attacker can craft an attack path that avoids observation or 2603 mitigations by getting the information of available security 2604 capabilities in a victim network. 2606 Some of the capability indicators (i.e., identities) defined in this 2607 document are highly sensitive and/or privileged operations that 2608 inherently require access to individuals' private data. These are 2609 subtrees and data nodes that are considered privacy-sensitive: 2611 * url-filtering-capability: URLs themselves often contain sensitive 2612 information [CAPABILITY-URLS], and access to URLs typically comes 2613 hand-in-hand with access to request and response content, which is 2614 also often sensitive. 2616 * voip-vocn-filtering-capability: The NSF that is able to filter 2617 VoIP/VoCN calls might identify certain individual identification. 2619 * user-condition-capabilities: The capability uses a set of IP 2620 addresses mapped to users. 2622 * geographic-capabilities: The IP address used in this capability 2623 can identify a user's geographical location. 2625 It is noted that some private information is made accessible in this 2626 manner. Thus, the nodes/entities given access to this data MUST be 2627 tightly secured, monitored, and audited to prevent leakage or other 2628 unauthorized disclosure of private data. Refer to [RFC6973] for the 2629 description of privacy aspects that protocol designers (including 2630 YANG data model designers) should consider along with regular 2631 security and privacy analysis. 2633 10. References 2635 10.1. Normative References 2637 [RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, 2638 DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980, 2639 . 2641 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 2642 DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981, 2643 . 2645 [RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, 2646 RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981, 2647 . 2649 [RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol 2650 Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, DOI 10.17487/RFC0854, May 2651 1983, . 2653 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 2654 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 2655 . 2657 [RFC1939] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", 2658 STD 53, RFC 1939, DOI 10.17487/RFC1939, May 1996, 2659 . 2661 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 2662 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 2663 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 2664 . 2666 [RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black, 2667 "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS 2668 Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474, 2669 DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998, 2670 . 2672 [RFC2595] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", 2673 RFC 2595, DOI 10.17487/RFC2595, June 1999, 2674 . 2676 [RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition 2677 of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", 2678 RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001, 2679 . 2681 [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, 2682 A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. 2683 Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, 2684 DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, 2685 . 2687 [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, 2688 DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, 2689 . 2691 [RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) 2692 Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, 2693 DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006, 2694 . 2696 [RFC4254] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) 2697 Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, DOI 10.17487/RFC4254, 2698 January 2006, . 2700 [RFC4340] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram 2701 Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340, 2702 DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006, 2703 . 2705 [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet 2706 Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet 2707 Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, 2708 RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006, 2709 . 2711 [RFC4766] Wood, M. and M. Erlinger, "Intrusion Detection Message 2712 Exchange Requirements", RFC 4766, DOI 10.17487/RFC4766, 2713 March 2007, . 2715 [RFC5103] Trammell, B. and E. Boschi, "Bidirectional Flow Export 2716 Using IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)", RFC 5103, 2717 DOI 10.17487/RFC5103, January 2008, 2718 . 2720 [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, 2721 DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008, 2722 . 2724 [RFC5595] Fairhurst, G., "The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol 2725 (DCCP) Service Codes", RFC 5595, DOI 10.17487/RFC5595, 2726 September 2009, . 2728 [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for 2729 the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, 2730 DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, 2731 . 