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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '1' on line 235 == Missing Reference: 'IoT' is mentioned on line 351, but not defined == Missing Reference: 'IKEv2' is mentioned on line 382, but not defined == Missing Reference: 'RFCXXXX' is mentioned on line 645, but not defined == Missing Reference: 'RFC5529' is mentioned on line 645, but not defined ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 4307 (Obsoleted by RFC 8247) Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 5 warnings (==), 4 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group Y. Nir 3 Internet-Draft Check Point 4 Obsoletes: 4307 (if approved) T. Kivinen 5 Updates: 7296 (if approved) INSIDE Secure 6 Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters 7 Expires: March 5, 2017 Red Hat 8 D. Migault 9 Ericsson 10 September 1, 2016 12 Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for IKEv2 13 draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-11 15 Abstract 17 The IPsec series of protocols makes use of various cryptographic 18 algorithms in order to provide security services. The Internet Key 19 Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate the IPsec Security 20 Association (IPsec SA) parameters, such as which algorithms should be 21 used. To ensure interoperability between different implementations, 22 it is necessary to specify a set of algorithm implementation 23 requirements and usage guidance to ensure that there is at least one 24 algorithm that all implementations support. This document defines 25 the current algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance 26 for IKEv2 and does minor cleaning up of IKEv2 IANA registry. This 27 document does not update the algorithms used for packet encryption 28 using IPsec Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP). 30 Status of This Memo 32 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 33 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 35 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 36 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 37 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 38 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 40 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 41 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 42 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 43 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 45 This Internet-Draft will expire on March 5, 2017. 47 Copyright Notice 49 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 50 document authors. All rights reserved. 52 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 53 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 54 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 55 publication of this document. Please review these documents 56 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 57 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 58 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 59 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 60 described in the Simplified BSD License. 62 Table of Contents 64 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 65 1.1. Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage 66 Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 67 1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 1.3. Document Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 69 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 70 3. Algorithm Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 71 3.1. Type 1 - IKEv2 Encryption Algorithm Transforms . . . . . 5 72 3.2. Type 2 - IKEv2 Pseudo-random Function Transforms . . . . 7 73 3.3. Type 3 - IKEv2 Integrity Algorithm Transforms . . . . . . 8 74 3.4. Type 4 - IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Group Transforms . . . . . 9 75 4. IKEv2 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 76 4.1. IKEv2 Authentication Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 77 4.1.1. Recommendations for RSA key length . . . . . . . . . 