idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-12.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (April 10, 2017) is 2574 days in the past. Is this intentional? -- Found something which looks like a code comment -- if you have code sections in the document, please surround them with '' and '' lines. Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Unused Reference: 'I-D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases' is defined on line 1186, but no explicit reference was found in the text Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 I2NSF S. Hares 3 Internet-Draft Huawei 4 Intended status: Standards Track D. Lopez 5 Expires: October 12, 2017 Telefonica I+D 6 M. Zarny 7 vArmour 8 C. Jacquenet 9 France Telecom 10 R. Kumar 11 Juniper Networks 12 J. Jeong 13 Sungkyunkwan University 14 April 10, 2017 16 I2NSF Problem Statement and Use cases 17 draft-ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-12 19 Abstract 21 This document is the problem statement for Interface to Network 22 Security Functions (I2NSF) as well as some companion use cases. 24 Status of This Memo 26 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 27 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 29 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 30 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 31 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 32 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 34 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 35 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 36 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 37 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 39 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2017. 41 Copyright Notice 43 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 44 document authors. All rights reserved. 46 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 47 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 48 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 49 publication of this document. Please review these documents 50 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 51 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 52 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 53 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 54 described in the Simplified BSD License. 56 Table of Contents 58 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 3. Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 3.1. Challenges Facing Security Service Providers . . . . . . 5 62 3.1.1. Diverse Types of Security Functions . . . . . . . . . 5 63 3.1.2. Diverse Interfaces to Control and Monitor NSFs . . . 6 64 3.1.3. More Distributed NSFs and vNSFs . . . . . . . . . . . 7 65 3.1.4. More Demand to Control NSFs Dynamically . . . . . . . 7 66 3.1.5. Demand for Multi-Tenancy to Control and Monitor NSFs 8 67 3.1.6. Lack of Characterization of NSFs and Capability 68 Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 3.1.7. Lack of Mechanism for NSFs to Utilize External 70 Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 3.1.8. Lack of Mechanisms to Accept External Alerts to 72 Trigger Automatic Rule and Configuration Changes . . 9 73 3.1.9. Lack of Mechanism for Dynamic Key Distribution to 74 NSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 75 3.2. Challenges Facing Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 76 3.2.1. NSFs from Heterogeneous Administrative Domains . . . 11 77 3.2.2. Today's Control Requests are Vendor Specific . . . . 11 78 3.2.3. Difficult for Customer to Monitor the Execution of 79 Desired Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 80 3.3. Lack of Standard Interface to Inject Feedback to NSF . . 13 81 3.4. Lack of Standard Interface for Capability Negotiation . . 14 82 3.5. Difficulty to Validate Policies across Multiple Domains . 14 83 3.6. Software-Defined Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 84 4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 85 4.1. Basic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 86 4.2. Access Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 87 4.3. Cloud Data Center Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 88 4.3.1. On-Demand Virtual Firewall Deployment . . . . . . . . 20 89 4.3.2. Firewall Policy Deployment Automation . . . . . . . . 21 90 4.3.3. Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs . . . . 21 91 4.3.4. Internal Network Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 92 4.4. Preventing Distributed DoS, Malware and Botnet attacks . 22 93 4.5. Regulatory and Compliance Security Policies . . . . . . . 22 94 5. Management Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 95 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 96 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 97 8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 98 9. Contributing Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 99 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 100 11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 101 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 103 1. Introduction 105 This document is the problem statement for Interface to Network 106 Security Functions (I2NSF) as well as some I2NSF use cases. A 107 summary of the state of the art in the industry and IETF which is 108 relevant to I2NSF work is documented in 109 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis]. 111 The growing challenges and complexity in maintaining a secure 112 infrastructure, complying with regulatory requirements, and 113 controlling costs are enticing enterprises into consuming network 114 security functions hosted by service providers. The hosted security 115 service is especially attractive to small and medium size enterprises 116 who suffer from a lack of security experts to continuously monitor 117 networks, acquire new skills and propose immediate mitigations to 118 ever increasing sets of security attacks. 120 According to [Gartner-2013], the demand for hosted (or cloud-based) 121 security services is growing. Small and medium-sized businesses 122 (SMBs) are increasingly adopting cloud-based security services to 123 replace on-premises security tools, while larger enterprises are 124 deploying a mix of traditional and cloud-based security services. 126 To meet the demand, more and more service providers are providing 127 hosted security solutions to deliver cost-effective managed security 128 services to enterprise customers. The hosted security services are 129 primarily targeted at enterprises (especially small/medium ones), but 130 could also be provided to any kind of mass-market customer. As a 131 result, the Network Security Functions (NSFs) are provided and 132 consumed in a large variety of environments. Users of NSFs may 133 consume network security services hosted by one or more providers, 134 which may be their own enterprise, service providers, or a 135 combination of both. 137 This document also briefly describes the following use cases 138 summarized by [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-merged-use-cases]: 140 o [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-usecases] (I2NSF-Access), 142 o [I-D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases](I2NSF-DC), and 144 o [I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-usecase] (I2NSF-Mobile). 