2733 [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., 2734 and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol 2735 (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, 2736 . 2738 [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure 2739 Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011, 2740 . 2742 [RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. 2743 Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) 2744 Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and 2745 Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, 2746 RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011, 2747 . 2749 [RFC6437] Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme, 2750 "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437, 2751 DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011, 2752 . 2754 [RFC6691] Borman, D., "TCP Options and Maximum Segment Size (MSS)", 2755 RFC 6691, DOI 10.17487/RFC6691, July 2012, 2756 . 2758 [RFC6864] Touch, J., "Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field", 2759 RFC 6864, DOI 10.17487/RFC6864, February 2013, 2760 . 2762 [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", 2763 RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, 2764 . 2766 [RFC7323] Borman, D., Braden, B., Jacobson, V., and R. 2767 Scheffenegger, Ed., "TCP Extensions for High Performance", 2768 RFC 7323, DOI 10.17487/RFC7323, September 2014, 2769 . 2771 [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", 2772 RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, 2773 . 2775 [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF 2776 Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, 2777 . 2779 [RFC8075] Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and 2780 E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to 2781 the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075, 2782 DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, February 2017, 2783 . 2785 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2786 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2787 May 2017, . 2789 [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 2790 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, 2791 DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, 2792 . 2794 [RFC8311] Black, D., "Relaxing Restrictions on Explicit Congestion 2795 Notification (ECN) Experimentation", RFC 8311, 2796 DOI 10.17487/RFC8311, January 2018, 2797 . 2799 [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. 2800 Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security 2801 Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018, 2802 . 2804 [RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", 2805 BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, 2806 . 2808 [RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration 2809 Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, 2810 DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, 2811 . 2813 [RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., 2814 and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture 2815 (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018, 2816 . 2818 [RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of 2819 Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, 2820 DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018, 2821 . 2823 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 2824 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 2825 . 2827 [RFC8525] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K., 2828 and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525, 2829 DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019, 2830 . 2832 [RFC9051] Melnikov, A., Ed. and B. Leiba, Ed., "Internet Message 2833 Access Protocol (IMAP) - Version 4rev2", RFC 9051, 2834 DOI 10.17487/RFC9051, August 2021, 2835 . 2837 [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2bis] 2838 Thomson, M. and C. Benfield, "HTTP/2", Work in Progress, 2839 Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-http2bis-07, 24 January 2840 2022, . 2843 [I-D.ietf-httpbis-messaging] 2844 Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, 2845 "HTTP/1.1", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- 2846 httpbis-messaging-19, 12 September 2021, 2847 . 2850 [I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics] 2851 Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP 2852 Semantics", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- 2853 httpbis-semantics-19, 12 September 2021, 2854 . 2857 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm] 2858 Kim, J. (., Jeong, J. (., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin, 2859 "I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG 2860 Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- 2861 i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-22, 21 March 2022, 2862 . 2865 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model] 2866 Jeong, J. (., Lingga, P., Hares, S., Xia, L. (., and H. 2867 Birkholz, "I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data 2868 Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- 2869 i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-15, 15 February 2022, 2870 . 