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Sakimura 5 Expires: November 28, 2015 NRI 6 May 27, 2015 8 JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint 9 draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint-05 11 Abstract 13 This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a 14 JSON Web Key (JWK). It defines which fields in a JWK are used in the 15 hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form for those 16 fields, and how to convert the resulting Unicode string into a byte 17 sequence to be hashed. The resulting hash value can be used for 18 identifying or selecting the key represented by the JWK that is the 19 subject of the thumbprint. 21 Status of this Memo 23 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 24 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 28 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 29 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 28, 2015. 38 Copyright Notice 40 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 41 document authors. All rights reserved. 43 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 44 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 45 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 46 publication of this document. Please review these documents 47 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 48 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 49 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 50 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 51 described in the Simplified BSD License. 53 Table of Contents 55 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3. JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 3.1. Example JWK Thumbprint Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 3.2. JWK Members Used in the Thumbprint Computation . . . . . . 5 61 3.2.1. JWK Thumbprint of a Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 3.2.2. Why Not Include Optional Members? . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 3.3. Order and Representation of Members in Hash Input . . . . 7 64 3.4. JWK Thumbprints of Keys Not in JWK Format . . . . . . . . 8 65 4. Practical JSON and Unicode Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 5. Relationship to Digests of X.509 Values . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 69 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 71 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 73 Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 74 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 76 1. Introduction 78 This specification defines a method for computing a hash value 79 (a.k.a. digest) over a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK]. It defines which 80 fields in a JWK are used in the hash computation, the method of 81 creating a canonical form for those fields, and how to convert the 82 resulting Unicode string into a byte sequence to be hashed. The 83 resulting hash value can be used for identifying or selecting the key 84 represented by the JWK that is the subject of the thumbprint, for 85 instance, by using the base64url-encoded JWK Thumbprint value as a 86 "kid" (key ID) value. 88 1.1. Notational Conventions 90 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 91 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 92 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 93 "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119]. 94 The interpretation should only be applied when the terms appear in 95 all capital letters. 97 2. Terminology 99 This specification uses the same terminology as the "JSON Web Key 100 (JWK)" [JWK], "JSON Web Signature (JWS)" [JWS], and "JSON Web 101 Algorithms (JWA)" [JWA] specifications. 103 This term is defined by this specification: 105 JWK Thumbprint 106 The digest value for a JWK. 108 3. JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint 110 The thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) is computed as follows: 112 1. Construct a JSON object [RFC7159] containing only the required 113 members of a JWK representing the key and with no whitespace or 114 line breaks before or after any syntactic elements and with the 115 required members ordered lexicographically by the Unicode 116 [UNICODE] code points of the member names. (This JSON object is 117 itself a legal JWK representation of the key.) 119 2. Hash the octets of the UTF-8 representation of this JSON object 120 with a cryptographic hash function H. For example, SHA-256 [SHS] 121 might be used as H. 123 The resulting value is the JWK Thumbprint with H of the JWK. The 124 details of this computation are further described in subsequent 125 sections. 127 3.1. Example JWK Thumbprint Computation 129 This section demonstrates the JWK Thumbprint computation for the JWK 130 below (with long lines broken for display purposes only): 132 { 133 "kty": "RSA", 134 "n": "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx4cbbfAAt 135 VT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMstn6 136 4tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FD 137 W2QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n9 138 1CbOpbISD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINH 139 aQ-G_xBniIqbw0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw", 140 "e": "AQAB", 141 "alg": "RS256", 142 "kid": "2011-04-29" 143 } 145 As defined in "JSON Web Key (JWK)" [JWK] and "JSON Web Algorithms 146 (JWA)" [JWA], the required members for an RSA public key are: 148 o "kty" 149 o "n" 150 o "e" 152 Therefore, these are the members used in the thumbprint computation. 