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'IEC62351' ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2986 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5212 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 6268 == Outdated reference: A later version (-45) exists of draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-41 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 2616 (Obsoleted by RFC 7230, RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC 7234, RFC 7235) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7230 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110, RFC 9112) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7231 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) Summary: 3 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 7 warnings (==), 5 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 LAMPS Working Group M. Richardson 3 Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works 4 Updates: 7030 (if approved) T. Werner 5 Intended status: Standards Track Siemens 6 Expires: December 18, 2020 W. Pan 7 Huawei Technologies 8 June 16, 2020 10 Clarification of Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST): transfer 11 encodings and ASN.1 12 draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030est-clarify-07 14 Abstract 16 This document updates RFC7030: Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) 17 to resolve some errata that was reported, and which has proven to 18 cause interoperability issues when RFC7030 was extended. 20 This document deprecates the specification of "Content-Transfer- 21 Encoding" headers for EST endpoints. This document fixes some 22 syntactical errors in ASN.1 that was presented. 24 Status of This Memo 26 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 27 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 29 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 30 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 31 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 32 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 34 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 35 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 36 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 37 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 39 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 18, 2020. 41 Copyright Notice 43 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 44 document authors. All rights reserved. 46 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 47 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 48 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 49 publication of this document. Please review these documents 50 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 51 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 52 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 53 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 54 described in the Simplified BSD License. 56 Table of Contents 58 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 59 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 3. Changes to EST endpoint processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 3.1. Whitespace processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 3.2. Changes sections 4 of RFC7030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 3.2.1. Section 4.1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 3.2.2. Section 4.3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 3.2.3. Section 4.3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 3.2.4. Section 4.4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 3.2.5. Section 4.5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 4. Clarification of ASN.1 for Certificate Attribute set. . . . . 6 69 5. Clarification of error messages for certificate enrollment 70 operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 5.1. Updating section 4.2.3: Simple Enroll and Re-enroll 72 Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 73 5.2. Updating section 4.4.2: Server-Side Key Generation 74 Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 75 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 76 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 77 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 78 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 79 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 80 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 81 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 82 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 83 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 85 1. Introduction 87 Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is defined in [RFC7030]. The 88 EST specification defines a number of HTTP end points for certificate 89 enrollment and management. The details of the transaction were 90 defined in terms of MIME headers as defined in [RFC2045], rather than 91 in terms of the HTTP protocol as defined in [RFC2616] and [RFC7230]. 93 [RFC2616] and later [RFC7231] Appendix A.5 has text specifically 94 deprecating Content-Transfer-Encoding. However, [RFC7030] 95 incorrectly uses this header. 97 Any updates to [RFC7030] to bring it inline with HTTP processing risk 98 changing the on-wire protocol in a way that is not backwards 99 compatible. However, reports from implementers suggest that many 100 implementations do not send the Content-Transfer-Encoding, and many 101 of them ignore it. The consequence is that simply deprecating the 102 header would remain compatible with current implementations. 104 [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] extends [RFC7030], adding new 105 functionality, and interop testing of the protocol has revealed that 106 unusual processing called out in [RFC7030] causes confusion. 108 EST is currently specified as part of [IEC62351], and is widely used 109 in Government, Utilities and Financial markets today. 111 This document therefore revises [RFC7030] to reflect the field 112 reality, deprecating the extraneous field. 114 This document deals with errata numbers [errata4384], [errata5107], 115 [errata5108], and [errata5904]. 117 This document deals explicitely with [errata5107] and [errata5904] in 118 Section 3. [errata5108] is dealt with in section Section 5. 120 [errata4384] is closed by correcting the ASN.1 Module in Section 4. 