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Scudder 7 Juniper 8 June 15, 2017 10 BGP Administrative Shutdown Communication 11 draft-ietf-idr-shutdown-10 13 Abstract 15 This document enhances the BGP Cease NOTIFICATION message 16 "Administrative Shutdown" and "Administrative Reset" subcodes for 17 operators to transmit a short freeform message to describe why a BGP 18 session was shutdown or reset. This document updates RFC 4486. 20 Requirements Language 22 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 23 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 24 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 26 Status of This Memo 28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 34 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 17, 2017. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 50 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document. Please review these documents 52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 56 described in the Simplified BSD License. 58 Table of Contents 60 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 61 2. Shutdown Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 62 3. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 4. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 7. Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION 5 67 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 69 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 73 1. Introduction 75 It can be troublesome for an operator to correlate a BGP-4 [RFC4271] 76 session teardown in the network with a notice that was transmitted 77 via off-line methods such email or telephone calls. This document 78 updates [RFC4486] by specifying a mechanism to transmit a short 79 freeform UTF-8 [RFC3629] message as part of a Cease NOTIFICATION 80 message [RFC4271] to inform the peer why the BGP session is being 81 shutdown or reset. 83 2. Shutdown Communication 85 If a BGP speaker decides to terminate its session with a BGP 86 neighbor, and it sends a NOTIFICATION message with the Error Code 87 "Cease" and Error Subcode "Administrative Shutdown" or 88 "Administrative Reset" [RFC4486], it MAY include an UTF-8 encoded 89 string. The contents of the string are at the operator's discretion. 91 The Cease NOTIFICATION message with a Shutdown Communication is 92 encoded as below: 94 0 1 2 3 95 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 96 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 97 | Error code 6 | Subcode | Length | ... \ 98 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / 99 \ \ 100 / ... Shutdown Communication ... / 101 \ \ 102 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 104 Figure 1 106 Subcode: the Error Subcode value MUST be one of the following 107 values: 2 ("Administrative Shutdown") or 4 ("Administrative 108 Reset"). 110 Length: this 8-bit field represents the length of the Shutdown 111 Communication field in octets. The length value MUST range from 0 112 to 128 inclusive. When the length value is zero, no Shutdown 113 Communication field follows. 115 Shutdown Communication: to support international characters, the 116 Shutdown Communication field MUST be encoded using UTF-8. A 117 receiving BGP speaker MUST NOT interpret invalid UTF-8 sequences. 118 Note that when the Shutdown Communication contains multibyte 119 characters, the number of characters will be less than the length 120 value. This field is not NUL terminated. 122 Mechanisms concerning the reporting of information contained in the 123 Shutdown Communication are implementation specific but SHOULD include 124 methods such as SYSLOG [RFC5424]. 126 3. Operational Considerations 128 Operators are encouraged to use the Shutdown Communication to inform 129 their peers of the reason for the shutdown of the BGP session and 130 include out-of-band reference materials. An example of a useful 131 Shutdown Communication would be: 133 "[TICKET-1-1438367390] software upgrade, back in 2 hours" 135 "[TICKET-1-1438367390]" is a ticket reference with significance to 136 both the sender and receiver, followed by a brief human readable 137 message regarding the reason for the BGP session shutdown followed by 138 an indication about the length of the maintenance. The receiver can 139 now use the string 'TICKET-1-1438367390' to search in their email 140 archive to find more details. 142 4. Error Handling 144 If a Shutdown Communication with an invalid Length value, or an 145 invalid UTF-8 sequence is received, a message indicating this event 146 SHOULD be logged for the attention of the operator. An erroneous or 147 malformed Shutdown Communication itself MAY be logged in a hexdump 148 format. 150 5. IANA Considerations 152 Per this document, IANA is requested to reference this document at 153 subcode "Administrative Shutdown", and at subcode "Administrative 154 Reset" in the "Cease NOTIFICATION message subcodes" registry under 155 the "Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters" group in addition to 156 [RFC4486]. 158 6. Security Considerations 160 This document uses UTF-8 encoding for the Shutdown Communication. 161 There are a number of security issues with UNICODE. Implementers and 162 operator are advised to review UNICODE TR36 [UTR36] to learn about 163 these issues. UTF-8 "Shortest Form" encoding is REQUIRED to guard 164 against the technical issues outlined in UTR36. 166 As BGP Shutdown Communications are likely to appear in syslog output, 167 there is a risk that carefully constructed Shutdown Communication 168 might be formatted by receiving systems in a way to make them appear 169 as additional syslog messages. To limit the ability to mount such an 170 attack, the BGP Shutdown Communication is limited to 128 octets in 171 length. 173 Users of this mechanism should be aware that unless a transport that 174 provides integrity is used for the BGP session in question, a 175 Shutdown Communication message could be forged. Unless a transport 176 that provides confidentiality is used, a Shutdown Communication 177 message could be snooped by an attacker. These issues are common to 178 any BGP message but may be of greater interest in the context of this 179 proposal since the information carried in the message is generally 180 expected to be used for human-to-human communication. Refer to the 181 related considerations in [RFC4271] and [RFC4272]. 183 Users of this mechanism should consider applying data minimization 184 practises as outlined in Section 6.1 [RFC6973] as a received Shutdown 185 Communication may be used at the receiver's discretion. 187 7. Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION 189 This section records the status of known implementations of the 190 protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this 191 Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC7942. The 192 description of implementations in this section is intended to assist 193 the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. 194 Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here 195 does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has 196 been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied 197 by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be 198 construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their 199 features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may 200 exist. 202 As of today these vendors have produced an implementation of the 203 Shutdown Communication: 205 o ExaBGP 206 o pmacct 207 o OpenBGPD 208 o GoBGP 209 o FreeRangeRouting (frr) 210 o tcpdump (packet analyser) 211 o Wireshark (packet analyser) 213 8. References 215 8.1. Normative References 217 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 218 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 219 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 220 . 222 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 223 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 224 2003, . 226 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A 227 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, 228 DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, 229 . 231 [RFC4486] Chen, E. and V. Gillet, "Subcodes for BGP Cease 232 Notification Message", RFC 4486, DOI 10.17487/RFC4486, 233 April 2006, . 235 8.2. Informative References 237 [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", 238 RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006, 239 . 241 [RFC5424] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", RFC 5424, 242 DOI 10.17487/RFC5424, March 2009, 243 . 245 [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., 246 Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy 247 Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, 248 DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, 249 . 251 [UTR36] Davis, M. and M. Suignard, "Unicode Security 252 Considerations", Unicode Technical Report #36, August 253 2010, . 255 Appendix A. Acknowledgements 257 The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge Tom Scholl, David 258 Freedman, Jared Mauch, Jeff Haas, Peter Hessler, Bruno Decraene, John 259 Heasley, Peter van Dijk, Arjen Zonneveld, James Bensley, Susan Hares, 260 Saku Ytti, Lou Berger, Alvaro Retana, and Adam Roach. 262 The authors would like to thank Enke Chen and Vincent Gillet for 263 their work on [RFC4486] and granting the related BCP 78 rights to the 264 IETF Trust. 266 Authors' Addresses 268 Job Snijders 269 NTT Communications 270 Theodorus Majofskistraat 100 271 Amsterdam 1065 SZ 272 The Netherlands 274 Email: job@ntt.net 275 Jakob Heitz 276 Cisco 277 170 West Tasman Drive 278 San Jose, CA 95134 279 USA 281 Email: jheitz@cisco.com 283 John Scudder 284 Juniper Networks 285 1194 N. Mathilda Ave 286 Sunnyvale, CA 94089 287 USA 289 Email: jgs@juniper.net