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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group D. Migault 3 Internet-Draft J. Mattsson 4 Obsoletes: 7321 (if approved) Ericsson 5 Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters 6 Expires: August 06, 2017 Red Hat 7 Y. Nir 8 Check Point 9 T. Kivinen 10 INSIDE Secure 11 February 02, 2017 13 Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance 14 for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) 15 draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7321bis-03 17 Abstract 19 This document updates the Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation 20 Requirements for ESP and AH. The goal of these document is to enable 21 ESP and AH to benefit from cryptography that is up to date while 22 making IPsec interoperable. 24 This document obsoletes RFC 7321 on the cryptographic recommendations 25 only. 27 Status of This Memo 29 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 30 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 33 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 34 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 35 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 42 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 06, 2017. 44 Copyright Notice 46 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 47 document authors. All rights reserved. 49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 51 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 52 publication of this document. Please review these documents 53 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 54 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 55 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 56 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 57 described in the Simplified BSD License. 59 Table of Contents 61 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 62 1.1. Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage 63 Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64 1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . . 3 65 1.3. Document Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 3. Manual Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 4. ESP Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 69 5. ESP and AH Authentication Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 70 6. ESP and AH Compression Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 71 7. Summary of Changes from RFC 7321 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 73 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 74 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 75 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 76 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 77 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 78 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 80 1. Introduction 82 The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] and the 83 Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] are the mechanisms for applying 84 cryptographic protection to data being sent over an IPsec Security 85 Association (SA) [RFC4301]. 87 This document provides guidance and recommendations so that ESP and 88 AH can be used with a cryptographic algorithms that are up to date. 89 The challenge of such document is to make sure that over the time 90 IPsec implementations can use secure and up-to-date cryptographic 91 algorithms while keeping IPsec interoperable. 93 1.1. Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance 95 The field of cryptography evolves continuously. New stronger 96 algorithms appear and existing algorithms are found to be less secure 97 than originally thought. Therefore, algorithm implementation 98 requirements and usage guidance need to be updated from time to time 99 to reflect the new reality. The choices for algorithms must be 100 conservative to minimize the risk of algorithm compromise. 101 Algorithms need to be suitable for a wide variety of CPU 102 architectures and device deployments ranging from high end bulk 103 encryption devices to small low-power IoT devices. 105 The algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance may need 106 to change over time to adapt to the changing world. For this reason, 107 the selection of mandatory-to-implement algorithms was removed from 108 the main IKEv2 specification and placed in a separate document. 110 1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels 112 The mandatory-to-implement algorithm of tomorrow should already be 113 available in most implementations of AH/ESP by the time it is made 114 mandatory. This document attempts to identify and introduce those 115 algorithms for future mandatory-to-implement status. There is no 116 guarantee that the algorithms in use today may become mandatory in 117 the future. Published algorithms are continuously subjected to 118 cryptographic attack and may become too weak or could become 119 completely broken before this document is updated. 121 This document only provides recommendations for the mandatory-to- 122 implement algorithms and algorithms too weak that are recommended not 123 to be implemented. As a result, any algorithm listed at the IPsec 124 IANA registry not mentioned in this document MAY be implemented. It 125 is expected that this document will be updated over time and next 126 versions will only mention algorithms which status has evolved. For 127 clarification when an algorithm has been mentioned in [RFC7321], this 128 document states explicitly the update of the status. 