2873 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm] 2874 Hyun, S., Jeong, J. (., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, 2875 "I2NSF Registration Interface YANG Data Model", Work in 2876 Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration- 2877 interface-dm-14, 28 January 2022, 2878 . 2881 [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis] 2882 Eddy, W. M., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 2883 Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- 2884 ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-28, 7 March 2022, 2885 . 2888 [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] 2889 Briscoe, B., Kühlewind, M., and R. Scheffenegger, "More 2890 Accurate ECN Feedback in TCP", Work in Progress, Internet- 2891 Draft, draft-ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn-18, 22 March 2022, 2892 . 2895 [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis] 2896 Stewart, R. R., Tüxen, M., and K. E. E. Nielsen, "Stream 2897 Control Transmission Protocol", Work in Progress, 2898 Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-rfc4960-bis-19, 5 2899 February 2022, . 2902 [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-udp-options] 2903 Touch, J., "Transport Options for UDP", Work in Progress, 2904 Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-16, 19 March 2905 2022, . 2908 10.2. Informative References 2910 [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., 2911 Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy 2912 Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, 2913 DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, 2914 . 2916 [RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R., 2917 and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions 2918 (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, 2919 DOI 10.17487/RFC8192, July 2017, 2920 . 2922 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 2923 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 2924 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 2925 . 2927 [RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based 2928 Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, 2929 DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021, 2930 . 2932 [IANA-Protocol-Numbers] 2933 "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers", Available: 2934 https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol- 2935 numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml, September 2020. 2937 [IEEE802.3-2018] 2938 Committee, I. S., "IEEE 802.3-2018 - IEEE Standard for 2939 Ethernet", August 2018, 2940 . 2942 [Alshaer] Shaer, Al., Hamed, E., and H. Hamed, "Modeling and 2943 management of firewall policies", 2004. 2945 [Hirschman] 2946 Hirschman, L. and R. Gaizauskas, "Natural Language 2947 Question Answering: The View from Here", Natural Language 2948 Engineering 7:4, pgs 275-300, Cambridge University Press , 2949 November 2001. 2951 [Hohpe] Hohpe, G. and B. Woolf, "Enterprise Integration Patterns", 2952 ISBN 0-32-120068-3 , 2003. 2954 [Martin] Martin, R.C., "Agile Software Development, Principles, 2955 Patterns, and Practices", Prentice-Hall , ISBN: 2956 0-13-597444-5 , 2002. 2958 [OODMP] "https://www.oodesign.com/mediator-pattern.html". 2960 [OODOP] "https://www.oodesign.com/observer-pattern.html". 2962 [OODSRP] "https://www.oodesign.com/single-responsibility- 2963 principle.html". 2965 [CAPABILITY-URLS] 2966 Tennison, J., "Good Practices for Capability URLs", 2967 October 2014, 2968 . 2970 Appendix A. Configuration Examples 2972 This section shows configuration examples of "ietf-i2nsf-capability" 2973 module for capabilities registration of general firewall. 2975 A.1. Example 1: Registration for the Capabilities of a General Firewall 2977 This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities 2978 registration of a general firewall in either an IPv4 network or an 2979 IPv6 network. 2981 2982 general_firewall 2983 2984 2985 next-header 2986 flow-direction 2987 source-address 2988 destination-address 2989 source-port-number 2990 destination-port-number 2991 source-port-number 2992 destination-port-number 2993 2994 2995 2996 pass 2997 drop 2998 mirror 2999 pass 3000 drop 3001 mirror 3002 3003 3005 Figure 4: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of 3006 a General Firewall in an IPv4 Network 3008 Figure 4 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities 3009 registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network. Its 3010 capabilities are as follows. 3012 1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall. 3014 2. The NSF can inspect the IPv4 protocol header field, flow 3015 direction, source address(es), and destination address(es) 3017 3. The NSF can inspect the port number(s) and flow direction for the 3018 transport layer protocol, i.e., TCP and UDP. 3020 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, 3021 drop, or mirror. 