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Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Internet Engineering Task Force P. Dawes 3 Internet-Draft Vodafone Group 4 Intended status: Informational C. Arunachalam 5 Expires: July 20, 2017 Cisco Systems 6 January 16, 2017 8 Requirements for Marking SIP Messages to be Logged 9 draft-ietf-insipid-logme-reqs-12 11 Abstract 13 SIP networks use signaling monitoring tools to debug customer 14 reported problems and for regression testing if network or client 15 software is upgraded. As networks grow and become interconnected, 16 including connection via transit networks, it becomes impractical to 17 predict the path that SIP signaling will take between clients, and 18 therefore impractical to monitor SIP signaling end-to-end. 20 This draft describes requirements for adding an indicator to the SIP 21 protocol data unit (PDU, or a SIP message) that marks the PDU as a 22 candidate for logging. Such marking will typically be applied as 23 part of network testing controlled by the network operator and not 24 used in regular client signaling. However, such marking can be 25 carried end-to-end including the SIP terminals, even if a session 26 originates and terminates in different networks. 28 Status of This Memo 30 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 31 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 33 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 34 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 35 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 36 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 38 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 39 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 40 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 41 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 43 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2017. 45 Copyright Notice 47 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 48 document authors. All rights reserved. 50 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 51 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 52 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 53 publication of this document. Please review these documents 54 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 55 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 56 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 57 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 58 described in the Simplified BSD License. 60 Table of Contents 62 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 63 2. Conventions Used in this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 65 3.1. Network Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 66 3.2. Trust Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 67 3.3. Intermediary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 68 4. Motivating Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 69 4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 70 4.2. Example Network Arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 71 4.3. Example Debugging Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 72 5. Logme Marking Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 73 5.1. Message Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 74 5.2. "Log Me" Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 75 5.3. Processing the "Log Me" Marker . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 76 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 77 6.1. Trust Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 78 6.2. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 79 6.2.1. "Log Me" Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 80 6.2.2. Logged Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 81 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 82 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 83 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 84 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 85 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 86 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 88 1. Introduction 90 Service providers, enterprises, and others who operate networks that 91 use SIP (see [RFC3261]) need the ability to debug end user reported 92 problems and also to run regression tests if SIP client software/ 93 hardware is upgraded. Such debugging and tests might be confined to 94 a single service provider or network, or may occur between the 95 administrative domains of different network operators, including 96 domains in different countries that are interconnected through 97 networks belonging to one or more third parties. 99 A mechanism is needed to mark particular SIP sessions, i.e. those 100 related to debugging or regression testing, as candidates for logging 101 and this marking must be carried within the candidate SIP messages as 102 they are routed across networks (and geographies) to enable logging 103 at each SIP entity without having to know in advance the list of SIP 104 entities through which the SIP signaling messages will traverse. 105 Such marking must take into account that SIP messages might traverse 106 different network operators, different countries, regions with 107 different privacy requirements, and different trust domains. This 108 draft describes the requirements for such a "log me" marker for SIP 109 signaling. 111 2. Conventions Used in this Document 113 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 114 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 115 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119], except that 116 rather than describing interoperability requirements, they are used 117 to describe requirements to be satisfied by the "log-me" marker 118 solution. 120 3. Terminology 122 3.1. Network Boundary 124 A network boundary is the part of a signaling path where messages 125 pass between entities that are under different administrative 126 control. [RFC5853] Figure 2 shows a network boundary between GW-A1 127 in operator A's network and the Session Border Controller (SBC) in 128 operator B's network. A network boundary is significant in this 129 document because manipulation of signaling at the boundary could 130 prevent end-to-end testing or troubleshooting. 