130 Although this document updates the algorithms to keep the AH/ESP 131 communication secure over time, it also aims at providing 132 recommendations so that AH/ESP implementations remain interoperable. 133 AH/ESP interoperability is addressed by an incremental introduction 134 or deprecation of algorithms. In addition, this document also 135 considers the new use cases for AH/ESP deployment, such as Internet 136 of Things (IoT). 138 It is expected that deprecation of an algorithm is performed 139 gradually. This provides time for various implementations to update 140 their implemented algorithms while remaining interoperable. Unless 141 there are strong security reasons, an algorithm is expected to be 142 downgraded from MUST to MUST- or SHOULD, instead of MUST NOT. 143 Similarly, an algorithm that has not been mentioned as mandatory-to- 144 implement is expected to be introduced with a SHOULD instead of a 145 MUST. 147 The current trend toward Internet of Things and its adoption of AH/ 148 ESP requires this specific use case to be taken into account as well. 149 IoT devices are resource constrained devices and their choice of 150 algorithms are motivated by minimizing the footprint of the code, the 151 computation effort and the size of the messages to send. This 152 document indicates "(IoT)" when a specified algorithm is specifically 153 listed for IoT devices. Requirement levels that are marked as "IoT" 154 apply to IoT devices and to server-side implementations that might 155 presumably need to interoperate with them, including any general- 156 purpose VPN gateways. 158 1.3. Document Audience 160 The recommendations of this document mostly target AH/ESP 161 implementers as implementations need to meet both high security 162 expectations as well as high interoperability between various vendors 163 and with different versions. Interoperability requires a smooth move 164 to more secure cipher suites. This may differ from a user point of 165 view that may deploy and configure AH/ESP with only the safest cipher 166 suite. 168 This document does not give any recommendations for the use of 169 algorithms, it only gives implementation recommendations for 170 implementations. The use of algorithms by users is dictated by the 171 security policy requirements for that specific user, and are outside 172 the scope of this document. 174 The algorithms considered here are listed by the IANA as part of the 175 IKEv2 parameters. IKEv1 is out of scope of this document. IKEv1 is 176 deprecated and the recommendations of this document must not be 177 considered for IKEv1, nor IKEv1 parameters be considered by this 178 document. 180 The IANA registry for Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) 181 Parameters contains some entries that are not for use with ESP or AH. 182 This document does not modify the status of those algorithms. 184 2. Requirements Language 186 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 187 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 188 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 189 [RFC2119]. 191 We define some additional terms here: 193 SHOULD+ This term means the same as SHOULD. However, it is likely 194 that an algorithm marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at some 195 future time to be a MUST. 196 SHOULD- This term means the same as SHOULD. However, an algorithm 197 marked as SHOULD- may be deprecated to a MAY in a future 198 version of this document. 199 MUST- This term means the same as MUST. However, we expect at some 200 point that this algorithm will no longer be a MUST in a 201 future document. Although its status will be determined at a 202 later time, it is reasonable to expect that if a future 203 revision of a document alters the status of a MUST- 204 algorithm, it will remain at least a SHOULD or a SHOULD- 205 level. 206 IoT stands for Internet of Things. 208 Table 1 210 3. Manual Keying 212 Manual Keying is not to be used as it is inherently dangerous. 213 Without any keying protocol, it does not offer Perfect Forward 214 Secrecy ("PFS") protection. Deployments tend to never be 215 reconfigured with fresh session keys. It also fails to scale and 216 keeping SPI's unique amongst many servers is impractical. This 217 document was written for deploying ESP/AH using IKE ([RFC7296]) and 218 assumes that keying happens using IKEv2. 220 If manual keying is used anyway, ENCR_AES_CBC MUST be used, and 221 ENCR_AES_CCM, ENCR_AES_GCM and ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 MUST NOT be 222 used as these algorithms require IKE. 224 4. ESP Encryption Algorithms 226 +-------------------------+-------------+---------+--------------+ 227 | Name | Status | AEAD | Comment | 228 +-------------------------+-------------+---------+--------------+ 229 | ENCR_DES_IV64 | MUST NOT | No | UNSPECIFIED | 230 | ENCR_DES | MUST NOT | No | [RFC2405] | 231 | ENCR_3DES | SHOULD NOT | No | [RFC2451] | 232 | ENCR_BLOWFISH | MUST NOT | No | [RFC2451] | 233 | ENCR_3IDEA | MUST NOT | No | UNSPECIFIED | 234 | ENCR_DES_IV32 | MUST NOT | No | UNSPECIFIED | 235 | ENCR_NULL | MUST | No | [RFC2410] | 236 | ENCR_AES_CBC | MUST | No | [RFC3602][1] | 237 | ENCR_AES_CCM_8 | SHOULD(IoT) | Yes | [RFC4309] | 238 | ENCR_AES_GCM_16 | MUST | Yes | [RFC4106][1] | 239 | ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | SHOULD | Yes | [RFC7634] | 240 +-------------------------+-------------+---------+--------------+ 242 [1] - This requirement level is for 128-bit and 256-bit keys. 243 192-bit keys remain at MAY level. (IoT) - This requirement is for 244 interoperability with IoT. Only 128-bit keys are at the given level. 