11 78 4.2. Digital Signature Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 79 5. Algorithms for Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 80 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 81 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 82 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 83 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 84 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 85 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 86 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 88 1. Introduction 90 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [RFC7296] is used to 91 negotiate the parameters of the IPsec SA, such as the encryption and 92 authentication algorithms and the keys for the protected 93 communications between the two endpoints. The IKE protocol itself is 94 also protected by cryptographic algorithms which are negotiated 95 between the two endpoints using IKE. Different implementations of 96 IKE may negotiate different algorithms based on their individual 97 local policy. To ensure interoperability, a set of "mandatory-to- 98 implement" IKE cryptographic algorithms is defined. 100 This document describes the parameters of the IKE protocol and 101 updates the IKEv2 specification because it changes the mandatory to 102 implement authentication algorithms of the section 4 of the RFC7296 103 by saying RSA key lengths of less than 2048 are SHOULD NOT. It does 104 not describe the cryptographic parameters of the AH or ESP protocols. 106 1.1. Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance 108 The field of cryptography evolves continuously. New stronger 109 algorithms appear and existing algorithms are found to be less secure 110 then originally thought. Therefore, algorithm implementation 111 requirements and usage guidance need to be updated from time to time 112 to reflect the new reality. The choices for algorithms must be 113 conservative to minimize the risk of algorithm compromise. 114 Algorithms need to be suitable for a wide variety of CPU 115 architectures and device deployments ranging from high end bulk 116 encryption devices to small low-power IoT devices. 118 The algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance may need 119 to change over time to adapt to the changing world. For this reason, 120 the selection of mandatory-to-implement algorithms was removed from 121 the main IKEv2 specification and placed in a separate document. 123 1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels 125 The mandatory-to-implement algorithm of tomorrow should already be 126 available in most implementations of IKE by the time it is made 127 mandatory. This document attempts to identify and introduce those 128 algorithms for future mandatory-to-implement status. There is no 129 guarantee that the algorithms in use today may become mandatory in 130 the future. Published algorithms are continuously subjected to 131 cryptographic attack and may become too weak or could become 132 completely broken before this document is updated. 134 This document only provides recommendations for the mandatory-to- 135 implement algorithms or algorithms too weak that are recommended not 136 to be implemented. As a result, any algorithm listed at the IKEv2 137 IANA registry not mentioned in this document MAY be implemented. For 138 clarification and consistency with [RFC4307] an algorithm will be 139 denoted here as MAY only when it has been downgraded. 141 Although this document updates the algorithms to keep the IKEv2 142 communication secure over time, it also aims at providing 143 recommendations so that IKEv2 implementations remain interoperable. 144 IKEv2 interoperability is addressed by an incremental introduction or 145 deprecation of algorithms. In addition, this document also considers 146 the new use cases for IKEv2 deployment, such as Internet of Things 147 (IoT). 149 It is expected that deprecation of an algorithm is performed 150 gradually. This provides time for various implementations to update 151 their implemented algorithms while remaining interoperable. Unless 152 there are strong security reasons, an algorithm is expected to be 153 downgraded from MUST to MUST- or SHOULD, instead of MUST NOT. 154 Similarly, an algorithm that has not been mentioned as mandatory-to- 155 implement is expected to be introduced with a SHOULD instead of a 156 MUST. 158 The current trend toward Internet of Things and its adoption of IKEv2 159 requires this specific use case to be taken into account as well. 160 IoT devices are resource constrained devices and their choice of 161 algorithms are motivated by minimizing the footprint of the code, the 162 computation effort and the size of the messages to send. This 163 document indicates "[IoT]" when a specified algorithm is specifically 164 listed for IoT devices. Requirement levels that are marked as "IoT" 165 apply to IoT devices and to server-side implementations that might 166 presumably need to interoperate with them, including any general- 167 purpose VPN gateways. 