3023 3024 general_firewall 3025 3026 3027 next-header 3028 flow-direction 3029 source-address 3030 destination-address 3031 source-port-number 3032 destination-port-number 3033 source-port-number 3034 destination-port-number 3035 3036 3037 3038 pass 3039 drop 3040 mirror 3041 pass 3042 drop 3043 mirror 3044 3045 3047 Figure 5: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of 3048 a General Firewall in an IPv6 Network 3050 In addition, Figure 5 shows the configuration XML for the 3051 capabilities registration of a general firewall as an NSF in an IPv6 3052 network. Its capabilities are as follows. 3054 1. The name of the NSF is general_firewall. 3056 2. The NSF can inspect IPv6 next header, flow direction, source 3057 address(es), and destination address(es) 3059 3. The NSF can inspect the port number(s) and flow direction for the 3060 transport layer protocol, i.e., TCP and UDP. 3062 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, 3063 drop, or mirror. 3065 A.2. Example 2: Registration for the Capabilities of a Time-based 3066 Firewall 3068 This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities 3069 registration of a time-based firewall in either an IPv4 network or an 3070 IPv6 network. 3072 3073 time_based_firewall 3074 3075 3076 next-header 3077 flow-direction 3078 source-address 3079 destination-address 3080 3081 absolute-time 3082 periodic-time 3083 3084 3085 3086 3087 pass 3088 drop 3089 mirror 3090 pass 3091 drop 3092 mirror 3093 3094 3096 Figure 6: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of 3097 a Time-based Firewall in an IPv4 Network 3099 Figure 6 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities 3100 registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an IPv4 network. 3101 Its capabilities are as follows. 3103 1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall. 3105 2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to 3106 absolute time and periodic time. 3108 3. The NSF can inspect the IPv4 protocol header field, flow 3109 direction, source address(es), and destination address(es). 3111 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, 3112 drop, or mirror. 3114 3115 time_based_firewall 3116 3117 3118 next-header 3119 flow-direction 3120 source-address 3121 destination-address 3122 3123 absolute-time 3124 periodic-time 3125 3126 3127 3128 3129 pass 3130 drop 3131 mirror 3132 pass 3133 drop 3134 mirror 3135 3136 3138 Figure 7: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of 3139 a Time-based Firewall in an IPv6 Network 3141 In addition, Figure 7 shows the configuration XML for the 3142 capabilities registration of a time-based firewall as an NSF in an 3143 IPv6 network. Its capabilities are as follows. 3145 1. The name of the NSF is time_based_firewall. 3147 2. The NSF can execute the security policy rule according to 3148 absolute time and periodic time. 3150 3. The NSF can inspect the IPv6 protocol header field, flow 3151 direction, source address(es), and destination address(es). 3153 4. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, 3154 drop, or mirror. 3156 A.3. Example 3: Registration for the Capabilities of a Web Filter 3158 This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities 3159 registration of a web filter. 3161 3162 web_filter 3163 3164 3165 user-defined 3166 3167 3168 3169 pass 3170 drop 3171 mirror 3172 pass 3173 drop 3174 mirror 3175 3176 3178 Figure 8: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of 3179 a Web Filter 3181 Figure 8 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities 3182 registration of a web filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are as 3183 follows. 3185 1. The name of the NSF is web_filter. 3187 2. The NSF can inspect a URL matched from a user-defined URL. User 3188 can specify their own URL. 3190 3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, 3191 drop, or mirror. 3193 4. Overall, the NSF can compare the URL of a packet to a user- 3194 defined database. The matched packet can be passed, dropped, or 3195 mirrored. 3197 A.4. Example 4: Registration for the Capabilities of a VoIP/VoCN Filter 3199 This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities 3200 registration of a VoIP/VoCN filter. 3202 3203 voip_vocn_filter 3204 3205 3206 3207 call-id 3208 3209 3210 3211 3212 pass 3213 drop 3214 mirror 3215 pass 3216 drop 3217 mirror 3218 3219 3221 Figure 9: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of 3222 a VoIP/VoCN Filter 3224 Figure 9 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities 3225 registration of a VoIP/VoCN filter as an NSF. Its capabilities are 3226 as follows. 3228 1. The name of the NSF is voip_vocn_filter. 3230 2. The NSF can inspect a voice call id for VoIP/VoCN packets. 3232 3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, 3233 drop, or mirror. 3235 A.5. Example 5: Registration for the Capabilities of an HTTP and HTTPS 3236 Flood Mitigator 3238 This section shows a configuration example for the capabilities 3239 registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator. 3241 3242 DDoS_mitigator 3243 3244 3245 packet-rate 3246 byte-rate 3247 flow-rate 3248 3249 3250 3251 pass 3252 drop 3253 mirror 3254 pass 3255 drop 3256 mirror 3257 3258 3260 Figure 10: Configuration XML for the Capabilities Registration of 3261 a HTTP and HTTPS Flood Mitigator 3263 Figure 10 shows the configuration XML for the capabilities 3264 registration of a HTTP and HTTPS flood mitigator as an NSF. Its 3265 capabilities are as follows. 