246 Table 2 248 IPsec sessions may have very long life time, and carry multiple 249 packets, so there is a need to move to 256-bit keys in the long term. 250 For that purpose the requirement level for 128 bit keys and 256 bit 251 keys are at MUST (when applicable). In that sense 256 bit keys 252 status has been raised from MAY in RFC7321 to MUST. 254 IANA has allocated codes for cryptographic algorithms that have not 255 been specified by the IETF. Such algorithms are noted as 256 UNSPECIFIED. Usually, the use of theses algorithms is limited to 257 specific cases, and the absence of specification makes 258 interoperability difficult for IPsec communications. These 259 algorithms were not been mentioned in [RFC7321] and this document 260 clarify that such algorithms MUST NOT be implemented for IPsec 261 communications. 263 Similarly IANA also allocated code points for algorithms that are not 264 expected to be used to secure IPsec communications. Such algorithms 265 are noted as Non IPsec. As a result, these algorithms MUST NOT be 266 implemented. 268 Various older and not well tested and never widely implemented 269 ciphers have been changed to MUST NOT. 271 ENCR_3DES status has been downgraded from MAY in RFC7321 to SHOULD 272 NOT. ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is a more modern approach alternative 273 for ENCR_3DES than ENCR_AES_CBC and so it expected to be favored to 274 replace ENCR_3DES. 276 ENCR_BLOWFISH has been downgraded to MUST NOT as it has been 277 deprecated for years by TWOFISH, which is not standarized for ESP and 278 therefore not listed in this document. Some implementations support 279 TWOFISH using a private range number. 281 ENCR_NULL status was set to MUST in [RFC7321] and remains a MUST to 282 enable the use of ESP with only authentication which is preferred 283 over AH due to NAT traversal. ENCR_NULL is expected to remain MUST 284 by protocol requirements. 286 ENCR_AES_CBC status remains at MUST. ENCR_AES_CBC MUST be 287 implemented in order to enable interoperability between 288 implementations that followed RFC7321. However, there is a trend for 289 the industry to move to AEAD encryption, and the overhead of 290 ENCR_AES_CBC remains quite large so it is expected to be replaced by 291 AEAD algorithms in the long term. 293 ENCR_AES_CCM_8 status was set to MAY in [RFC7321] and has been raised 294 from MAY to SHOULD in order to interact with Internet of Things 295 devices. As this case is not a general use case for VPNs, its status 296 is expected to remain as SHOULD. 298 ENCR_AES_GCM_16 status has been updated from SHOULD+ to MUST in order 299 to favor the use of authenticated encryption and AEAD algorithms. 300 ENCR_AES_GCM_16 has been widely implemented for ESP due to its 301 increased performance and key longevity compared to ENCR_AES_CBC. 303 ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 was not ready to be considered at the time of 304 RFC7321. It has been recommended by the CRFG and others as an 305 alternative to AES-CBC and AES-GCM. It is also being standardized 306 for ESP for the same reasons. At the time of writing, there are not 307 enough ESP implementations of ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 to be able to 308 introduce it at the SHOULD+ level. Its status has been set to SHOULD 309 and is expected to become MUST in the long term. 311 5. ESP and AH Authentication Algorithms 313 Encryption without authentication MUST NOT be used. As a result, 314 authentication algorithm recommendations in this section are 315 targeting two types of communications: Firstly authenticated only 316 communications without encryption. Such communications can be ESP 317 with NULL encryption or AH communications. Secondly, communications 318 that are encrypted with non AEAD encryption algorithms mentioned 319 above. In this case, they MUST be combined with an authentication 320 algorithm. 322 +----------------------------+-------------+------------------------+ 323 | Name | Status | Comment | 324 +----------------------------+-------------+------------------------+ 325 | AUTH_NONE | MUST / MUST | [RFC7296] AEAD | 326 | | NOT | | 327 | AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96 | MUST NOT | [RFC2403][RFC7296] | 328 | AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 | MUST- | [RFC2404][RFC7296] | 329 | AUTH_DES_MAC | MUST NOT | [UNSPECIFIED] | 330 | AUTH_KPDK_MD5 | MUST NOT | [UNSPECIFIED] | 331 | AUTH_AES_XCBC_96 | SHOULD | [RFC3566][RFC7296] | 332 | | | (IoT) | 333 | AUTH_AES_128_GMAC | MAY | [RFC4543] | 334 | AUTH_AES_256_GMAC | MAY | [RFC4543] | 335 | AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | MUST | [RFC4868] | 336 | AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 | SHOULD | [RFC4868] | 337 +----------------------------+-------------+------------------------+ 339 (IoT) - This requirement is for interoperability with IoT 341 Table 3 343 AUTH_NONE has been downgraded from MAY in RFC7321 to MUST NOT. The 344 only reason NULL is acceptable is when authenticated encryption 345 algorithms are selected from Section 4. In all other cases, NULL 346 MUST NOT be selected. As ESP and AH both provides authentication, 347 one may be tempted to combine these protocols to provide 348 authentication. As mentioned by RFC7321, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to 349 use ESP with NULL authentication - with non authenticated encryption 350 - in conjunction with AH; some configurations of this combination of 351 services have been shown to be insecure [PD10]. In addition, NULL 352 authentication cannot be combined with ESP NULL encryption. 354 AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96 and AUTH_KPDK_MD5 were not mentioned in RFC7321. As 355 MD5 is known to be vulnerable to collisions, these algorithms MUST 356 NOT be used. 358 AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 has been downgraded from MUST in RFC7321 to MUST- 359 as there is an industry-wide trend to deprecate its usage. 361 AUTH_DES_MAC was not mentioned in RFC7321. As DES is known to be 362 vulnerable, it MUST NOT be used. 364 AUTH_AES_XCBC_96 is set as SHOULD only in the scope of IoT, as 365 Internet of Things deployments tend to prefer AES based HMAC 366 functions in order to avoid implementing SHA2. For the wide VPN 367 deployment, as it has not been widely adopted, it has been downgraded 368 from SHOULD to MAY. 370 AUTH_AES_128_GMAC status has been downgraded from SHOULD+ to MAY. 371 Along with AUTH_AES_192_GMAC and AUTH_AES_256_GMAC, these algorithms 372 should only be used for AH and not for ESP. If using ENCR_NULL, 373 AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 is recommended for integrity. If using AES- 374 GMAC in ESP without authentication, ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC is 375 recommended. Therefore, these ciphers are kept at MAY. 377 AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 was not mentioned in RFC7321, as no SHA2 based 378 authentication was mentioned. AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 MUST be 379 implemented in order to replace AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96. Note that due to 380 a long standing common implementation bug of this algorithm that 381 truncates the hash at 96-bits instead of 128-bits, it is recommended 382 that implementations prefer AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 over 383 AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 if they implement AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256. 385 AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 SHOULD be implemented as a future replacement 386 of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 or when stronger security is required. 387 This value has been preferred to AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384, as the 388 additional overhead of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512 is negligible. 390 6. ESP and AH Compression Algorithms 392 +----------------+----------+-------------+ 393 | Name | Status | Comment | 394 +----------------+----------+-------------+ 395 | IPCOMP_OUI | MUST NOT | UNSPECIFIED | 396 | IPCOMP_DEFLATE | MAY | [RFC2393] | 397 | IPCOMP_LZS | MAY | [RFC2395] | 398 | IPCOMP_LZJH | MAY | [RFC3051] | 399 +----------------+----------+-------------+ 401 (IoT) - This requirement is for interoperability with IoT 403 Table 4 405 Compression was not mentioned in RFC7321. As it is not widely 406 deployed, it remains optional and at the MAY-level. 408 7. Summary of Changes from RFC 7321 410 The following table summarizes the changes from RFC 7321. 412 RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH AND REPLACE XXXX IN THE 413 TABLE BELOW WITH THE NUMBER OF THIS RFC 415 +-------------------+----------+-----------------+ 416 | Algorithm | RFC 7321 | RFC XXXX | 417 +-------------------+----------+-----------------+ 418 | ENCR_AES_GCM_16 | SHOULD+ | MUST | 419 | ENCR_AES_CCM_8 | MAY | SHOULD | 420 | ENCR_AES_CTR | MAY | (*) | 421 | ENCR_3DES | MAY | SHOULD NOT | 422 | AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 | MUST | MUST- | 423 | AUTH_AES_128_GMAC | SHOULD+ | MAY | 424 | AUTH_NONE | MAY | MUST / MUST NOT | 425 +-------------------+----------+-----------------+ 427 (*) This algorithm is not mentioned in the above sections, so it 428 defaults to MAY. 430 Table 5 432 8. Acknowledgements 434 Some of the wording in this document was adapted from [RFC7321], the 435 document that this one obsoletes, which was written by D. McGrew and 436 P. Hoffman. 438 9. IANA Considerations 440 This document has no IANA actions. 442 10. Security Considerations 444 The security of a system that uses cryptography depends on both the 445 strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of 446 the keys used with those algorithms. The security also depends on 447 the engineering and administration of the protocol used by the system 448 to ensure that there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the 449 security of the overall system. 