146 2. Terminology 148 AAA: Authentication, Authorization, and Account [RFC2904]. 150 ACL: Access Control List 152 B2B: Business-to-Business 154 Bespoke: Something made to fit a particular person, client or 155 company. 157 Bespoke security management: Security management which is made to 158 fit a particular customer. 160 DC: Data Center 162 FW: Firewall 164 IDS: Intrusion Detection System 166 IPS: Intrusion Protection System 168 I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions 170 NSF: Network Security Function. An NSF is a function that used to 171 ensure integrity, confidentiality, or availability of network 172 communication, to detect unwanted network activity, or to block or 173 at least mitigate the effects of unwanted activity. 175 Flow-based NSF: An NSF which inspects network flows according to a 176 security policy. Flow-based security also means that packets are 177 inspected in the order they are received, and without altering 178 packets due to the inspection process (e.g., MAC rewrites, TTL 179 decrement action, or NAT inspection or changes). 181 Security Service Provider: A provider of security services to the 182 customers (end-users or enterprises) using NSF equipment purchased 183 from vendors or created by the service provider. 185 SDN: Software Defined Networking. (See [RFC7426]) for 186 architectural and terminology or [RFC7149] for service provider 187 view). 189 Virtual NSF: An NSF which is deployed as a distributed virtual 190 resource. 192 VPN: Virtual Private Networks 194 3. Problem Space 196 The following sub-sections describe the problems and challenges 197 facing customers and security service providers when some or all of 198 the security functions are no longer physically hosted by the 199 customer's administrative domain. 201 Security service providers can be internal or external to the 202 company. For example, an internal IT Security group within a large 203 enterprise could act as a security service provider for the 204 enterprise. In contrast, an enterprise could outsource all security 205 services to an external security service provider. In this document, 206 the security service provider function, whether it is internal or 207 external, will be denoted as "service provider". 209 The "Customer-Provider" relationship may be between any two parties. 210 The parties can be in different firms or different domains of the 211 same firm. Contractual agreements may be required in such contexts 212 to formally document the customer's security requirements and the 213 provider's guarantees to fulfill those requirements. Such agreements 214 may detail protection levels, escalation procedures, alarms 215 reporting, etc. There is currently no standard mechanism to capture 216 those requirements. 218 A service provider may be a customer of another service provider. 220 It is the objective of the I2NSF work to address these problems and 221 challenges. 223 3.1. Challenges Facing Security Service Providers 225 3.1.1. Diverse Types of Security Functions 227 There are many types of NSFs. NSFs by different vendors can have 228 different features and have different interfaces. NSFs can be 229 deployed in multiple locations in a given network, and perhaps have 230 different roles. 232 Below are a few examples of security functions and locations or 233 contexts in which they are often deployed: 235 External Intrusion and Attack Protection: Examples of this function 236 are firewall/ACL authentication, IPS, IDS, and endpoint 237 protection. 239 Security Functions in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ): Examples of this 240 function are firewall/ACLs, IDS/IPS, one or all of AAA services, 241 NAT, forwarding proxies, and application filtering. These 242 functions may be physically on-premise in a server provider's 243 network at the DMZ spots or located in a "virtual" DMZ. 245 Centralized or Distributed security functions: The security 246 functions could be deployed in a centralized fashion for ease of 247 management and network design or in a distributed fashion for 248 scaled requirement. No matter how a security function is deployed 249 and provisioned, it is desirable to have same interface to 250 provision security policies; otherwise it makes the job of 251 security administration more complex, requiring knowledge of 252 firewall and network design. 254 Internal Security Analysis and Reporting: Examples of this function 255 are security logs, event correlation, and forensic analysis. 257 Internal Data and Content Protection: Examples of this function are 258 encryption, authorization, and public/private key management for 259 internal database. 261 Security gateways and VPN concentrators: Examples of these 262 functions are; IPsec gateways, Secure VPN concentrators that 263 handle bridging secure VPNs, and secure VPN controllers for data 264 flows. 266 Given the diversity of security functions, the contexts in which 267 these functions can be deployed, and the constant evolution of these 268 functions, standardizing all aspects of security functions is 269 challenging, and most probably not feasible. Fortunately, it is not 270 necessary to standardize all aspects. For example, from an I2NSF 271 perspective, there is no need to standardize how every firewall's 272 filtering is created or applied. Some features in a specific 273 vendor's filtering may be unique to the vendor's product so it is not 274 necessary to standardize these features. 276 What is needed is a standardized interface to control and monitor the 277 rule sets that NSFs use to treat packets traversing through these 278 NSFs. Thus standardizing interfaces will provide an impetus for 279 standardizing established security functions. 281 I2NSF may specify some filters, but these filters will be linked to 282 specific common functionality developed by I2NSF in information 283 models or data models. 285 3.1.2. Diverse Interfaces to Control and Monitor NSFs 287 To provide effective and competitive solutions and services, Security 288 Service Providers may need to utilize multiple security functions 289 from various vendors to enforce the security policies desired by 290 their customers. 292 Since no widely accepted industry standard security interface to 293 security NSFs exists today, management of NSFs (device and policy 294 provisioning, monitoring, etc.) tends to be bespoke security 295 management offered by product vendors. As a result, automation of 296 such services, if it exists at all, is also bespoke. Thus, even in 297 the traditional way of deploying security features, there is a gap to 298 coordinate among implementations from distinct vendors. This is the 299 main reason why mono-vendor security functions are often deployed and 300 enabled in a particular network segment. 302 A challenge for monitoring prior to mitigation of a security 303 intrusion is that an NSF cannot monitor what it cannot view. 304 Therefore, enabling a security function to mitigate an intrusion 305 (e.g., firewall [I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls]) does not mean that a 306 network is protected if there is no monitoring feedback. As such, it 307 is necessary to have a mechanism to monitor and provide execution 308 status of NSFs to security and compliance management tools. There 309 exist various network security monitoring vendor-specific interfaces 310 for forensics and troubleshooting, but an industry standard interface 311 could provide monitoring across a variety of NSFs. 313 3.1.3. More Distributed NSFs and vNSFs 315 The security functions which are invoked to enforce a security policy 316 can be located in different equipment and network locations. 