169 1.3. Document Audience 171 The recommendations of this document mostly target IKEv2 implementers 172 as implementations need to meet both high security expectations as 173 well as high interoperability between various vendors and with 174 different versions. Interoperability requires a smooth move to more 175 secure cipher suites. This may differ from a user point of view that 176 may deploy and configure IKEv2 with only the safest cipher suite. 178 This document does not give any recommendations for the use of 179 algorithms, it only gives implementation recommendations for 180 implementations. The use of algorithms by users is dictated by the 181 security policy requirements for that specific user, and are outside 182 the scope of this document. 184 IKEv1 is out of scope of this document. IKEv1 is deprecated and the 185 recommendations of this document must not be considered for IKEv1, as 186 most IKEv1 implementations have been "frozen" and will not be able to 187 update the list of mandatory-to-implement algorithms. 189 2. Conventions Used in This Document 191 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 192 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 193 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 195 We define some additional terms here: 197 SHOULD+ This term means the same as SHOULD. However, it is likely 198 that an algorithm marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at 199 some future time to be a MUST. 200 SHOULD- This term means the same as SHOULD. However, an algorithm 201 marked as SHOULD- may be deprecated to a MAY in a future 202 version of this document. 203 MUST- This term means the same as MUST. However, we expect at 204 some point that this algorithm will no longer be a MUST in 205 a future document. Although its status will be determined 206 at a later time, it is reasonable to expect that if a 207 future revision of a document alters the status of a MUST- 208 algorithm, it will remain at least a SHOULD or a SHOULD- 209 level. 210 IoT stands for Internet of Things. 212 3. Algorithm Selection 214 3.1. Type 1 - IKEv2 Encryption Algorithm Transforms 216 The algorithms in the below table are negotiated in the SA payload 217 and used for the Encrypted Payload. References to the specification 218 defining these algorithms and the ones in the following subsections 219 are in the IANA registry [IKEV2-IANA]. Some of these algorithms are 220 Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD - [RFC5282]). 221 Algorithms that are not AEAD MUST be used in conjunction with an 222 integrity algorithms in Section 3.3. 224 +------------------------+----------+-------+---------+ 225 | Name | Status | AEAD? | Comment | 226 +------------------------+----------+-------+---------+ 227 | ENCR_AES_CBC | MUST | No | [1] | 228 | ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | SHOULD | Yes | | 229 | ENCR_AES_GCM_16 | SHOULD | Yes | [1] | 230 | ENCR_AES_CCM_8 | SHOULD | Yes | [IoT] | 231 | ENCR_3DES | MAY | No | | 232 | ENCR_DES | MUST NOT | No | | 233 +------------------------+----------+-------+---------+ 235 [1] - This requirement level is for 128-bit and 256-bit keys. 236 192-bit keys remain at MAY level. [IoT] - This requirement is for 237 interoperability with IoT. Only 128-bit keys are at MUST level. 238 192-bit and 256-bit keys are at the MAY level. 240 ENCR_AES_CBC is raised from SHOULD+ in [RFC4307] to MUST. It is the 241 only shared mandatory-to-implement algorithm with RFC4307 and as a 242 result it is necessary for interoperability with IKEv2 implementation 243 compatible with RFC4307. 245 ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 was not ready to be considered at the time of 246 RFC4307. It has been recommended by the CRFG and others as an 247 alternative to AES-CBC and AES-GCM. It is also being standardized 248 for IPsec for the same reasons. At the time of writing, there were 249 not enough IKEv2 implementations supporting ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 to 250 be able to introduce it at the SHOULD+ level. 252 ENCR_AES_GCM_16 was not considered in RFC4307. At the time RFC4307 253 was written, AES-GCM was not defined in an IETF document. AES-GCM 254 was defined for ESP in [RFC4106] and later for IKEv2 in [RFC5282]. 255 The main motivation for adopting AES-GCM for ESP is encryption 256 performance and key longevity compared to AES-CBC. This resulted in 257 AES-GCM being widely implemented for ESP. As the computation load of 258 IKEv2 is relatively small compared to ESP, many IKEv2 implementations 259 have not implemented AES-GCM. For this reason, AES-GCM is not 260 promoted to a greater status than SHOULD. The reason for promotion 261 from MAY to SHOULD is to promote the slightly more secure AEAD method 262 over the traditional encrypt+auth method. Its status is expected to 263 be raised once widely implemented. As the advantage of the shorter 264 (and weaker) ICVs is minimal, the 8 and 12 octet ICV's remain at the 265 MAY level. 