154 Their lexicographic order, per Section 3.3, is: 156 o "e" 157 o "kty" 158 o "n" 160 Therefore the JSON object constructed as an intermediate step in the 161 computation is as follows (with long lines broken for display 162 purposes only): 164 {"e":"AQAB","kty":"RSA","n":"0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2 165 aiAFbWhM78LhWx4cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCi 166 FV4n3oknjhMstn64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65Y 167 GjQR0_FDW2QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n 168 91CbOpbISD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_x 169 BniIqbw0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw"} 171 The octets of the UTF-8 representation of this JSON object are: 173 [123, 34, 101, 34, 58, 34, 65, 81, 65, 66, 34, 44, 34, 107, 116, 121, 174 34, 58, 34, 82, 83, 65, 34, 44, 34, 110, 34, 58, 34, 48, 118, 120, 175 55, 97, 103, 111, 101, 98, 71, 99, 81, 83, 117, 117, 80, 105, 76, 74, 176 88, 90, 112, 116, 78, 57, 110, 110, 100, 114, 81, 109, 98, 88, 69, 177 112, 115, 50, 97, 105, 65, 70, 98, 87, 104, 77, 55, 56, 76, 104, 87, 178 120, 52, 99, 98, 98, 102, 65, 65, 116, 86, 84, 56, 54, 122, 119, 117, 179 49, 82, 75, 55, 97, 80, 70, 70, 120, 117, 104, 68, 82, 49, 76, 54, 180 116, 83, 111, 99, 95, 66, 74, 69, 67, 80, 101, 98, 87, 75, 82, 88, 181 106, 66, 90, 67, 105, 70, 86, 52, 110, 51, 111, 107, 110, 106, 104, 182 77, 115, 116, 110, 54, 52, 116, 90, 95, 50, 87, 45, 53, 74, 115, 71, 183 89, 52, 72, 99, 53, 110, 57, 121, 66, 88, 65, 114, 119, 108, 57, 51, 184 108, 113, 116, 55, 95, 82, 78, 53, 119, 54, 67, 102, 48, 104, 52, 81, 185 121, 81, 53, 118, 45, 54, 53, 89, 71, 106, 81, 82, 48, 95, 70, 68, 186 87, 50, 81, 118, 122, 113, 89, 51, 54, 56, 81, 81, 77, 105, 99, 65, 187 116, 97, 83, 113, 122, 115, 56, 75, 74, 90, 103, 110, 89, 98, 57, 99, 188 55, 100, 48, 122, 103, 100, 65, 90, 72, 122, 117, 54, 113, 77, 81, 189 118, 82, 76, 53, 104, 97, 106, 114, 110, 49, 110, 57, 49, 67, 98, 79, 190 112, 98, 73, 83, 68, 48, 56, 113, 78, 76, 121, 114, 100, 107, 116, 191 45, 98, 70, 84, 87, 104, 65, 73, 52, 118, 77, 81, 70, 104, 54, 87, 192 101, 90, 117, 48, 102, 77, 52, 108, 70, 100, 50, 78, 99, 82, 119, 193 114, 51, 88, 80, 107, 115, 73, 78, 72, 97, 81, 45, 71, 95, 120, 66, 194 110, 105, 73, 113, 98, 119, 48, 76, 115, 49, 106, 70, 52, 52, 45, 99, 195 115, 70, 67, 117, 114, 45, 107, 69, 103, 85, 56, 97, 119, 97, 112, 196 74, 122, 75, 110, 113, 68, 75, 103, 119, 34, 125] 198 Using SHA-256 [SHS] as the hash function H, the JWK SHA-256 199 Thumbprint value is the SHA-256 hash of these octets, specifically: 201 [55, 54, 203, 177, 120, 124, 184, 48, 156, 119, 238, 140, 55, 5, 197, 202 225, 111, 251, 158, 133, 151, 21, 144, 31, 30, 76, 89, 177, 17, 130, 203 245, 123] 205 The base64url encoding [JWS] of this JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint value 206 (which might, for instance, be used as a "kid" (key ID) value) is: 208 NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs 210 3.2. JWK Members Used in the Thumbprint Computation 212 Only the required members of a key's representation are used when 213 computing its JWK Thumbprint value. As defined in "JSON Web Key 214 (JWK)" [JWK] and "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)" [JWA], the required 215 members for an elliptic curve public key for the curves specified in 216 Section 6.2.1.1 of [JWK], in lexicographic order, are: 218 o "crv" 219 o "kty" 220 o "x" 221 o "y" 223 the required members for an RSA public key, in lexicographic order, 224 are: 226 o "e" 227 o "kty" 228 o "n" 230 and the required members for a symmetric key, in lexicographic order, 231 are: 233 o "k" 234 o "kty" 236 As other "kty" (key type) values are defined, the specifications 237 defining them should be similarly consulted to determine which 238 members, in addition to "kty", are required. 240 3.2.1. JWK Thumbprint of a Private Key 242 The JWK Thumbprint of a JWK representing a private key is computed as 243 the JWK Thumbprint of a JWK representing the corresponding public 244 key. This has the intentional benefit that the same JWK Thumbprint 245 value can be computed both by parties using either the public or 246 private key. The JWK Thumbprint can then be used to refer to both 247 keys of the key pair. Application context can be used to determine 248 whether the public or the private key is the one being referred to by 249 the JWK Thumbprint. 251 This specification defines the method of computing JWK Thumbprints of 252 JWKs representing private keys for interoperability reasons -- so 253 that different implementations computing JWK Thumbprints of private 254 keys will produce the same result. 256 3.2.2. Why Not Include Optional Members? 258 Optional members of JWKs are intentionally not included in the JWK 259 Thumbprint computation so that their absence or presence in the JWK 260 does not alter the resulting value. The JWK Thumbprint value is a 261 digest of the members required to represent the key as a JWK -- not 262 of additional data that may also accompany the key. 264 Optional members are not included so that the JWK Thumbprint refers 265 to a key -- not a key with an associated set of key attributes. This 266 has the benefit that while in different application contexts 267 different subsets of attributes about the key might or might not be 268 included in the JWK, the JWK Thumbprint of any JWK representing the 269 key remains the same regardless of which optional attributes are 270 present. Different kinds of thumbprints could be defined by other 271 specifications that might include some or all additional JWK members, 272 should use cases arise where such different kinds of thumbprints 273 would be useful. See Section 9.1 of [JWK] for notes on some ways to 274 cryptographically bind attributes to a key. 276 3.3. Order and Representation of Members in Hash Input 278 The required members in the input to the hash function are ordered 279 lexicographically by the Unicode code points of the member names. 