318 The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Network 319 Functions Virtualization (NFV) initiative [ETSI-NFV] creates new 320 management challenges for security policies to be enforced by 321 distributed virtual network security functions (vNSF). 323 A vNSF has higher risk of changes to the state of network connection, 324 interfaces, or traffic as their hosting Virtual Machines (VMs) are 325 being created, moved, or decommissioned. 327 3.1.4. More Demand to Control NSFs Dynamically 329 In the advent of Software-Defined Networking (SDN)(see 330 [I-D.jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services]), more clients, applications 331 or application controllers need to dynamically update their security 332 policies that are enforced by NSFs. The Security Service Providers 333 have to dynamically update their decision-making process (e.g., in 334 terms of NSF resource allocation and invocation) upon receiving 335 security-related requests from their clients. 337 3.1.5. Demand for Multi-Tenancy to Control and Monitor NSFs 339 Service providers may need to deploy several NSF controllers to 340 control and monitor the NSFs, especially when NSFs become distributed 341 and virtualized. 343 3.1.6. Lack of Characterization of NSFs and Capability Exchange 345 To offer effective security services, service providers need to 346 activate various security functions in NSFs or vNSFs manufactured by 347 multiple vendors. Even within one product category (e.g., firewall), 348 security functions provided by different vendors can have different 349 features and capabilities. For example, filters that can be designed 350 and activated by a firewall may or may not support IPv6 depending on 351 the firewall technology. 353 The service provider's management system (or controller) needs a way 354 to retrieve the capabilities of service functions by different 355 vendors so that it could build an effective security solution. These 356 service function capabilities can be documented in a static manner 357 (e.g., a file) or via an interface which accesses a repository of 358 security function capabilities which the NSF vendors dynamically 359 update. 361 A dynamic capability registration is useful for automation because 362 security functions may be subject to software and hardware updates. 363 These updates may have implications on the policies enforced by the 364 NSFs. 366 Today, there is no standard method for vendors to describe the 367 capabilities of their security functions. Without a common technical 368 framework to describe the capabilities of security functions, service 369 providers cannot automate the process of selecting NSFs by different 370 vendors to accommodate customer's security requirements. 372 The I2NSF work will focus on developing a standard method to describe 373 capabilities of security functions. 375 3.1.7. Lack of Mechanism for NSFs to Utilize External Profiles 377 Many security functions depend on signature files or profiles (e.g., 378 IPS/IDS signatures, DDos Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) filters). 379 Different policies might need different signatures or profiles. 380 Today, black list databases can be a beneficial strategy for all 381 parties involved, but in the future there might be open Source- 382 provided signature/profiles distributed as part of IDS systems (e.g., 383 by Snort, Suricata, Bro and Kismet). 385 There is a need to have a standard envelope (i.e., a message format) 386 to allow NSFs to use external profiles. 388 3.1.8. Lack of Mechanisms to Accept External Alerts to Trigger 389 Automatic Rule and Configuration Changes 391 NSF can ask the I2NSF security controller to alter specific rules 392 and/or configurations. For example, a Distributed Denial of Service 393 (DDoS) alert could trigger a change to the routing system to send 394 traffic to a traffic scrubbing service to mitigate the DDoS. 396 The DDoS protection has the following two parts: a) the configuration 397 of signaling of open threats and b) DDoS mitigation. DOTS controller 398 manages the signaling part of DDoS. I2NSF controller(s) would 399 control any changes to affected policies (e.g., forwarding and 400 routing, filtering, etc.). By monitoring the network alerts 401 regarding DDoS attacks (e.g. from DOTS servers or clients), the I2NSF 402 controller(s) can feed an alerts analytics engine that could 403 recognize attacks so the I2NSF can enforce the appropriate policies. 405 DDoS mitigation is enhanced if the provider's network security 406 controller can monitor, analyze, and investigate the abnormal events 407 and provide information to the customer or change the network 408 configuration automatically. 410 [I-D.zhou-i2nsf-capability-interface-monitoring] provides details on 411 how monitoring aspects of the flow-based Network Security Functions 412 (NSFs) can use the I2NSF interfaces to receive traffic reports and 413 enforce appropriate policies. 415 3.1.9. Lack of Mechanism for Dynamic Key Distribution to NSFs 417 There is a need for a controller to create, manage, and distribute 418 various keys to distributed NSFs. While there are many key 419 management methods and cryptographic suites (e.g., encryption 420 algorithms, key derivation functions, etc.) and other functions, 421 there is a lack of a standard interface to provision and manage 422 security associations. 424 The keys may be used for message authentication and integrity in 425 order to protect data flows. In addition, keys may be used to secure 426 the protocols and messages in the core routing infrastructure (see 427 [RFC4948]) 429 As of now there is not much focus on an abstraction for keying 430 information that describes the interface between protocols, 431 operators, and automated key management. 433 An example of a solution may provide some insight into why the lack 434 of a mechanism is a problem. If a device had an abstract key table 435 maintained by security services, it could use these keys for routing 436 and security devices. 438 What does this take? 440 Conceptually, there must be an interface defined for routing/ 441 signaling protocols that can: a) make requests for automated key 442 management when it is being used. and b) notify the protocols when 443 keys become available in the key table. One potential use of such an 444 interface is to manage IPsec security associations on SDN networks. 446 An abstract key service will work under the following conditions: 448 1. I2NSF needs to design the key table abstraction, the interface 449 between key management protocols and routing/other protocols, and 450 possibly security protocols at other layers. 452 2. For each routing/other protocol, I2NSF needs to define the 453 mapping between how the protocol represents key material and the 454 protocol-independent key table abstraction. If several protocols 455 share common mechanisms for authentication (e.g., TCP 456 Authentication Option [RFC5925]), then the same mapping may be 457 used for all usages of that mechanism. 459 3. Automated key management needs to support both symmetric keys and 460 group keys via the abstract key service provided by items 1 and 461 2. I2NSF controllers within the NSF required to exchange data 462 with NSFs may exchange data with individual NSFs using individual 463 symmetric keys or with a group of NSFs simultaneously using an IP 464 group address secured by a group security key(s). 