267 ENCR_AES_CCM_8 was not considered in RFC4307. This document 268 considers it as SHOULD be implemented in order to be able to interact 269 with Internet of Things devices. As this case is not a general use 270 case for non-IoT VPNs, its status is expected to remain as SHOULD. 271 The 8 octet size of the ICV is expected to be sufficient for most use 272 cases of IKEv2, as far less packets are exchanged on those cases, and 273 IoT devices want to make packets as small as possible. When 274 implemented, ENCR_AES_CCM_8 MUST be implemented for key length 128 275 and MAY be implemented for key length 256. 277 ENCR_3DES has been downgraded from RFC4307 MUST- to SHOULD NOT. All 278 IKEv2 implementation already implement ENCR_AES_CBC, so there is no 279 need to keep support for the much slower ENCR_3DES. In addition, 280 ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 provides a more modern alternative to AES. 282 ENCR_DES can be brute-forced using of-the-shelves hardware. It 283 provides no meaningful security whatsoever and therefor MUST NOT be 284 implemented. 286 3.2. Type 2 - IKEv2 Pseudo-random Function Transforms 288 Transform Type 2 algorithms are pseudo-random functions used to 289 generate pseudo-random values when needed. 291 If an algorithm is selected as the integrity algorithm, it SHOULD 292 also be used as the PRF. When using an AEAD cipher, a choice of PRF 293 needs to be made. The table below lists the recommended algorithms. 295 +-------------------+----------+---------+ 296 | Name | Status | Comment | 297 +-------------------+----------+---------+ 298 | PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 | MUST | | 299 | PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 | SHOULD+ | | 300 | PRF_HMAC_SHA1 | MUST- | | 301 | PRF_AES128_XCBC | SHOULD | [IoT] | 302 | PRF_HMAC_MD5 | MUST NOT | | 303 +-------------------+----------+---------+ 305 [IoT] - This requirement is for interoperability with IoT 307 PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 was not mentioned in RFC4307, as no SHA2 based 308 transforms were mentioned. PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 MUST be implemented in 309 order to replace SHA1 and PRF_HMAC_SHA1. 311 PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 SHOULD be implemented as a future replacement for 312 PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 or when stronger security is required. 313 PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 is preferred over PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384, as the 314 additional overhead of PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512 is negligible. 316 PRF_HMAC_SHA1 has been downgraded from MUST in RFC4307 to MUST- as 317 their is an industry-wide trend to deprecate its usage. 319 PRF_AES128_XCBC is only recommended in the scope of IoT, as Internet 320 of Things deployments tend to prefer AES based pseudo-random 321 functions in order to avoid implementing SHA2. For the non-IoT VPN 322 deployment it has been downgraded from SHOULD in RFC4307 to MAY as it 323 has not seen wide adoption. 325 PRF_HMAC_MD5 has been downgraded from MAY in RFC4307 to MUST NOT. 326 There is an industry-wide trend to deprecate its usage as MD5 support 327 is being removed from cryptographic libraries in general because its 328 non-HMAC use is known to be subject to collision attacks, for example 329 as mentioned in [TRANSCRIPTION]. 331 3.3. Type 3 - IKEv2 Integrity Algorithm Transforms 333 The algorithms in the below table are negotiated in the SA payload 334 and used for the Encrypted Payload. References to the specification 335 defining these algorithms are in the IANA registry. When an AEAD 336 algorithm (see Section 3.1) is proposed, this algorithm transform 337 type is not in use. 339 +------------------------+----------+---------+ 340 | Name | Status | Comment | 341 +------------------------+----------+---------+ 342 | AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | MUST | | 343 | AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 | SHOULD | | 344 | AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 | MUST- | | 345 | AUTH_AES_XCBC_96 | SHOULD | [IoT] | 346 | AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96 | MUST NOT | | 347 | AUTH_DES_MAC | MUST NOT | | 348 | AUTH_KPDK_MD5 | MUST NOT | | 349 +------------------------+----------+---------+ 351 [IoT] - This requirement is for interoperability with IoT 353 AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 was not mentioned in RFC4307, as no SHA2 based 354 transforms were mentioned. AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 MUST be 355 implemented in order to replace AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96. 