281 Characters in member names and member values MUST be represented 282 without being escaped. This means that thumbprints of JWKs that 283 require such characters are not defined by this specification. (This 284 is not expected to limit the applicability of this specification, in 285 practice, as the members of JWK representations are not expected to 286 use any of these characters.) The characters specified as requiring 287 escaping by Section 7 of [RFC7159] are quotation mark, reverse 288 solidus (a.k.a. backslash), and the control characters U+0000 through 289 U+001F. 291 If the JWK key type uses members whose values are themselves JSON 292 objects, the members of those objects MUST likewise be 293 lexicographically ordered. (As of the time of this writing, none are 294 defined that do.) 296 If the JWK key type uses members whose values are JSON numbers, if 297 the numbers are integers, they MUST be represented as a JSON number 298 as defined in Section 6 of [RFC7159] without including a fraction 299 part or exponent part. For instance, the value "1.024e3" MUST be 300 represented as "1024". This means that thumbprints of JWKs that use 301 numbers that are not integers are not defined by this specification. 302 Also, as noted in "The I-JSON Message Format" [RFC7493], 303 implementations cannot expect an integer whose absolute value is 304 greater than 9007199254740991 (i.e., that is outside the range 305 [-(2**53)+1, (2**53)-1]) to be treated as an exact value. (As of the 306 time of this writing, none are defined that use JSON numbers.) 308 See Section 4 for a discussion of further practical considerations 309 pertaining to the representation of the hash input. 311 3.4. JWK Thumbprints of Keys Not in JWK Format 313 Note that a key need not be in JWK format to create a JWK Thumbprint 314 of it. The only prerequisites are that the JWK representation of the 315 key be defined and the party creating the JWK Thumbprint is in 316 possession of the necessary key material. These are sufficient to 317 create the hash input from the JWK representation of the key, as 318 described in Section 3.3. 320 4. Practical JSON and Unicode Considerations 322 Implementations will almost certainly use functionality provided by 323 the platform's JSON support when parsing the JWK and emitting the 324 JSON object used as the hash input. As a practical consideration, 325 future JWK member names should be avoided for which different 326 platforms or libraries might emit different representations. As of 327 the time of this writing, currently all defined JWK member names use 328 only printable ASCII characters, which should not exhibit this 329 problem. Note however, that JSON.stringify() cannot be counted on to 330 lexicographically sort the members of JSON objects, so while it may 331 be able to be used to emit some kinds of member values, different 332 code is likely to be needed to perform the sorting. 334 In particular, while the operation of lexicographically ordering 335 member names by their Unicode code points is well defined, different 336 platform sort functions may produce different results for non-ASCII 337 characters, in ways that may not be obvious to developers. If 338 writers of future specifications defining new JWK key type values 339 choose to restrict themselves to ASCII member names (which are for 340 machine and not human consumption anyway), some future 341 interoperability problems might be avoided. 343 However, if new JWK members are defined that use non-ASCII member 344 names, their definitions should specify the exact Unicode code point 345 sequences used to represent them. This is particularly important in 346 cases in which Unicode normalization could result in the 347 transformation of one set of code points into another under any 348 circumstances. 350 Use of escaped characters in JWKs for which JWK Thumbprints will be 351 computed should be avoided. Use of escaped characters in the hash 352 input JWKs derived from these original JWKs is prohibited. 354 There is a natural representation to use for numeric values that are 355 integers. However, this specification does not attempt to define a 356 standard representation for numbers that are not integers or that 357 contain an exponent component. This is not expected to be a problem 358 in practice, as the required members of JWK representations are 359 expected to use only numbers that are integers. 361 Use of number representations containing fraction or exponent parts 362 in JWKs for which JWK Thumbprints will be computed should be avoided. 364 All of these practical considerations are really an instance of Jon 365 Postel's principle: "Be liberal in what you accept, and conservative 366 in what you send." 368 5. Relationship to Digests of X.509 Values 370 JWK Thumbprint values are computed on the JWK members required to 371 represent a key, rather than all members of a JWK that the key is 372 represented in. Thus, they are more analogous to applications that 373 use digests of X.509 Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) values, which are 374 defined in Section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280], than to applications that 375 use digests of complete certificate values, as the "x5t" (X.509 376 certificate SHA-1 thumbprint) [JWS] value defined for X.509 377 certificate objects does. While logically equivalent to a digest of 378 the SPKI representation of the key, a JWK Thumbprint is computed over 379 a JSON representation of that key, rather than over an ASN.1 380 representation of it. 382 6. IANA Considerations 384 This specification makes no requests of IANA. 386 7. Security Considerations 388 The JSON Security Considerations and Unicode Comparison Security 389 Considerations described in Sections 10.2 and 10.3 of "JSON Web 390 Signature (JWS)" [JWS] also apply to this specification. 