idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-01.txt: -(294): Line appears to be too long, but this could be caused by non-ascii characters in UTF-8 encoding -(295): Line appears to be too long, but this could be caused by non-ascii characters in UTF-8 encoding Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Looks like you're using RFC 2026 boilerplate. This must be updated to follow RFC 3978/3979, as updated by RFC 4748. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == There are 3 instances of lines with non-ascii characters in the document. == No 'Intended status' indicated for this document; assuming Proposed Standard Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** There are 30 instances of too long lines in the document, the longest one being 4 characters in excess of 72. ** The abstract seems to contain references ([11]), which it shouldn't. Please replace those with straight textual mentions of the documents in question. == There are 11 instances of lines with non-RFC6890-compliant IPv4 addresses in the document. If these are example addresses, they should be changed. == There are 2 instances of lines with non-RFC3849-compliant IPv6 addresses in the document. If these are example addresses, they should be changed. ** The document seems to lack a both a reference to RFC 2119 and the recommended RFC 2119 boilerplate, even if it appears to use RFC 2119 keywords -- however, there's a paragraph with a matching beginning. Boilerplate error? RFC 2119 keyword, line 80: '... resource record SHOULD be authenticat...' RFC 2119 keyword, line 195: '...| REQUIRED. There base64 encoded pub...' RFC 2119 keyword, line 197: '...d, then the root (".") SHOULD be used....' RFC 2119 keyword, line 274: '...rs and resolvers SHOULD take care to m...' RFC 2119 keyword, line 281: '... resource record MUST carefully docume...' Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the RFC 3978 Section 5.4 Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008. If you have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to grant the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can ignore this comment. If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378 disclaimer. (See the Legal Provisions document at https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.) -- The document date (April 28, 2003) is 7669 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: '11' is mentioned on line 332, but not defined == Missing Reference: '6' is mentioned on line 317, but not defined == Missing Reference: '8' is mentioned on line 323, but not defined == Missing Reference: '9' is mentioned on line 326, but not defined == Missing Reference: '10' is mentioned on line 329, but not defined == Missing Reference: '5' is mentioned on line 314, but not defined == Missing Reference: '7' is mentioned on line 320, but not defined == Unused Reference: '1' is defined on line 300, but no explicit reference was found in the text == Unused Reference: '3' is defined on line 306, but no explicit reference was found in the text == Unused Reference: '4' is defined on line 309, but no explicit reference was found in the text ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2065 (ref. '4') (Obsoleted by RFC 2535) Summary: 5 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 15 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 IPSECKEY WG M. Richardson 3 Internet-Draft SSW 4 |Expires: October 27, 2003 April 28, 2003 6 A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS. 7 | draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-01.txt 9 Status of this Memo 11 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with 12 all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. 14 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 15 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 16 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 17 Drafts. 19 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 20 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 21 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 22 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 24 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http:// 25 www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 27 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 28 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 30 | This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2003. 32 Copyright Notice 34 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. 36 Abstract 38 This document describes a new resource record for DNS. This record 39 may be used to store public keys for use in IPsec systems. 41 This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY 42 Resource Record, which has been proposed to be obsoleted by RFC3445 43 | [11]. 45 Table of Contents 47 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 48 1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 49 2. Storage formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 50 2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 51 2.2 RDATA format - precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 52 2.3 RDATA format - algorithm type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 | 2.4 RDATA format - gateway type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 54 | 2.5 RDATA format - gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 | 2.6 RDATA format - RSA public key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 56 | 2.7 RDATA format - DSA public key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 | 3. Presentation formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 58 | 3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 59 | 3.