357 AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 SHOULD be implemented as a future replacement 358 of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 or when stronger security is required. 359 This value has been preferred over AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384, as the 360 additional overhead of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512 is negligible. 362 AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 has been downgraded from MUST in RFC4307 to MUST- 363 as there is an industry-wide trend to deprecate its usage. 365 AUTH_AES-XCBC is only recommended in the scope of IoT, as Internet of 366 Things deployments tend to prefer AES based pseudo-random functions 367 in order to avoid implementing SHA2. For the non-IoT VPN deployment, 368 it has been downgraded from SHOULD in RFC4307 to MAY as it has not 369 been widely adopted. 371 AUTH_DES_MAC, AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, and AUTH_KPDK_MD5 were not mentioned 372 in RFC4307 so their default status ware MAY. They have been 373 downgraded to MUST NOT. There is an industry-wide trend to deprecate 374 DES and MD5. MD5 support is being removed from cryptographic 375 libraries in general because its non-HMAC use is known to be subject 376 to collision attacks, for example as mentioned in [TRANSCRIPTION]. 378 3.4. Type 4 - IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Group Transforms 380 There are several Modular Exponential (MODP) groups and several 381 Elliptic Curve groups (ECC) that are defined for use in IKEv2. These 382 groups are defined in both the [IKEv2] base document and in 383 extensions documents and are identified by group number. Note that 384 it is critical to enforce a secure Diffie-Hellman exchange as this 385 exchange provides keys for the session. If an attacker can retrieve 386 the private numbers (a, or b) and the public values (g**a, and g**b), 387 then the attacker can compute the secret and the keys used and 388 decrypt the exchange and IPsec SA created inside the IKEv2 SA. Such 389 an attack can be performed off-line on a previously recorded 390 communication, years after the communication happened. This differs 391 from attacks that need to be executed during the authentication which 392 must be performed online and in near real-time. 394 +--------+---------------------------------------------+------------+ 395 | Number | Description | Status | 396 +--------+---------------------------------------------+------------+ 397 | 14 | 2048-bit MODP Group | MUST | 398 | 19 | 256-bit random ECP group | SHOULD | 399 | 5 | 1536-bit MODP Group | SHOULD NOT | 400 | 2 | 1024-bit MODP Group | SHOULD NOT | 401 | 1 | 768-bit MODP Group | MUST NOT | 402 | 22 | 1024-bit MODP Group with 160-bit Prime | SHOULD NOT | 403 | | Order Subgroup | | 404 | 23 | 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime | SHOULD NOT | 405 | | Order Subgroup | | 406 | 24 | 2048-bit MODP Group with 256-bit Prime | SHOULD NOT | 407 | | Order Subgroup | | 408 +--------+---------------------------------------------+------------+ 410 Group 14 or 2048-bit MODP Group is raised from SHOULD+ in RFC4307 as 411 a replacement for 1024-bit MODP Group. Group 14 is widely 412 implemented and considered secure. 414 Group 19 or 256-bit random ECP group was not specified in RFC4307, as 415 this group were not specified at that time. Group 19 is widely 416 implemented and considered secure. 418 Group 5 or 1536-bit MODP Group has been downgraded from MAY in 419 RFC4307 to SHOULD NOT. It was specified earlier, but is now 420 considered to be vulnerable to be broken within the next few years by 421 a nation state level attack, so its security margin is considered too 422 narrow. 424 Group 2 or 1024-bit MODP Group has been downgraded from MUST- in 425 RFC4307 to SHOULD NOT. It is known to be weak against sufficiently 426 funded attackers using commercially available mass-computing 427 resources, so its security margin is considered too narrow. It is 428 expected in the near future to be downgraded to MUST NOT. 430 Group 1 or 768-bit MODP Group was not mentioned in RFC4307 and so its 431 status was MAY. It can be broken within hours using cheap of-the- 432 shelves hardware. It provides no security whatsoever. 