466 3.2. Challenges Facing Customers 468 When customers invoke hosted security services, their security 469 policies may be enforced by a collection of security functions hosted 470 in different domains. Customers may not have the security skills to 471 express sufficiently precise requirements or security policies. 472 Usually, these customers express the expectations of their security 473 requirements or the intent of their security policies. These 474 expectations can be considered customer-level security expectations. 475 Customers may also desire to express guidelines for security 476 management. Examples of such guidelines include: 478 o Which critical communications are to be preserved during critical 479 events and which hosts will continue services over the network, 481 o What signaling information is passed to a controller during a 482 Distributed Denial of Service in order to ask for mitigation 483 services (within the scope DOTS working group), 485 o Reporting of attacks to CERT (within the scope of MILE working 486 group), and 488 o Managing network connectivity of systems out of compliance (within 489 the scope of SACM working group). 491 3.2.1. NSFs from Heterogeneous Administrative Domains 493 Many medium and large enterprises have deployed various on-premises 494 security functions which they want to continue to deploy. These 495 enterprises want to combine local security functions with remote 496 hosted security functions to achieve more efficient and immediate 497 counter-measures to both Internet-originated attacks and enterprise 498 network-originated attacks. 500 Some enterprises may only need the hosted security services for their 501 remote branch offices where minimal security infrastructures/ 502 capabilities exist. The security solution will consist of deploying 503 NSFs on customer networks and on service provider networks. 505 3.2.2. Today's Control Requests are Vendor Specific 507 Customers may utilize NSFs provided by multiple service providers. 508 Customers need to express their security requirements, guidelines, 509 and expectations to the service providers. In turn, the service 510 providers must translate this customer information into customer 511 security policies and associated configuration tasks for the set of 512 security functions in their network. Without a standardized 513 interface that provides a clear technical characterization, the 514 service provider faces many challenges: 516 No standard technical characterization, APIs, or Interface: Even 517 for the most common security services there is no standard 518 technical characterization, APIs, or interface(s). Most security 519 services are accessible only through disparate, proprietary 520 interfaces (e.g., portals or APIs) in whatever format vendors 521 choose to offer. The service provider must process the customer's 522 input with these widely varying interfaces and differing 523 configuration models for security devices and security policy. 524 Without a standard interface, new innovative security products 525 find a large barrier to entry into the market. 527 Lack of immediate feedback: Customers may also require a mechanism 528 to easily update/modify their security requirements with immediate 529 effect in the underlying involved NSFs. 531 Lack of explicit invocation request: While security agreements are 532 in place, security functions may be solicited without requiring an 533 explicit invocation means. Nevertheless, some explicit invocation 534 means may be required to interact with a service function. 536 Managing by scripts de-jour: The current practices rely upon the 537 use of scripts that generate other scripts which automatically run 538 to upload or download configuration changes, log information and 539 other things. These scripts have to be adjusted each time an 540 implementation from a different vendor technology is enabled by a 541 provider side. 543 To see how standard interfaces could help achieve faster 544 implementation time cycles, let us consider a customer who would like 545 to dynamically allow an encrypted flow with specific port, src/dst 546 addresses or protocol type through the firewall/IPS to enable an 547 encrypted video conferencing call only during the time of the call. 548 With no commonly accepted interface in place, as shown in figure 1, 549 the customer would have to learn about the particular provider's 550 firewall/IPS interface and send the request in the provider's 551 required format. 553 +------------+ 554 | security | 555 | management | 556 | system | 557 +----||------+ 558 || proprietary 559 || or I2NSF standard 560 Video: || 561 Port 10 +--------+ 562 --------| FW/IPS |------------- 563 Encrypted +--------+ 564 Video Flow 566 Figure 1: Example of non-standard vs. standard interface 568 In contrast, as figure 1 shows, if a firewall/IPS interface standard 569 exists the customer would be able to send the request to a security 570 management system and the security management would send it via a 571 I2NSF standard interface. Service providers could now utilize the 572 same standard interface interface to represent firewall/IPS services 573 implemented using products from many vendors. 575 3.2.3. Difficult for Customer to Monitor the Execution of Desired 576 Policies 578 How a policy is translated into technology-specific actions is hidden 579 from the customers. However, customers still need ways to monitor 580 the delivered security service that results from the execution of 581 their desired security requirements, guidelines and expectations. 582 Customers want to monitor existing policies to determine such things 583 as: which policies are in effect, how many security attacks are being 584 prevented, and how much bandwidth efficiency does security 585 enforcement cost. 587 Today, there is no standard way for customers to get these details 588 from the security service which assure the customer that their 589 specified security policies properly enforced by the security 590 functions in the provider domain. 592 Customers also want this monitoring information from the security 593 system in order to plan for the future using "what-if" scenarios with 594 real data. A tight loop between the data gathered from security 595 systems and the "what-if" scenario planning can reduce the time to 596 design and deploy workable security policies that deal with new 597 threats. 599 It is the objective of the I2NSF work to provide a standard way to 600 get the information that security service assurance systems need to 601 provide customers an evaluation about the current security systems, 602 and to quickly plan for future security policies using "what-if" 603 scenarios based on today's information 605 3.3. Lack of Standard Interface to Inject Feedback to NSF 607 Today, many security functions in the NSF, such as IPS, IDS, DDoS 608 mitigation and antivirus, depend heavily on the associated profiles. 609 NSF devices can perform more effective protection if these NSF 610 devices have the up-to-date profiles for these functions. Today 611 there is no standard interface to provide these security profiles for 612 the NSF. 614 As more sophisticated threats arise, protection will depend on 615 enterprises, vendors, and service providers being able to cooperate 616 to develop optimal profiles such as the [CTA]. The standard 617 interface to provide security profiles to the NSF should interwork 618 with the formats which exchange security profiles between 619 organizations. 