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 | 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 61 | 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 62 | 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 63 | Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 64 | Non-normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 65 | Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 66 | Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 67 1. Introduction 69 1.1 Overview 71 The IPSECKEY resource record (RR) is used to publish a public key 72 that is to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name. This 73 can be the public key of a host, network, or application (in the case 74 of per-port keying). 76 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 77 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 78 | document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [6]. 80 An IPSECKEY resource record SHOULD be authenticated DNSSEC resource 81 record. 83 It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource 84 records at the same terminal node. This will be due to the presence 85 of multiple gateways and the need to rollover keys. 87 This resource record is class independent. 89 2. Storage formats 91 The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD. 93 2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format 95 The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a public 96 key (and algorithm type), and an optional gateway address. 98 0 1 2 3 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 100 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 101 | | precedence | gateway type | algorithm | gateway | 102 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+ + 103 ~ gateway ~ 104 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 105 | / 106 / public key / 107 / / 108 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-| 110 2.2 RDATA format - precedence 112 This is an 8-bit precedence for this record. This is interpreted in 113 the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section 3.3.9 of 114 RFC1035 [2]. 116 2.3 RDATA format - algorithm type 118 | The algorithm field indicates the type of key that is present in the 119 | public key field. A positive number, larger than 0 identifies an 120 | algorithm type. The following values, which have been previously 121 | defined by IANA are useful (see RFC2535 [8]). 123 A value of 0 indicates that no key is present. 125 The following values defined by IANA are useful: 127 | 3 A DSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC2536 [9] 129 | 5 A RSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC3110 [10] 131 |2.4 RDATA format - gateway type 133 | The gateway type field indicates the format of the gateway that is 134 | stored in the gateway field. 136 | The following values are defined: 138 | 0 No gateway is present 140 | 1 A 4-byte IPv4 address is present 142 | 2 A 16-byte IPv6 address is present 144 | 3 A wire-encoded domain-name is present. The wire-encoded format is 145 | self-describing, so the length is implicit. 147 |2.5 RDATA format - gateway 149 | The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be 150 | created in order to reach the entity holding this resource record. 152 | There are three formats: 154 | A 32-bit IPv4 address is present in the gateway field, as defined in 155 | section 3.4.1 of RFC1035 [2]. This is a 32-bit number in network 156 | byte order. 158 | A 128-bit IPv6 address is present in the gateway field. The data 159 | portion is an IPv6 address as described in section 3.2 of RFC1886 160 | [5]. This is a 128-bit number in network byte order. 162 | The gateway field is a normal wire-encoded domain name (section 3.3 163 | of RFC1035 [2]). 165 |2.6 RDATA format - RSA public key 167 If the algorithm type has the value 5 then public key portion 168 contains an RSA public key, encoded as described in secion 2 of 169 | RFC3110 [10]. 171 RFC2065 limited the exponent and modulus to 2552 bits in length, and 172 RFC3110 to 4096 bits. No such limit is specified here for the 173 purposes of encoding and decoding. 175 The length in octets of the public exponent length is represented as 176 one octet if it is in the range of 1 to 255 and by a zero octet 177 followed by a two octet unsigned length if it is longer than 255 178 bytes. The public key modulus field is a multiprecision unsigned 179 integer. The length of the modulus can be determined from the 180 RDLENGTH and the preceding RDATA fields including the exponent. 182 Leading zero bytes are prohibited in the exponent and modulus. 184 |2.7 RDATA format - DSA public key 186 If the algorithm type has the value 3, then public key portion 187 | contains an DSA public key, encoded as described in RFC2536 [9]. 189 3. Presentation formats 191 3.1 Representation of IPSECKEY RRs 193 IPSECKEY RRs may appear as lines in a zone data master file. The 194 | precedence, gateway type and algorithm and gateway fields are 195 | REQUIRED. There base64 encoded public key block is OPTIONAL. 197 If no gateway is to be indicated, then the root (".") SHOULD be used. 199 | IN IPSECKEY ( precedence gateway-type algorithm 200 | gateway base64-encoded-public-key ) 202 3.2 Examples 204 An example of a node 192.2.0.38 that will accept IPsec tunnels on its 205 own behalf. 207 | 38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 5 1 208 | 192.2.0.38 209 AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ 210 Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La 211 9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1 212 49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC 213 MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8 214 cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3 215 fejrfi1H ) 217 An example of a node, 192.2.0.38 that has published its key only. 219 | 38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 0 5 220 . 221 AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ 222 Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La 223 9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1 224 49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC 225 MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8 226 cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3 227 fejrfi1H ) 229 An example of a node, 192.2.0.38 that has delegated authority to the 230 node 192.2.3.5. 