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Housley 3 Internet-Draft Vigil Security 4 Updates: 4211 (if approved) 18 December 2020 5 Intended status: Standards Track 6 Expires: 21 June 2021 8 Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key 9 Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 10 draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-01 12 Abstract 14 This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for 15 the Password-Based Message Authentication Code in the Internet X.509 16 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 17 specified in RFC 4211. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 June 2021. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ 43 license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. 44 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 45 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components 46 extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text 47 as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are 48 provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 53 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 3. Password-Based Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . 2 55 3.1. Introduction Paragraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 56 3.2. One-Way Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 3.3. Iteration Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3.4. MAC Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 65 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 1. Introduction 69 This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for 70 the Password-Based Message Authentication Code (MAC) in the Internet 71 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format 72 (CRMF) [RFC4211]. The algorithms specified in [RFC4211] were 73 appropriate in 2005; however, these algorithms are no longer 74 considered the best choices. This update specifies algorithms that 75 are more appropriate today. 77 2. Terminology 79 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 80 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 81 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 82 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 83 capitals, as shown here. 85 3. Password-Based Message Authentication Code 87 Section 4.4 of [RFC4211] specifies a Password-Based MAC that relies 88 on a one-way function to compute a symmetric key from the password 89 and a MAC algorithm. This section specifies algorithm requirements 90 for the one-way function and the MAC algorithm. 92 3.1. Introduction Paragraph 94 Add guidance about limiting the use of the password. 96 OLD: 98 This MAC algorithm was designed to take a shared secret (a 99 password) and use it to compute a check value over a piece of 100 information. The assumption is that, without the password, the 101 correct check value cannot be computed. The algorithm computes 102 the one-way function multiple times in order to slow down any 103 dictionary attacks against the password value. 105 NEW: 107 This MAC algorithm was designed to take a shared secret (a 108 password) and use it to compute a check value over a piece of 109 information. The assumption is that, without the password, the 110 correct check value cannot be computed. The algorithm computes 111 the one-way function multiple times in order to slow down any 112 dictionary attacks against the password value. The password used 113 to compute this MAC SHOULD NOT be used for any other purpose. 115 3.2. One-Way Function 117 Change the paragraph describing the "owf" as follows: 119 OLD: 121 owf identifies the algorithm and associated parameters used to 122 compute the key used in the MAC process. All implementations MUST 123 support SHA-1. 125 NEW: 127 owf identifies the algorithm and associated parameters used to 128 compute the key used in the MAC process. All implementations MUST 129 support SHA-256 [SHS]. 131 3.3. Iteration Count 133 Update the guidance on appropriate iteration count values. 135 OLD: 137 iterationCount identifies the number of times the hash is applied 138 during the key computation process. The iterationCount MUST be a 139 minimum of 100. Many people suggest using values as high as 1000 140 iterations as the minimum value. The trade off here is between 141 protection of the password from attacks and the time spent by the 142 server processing all of the different iterations in deriving 143 passwords. Hashing is generally considered a cheap operation but 144 this may not be true with all hash functions in the future. 146 NEW: 148 iterationCount identifies the number of times the hash is applied 149 during the key computation process. The iterationCount MUST be a 150 minimum of 100; however, the iterationCount SHOULD be as large as 151 server performance will allow, typically at least 10,000 152 [NISTSP800-63B]. There is a trade off between protection of the 153 password from attacks and the time spent by the server processing 154 the iterations. 156 3.4. MAC Algorithm 158 Change the paragraph describing the "mac" as follows: 160 OLD: 162 mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC 163 function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 164 [HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple- 165 DES-MAC [PKCS11]. 167 NEW: 169 mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC 170 function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA256 171 [HMAC]. All implementations SHOULD support AES-GMAC AES [GMAC] 172 with a 128 bit key. 174 For convenience, the identifiers for these two algorithms are 175 repeated here. 177 The algorithm identifier for HMAC-SHA256 is defined in [RFC4231]: 179 id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) 180 us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } 182 When this The algorithm identifier is used, the parameters SHOULD be 183 present. When present, the parameters MUST contain a type of NULL. 185 The algorithm identifier for AES-GMAC [AES][GMAC] with a 128-bit key 186 is defined in [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-aes-mac-alg]: 188 id-aes128-GMAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) 189 country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) 190 nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 9 } 192 When this The algorithm identifier is used, the parameters MUST be 193 present, and the parameters MUST contain the GMACParameters structure 194 as follows: 196 GMACParameters ::= SEQUENCE { 197 nonce OCTET STRING, -- recommended size is 12 octets 198 length MACLength DEFAULT 12 } 200 MACLength ::= INTEGER (12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16) 202 The GMACParameters nonce parameter is the GMAC initialization vector. 