451 This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic 452 algorithms for the use of ESP and AH, specifically with the selection 453 of mandatory-to-implement algorithms. The algorithms identified in 454 this document as "MUST implement" or "SHOULD implement" are not known 455 to be broken at the current time, and cryptographic research to date 456 leads us to believe that they will likely remain secure into the 457 foreseeable future. However, this is not necessarily forever. 458 Therefore, we expect that revisions of that document will be issued 459 from time to time to reflect the current best practice in this area. 461 11. References 463 11.1. Normative References 465 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 466 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/ 467 RFC2119, March 1997, 468 . 470 [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the 471 Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301, 472 December 2005, . 474 [RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, DOI 475 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005, 476 . 478 [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 479 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, 480 . 482 [RFC7321] McGrew, D. and P. Hoffman, "Cryptographic Algorithm 483 Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for 484 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication 485 Header (AH)", RFC 7321, DOI 10.17487/RFC7321, August 2014, 486 . 488 [RFC7634] Nir, Y., "ChaCha20, Poly1305, and Their Use in the 489 Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) and IPsec", RFC 7634, 490 DOI 10.17487/RFC7634, August 2015, 491 . 493 11.2. Informative References 495 [PD10] Paterson, K. and J. Degabriele, "On the (in)security of 496 IPsec in MAC-then-encrypt configurations (ACM Conference 497 on Computer and Communications Security, ACM CCS)", 2010. 499 [RFC2393] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, R., and M. Thomas, "IP 500 Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 2393, DOI 501 10.17487/RFC2393, December 1998, 502 . 504 [RFC2395] Friend, R. and R. Monsour, "IP Payload Compression Using 505 LZS", RFC 2395, DOI 10.17487/RFC2395, December 1998, 506 . 508 [RFC2403] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within 509 ESP and AH", RFC 2403, DOI 10.17487/RFC2403, November 510 1998, . 512 [RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within 513 ESP and AH", RFC 2404, DOI 10.17487/RFC2404, November 514 1998, . 516 [RFC2405] Madson, C. and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher 517 Algorithm With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, DOI 10.17487/ 518 RFC2405, November 1998, 519 . 521 [RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and 522 Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, DOI 10.17487/RFC2410, 523 November 1998, . 525 [RFC2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher 526 Algorithms", RFC 2451, DOI 10.17487/RFC2451, November 527 1998, . 529 [RFC3051] Heath, J. and J. Border, "IP Payload Compression Using 530 ITU-T V.44 Packet Method", RFC 3051, DOI 10.17487/RFC3051, 531 January 2001, . 533 [RFC3566] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm 534 and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 3566, DOI 10.17487/RFC3566, 535 September 2003, . 537 [RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher 538 Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, DOI 10.17487/ 539 RFC3602, September 2003, 540 . 542 [RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode 543 (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 544 4106, DOI 10.17487/RFC4106, June 2005, 545 . 547 [RFC4309] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM 548 Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 549 4309, DOI 10.17487/RFC4309, December 2005, 550 . 552 [RFC4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message 553 Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543, 554 DOI 10.17487/RFC4543, May 2006, 555 . 557 [RFC4835] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation 558 Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and 559 Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4835, DOI 10.17487/ 560 RFC4835, April 2007, 561 . 563 [RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- 564 SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, DOI 565 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007, 566 . 568 [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. 569 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 570 (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 571 2014, . 573 Authors' Addresses 575 Daniel Migault 576 Ericsson 577 8400 boulevard Decarie 578 Montreal, QC H4P 2N2 579 Canada 581 Phone: +1 514-452-2160 582 Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com 584 John Mattsson 585 Ericsson AB 586 SE-164 80 Stockholm 587 Sweden 589 Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com 591 Paul Wouters 592 Red Hat 594 Email: pwouters@redhat.com 596 Yoav Nir 597 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. 598 5 Hasolelim st. 599 Tel Aviv 6789735 600 Israel 602 Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com 604 Tero Kivinen 605 INSIDE Secure 606 Eerikinkatu 28 607 HELSINKI FI-00180 608 FI 610 Email: kivinen@iki.fi