232 | 38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 5 1 233 | 192.2.3.5 234 AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ 235 Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La 237 | 9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1 238 | 49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC 239 | MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8 240 | cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3 241 fejrfi1H ) 243 An example of a node, 192.1.0.38 that has delegated authority to the 244 node with the identity "mygateway.example.com". 246 | 38.0.2.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 3 5 247 mygateway.example.com. 248 AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ 249 Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La 250 9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1 251 49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC 252 MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8 253 cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3 254 fejrfi1H ) 256 | An example of a node, 3ffe:501:4819:2000:210:f3ff:fe03:4d0 that has 257 | delegated authority to the node 259 | $ORIGIN 0.0.0.2.9.1.8.4.1.0.5.0.e.f.f.3.ip6.int. 260 | 0.d.4.0.3.0.e.f.f.f.3.f.0.1.2.0 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 2 5 261 | 2001:200:0:8002::2000:1 262 | AQOrXJxB56Q28iOO43Va36elIFFKc/QB2orIeL94BdC5X4idFQZjSpsZ 263 | Th48wKVXUE9xjwUkwR4R4/+1vjNN7KFp9fcqa2OxgjsoGqCn+3OPR8La 264 | 9uyvZg0OBuSTj3qkbh/2HacAUJ7vqvjQ3W8Wj6sMXtTueR8NNcdSzJh1 265 | 49ch3zqfiXrxxna8+8UEDQaRR9KOPiSvXb2KjnuDan6hDKOT4qTZRRRC 266 | MWwnNQ9zPIMNbLBp0rNcZ+ZGFg2ckWtWh5yhv1iXYLV2vmd9DB6d4Dv8 267 | cW7scc3rPmDXpYR6APqPBRHlcbenfHCt+oCkEWse8OQhMM56KODIVQq3 268 | fejrfi1H ) 269 4. Security Considerations 271 | This entire memo pertains to the provision of public keying material 272 | for use by key management protocols such as ISAKMP/IKE (RFC2407) [7]. 274 | Implementations of DNS servers and resolvers SHOULD take care to make 275 | sure that the keying material is delivered intact to the end 276 | application. The use of DNSSEC to provide end-to-end integrity 277 | protection is strongly encouraged. 279 | The semantics of this record is outside of the scope of this 280 | document, so no advice for users of this information is provided. 281 | Any user of this resource record MUST carefully document their trust 282 | model, and why the trust model of DNSSEC is appropriate. 284 5. IANA Considerations 286 IANA is asked to assign a resource record type number from the normal 287 resource record number space. 289 The algorithm field does not require any IANA action, as it is 290 inherited from DNS KEY algorithm values. 292 6. Acknowledgments 294 | My thanks to Paul Hoffman, Sam Weiler, Jean-Jacques Puig, and �lafur 295 | Gu�mundsson who reviewed this document carefully. Additional thanks 296 | to �lafur Gu�mundsson for a reference implementation. 298 Normative references 300 [1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD 301 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. 303 [2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and 304 specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. 306 [3] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP 307 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. 309 [4] Eastlake, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System Security 310 Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997. 312 Non-normative references 314 | [5] Thomson, S. and C. Huitema, "DNS Extensions to support IP 315 | version 6", RFC 1886, December 1995. 317 | [6] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement 318 Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 320 | [7] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation 321 | for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998. 323 | [8] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC 324 2535, March 1999. 326 | [9] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System 327 (DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999. 329 | [10] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name 330 System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001. 332 | [11] Massey, D. and S. Rose, "Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource 333 Record (RR)", RFC 3445, December 2002. 335 Author's Address 337 Michael C. Richardson 338 Sandelman Software Works 339 470 Dawson Avenue 340 Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7 341 CA 343 EMail: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca 344 URI: http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ 346 Full Copyright Statement 348 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. 350 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to 351 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it 352 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published 353 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any 354 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are 355 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this 356 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing 357 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other 358 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of 359 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for 360 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be 361 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than 362 English. 364 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be 365 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. 367 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an 368 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING 369 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING 370 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION 371 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 372 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 374 Acknowledgement 376 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the 377 Internet Society.