621 One objective of the I2NSF work is to provide this type of standard 622 interface to security profiles. 624 3.4. Lack of Standard Interface for Capability Negotiation 626 There could be situations when the selected NSFs cannot perform the 627 policies requested by the Security Controller, due to resource 628 constraints. The customer and security service provider should 629 negotiate the appropriate resource constraints before the security 630 service begins. However, unexpected events may happen causing the 631 NSF to exhaust those negotiated resources. At this point, the NSF 632 should inform the security controller that the alloted resources have 633 been exhausted. To support the automatic control in the SDN-era, it 634 is necessary to have a set of messages for proper notification (and a 635 response to that notification) between the Security Controller and 636 the NSFs. 638 3.5. Difficulty to Validate Policies across Multiple Domains 640 As discussed in the previous four sections, both service providers 641 and customers have need to express policies and profiles, monitor 642 systems, verify security policy has been installed in NSFs within a 643 security domain, and establish limits for services NSFs can safely 644 perform. This sub-section and the next sub-section (section 3.6) 645 examine what happens in two specific network scenarios: a) multi- 646 domain control of security devices hosted on virtual and non-virtual 647 NSFs, and b) software defined networking. 649 Hosted security service may instantiate NSFs in virtual machines 650 which are sometimes widely distributed in the network and sometimes 651 are combined together in one device to perform a set of tasks for 652 delivering a service. Hosted security services may be connected 653 within a single service provider or via multiple services provider. 654 Ensuring that the security service purchased by the customer adheres 655 to customer policy requires that the central controller(s) for this 656 service monitor and validate this service across multiple networks on 657 NSFs (some of which may be virtual networks on virtual machines). To 658 set up this cross-domain service, the security controller must be 659 able to communicate with NSFs and/or controllers within its domain 660 and across domains to negotiate for the services needed. 662 Without standard interfaces and security policy data models, the 663 enforcement of a customer-driven security policy remains challenging 664 because of the inherent complexity created by combining the 665 invocation of several vendor-specific security functions into a 666 multi-vendor, heterogeneous environment across multiple domains. 667 Each vendor-specific function may require specific configuration 668 procedures and operational tasks. 670 Ensuring the consistent enforcement of the policies at various 671 domains is also challenging. Standard data models are likely to 672 contribute to solving that issue. 674 3.6. Software-Defined Networks 676 Software-Defined Networks have changed the landscape of data center 677 designs by introducing overlay networks deployed over Top of Rack 678 (ToR) switches that connect to a hypervisor. SDN techniques are 679 meant to improve the flexibility of workload management without 680 affecting applications and how they work. Workload can thus be 681 easily and seamlessly managed across private and public clouds. SDN 682 techniques optimize resource usage and are now being deployed in 683 various networking environments, besides cloud infrastructures. Yet, 684 such SDN-inferred agility may raise specific security issues. For 685 example a security administrator must make sure that a security 686 policy can be enforced regardless of the location of the workload, 687 thereby raising concerns about the ability of SDN computation logic 688 to send security policy-provisioning information to the participating 689 NSFs. A second example is workload migration to a public cloud 690 infrastructure which may raise additional security requirements 691 during the migration. 693 4. Use Cases 695 Standard interfaces for monitoring and controlling the behavior of 696 NSFs are essential building blocks for Security Service Providers and 697 enterprises to automate the use of different NSFs from multiple 698 vendors by their security management entities. I2NSF may be invoked 699 by any (authorized) client. Examples of authorized clients are 700 upstream applications (controllers), orchestration systems, and 701 security portals. 703 4.1. Basic Framework 705 Users request security services through specific clients (e.g., a 706 customer application, the Network Service Providers (NSP) Business 707 Support Systems/Operations Support Systems (BSS/OSS) or management 708 platform) and the appropriate NSP network entity will invoke the 709 (v)NSFs according to the user service request. This network entity 710 is denoted as the security controller in this document. The 711 interaction between the entities discussed above (client, security 712 controller, NSF) is shown in Figure 2: 714 +----------+ 715 +-------+ | | +-------+ 716 | | Interface 1 |Security | Interface 2 | NSF(s)| 717 |Client <--------------> <------------------> | 718 | | |Controller| | | 719 +-------+ | | +-------+ 720 +----------+ 722 Figure 2: Interaction between Entities 724 Interface 1 is used for receiving security requirements from a client 725 and translating them into commands that NSFs can understand and 726 execute. The security controller also passes back NSF security 727 reports (e.g., statistics) to the client which the security 728 controller has gathered from NSFs. Interface 2 is used for 729 interacting with NSFs according to commands (e.g., enact/revoke a 730 security policy, or distribute a policy), and collecting status 731 information about NSFs. 733 Client devices or applications can require the security controller to 734 add, delete or update rules in the security service function for 735 their specific traffic. 737 When users want to get the executing status of a security service, 738 they can request NSF status from the client. The security controller 739 will collect NSF information through Interface 2, consolidate it, and 740 give feedback to the client through Interface 1. This interface can 741 be used to collect not only individual service information, but also 742 aggregated data suitable for tasks like infrastructure security 743 assessment. 745 Customers may require validating NSF availability, provenance, and 746 execution. This validation process, especially relevant to vNSFs, 747 includes at least: 749 Integrity of the NSF: Ensuring that the NSF is not compromised; 751 Isolation: Ensuring the execution of the NSF is self-contained for 752 privacy requirements in multi-tenancy scenarios; and 754 Provenance of the NSF: Customers may need to be provided with 755 strict guarantees about the origin of the NSF, its status (e.g., 756 available, idle, down, and others), and feedback mechanisms so 757 that a customer may be able to check that a given NSF or set of 758 NSFs properly conform to the the customer's requirements and 759 subsequent configuration tasks. 