434 Group 22, 23 and 24 or 1024-bit MODP Group with 160-bit, and 2048-bit 435 MODP Group with 224-bit and 256-bit Prime Order Subgroup have small 436 subgroups, which means that checks specified in the "Additional 437 Diffie-Hellman Test for the IKEv2" [RFC6989] section 2.2 first bullet 438 point MUST be done when these groups are used. These groups are also 439 not safe-primes. The seeds for these groups have not been publicly 440 released, resulting in reduced trust in these groups. These groups 441 were proposed as alternatives for group 2 and 14 but never saw wide 442 deployment. It is expected in the near future to be further 443 downgraded to MUST NOT. 445 4. IKEv2 Authentication 447 IKEv2 authentication may involve a signatures verification. 448 Signatures may be used to validate a certificate or to check the 449 signature of the AUTH value. Cryptographic recommendations regarding 450 certificate validation are out of scope of this document. What is 451 mandatory to implement is provided by the PKIX Community. This 452 document is mostly concerned on signature verification and generation 453 for the authentication. 455 4.1. IKEv2 Authentication Method 456 +--------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 457 | Number | Description | Status | 458 +--------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 459 | 1 | RSA Digital Signature | MUST | 460 | 2 | Shared Key Message Integrity Code | MUST | 461 | 3 | DSS Digital Signature | SHOULD NOT | 462 | 9 | ECDSA with SHA-256 on the P-256 curve | SHOULD | 463 | 10 | ECDSA with SHA-384 on the P-384 curve | SHOULD | 464 | 11 | ECDSA with SHA-512 on the P-521 curve | SHOULD | 465 | 14 | Digital Signature | SHOULD | 466 +--------+---------------------------------------+------------+ 468 RSA Digital Signature is widely deployed and therefore kept for 469 interoperability. It is expected to be downgraded in the future as 470 its signatures are based on the older RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 which is no 471 longer recommended. RSA authentication, as well as other specific 472 Authentication Methods, are expected to be replaced with the generic 473 Digital Signature method of [RFC7427]. RSA Digital Signature is not 474 recommended for keys smaller then 2048, but since these signatures 475 only have value in real-time, and need no future protection, smaller 476 keys was kept at SHOULD NOT instead of MUST NOT. 478 Shared Key Message Integrity Code is widely deployed and mandatory to 479 implement in the IKEv2 in the RFC7296. 481 ECDSA based Authentication Methods are also expected to be downgraded 482 as it does not provide hash function agility. Instead, ECDSA (like 483 RSA) is expected to be performed using the generic Digital Signature 484 method. 486 DSS Digital Signature is bound to SHA-1 and has the same level of 487 security as 1024-bit RSA. It is expected to be downgraded to MUST 488 NOT in the future. 490 Digital Signature [RFC7427] is expected to be promoted as it provides 491 hash function, signature format and algorithm agility. 493 4.1.1. Recommendations for RSA key length 495 +-------------------------------------------+------------+ 496 | Description | Status | 497 +-------------------------------------------+------------+ 498 | RSA with key length 2048 | MUST | 499 | RSA with key length 3072 and 4096 | SHOULD | 500 | RSA with key length between 2049 and 4095 | MAY | 501 | RSA with key length smaller than 2048 | SHOULD NOT | 502 +-------------------------------------------+------------+ 504 The IKEv2 RFC7296 mandates support for the RSA keys of size 1024 or 505 2048 bits, but here we make key sizes less than 2048 SHOULD NOT as 506 there is industry-wide trend to deprecate key lengths less than 2048 507 bits. 509 4.2. Digital Signature Recommendations 511 When Digital Signature authentication method is implemented, then the 512 following recommendations are applied for hash functions: 514 +--------+-------------+----------+---------+ 515 | Number | Description | Status | Comment | 516 +--------+-------------+----------+---------+ 517 | 1 | SHA1 | MUST NOT | | 518 | 2 | SHA2-256 | MUST | | 519 | 3 | SHA2-384 | MAY | | 520 | 4 | SHA2-512 | SHOULD | | 521 +--------+-------------+----------+---------+ 523 When Digital Signature authentication method is used with RSA 524 signature algorithm, then RSASSA-PSS MUST be supported and RSASSA- 525 PKCS1-v1.5 MAY be supported. 527 The following table lists recommendations for authentication methods 528 in RFC7427 [RFC7427] notation. These recommendations are applied 529 only if Digital Signature authentication method is implemented. 