132 Topology hiding and protocol repair (see [RFC5853]) are two common 133 functions that manipulate signaling at the network boundary. These 134 functions are performed by SIP device types (see [RFC7092]) such as 135 Session Border Controller and Interconnection Border Control Function 136 (IBCF). 138 3.2. Trust Domain 140 In this document a trust domain is the set of entities that have been 141 identified, by prior agreement, as participating elements in logging, 142 typically for the purpose of debugging or regression testing. A 143 trust domain contains all SIP entities under configuration control of 144 the network operator that is performing regression testing plus all 145 SIP entities that are under configuration control of peer network 146 operators who have agreed to participate in that regression testing. 147 The purpose of trust domain requirements is to prevent network 148 operators inadvertently triggering logging in networks that are not 149 part of any testing or troubleshooting. 151 3.3. Intermediary 153 The term "intermediary" is defined in [RFC7989] section 2 and refers 154 to any entity along the call signaling path. 156 4. Motivating Scenario 158 4.1. Introduction 160 Signaling for SIP session setup can cross several networks, and these 161 networks may not have common ownership and also may be in different 162 countries. If a single operator wishes to perform regression testing 163 or fault debugging end-to-end, the separate ownership of networks 164 that carry the signaling and the explosion in the number of possible 165 signaling paths through SIP entities from the originating to the 166 terminating user make it impractical to pre-configure logging of an 167 end-to-end SIP signaling of a session of interest. 169 4.2. Example Network Arrangement 171 The figure below gives an example of a signaling path through 172 multiple networks. 174 +------------------+ +------------------+ 175 | COUNTRY W | | COUNTRY X | 176 | Operator A | | Operator A | 177 | | | | 178 | SIP Phones | | SIP Phones | 179 | | //| | 180 +------------------+ // +------------------+ 181 | // 182 | // 183 ,'```', // +------------------+ 184 .`',.' `..'``',<==// | COUNTRY X | 185 ,' Operator A `', | Operator A | 186 ; Backbone Network ..'--| | 187 ', ,., .'` | PSTN phones | 188 '.,.`'.,,,.` `''` | | 189 || +------------------+ 190 || 191 \/ 192 +------------------+ 193 | | 194 | Transit Network | 195 | | 196 | |\\ 197 +------------------+ \\ 198 | \\ 199 | \\ 200 +------------------+ \\ +------------------+ 201 | COUNTRY Z | \\ | COUNTRY Y | 202 | Operator C | \\=>| Operator B | 203 | | | | 204 | SIP Phones | | SIP Phones | 205 | | | | 206 +------------------+ +------------------+ 208 Figure 1: Example signaling path through multiple networks 210 4.3. Example Debugging Procedure 212 One possible set of steps is outlined below to illustrate the 213 debugging procedure. 215 o The user's terminal is placed in debug mode. The terminal logs 216 its own signaling and inserts a "log me" marker into SIP requests 217 for session setup. 219 o All SIP entities that the signaling traverses, from the first 220 proxy the terminal connects to at the edge of the network to the 221 destination client terminal, detect that the "log me" marker is 222 present and log SIP requests and responses that contain the marker 223 if configured to do so. 225 o Subsequent responses and requests in the same dialog are also 226 marked with a "log me" marker. For some scenarios, such as call 227 transfer, related dialogs may also be marked with "log me" marker. 229 o Logging stops, either because the dialog has ended or because a 230 'stop event', typically expiry of a certain amount of time, 231 occurred. 233 o Logs are retrieved, for example by logging on to the SIP entity or 234 entities that contain the logs. 236 5. Logme Marking Requirements 238 5.1. Message Logs 240 o REQ1: If a SIP message is logged then the entire SIP message (SIP 241 headers and message body) MUST be logged using standard logging 242 format such as SIP CLF defined in [RFC6873]. 244 o REQ2: Header fields SHOULD be logged in the form in which they 245 appear in the message, they SHOULD NOT be converted between long 246 and compact forms described in [RFC3261] clause 7.3.3. 248 When and how signaling logs are retrieved is out of scope of this 249 document. Logs might be retrieved by logging on to the SIP entity 250 that contains the logs, by sending logs to a central server that is 251 co-ordinating debugging, by storing them on removable media for later 252 manual collection, or by some other method. All log retrieval 253 mechanisms MUST adhere to authorization and privacy protection 254 policies set forth by the network administrator. 256 5.2. "Log Me" Marking 258 o REQ3: It MUST be possible to mark a SIP request or response to be 259 considered for logging by inserting a "log me" marker. This is 260 known as "log me" marking. 262 o REQ4: It MUST be possible for a "log me" marker to cross network 263 boundaries. 265 o REQ5: A "log me" marker MAY include an identifier that indicates 266 the test case that caused it to be inserted, known as a test case 267 identifier. The test case identifier does not have any impact on 268 session setup, it is used to collate all logged SIP requests and 269 responses to the initial SIP request in a dialog or standalone 270 transaction. The local UUID portion of Session-ID described in 271 [RFC7206] and [RFC7989] could be used as a random test case 272 identifier. 274 5.3. Processing the "Log Me" Marker 276 o REQ6: A "log me" marker is most effective if all networks on the 277 signaling path agree to pass it end-to-end. However, source 278 networks should behave responsibly and not leave it to a 279 downstream network to detect and remove a marker that it is not 280 expecting. 282 o REQ7: The presence of a "log me" marker indicates that a request 283 or response is part of debugging or regression testing. 285 o REQ8: It MUST be possible to insert a "log me" marker in SIP 286 responses that correspond to SIP requests with a "log me" marker 287 in order to ensure that the complete SIP transaction is logged. 