761 In order to achieve this, the security controller may collect 762 security measurements and share them with an independent and trusted 763 third party (via Interface 1) in order to allow for attestation of 764 NSF functions using the third party added information. 766 This implies that there may be the following two types of clients 767 using interface 1: the end-user and and the trusted independent third 768 party. The I2NSF work may determine that interface 1 creates two 769 sub-interfaces to support these two types of clients. 771 4.2. Access Networks 773 This scenario describes use cases for users (e.g., residential user, 774 enterprise user, mobile user, and management system) that request and 775 manage security services hosted in the NSP infrastructure. Given 776 that NSP customers are essentially users of their access networks, 777 the scenario is essentially associated with their characteristics as 778 well as with the use of vNSFs. Figure 3 shows how different types of 779 customer connect through virtual access nodes (vCPE, vPE, and vEPC) 780 to an NSF. 782 The virtual customer premise equipment (vCPE) described in use case 783 #7 in [NFVUC] requires a model of access virtualization that includes 784 mobile and residential access networks where the operator may offload 785 security services from the customer local environment (e.g., device 786 or terminal) to its own infrastructure. 788 These use cases define the interaction between the operator and the 789 vNSFs through automated interfaces which support the business 790 communications between customer and provider or between two business 791 entities. 793 Customer + Access + PoP/Datacenter 794 | | +--------+ 795 | ,-----+--. |Network | 796 | ,' | `-|Operator| 797 +-------------+ | /+----+ | |Mgmt Sys| 798 | Residential |-+------/-+vCPE+----+ +--------+ 799 +-------------+ | / +----+ | \ | : 800 | / | \ | | 801 +----------+ | ; +----+ | +----+ | 802 |Enterprise|---+---+----+ vPE+--+----+ NSF| | 803 +----------+ | : +----+ | +----+ | 804 | : | / | 805 +--------+ | : +----+ | / ; 806 | Mobile |-+-----\--+vEPC+----+ / 807 +--------+ | \ +----+ | Service / 808 | `--. | Provider / 809 | `----+---------.. 810 + + 812 vCPE - virtual customer premise equipment 813 vPE - virtual provider equipment 814 vEPC - virtual evolved packet core 815 (mobile-core network) 817 Figure 3: NSF and actors 819 Different access clients may have different service requests: 821 Residential: service requests for parental control, content 822 management, and threat management. 824 Threat content management may include identifying and blocking 825 malicious activities from web contents, mail, or files downloaded. 826 Threat management may include identifying and blocking botnets or 827 malware. 829 Enterprise: service requests for enterprise flow security policies 830 and managed security services 832 Flow security policies identify and block malicious activities 833 during access to (or isolation from) web sites or social media 834 applications. Managed security services for an enterprise may 835 include detection and mitigation of external and internal threats. 836 External threats can include application or phishing attacks, 837 malware, botnet, DDoS, and others. 839 Service Provider: Service requests for policies that protect 840 service provider networks against various threats (including DDoS, 841 botnets and malware). Such policies are meant to securely and 842 reliably deliver contents (e.g., data, voice, and video) to 843 various customers, including residential, mobile and corporate 844 customers. These security policies are also enforced to guarantee 845 isolation between multiple tenants, regardless of the nature of 846 the corresponding connectivity services. 848 Mobile: service requests from interfaces which monitor and ensure 849 user quality of experience, content management, parental controls, 850 and external threat management. 852 Content management for the mobile device includes identifying and 853 blocking malicious activities from web contents, mail, files 854 uploaded/downloaded. Threat management for infrastructure 855 includes detecting and removing malicious programs such as botnet, 856 malware, and other programs that create distributed DoS attacks). 858 Some access customers may not care about which NSFs are utilized to 859 achieve the services they requested. In this case, provider network 860 orchestration systems can internally select the NSFs (or vNSFs) to 861 enforce the security policies requested by the clients. 863 Other access customers, especially some enterprise customers, may 864 want to contract separately for dedicated NSFs (most likely vNSFs) 865 for direct control purposes. In this case, here are the steps to 866 associate vNSFs to specific customers: 868 vNSF Deployment: The deployment process consists in instantiating 869 an NSF on a Virtualization Infrastructure (NFVI), within the NSP 870 administrative domain(s) or with other external domain(s). This 871 is a required step before a customer can subscribe to a security 872 service supported in the vNSF. 874 vNSF Customer Provisioning: Once a vNSF is deployed, any customer 875 can subscribe to it. The provisioning life cycle includes the 876 following: 878 * Customer enrollment and cancellation of the subscription to a 879 vNSF; 881 * Configuration of the vNSF, based on specific configurations, or 882 derived from common security policies defined by the NSP. 884 * Retrieval of the vNSF functionalities, extracted from a 885 manifest or a descriptor. The NSP management systems can 886 demand this information to offer detailed information through 887 the commercial channels to the customer. 889 4.3. Cloud Data Center Scenario 891 In a data center, network security mechanisms such as firewalls may 892 need to be dynamically added or removed for a number of reasons. 893 These changes may be explicitly requested by the user, or triggered 894 by a pre-agreed upon demand level in the Service Level Agreement 895 (SLA) between the user and the provider of the service. For example, 896 the service provider may be required to add more firewall capacity 897 within a set of time frames whenever the bandwidth utilization hits a 898 certain threshold for a specified period. This capacity expansion 899 could result in adding new instances of firewalls on existing 900 machines or provisioning a completely new firewall instance in a 901 different machine. 903 The on-demand, dynamic nature of security service delivery 904 essentially encourages that the network security "devices" be in 905 software or virtual forms, rather than in a physical appliance form. 906 This requirement is a provider-side concern. Users of the firewall 907 service are agnostic (as they should) as to whether or not the 908 firewall service is run on a VM or any other form factor. Indeed, 909 they may not even be aware that their traffic traverses firewalls. 911 Furthermore, new firewall instances need to be placed in the "right 912 zone" (domain). The issue applies not only to multi-tenant 913 environments where getting the tenant in the right domain is of 914 paramount importance, but also in environments owned and operated by 915 a single organization with its own service segregation policies. For 916 example, an enterprise may mandate that firewalls serving Internet 917 traffic and B2B traffic be separated. Another example is that IPS/ 918 IDS services which splits traffic into investment banking traffic and 919 other data traffic to comply with regulatory restrictions for 920 transfer of investment banking information. 