531 +------------------------------------+----------+---------+ 532 | Description | Status | Comment | 533 +------------------------------------+----------+---------+ 534 | RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256 | MUST | | 535 | ecdsa-with-sha256 | SHOULD | | 536 | sha1WithRSAEncryption | MUST NOT | | 537 | dsa-with-sha1 | MUST NOT | | 538 | ecdsa-with-sha1 | MUST NOT | | 539 | RSASSA-PSS with Empty Parameters | MUST NOT | | 540 | RSASSA-PSS with Default Parameters | MUST NOT | | 541 +------------------------------------+----------+---------+ 543 5. Algorithms for Internet of Things 545 Some algorithms in this document are marked for use with the Internet 546 of Things (IoT). There are several reasons why IoT devices prefer a 547 different set of algorithms from regular IKEv2 clients. IoT devices 548 are usually very constrained, meaning the memory size and CPU power 549 is so limited, that these clients only have resources to implement 550 and run one set of algorithms. For example, instead of implementing 551 AES and SHA, these devices typically use AES_XCBC as integrity 552 algorithm so SHA does not need to be implemented. 554 For example, IEEE Std 802.15.4 [IEEE-802-15-4] devices have a 555 mandatory to implement link level security using AES-CCM with 128 bit 556 keys. The IEEE Recommended Practice for Transport of Key Management 557 Protocol (KMP) Datagrams [IEEE-802-15-9] already provide a way to use 558 Minimal IKEv2 [RFC7815] over 802.15.4 to provide link keys for the 559 802.15.4 layer. 561 These devices might want to use AES-CCM as their IKEv2 algorithm, so 562 they can reuse the hardware implementing it. They cannot use the 563 AES-CBC algorithm, as the hardware quite often do not include support 564 for AES decryption needed to support the CBC mode. So despite the 565 AES-CCM algorithm requiring AEAD [RFC5282] support, the benefit of 566 reusing the crypto hardware makes AES-CCM the preferred algorithm. 568 Another important aspect of IoT devices is that their transfer rates 569 are usually quite low (in order of tens of kbits/s), and each bit 570 they transmit has an energy consumption cost associated with it and 571 shortens their battery life. Therefore, shorter packets are 572 preferred. This is the reason for recommending the 8 octet ICV over 573 the 16 octet ICV. 575 Because different IoT devices will have different constraints, this 576 document cannot specify the one mandatory profile for IoT. Instead, 577 this document points out commonly used algorithms with IoT devices. 579 6. Security Considerations 581 The security of cryptographic-based systems depends on both the 582 strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of 583 the keys used with those algorithms. The security also depends on 584 the engineering of the protocol used by the system to ensure that 585 there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the security of the 586 overall system. 588 The Diffie-Hellman Group parameter is the most important one to 589 choose conservatively. Any party capturing all IKE and ESP traffic 590 that (even years later) can break the selected DH group in IKE, can 591 gain access to the symmetric keys used to encrypt all the ESP 592 traffic. Therefore, these groups must be chosen very conservatively. 593 However, specifying an extremely large DH group also puts a 594 considerable load on the device, especially when this is a large VPN 595 gateway or an IoT constrained device. 597 This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic 598 algorithms for the use of IKEv2, specifically with the selection of 599 "mandatory-to-implement" algorithms. The algorithms identified in 600 this document as "MUST implement" or "SHOULD implement" are not known 601 to be broken at the current time, and cryptographic research so far 602 leads us to believe that they will likely remain secure into the 603 foreseeable future. However, this isn't necessarily forever and it 604 is expected that new revisions of this document will be issued from 605 time to time to reflect the current best practice in this area. 607 7. IANA Considerations 609 This document renames some of the names in the "Transform Type 1 - 610 Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry of the "Internet Key 611 Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters". All the other names have 612 ENCR_ prefix except 3, and all other entries use names in format of 613 uppercase words separated with underscores except 6. This document 614 changes those names to match others. 