3267 1. The name of the NSF is DDoS_mitigator. 3269 2. The NSF can detect the amount of packet, flow, and byte rate in 3270 the network for potential DDoS Attack. 3272 3. The NSF can control whether the packets are allowed to pass, 3273 drop, or mirror. 3275 Appendix B. Acknowledgments 3277 This document is a product by the I2NSF Working Group (WG) including 3278 WG Chairs (i.e., Linda Dunbar and Yoav Nir) and Diego Lopez. This 3279 document took advantage of the review and comments from the following 3280 experts: Roman Danyliw, Acee Lindem, Paul Wouters (SecDir), Michael 3281 Scharf (TSVART), Dan Romascanu (GenART), and Tom Petch. The authors 3282 sincerely appreciate their sincere efforts and kind help. 3284 This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications 3285 Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea 3286 MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based 3287 Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized 3288 Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by 3289 the IITP grant funded by the MSIT (2020-0-00395, Standard Development 3290 of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology). 3292 Appendix C. Contributors 3294 The following are co-authors of this document: 3296 Patrick Lingga - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 3297 Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 3298 16419, Republic of Korea, EMail: patricklink@skku.edu 3300 Liang Xia - Huawei, 101 Software Avenue, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012, 3301 China, EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com 3303 Cataldo Basile - Politecnico di Torino, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi, 34, 3304 Torino, 10129, Italy, EMail: cataldo.basile@polito.it 3306 John Strassner - Huawei, 2330 Central Expressway, Santa Clara, CA 3307 95050, USA, EMail: John.sc.Strassner@huawei.com 3309 Diego R. Lopez - Telefonica I+D, Zurbaran, 12, Madrid, 28010, Spain, 3310 Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com 3312 Hyoungshick Kim - Department of Computer Science and Engineering, 3313 Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 3314 16419, Republic of Korea, EMail: hyoung@skku.edu 3316 Daeyoung Hyun - Department of Computer Science and Engineering, 3317 Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 3318 16419, Republic of Korea, EMail: dyhyun@skku.edu 3320 Dongjin Hong - Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer 3321 Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seobu-ro Jangan-gu, Suwon, 3322 Gyeonggi-do 16419, Republic of Korea, EMail: dong.jin@skku.edu 3324 Jung-Soo Park - Electronics and Telecommunications Research 3325 Institute, 218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu, Daejeon, 34129, Republic of 3326 Korea, EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr 3328 Tae-Jin Ahn - Korea Telecom, 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu, Daejeon, 3329 305-811, Republic of Korea, EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com 3330 Se-Hui Lee - Korea Telecom, 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu, Daejeon, 3331 305-811, Republic of Korea, EMail: sehuilee@kt.com 3333 Appendix D. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-26 3335 The following changes are made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data- 3336 model-26: 3338 * This version has been updated to synchronize its contents with the 3339 contents in the NSF-Facing Interface due to Jean-Michel Combes' 3340 comment about the placement of time as an event. 3342 * This version also add notes about the exclusion of QUIC and HTTP/3 3343 protocols as a comment from Zaheduzzaman Sarker. 3345 Authors' Addresses 3347 Susan Hares (editor) 3348 Huawei 3349 7453 Hickory Hill 3350 Saline, MI 48176 3351 United States of America 3352 Phone: +1-734-604-0332 3353 Email: shares@ndzh.com 3355 Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong (editor) 3356 Department of Computer Science and Engineering 3357 Sungkyunkwan University 3358 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu 3359 Suwon 3360 Gyeonggi-Do 3361 16419 3362 Republic of Korea 3363 Phone: +82 31 299 4957 3364 Email: pauljeong@skku.edu 3365 URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php 3367 Jinyong (Tim) Kim 3368 Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering 3369 Sungkyunkwan University 3370 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu 3371 Suwon 3372 Gyeonggi-Do 3373 16419 3374 Republic of Korea 3375 Phone: +82 10 8273 0930 3376 Email: timkim@skku.edu 3378 Robert Moskowitz 3379 HTT Consulting 3380 Oak Park, MI 3381 United States of America 3382 Phone: +1-248-968-9809 3383 Email: rgm@htt-consult.com 3385 Qiushi Lin 3386 Huawei 3387 Huawei Industrial Base 3388 Shenzhen 3389 Guangdong 518129, 3390 China 3391 Email: linqiushi@huawei.com