922 4.3.1. On-Demand Virtual Firewall Deployment 924 A service provider-operated cloud data center could serve tens of 925 thousands of clients. Clients' compute servers are typically hosted 926 on VMs, which could be deployed across different server racks located 927 in different parts of the data center. It is often not technically 928 and/or financially feasible to deploy dedicated physical firewalls to 929 suit each client's security policy requirements, which can be 930 numerous. What is needed is the ability to dynamically deploy 931 virtual firewalls for each client's set of servers based on 932 established security policies and underlying network topologies. 933 Figure 4 shows an example topology of virtual firewalls within a data 934 center. 936 ---+-----------------------------+----- 937 | | 938 +---+ +-+-+ 939 |vFW| |vFW| 940 +---+ +-+-+ 941 | Client #1 | Client #2 942 ---+-------+--- ---+-------+--- 943 +-+-+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +-+-+ 944 |vM | |vM | |vM | |vM | 945 +---+ +---+ +---+ +---+ 947 Figure 4: NSF in Data Centers 949 4.3.2. Firewall Policy Deployment Automation 951 Firewall rule setting is often a time consuming, complex and error- 952 prone process even within a single organization/enterprise framework. 953 It becomes far more complex in provider-owned cloud networks that 954 serve myriads of customers. 956 Firewall rules today are highly tied with ports and addresses that 957 identify traffic. This makes it very difficult for clients of cloud 958 data centers to construct rules for their own traffic as the clients 959 only see the virtual networks and the virtual addresses. The 960 customer-visible virtual networks and addresses may be different from 961 the actual packets traversing the firewalls (FWs). 963 Even though most vendors support similar firewall features, the 964 specific rule configuration keywords are different from vendors to 965 vendors, making it difficult for automation. Automation works best 966 when it can leverage a common set of standards that will work across 967 NSFs by multiple vendors and utilize dynamic key management. 969 4.3.3. Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs 971 Clients of service provider-operated cloud data centers need to 972 secure Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and virtual security functions 973 that apply the clients' security policies. The security policies may 974 govern communication within the clients' own virtual networks as well 975 as communication with external networks. For example, VPN service 976 providers may need to provide firewall and other security services to 977 their VPN clients. Today, it is generally not possible for clients 978 to dynamically view (let alone change) what, where and how security 979 policies are implemented on their provider-operated clouds. Indeed, 980 no standards-based framework exists to allow clients to retrieve/ 981 manage security policies in a consistent manner across different 982 providers. 984 As described above, the dynamic key management is critical for the 985 securing the VPN and the distribution of policies. 987 4.3.4. Internal Network Monitoring 989 There are many types of internal traffic monitors that may be managed 990 by a security controller. This includes the class of services 991 referred to as Data Loss Prevention (DLP), or Reputation Protection 992 Services (RPS). Depending on the class of event, alerts may go to 993 internal administrators, or external services. 995 4.4. Preventing Distributed DoS, Malware and Botnet attacks 997 In the Internet where everything is connected, preventing unwanted 998 traffic that may cause a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or a 999 distributed DoS (DDoS) attack has become a challenge. Similarly, a 1000 network could be exposed to malware attacks and become an attack 1001 vector to jeopardize the operation of other networks, by means of 1002 remote commands for example. Many networks which carry groups of 1003 information (such as Internet of Things (IoT) networks, Information- 1004 Centric Networks (ICN), Content Delivery Networks (CDN), Voice over 1005 IP packet networks (VoIP), and Voice over LTE (VoLTE)) are also 1006 exposed to such remote attacks. There are many examples of remote 1007 attacks on these networks, but the following examples will illustrate 1008 the issues. A malware attack on an IoT network which carries sensor 1009 readings and instructions may attempt to alter the sensor 1010 instructions in order to disable a key sensor. A malware attack VoIP 1011 or VoLTE networks is software that attempts to place unauthorized 1012 long-distance calls. Botnets may overwhelm nodes in ICN and CDN 1013 networks so that the networks cannot pass critical data. 1015 In order for organizations to better secure their networks against 1016 these kind of attacks, the I2NSF framework should provide a client- 1017 side interface that is use case-independent and technology-agnostic. 1018 Technology-agnostic is to is defined to be generic, technology 1019 independent, and able to support multiple protocols and data models. 1020 For example, such an I2NSF interface could be used to provision 1021 security policy configuration information that looks for specific 1022 malware signatures. Similarly, botnet attacks could be easily 1023 prevented by provisioning security policies using the I2NSF client- 1024 side interface that prevent access to botnet command and control 1025 servers. 1027 4.5. Regulatory and Compliance Security Policies 1029 Organizations must protect their networks against attacks and must 1030 also adhere to various industry regulations: any organization that 1031 falls under a specific regulation like Payment Card Industry (PCI)- 1032 Data Security Standard (DSS) [PCI-DSS] for the payment industry or 1033 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA] for the 1034 healthcare industry must be able to isolate various kinds of traffic. 1035 They must also show records of their security policies whenever 1036 audited. 1038 The I2NSF client-side interface could be used to provision regulatory 1039 and compliance-related security policies. The security controller 1040 would keep track of when and where a specific policy is applied and 1041 if there is any policy violation; this information can be provided in 1042 the event of an audit as a proof that traffic is isolated between 1043 specific endpoints, in full compliance with the required regulations. 1045 5. Management Considerations 1047 Management of NSFs usually include the following: 1049 o Life cycle management and resource management of NSFs, 1051 o Device configuration, such as address configuration, device 1052 internal attributes configuration, etc., 1054 o Signaling of events, notifications and changes, and 1056 o Policy rule provisioning. 1058 I2NSF will only focus on the policy provisioning part of NSF 1059 management. 1061 6. IANA Considerations 1063 No IANA considerations exist for this document. 1065 7. Security Considerations 1067 Having secure access to control and monitor NSFs is crucial for 1068 hosted security services. An I2NSF security controller raises new 1069 security threats. It needs to be resilient to attacks and quickly 1070 recover from attacks. Therefore, proper secure communication 1071 channels have to be carefully specified for carrying controlling and 1072 monitoring traffic between the NSFs and their management entity (or 1073 entities). 