122 2. Terminology 124 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 125 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 126 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 127 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 128 capitals, as shown here. 130 3. Changes to EST endpoint processing 132 The [RFC7030] sections 4.1.3 (CA Certificates Response, /cacerts), 133 4.3.1/4.3.2 (Full CMC, /fullcmc), 4.4.2 (Server-Side Key Generation, 134 /serverkeygen), and 4.5.2 (CSR Attributes, /csrattrs) specify the use 135 of base64 encoding with a Content-Transfer-Encoding for requests and 136 response. 138 This document updates [RFC7030] to require the POST request and 139 payload response of all endpoints use Base64 encoding as specified in 140 Section 4 of [RFC4648]. In both cases, the Distinguished Encoding 141 Rules (DER) [X.690] are used to produce the input for the Base64 142 encoding routine. This format is to be used regardless of any 143 Content-Transfer-Encoding header, and any value in such a header MUST 144 be ignored. 146 3.1. Whitespace processing 148 Note that "base64" as used in the HTTP [RFC2616] does not permit 149 CRLF, while the "base64" used in MIME [RFC2045] does. This 150 specification clarifies that despite [RFC2616], that white space 151 including CR, LF, spaces (ASCII 32) and, tabs (ASCII 9) SHOULD be 152 tolerated by receivers. Senders are not required to insert any kind 153 of white space. 155 3.2. Changes sections 4 of RFC7030 157 3.2.1. Section 4.1.3 159 In the paragraph reading: 161 A successful response MUST be a certs-only CMC Simple PKI Response, 162 as defined in [RFC5272], containing the certificates described in the 163 following paragraph. The HTTP content-type of 164 "application/pkcs7-mime" is used. The Simple PKI Response is sent 165 with a Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64" [RFC2045]. 167 Replace: 169 The Simple PKI Response is sent 170 with a Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64" [RFC2045]. 172 with: 174 The CMC Simple PKI Response is encoded in base64 [RFC4648]. 176 3.2.2. Section 4.3.1 178 In the paragraph reading: 180 If the HTTP POST to /fullcmc is not a valid Full PKI Request, the 181 server MUST reject the message. The HTTP content-type used is 182 "application/pkcs7-mime" with an smime-type parameter "CMC-request", 183 as specified in [RFC5273]. The body of the message is the binary 184 value of the encoding of the PKI Request with a 185 Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64" [RFC2045]. 187 Replace: 189 The body of the message is the binary 190 value of the encoding of the PKI Request with a 191 Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64" [RFC2045]. 193 with: 195 The body of the message is encoded in base64 [RFC4648]. 197 3.2.3. Section 4.3.2 199 Replace: 201 The body of the message is the binary value of the encoding of the 202 PKI Response with a Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64" [RFC2045]. 204 with: 206 The body of the message is the base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the 207 PKI Response. 209 3.2.4. Section 4.4.2 211 Replace: 213 An "application/pkcs8" 214 part consists of the base64-encoded DER-encoded [X.690] 215 PrivateKeyInfo with a Content-Transfer-Encoding of "base64" 216 [RFC4648]. 218 with: 220 An "application/pkcs8" part consists of the base64-encoded 221 DER-encoded [X.690] PrivateKeyInfo. 223 Replace: 225 In all three additional encryption cases, the EnvelopedData is 226 returned in the response as an "application/pkcs7-mime" part with an 227 smime-type parameter of "server-generated-key" and a Content- 228 Transfer-Encoding of "base64". 230 with: 232 In all three additional encryption cases, the EnvelopedData is 233 returned in the response as an "application/pkcs7-mime" part 234 with an smime-type parameter of "server-generated-key". It is 235 base64 encoded [RFC4648]. 237 3.2.5. Section 4.5.2 239 This section is updated in its entirety in Section 4. 241 4. Clarification of ASN.1 for Certificate Attribute set. 243 Section 4.5.2 of [RFC7030] is to be replaced with the following text: 245 4.5.2 CSR Attributes Response 247 If locally configured policy for an authenticated EST client 248 indicates a CSR Attributes Response is to be provided, the server 249 response MUST include an HTTP 200 response code. An HTTP response 250 code of 204 or 404 indicates that a CSR Attributes Response is not 251 available. Regardless of the response code, the EST server and CA 252 MAY reject any subsequent enrollment requests for any reason, e.g., 253 incomplete CSR attributes in the request. 255 Responses to attribute request messages MUST be encoded as the 256 content-type of "application/csrattrs", and are to be "base64" 257 [RFC2045] encoded. The syntax for application/csrattrs body is as 258 follows: 260 CsrAttrs ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID 262 AttrOrOID ::= CHOICE { 263 oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 264 attribute Attribute {{AttrSet}} } 266 AttrSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... } 268 An EST server includes zero or more OIDs or attributes [RFC2986] that 269 it requests the client to use in the certification request. The 270 client MUST ignore any OID or attribute it does not recognize. When 271 the server encodes CSR Attributes as an empty SEQUENCE, it means that 272 the server has no specific additional information it desires in a 273 client certification request (this is functionally equivalent to an 274 HTTP response code of 204 or 404). 276 If the CA requires a particular cryptographic algorithm or use of a 277 particular signature scheme (e.g., certification of a public key 278 based on a certain elliptic curve, or signing using a certain hash 279 algorithm) it MUST provide that information in the CSR Attribute 280 Response. If an EST server requires the linking of identity and POP 281 information (see Section 3.5), it MUST include the challengePassword 282 OID in the CSR Attributes Response. 284 The structure of the CSR Attributes Response SHOULD, to the greatest 285 extent possible, reflect the structure of the CSR it is requesting. 286 Requests to use a particular signature scheme (e.g. using a 287 particular hash function) are represented as an OID to be reflected 288 in the SignatureAlgorithm of the CSR. Requests to use a particular 289 cryptographic algorithm (e.g., certification of a public key based on 290 a certain elliptic curve) are represented as an attribute, to be 291 reflected as the AlgorithmIdentifier of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo, 292 with a type indicating the algorithm and the values indicating the 293 particular parameters specific to the algorithm. Requests for 294 descriptive information from the client are made by an attribute, to 295 be represented as Attributes of the CSR, with a type indicating the 296 [RFC2985] extensionRequest and the values indicating the particular 297 attributes desired to be included in the resulting certificate's 298 extensions. 