288 This requirement applies to endpoints, SIP/PSTN gateways and 289 B2BUAs. 291 o REQ9: The "log me" marker mechanism SHOULD allow a SIP 292 intermediary to request logging SIP requests and responses on 293 behalf of the originating endpoint. The typical use case for this 294 requirement is for compatibility with User Agents (UA) that have 295 not implemented "log me" marking, i.e. when a UA has not marked a 296 request or when responses received on a dialog of interest for 297 logging do not contain an echoed "log me" marker. Another use 298 case is when the session origination UA that inserted log me 299 marker is no longer participating in the session (e.g., call 300 transfer scenarios) and the intermediary adds "log me" marker in 301 related sessions to enable end-to-end signaling analysis. 303 o REQ10: The mechanism MUST allow stateless processing of SIP 304 requests that contain a "log me" marker by SIP intermediaries. 305 This requirement enables the SIP intermediaries to base the 306 decision to log a SIP request or response solely on the presence 307 of the "log me" marker. 309 o REQ11: The scope of SIP message logging request includes all 310 requests and responses within a given dialog. The scope can be 311 extended to related dialogs that correspond to an end-to-end 312 session for scenarios discussed in REQ9. The "log me" request 313 MUST be indicated at the beginning of the dialog of interest and 314 SHOULD continue to the dialog end without any stop and restart 315 during the duration of the dialog. 317 o REQ12: The presence of a "log me" marker might cause some SIP 318 entities to log signaling. Therefore, this marker MUST be removed 319 at the earliest opportunity if it has been incorrectly inserted 320 (e.g. mid-dialog or outside the configured start and stop of "log 321 me" marking). 323 The definition of types of events that cause logging to stop and 324 configuring SIP entities to detect such "stop events" is outside the 325 scope of this document. 327 6. Security Considerations 329 In order to prevent any security implications of a "log me" marker, 330 the marker itself MUST NOT contain any sensitive information, 331 detecting its presence or absence MUST NOT reveal sensitive 332 information, and maliciously adding a "log me" marker MUST NOT 333 adversely affect a network. This section analyses how to meet these 334 requirements. 336 6.1. Trust Domain 338 Since a "log me" marker may cause a SIP entity to log the SIP header 339 and body of a request or response, the "log me" marker MUST be 340 removed at a trust domain boundary. If a prior agreement to log 341 sessions exists with the next hop network then the "log me" marker 342 SHOULD NOT be removed. 344 6.2. Security Threats 346 6.2.1. "Log Me" Marking 348 The "log me" marker MUST NOT convey any sensitive information, 349 although the "log me" marker will sometimes be inserted because a 350 particular device is experiencing problems. The "log me" marker MUST 351 NOT reveal any information related to any SIP user or device. 353 The insertion of "log me" marker at the endpoint MUST be approved by 354 the end user or by the network administrator. Similarly, network 355 administrator authorization is required for a SIP intermediary to 356 insert a "log me" marker on behalf of an UA that does not support 357 "log me" marking. 359 Activating a debug mode affects the operation of a terminal, 360 therefore debugging configuration MUST be supplied by an authorized 361 party to an authorized terminal through a secure communication 362 channel. 364 6.2.2. Logged Information 366 Logged signaling is privacy-sensitive data, therefore signaling logs 367 MUST NOT be readable by an unauthorized third party. 369 7. IANA Considerations 371 There are no IANA considerations associated with this document. 373 8. Acknowledgments 375 The authors wish to thank Jorgen Axell, Ben Campbell, Keith Drage, 376 Vijay Gurbani, Christer Holmberg, Hadriel Kaplan, Paul Kyzivat, James 377 Polk, Gonzalo Salgueiro, Alberto Llamas, Brett Tate, Paul Giralt, 378 Stewart Bryant, Sean Turner, and Dan Romascanu for their constructive 379 comments and guidance while developing this document. 381 9. References 383 9.1. Normative References 385 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 386 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 387 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 388 . 390 [RFC6873] Salgueiro, G., Gurbani, V., and A. Roach, "Format for the 391 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Common Log Format 392 (CLF)", RFC 6873, DOI 10.17487/RFC6873, February 2013, 393 . 395 9.2. Informative References 397 [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, 398 A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. 399 Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, 400 DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, 401 . 403 [RFC5853] Hautakorpi, J., Ed., Camarillo, G., Penfield, R., 404 Hawrylyshen, A., and M. Bhatia, "Requirements from Session 405 Initiation Protocol (SIP) Session Border Control (SBC) 406 Deployments", RFC 5853, DOI 10.17487/RFC5853, April 2010, 407 . 409 [RFC7092] Kaplan, H. and V. Pascual, "A Taxonomy of Session 410 Initiation Protocol (SIP) Back-to-Back User Agents", 411 RFC 7092, DOI 10.17487/RFC7092, December 2013, 412 . 414 [RFC7206] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Polk, J., Liess, L., and H. 415 Kaplan, "Requirements for an End-to-End Session 416 Identification in IP-Based Multimedia Communication 417 Networks", RFC 7206, DOI 10.17487/RFC7206, May 2014, 418 . 420 [RFC7989] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Pearce, C., and P. Giralt, "End- 421 to-End Session Identification in IP-Based Multimedia 422 Communication Networks", RFC 7989, DOI 10.17487/RFC7989, 423 October 2016, . 425 Authors' Addresses 427 Peter Dawes 428 Vodafone Group 429 The Connection 430 Newbury, Berkshire RG14 2FN 431 UK 433 Email: peter.dawes@vodafone.com 435 Chidambaram Arunachalam 436 Cisco Systems 437 7200-12 Kit Creek Road 438 Research Triangle Park, NC, NC 27709 439 US 441 Email: carunach@cisco.com