203 The nonce may have any number of bits between 8 and 2^64, but it MUST 204 be a multiple of 8 bits. Within the scope of any GMAC key, the nonce 205 value MUST be unique. A nonce value of 12 octets can be processed 206 more efficiently, so that length for the nonce value is RECOMMENDED. 208 The GMACParameters length parameter field tells the size of the 209 message authentication code in octets. The length may have a value 210 between 12 and 16, inclusive. A length of 12 octets is RECOMMENDED. 212 4. IANA Considerations 214 This document makes no requests of the IANA. 216 5. Security Considerations 218 The security of the password-based MAC relies on the number of times 219 the hash function is applied as well as the entropy of the shared 220 secret (the password). Hardware support for hash calculation is 221 available at very low cost [PHS], which reduces the protection 222 provided by a high iterationCount value. Therefore, the entropy of 223 the password is crucial for the security of password-based MAC 224 function. In 2010, researchers showed that about half of the real- 225 world passwords can be broken with less than 150 million trials, 226 indicating a median entropy of only 27 bits [DMR]. Higher entropy 227 can be achieved by using randomly generated strings. For example, 228 assuming an alphabet of 60 characters a randomly chosen password with 229 10 characters offers 59 bits a entropy, and 20 characters offers 118 230 bits of entropy. Using a one-time password also increases the 231 security of the MAC, assuming that the integrity-protected 232 transaction will complete before the attacker is able to learn the 233 password with an offline attack. 235 Cryptographic algorithms age; they become weaker with time. As new 236 cryptanalysis techniques are developed and computing capabilities 237 improve, the work required to break a particular cryptographic 238 algorithm will reduce, making an attack on the algorithm more 239 feasible for more attackers. While it is unknown how cryptoanalytic 240 attacks will evolve, it is certain that they will get better. It is 241 unknown how much better they will become or when the advances will 242 happen. For this reason, the algorithm requirements for CRMF are 243 updated by this specification. 245 When a Password-Based MAC is used, implementations must protect the 246 password and the MAC key. Compromise of either the password or the 247 MAC key may result in the ability of an attacker to undermine 248 authentication. 250 6. Acknowledgements 252 Many thanks to Hans Aschauer, Hendrik Brockhaus, Quynh Dang, Tomas 253 Gustavsson, Jonathan Hammell, Lijun Liao, Tim Polk, Mike StJohns, and 254 Sean Turner for their careful review and improvements. 256 7. References 258 7.1. Normative References 260 [AES] "Advanced encryption standard (AES)", National Institute 261 of Standards and Technology report, 262 DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.197, November 2001, 263 . 265 [GMAC] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for block cipher modes of 266 operation :: GaloisCounter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", National 267 Institute of Standards and Technology report, 268 DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-38d, 2007, 269 . 271 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 272 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 273 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 274 . 276 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 277 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 278 DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, 279 . 281 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 282 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 283 May 2017, . 285 [SHS] Dang, Q., "Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of 286 Standards and Technology report, 287 DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.180-4, July 2015, 288 . 290 7.2. Informative References 292 [DMR] Dell'Amico, M., Michiardi, P., and Y. Roudier, "Password 293 Strength: An Empirical Analysis", 2010 Proceedings 294 IEEE INFOCOM, DOI 10.1109/infcom.2010.5461951, March 2010, 295 . 297 [I-D.housley-lamps-cms-aes-mac-alg] 298 Housley, R., "Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with the 299 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress, 300 Internet-Draft, draft-housley-lamps-cms-aes-mac-alg-00, 9 301 November 2020, . 304 [NISTSP800-63B] 305 Grassi, P., Fenton, J., Newton, E., Perlner, R., 306 Regenscheid, A., Burr, W., Richer, J., Lefkovitz, N., 307 Danker, J., Choong, Y., Greene, K., and M. Theofanos, 308 "Digital identity guidelines: authentication and lifecycle 309 management", National Institute of Standards and 310 Technology report, DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-63b, June 2017, 311 . 313 [PHS] Pathirana, A., Halgamuge, M., and A. Syed, "Energy 314 efficient bitcoin mining to maximize the mining profit: 315 Using data from 119 bitcoin mining hardware setups", 316 International Conference on Advances in Business 317 Management and Information Technology, pp 1-14, November 318 2019. 320 [RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA- 321 224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512", 322 RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005, 323 . 325 Author's Address 327 Russ Housley 328 Vigil Security, LLC 329 516 Dranesville Road 330 Herndon, VA, 20170 331 United States of America 332 Email: housley@vigilsec.com