1075 The traffic flow security policies specified by customers can 1076 conflict with providers' internal traffic flow security policies. 1077 This conflict can be resolved in one of two ways: a) installed 1078 policies can restrict traffic if either the customer traffic flow 1079 security policies or the provider's internal security policies 1080 restrict traffic, or b) can only restrict traffic if both the 1081 customer traffic flow security policies and the provider's internal 1082 traffic flow security policies restrict data. Either choice could 1083 cause potential problems. It is crucial for the management system to 1084 flag these conflicts to the customers and to the service provider. 1086 It is important to proper AAA [RFC2904] to authorize access to the 1087 network and access to the I2NSF management stream. 1089 8. Contributors 1091 I2NSF is a group effort. The following people actively contributed 1092 to the initial use case text: Xiaojun Zhuang (China Mobile), Sumandra 1093 Majee (F5), Ed Lopez (Curveball Networks), and Robert Moskowitz 1094 (Huawei). 1096 9. Contributing Authors 1098 I2NSF has had a number of contributing authors. The following are 1099 contributing authors: 1101 o Linda Dunbar (Huawei), 1103 o Antonio Pastur (Telefonica I+D), 1105 o Mohamed Boucadair (France Telecom), 1107 o Michael Georgiades (Prime Tel), 1109 o Minpeng Qi (China Mobile), 1111 o Shaibal Chakrabarty (US Ignite), 1113 o Nic Leymann (Deutsche Telekom), 1115 o Anil Lohiya (Juniper), 1117 o David Qi (Bloomberg), 1119 o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University), 1121 o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI), 1123 o Tae-Jin Ahn (Korea Telecom), and 1125 o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom). 1127 10. Acknowledgments 1129 This document was supported by Institute for Information and 1130 communications Technology Promotion (IITP) funded by the Korea 1131 government (MSIP) [R0166-15-1041, Standard Development of Network 1132 Security based SDN]. 1134 11. Informative References 1136 [CTA] Cyber Threat Alliance, , "Cyber Threat Alliance", October 1137 2016, . 1139 [ETSI-NFV] 1140 ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, , "Network Functions 1141 Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural Framework", October 1142 2013. 1144 [Gartner-2013] 1145 Messmer, E., "Gartner: Cloud-based security as a service 1146 set to take off", October 2013. 1148 [HIPAA] US Congress, , "HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND 1149 ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 (Public Law 104-191)", August 1150 1996, . 1152 [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis] 1153 Hares, S., Moskowitz, R., and D. Zhang, "Analysis of 1154 Existing work for I2NSF", draft-ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis-03 1155 (work in progress), March 2017. 1157 [I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls] 1158 Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet 1159 Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in 1160 progress), October 2012. 1162 [I-D.jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services] 1163 Jeong, J., Kim, H., Jung-Soo, P., Ahn, T., and s. 1164 sehuilee@kt.com, "Software-Defined Networking Based 1165 Security Services using Interface to Network Security 1166 Functions", draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-05 1167 (work in progress), July 2016. 1169 [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-access-usecases] 1170 Pastor, A. and D. Lopez, "Access Use Cases for an Open OAM 1171 Interface to Virtualized Security Services", draft-pastor- 1172 i2nsf-access-usecases-00 (work in progress), October 2014. 1174 [I-D.pastor-i2nsf-merged-use-cases] 1175 Pastor, A., Lopez, D., Wang, K., Zhuang, X., Qi, M., 1176 Zarny, M., Majee, S., Leymann, N., Dunbar, L., and M. 1177 Georgiades, "Use Cases and Requirements for an Interface 1178 to Network Security Functions", draft-pastor-i2nsf-merged- 1179 use-cases-00 (work in progress), June 2015. 1181 [I-D.qi-i2nsf-access-network-usecase] 1182 Wang, K. and X. Zhuang, "Integrated Security with Access 1183 Network Use Case", draft-qi-i2nsf-access-network- 1184 usecase-02 (work in progress), March 2015. 1186 [I-D.zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases] 1187 Zarny, M., Leymann, N., and L. Dunbar, "I2NSF Data Center 1188 Use Cases", draft-zarny-i2nsf-data-center-use-cases-00 1189 (work in progress), October 2014. 1191 [I-D.zhou-i2nsf-capability-interface-monitoring] 1192 Zhou, C., Xia, L., Boucadair, M., and J. Xiong, "The 1193 Capability Interface for Monitoring Network Security 1194 Functions (NSF) in I2NSF", draft-zhou-i2nsf-capability- 1195 interface-monitoring-00 (work in progress), October 2015. 1197 [NFVUC] ETSI GS NFV 001 V1.1.1, , "ETSI NFV Group Specification, 1198 Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) Use Cases", October 1199 2013. 1201 [PCI-DSS] PCI Security Council, , "Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data 1202 Security Standard Requirements and Security Assessment 1203 Procedures (version 3.2)", April 2016, 1204 . 1206 [RFC2904] Vollbrecht, J., Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., Gommans, L., 1207 Gross, G., de Bruijn, B., de Laat, C., Holdrege, M., and 1208 D. Spence, "AAA Authorization Framework", RFC 2904, 1209 DOI 10.17487/RFC2904, August 2000, 1210 . 1212 [RFC4948] Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the 1213 IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", 1214 RFC 4948, DOI 10.17487/RFC4948, August 2007, 1215 . 1217 [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP 1218 Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925, 1219 June 2010, . 1221 [RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined 1222 Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider 1223 Environment", RFC 7149, DOI 10.17487/RFC7149, March 2014, 1224 . 1226 [RFC7426] Haleplidis, E., Ed., Pentikousis, K., Ed., Denazis, S., 1227 Hadi Salim, J., Meyer, D., and O. Koufopavlou, "Software- 1228 Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture 1229 Terminology", RFC 7426, DOI 10.17487/RFC7426, January 1230 2015, . 1232 Authors' Addresses 1234 Susan Hares 1235 Huawei 1236 7453 Hickory Hill 1237 Saline, MI 48176 1238 USA 1240 Phone: +1-734-604-0332 1241 Email: shares@ndzh.com 1243 Diego R. Lopez 1244 Telefonica I+D 1245 Don Ramon de la Cruz, 82 1246 Madrid 28006 1247 Spain 1249 Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com 1251 Myo Zarny 1252 vArmour 1253 800 El Camino Real, Suite 3000 1254 Mountain View, CA 94040 1255 USA 1257 Email: myo@varmour.com 1259 Christian Jacquenet 1260 France Telecom 1261 Rennes, 35000 1262 France 1264 Email: Christian.jacquenet@orange.com 1265 Rakesh Kumar 1266 Juniper Networks 1267 1133 Innovation Way 1268 Sunnyvale, CA 94089 1269 USA 1271 Email: rkkumar@juniper.net 1273 Jaehoon Paul Jeong 1274 Department of Software 1275 Sungkyunkwan University 1276 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu 1277 Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 1278 Republic of Korea 1280 Phone: +82 31 299 4957 1281 Fax: +82 31 290 7996 1282 Email: pauljeong@skku.edu 1283 URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php