616 This document requests IANA to rename following entries: 618 +---------------------------------------+----------------------+ 619 | Old name | New name | 620 +---------------------------------------+----------------------+ 621 | AES-GCM with a 8 octet ICV | ENCR_AES_GCM_8 | 622 | AES-GCM with a 12 octet ICV | ENCR_AES_GCM_12 | 623 | AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV | ENCR_AES_GCM_16 | 624 | ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM with an 8-octet ICV | ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_8 | 625 | ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM with a 12-octet ICV | ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_12 | 626 | ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM with a 16-octet ICV | ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_16 | 627 +---------------------------------------+----------------------+ 629 In addition to add this RFC as reference to both ESP Reference and 630 IKEv2 Reference columns for ENCR_AES_GCM entries, keeping the current 631 references there also, and also add this RFC as reference to the ESP 632 Reference column for ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM entries, keeping the current 633 reference there also. 635 The final registry entries should be: 637 Number Name ESP Reference IKEv2 Reference 638 ... 639 18 ENCR_AES_GCM_8 [RFC4106][RFCXXXX] [RFC5282][RFCXXXX] 640 19 ENCR_AES_GCM_12 [RFC4106][RFCXXXX] [RFC5282][RFCXXXX] 641 20 ENCR_AES_GCM_16 [RFC4106][RFCXXXX] [RFC5282][RFCXXXX] 642 ... 643 25 ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_8 [RFC5529][RFCXXXX] - 644 26 ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_12 [RFC5529][RFCXXXX] - 645 27 ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_16 [RFC5529][RFCXXXX] - 647 8. Acknowledgements 649 The first version of this document was RFC 4307 by Jeffrey I. 650 Schiller of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Much of 651 the original text has been copied verbatim. 653 We would like to thank Paul Hoffman, Yaron Sheffer, John Mattsson and 654 Tommy Pauly for their valuable feedback. 656 9. References 658 9.1. Normative References 660 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 661 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 662 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 663 . 665 [RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode 666 (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", 667 RFC 4106, DOI 10.17487/RFC4106, June 2005, 668 . 670 [RFC4307] Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the 671 Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 4307, 672 DOI 10.17487/RFC4307, December 2005, 673 . 675 [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. 676 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 677 (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 678 2014, . 680 [RFC5282] Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption 681 Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key 682 Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282, 683 DOI 10.17487/RFC5282, August 2008, 684 . 686 9.2. Informative References 688 [RFC7427] Kivinen, T. and J. Snyder, "Signature Authentication in 689 the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 7427, 690 DOI 10.17487/RFC7427, January 2015, 691 . 693 [RFC6989] Sheffer, Y. and S. Fluhrer, "Additional Diffie-Hellman 694 Tests for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 695 (IKEv2)", RFC 6989, DOI 10.17487/RFC6989, July 2013, 696 . 698 [RFC7815] Kivinen, T., "Minimal Internet Key Exchange Version 2 699 (IKEv2) Initiator Implementation", RFC 7815, 700 DOI 10.17487/RFC7815, March 2016, 701 . 703 [IKEV2-IANA] 704 "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters", 705 . 707 [TRANSCRIPTION] 708 Bhargavan, K. and G. Leurent, "Transcript Collision 709 Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH", 710 NDSS , feb 2016. 712 [IEEE-802-15-4] 713 "IEEE Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area 714 Networks (WPANs)", IEEE Standard 802.15.4, 2015. 716 [IEEE-802-15-9] 717 "IEEE Recommended Practice for Transport of Key Management 718 Protocol (KMP) Datagrams", IEEE Standard 802.15.9, 2016. 720 Authors' Addresses 722 Yoav Nir 723 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. 724 5 Hasolelim st. 725 Tel Aviv 6789735 726 Israel 728 EMail: ynir.ietf@gmail.com 730 Tero Kivinen 731 INSIDE Secure 732 Eerikinkatu 28 733 HELSINKI FI-00180 734 FI 736 EMail: kivinen@iki.fi 737 Paul Wouters 738 Red Hat 740 EMail: pwouters@redhat.com 742 Daniel Migault 743 Ericsson 744 8400 boulevard Decarie 745 Montreal, QC H4P 2N2 746 Canada 748 Phone: +1 514-452-2160 749 EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com