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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Transport Layer Security S. Whited 3 Internet-Draft 15 October 2021 4 Updates: 5801, 5802, 5929, 8446 (if approved) 5 Intended status: Standards Track 6 Expires: 18 April 2022 8 Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 9 draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-10 11 Abstract 13 This document defines a channel binding type, tls-exporter, that is 14 compatible with TLS 1.3 in accordance with RFC 5056, On Channel 15 Binding. Furthermore it updates the "default" channel binding to the 16 new binding for versions of TLS greater than 1.2. This document 17 updates RFC5801, RFC5802, RFC5929, and RFC8446. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on 18 April 2022. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ 43 license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. 44 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 45 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components 46 extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text 47 as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are 48 provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 53 1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 2. The 'tls-exporter' Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4.1. Use with Legacy TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 5.1. Registration of Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 5.2. Registration of Channel Binding TLS Exporter Label . . . 5 61 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 1. Introduction 68 The "tls-unique" channel binding type defined in [RFC5929] was found 69 to be vulnerable to the "triple handshake vulnerability" 70 [TRIPLE-HANDSHAKE] without the extended master secret extension 71 defined in [RFC7627]. While TLS 1.3 uses a complete transcript hash 72 akin to the extended master secret procedures, the safety of channel 73 bindings with TLS 1.3 was not analyzed as part of the core protocol 74 work, and so the specification of channel bindings for TLS 1.3 was 75 deferred. [RFC8446] section C.5 notes the lack of channel bindings 76 for TLS 1.3; as this document defines such channel bindings, it 77 updates [RFC8446] to note that this gap has been filled. 78 Furthermore, this document updates [RFC5929] by adding an additional 79 unique channel binding type, "tls-exporter", that replaces some usage 80 of "tls-unique". 82 1.1. Conventions and Terminology 84 Throughout this document the acronym "EKM" is used to refer to 85 Exported Keying Material as defined in [RFC5705]. 87 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 88 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 89 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 90 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 91 capitals, as shown here. 93 2. The 'tls-exporter' Channel Binding Type 95 Channel binding mechanisms are not useful until TLS implementations 96 expose the required data. To facilitate this, "tls-exporter" uses 97 exported keying material (EKM) which is already widely exposed by TLS 98 implementations. The EKM is obtained using the keying material 99 exporters for TLS as defined in [RFC5705] and [RFC8446] section 7.5 100 by supplying the following inputs: 102 Label: The ASCII string "EXPORTER-Channel-Binding" with no 103 terminating NUL. 105 Context value: Zero-length string. 107 Length: 32 bytes. 109 This channel binding mechanism is defined only when TLS cipher 110 negotiation results in unique master secrets, which is true of TLS 111 1.3 when renegotiation is disabled. 113 3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL 115 SCRAM [RFC5802] and GSS-API over SASL [RFC5801] define "tls-unique" 116 as the default channel binding to use over TLS. As "tls-unique" is 117 not defined for TLS 1.3 (and greater), this document updates 118 [RFC5801] and [RFC5802] to use "tls-exporter" as the default channel 119 binding over TLS 1.3 (and greater). 121 4. Security Considerations 123 The channel binding type defined in this document is constructed so 124 that disclosure of the channel binding data does not leak secret 125 information about the TLS channel and does not affect the security of 126 the TLS channel. 128 The Security Considerations sections of [RFC5056], [RFC5705], and 129 [RFC8446] apply to this document. 131 4.1. Use with Legacy TLS 133 While it is possible to use this channel binding mechanism with TLS 134 versions below 1.3, extra precaution must be taken to ensure that the 135 chosen cipher suites always result in unique master secrets. For 136 more information see [RFC7627] and the Security Considerations 137 section of [RFC5705]. 139 When TLS renegotiation is enabled on a connection the "tls-exporter" 140 channel binding type is not defined for that connection and 141 implementations MUST NOT support it. 143 In general, users wishing to take advantage of channel binding should 144 upgrade to TLS 1.3 or later. 146 The derived data MUST NOT be used for any purpose other than channel 147 bindings as described in [RFC5056]. In particular, implementations 148 MUST NOT use channel binding as a secret key to protect privileged 149 information. 151 5. IANA Considerations 153 5.1. Registration of Channel Binding Type 155 This document adds the following registration in the "Channel-Binding 156 Types" registry: 158 Subject: Registration of channel binding tls-exporter 160 Channel binding unique prefix: tls-exporter 162 Channel binding type: unique 164 Channel type: TLS [RFC8446] 166 Published specification: draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for- 167 tls13-10 169 Channel binding is secret: no 171 Description: The EKM value obtained from the current TLS connection. 173 Intended usage: COMMON 175 Person and email address to contact for further information: Sam 176 Whited . 178 Owner/Change controller name and email address: IESG. 180 Expert reviewer name and contact information: IETF KITTEN or TLS WG 181 (kitten@ietf.org or tls@ietf.org, failing that, ietf@ietf.org). 183 Note: See the published specification for advice on the 184 applicability of this channel binding type. 186 5.2. Registration of Channel Binding TLS Exporter Label 188 This document adds the following registration in the "TLS Exporter 189 Labels" registry: 191 Value: EXPORTER-Channel-Binding 193 DTLS-OK: Y 195 Recommended: Y 197 Reference: This document 199 6. References 201 6.1. Normative References 203 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 204 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 205 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 206 . 208 [RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure 209 Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007, 210 . 212 [RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport 213 Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, 214 March 2010, . 216 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 217 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 218 May 2017, . 220 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 221 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 222 . 224 6.2. Informative References 226 [RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security 227 Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms 228 in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The 229 GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, DOI 10.17487/RFC5801, 230 July 2010, . 232 [RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams, 233 "Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism 234 (SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, 235 DOI 10.17487/RFC5802, July 2010, 236 . 238 [RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings 239 for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010, 240 . 242 [RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., 243 Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) 244 Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", 245 RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015, 246 . 248 [TRIPLE-HANDSHAKE] 249 Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti, 250 A., and P. Strub, "Password Storage", March 2014, 251 . 253 Author's Address 255 Sam Whited 256 Atlanta, GA 257 United States of America 259 Email: sam@samwhited.com 260 URI: https://blog.samwhited.com/