392 Also, as described in Section 4, some implementations may produce 393 incorrect results if esoteric or escaped characters are used in the 394 member names. The security implications of this appear to be limited 395 for JWK Thumbprints of public keys, since while it may result in 396 implementations failing to identify the intended key, it should not 397 leak information, since the information in a public key is already 398 public in nature, by definition. 400 A hash of a symmetric key has the potential to leak information about 401 the key value. Thus, the JWK Thumbprint of a symmetric key should be 402 typically be concealed from parties not in possession of the 403 symmetric key, unless in the application context, the cryptographic 404 hash used, such as SHA-256, is known to provide sufficient protection 405 against disclosure of the key value. 407 A JWK Thumbprint will only uniquely identify a particular key if a 408 single unambiguous JWK representation for that key is defined and 409 used when computing the JWK Thumbprint. (Such representations are 410 defined for all the key types defined in "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)" 411 [JWA].) For example, if an RSA key were to use "e":"AAEAAQ" 412 (representing [0, 1, 0, 1]) rather than the specified correct 413 representation of "e":"AQAB" (representing [1, 0, 1]), a different 414 thumbprint value would be produced for what could be effectively the 415 same key, at least for implementations that are lax in validating the 416 JWK values that they accept. Thus, JWK Thumbprint values can only be 417 relied upon to be unique for a given key if the implementation also 418 validates that the correct representation of the key is used. 420 Even more insidious is that an attacker may supply a key that is a 421 transformation of a legal key in order to have it appear to be a 422 different key. For instance, if a legitimate RSA key uses a modulus 423 value N and an attacker supplies a key with modulus 3*N, the modified 424 key would still work about 1/3 of the time, but would appear to be a 425 different key. Thus, while thumbprint values are valuable for 426 identifying legitimate keys, comparing thumbprint values is not a 427 reliable means of excluding (blacklisting) the use of particular keys 428 (or transformations thereof). 430 8. References 432 8.1. Normative References 434 [JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, 435 May 2015, . 437 [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015, 438 . 440 [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web 441 Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015, 442 . 444 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 445 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 447 [RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 448 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014. 450 [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure 451 Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012, . 454 [UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard", 455 . 457 8.2. Informative References 459 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 460 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 461 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 462 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 464 [RFC7493] Bray, T., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493, 465 March 2015. 467 Appendix A. Acknowledgements 469 James Manger and John Bradley participated in discussions that led to 470 the creation of this specification. Jim Schaad also contributed to 471 this specification. 473 Appendix B. Document History 475 [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] 477 -05 479 o Addressed comments in Kathleen Moriarty's AD review. 481 -04 483 o Addressed additional review comments by Jim Schaad, which resulted 484 in several clarifications and some corrections to the case of RFC 485 2119 keywords. 487 -03 489 o Addressed review comments by James Manger and Jim Schaad, 490 including adding a section on the relationship to digests of X.509 491 values. 493 -02 494 o No longer register the new JSON Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web 495 Encryption (JWE) Header Parameters and the new JSON Web Key (JWK) 496 member name "jkt" (JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint) for holding these 497 values. 499 o Added security considerations about the measures needed to ensure 500 that a unique JWK Thumbprint value is produced for a key. 502 o Added text saying that the base64url encoded JWK Thumbprint value 503 could be used as a "kid" (key ID) value. 505 o Broke a sentence up that used to be way too long. 507 -01 509 o Addressed issues pointed out by Jim Schaad, including defining the 510 JWK Thumbprint computation in a manner that allows different hash 511 functions to be used over time. 513 o Added Nat Sakimura as an editor. 515 -00 517 o Created draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint-00 from 518 draft-jones-jose-jwk-thumbprint-01 with no normative changes. 520 Authors' Addresses 522 Michael B. Jones 523 Microsoft 525 Email: mbj@microsoft.com 526 URI: http://self-issued.info/ 528 Nat Sakimura 529 Nomura Research Institute 531 Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp 532 URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/