300 The sequence is Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) encoded [X.690] 301 and then base64 encoded (Section 4 of [RFC4648]). The resulting text 302 forms the application/csrattr body, without headers. 304 For example, if a CA requests a client to submit a certification 305 request containing the challengePassword (indicating that linking of 306 identity and POP information is requested; see Section 3.5), an 307 extensionRequest with the Media Access Control (MAC) address 308 ([RFC2307]) of the client, and to use the secp384r1 elliptic curve 309 and to sign with the SHA384 hash function. Then, it takes the 310 following: 312 OID: challengePassword (1.2.840.113549.1.9.7) 314 Attribute: type = extensionRequest (1.2.840.113549.1.9.14) 315 value = macAddress (1.3.6.1.1.1.1.22) 317 Attribute: type = id-ecPublicKey (1.2.840.10045.2.1) 318 value = secp384r1 (1.3.132.0.34) 320 OID: ecdsaWithSHA384 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.3) 322 and encodes them into an ASN.1 SEQUENCE to produce: 324 30 41 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 07 30 12 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 325 02 01 31 07 06 05 2b 81 04 00 22 30 16 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 326 09 0e 31 09 06 07 2b 06 01 01 01 01 16 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 327 03 329 and then base64 encodes the resulting ASN.1 SEQUENCE to produce: 331 MEEGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiMBYGCSqGSIb3DQEJDjEJ 332 BgcrBgEBAQEWBggqhkjOPQQDAw== 334 5. Clarification of error messages for certificate enrollment 335 operations 337 [errata5108] clarifies what format the error messages are to be in. 338 Previously a client might be confused into believing that an error 339 returned with type text/plain was not intended to be an error. 341 5.1. Updating section 4.2.3: Simple Enroll and Re-enroll Response 343 Replace: 345 If the content-type is not set, the response data MUST be a 346 plaintext human-readable error message containing explanatory 347 information describing why the request was rejected (for 348 example, indicating that CSR attributes are incomplete). 350 with: 352 If the content-type is not set, the response data MUST be a 353 plaintext human-readable error message containing explanatory 354 information describing why the request was rejected (for 355 example, indicating that CSR attributes are incomplete). 356 Servers MAY use the "text/plain" content-type [RFC2046] 357 for human-readable errors. 359 5.2. Updating section 4.4.2: Server-Side Key Generation Response 361 Replace: 363 If the content-type is not set, the response data MUST be a 364 plaintext human-readable error message. 366 with: 368 If the content-type is not set, the response data must be a 369 plaintext human-readable error message. 370 Servers MAY use the "text/plain" content-type [RFC2046] 371 for human-readable errors. 373 6. Privacy Considerations 375 This document does not disclose any additional identifies to either 376 active or passive observer would see with [RFC7030]. 378 7. Security Considerations 380 This document clarifies an existing security mechanism. It does not 381 create any new protocol mechanism. 383 8. IANA Considerations 385 The ASN.1 module in Appendix A of this document makes use of object 386 identifiers (OIDs). This document requests that IANA register an OID 387 in the SMI Security for PKIX Arc in the Module identifiers subarc 388 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) for the ASN.1 module. The OID for the Asymmetric 389 Decryption Key Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.54) was previously 390 defined in [RFC7030]. 392 IANA is requested to update the "Reference" column for the Asymmetric 393 Decryption Key Identifier attribute to also include a reference to 394 this document. 396 9. Acknowledgements 398 This work was supported by Huawei Technologies. 400 The ASN.1 Module was assembled by Russ Housley and formatted by Sean 401 Turner. Russ Housley provided editorial review. 403 10. References 405 10.1. Normative References 407 [errata4384] 408 "EST errata 4384: ASN.1 encoding error", n.d., 409 . 411 [errata5107] 412 "EST errata 5107: use Content-Transfer-Encoding", n.d., 413 . 415 [errata5108] 416 "EST errata 5108: use of Content-Type for error message", 417 n.d., . 419 [errata5904] 420 "EST errata 5904: use Content-Transfer-Encoding", n.d., 421 . 423 [IEC62351] 424 International Electrotechnical Commission, "Power systems 425 management and associated information exchange - Data and 426 communications security - Part 9: Cyber security key 427 management for power system equipment", ISO/ 428 IEC 62351-9:2017, 2017. 430 [RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail 431 Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message 432 Bodies", RFC 2045, DOI 10.17487/RFC2045, November 1996, 433 . 435 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 436 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 437 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 438 . 440 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 441 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 442 DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, 443 . 445 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data 446 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, 447 . 449 [RFC5212] Shiomoto, K., Papadimitriou, D., Le Roux, JL., Vigoureux, 450 M., and D. Brungard, "Requirements for GMPLS-Based Multi- 451 Region and Multi-Layer Networks (MRN/MLN)", RFC 5212, 452 DOI 10.17487/RFC5212, July 2008, 453 . 455 [RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules 456 for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public 457 Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, 458 DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, 459 . 461 [RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., 462 "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, 463 DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, 464 . 466 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 467 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 468 May 2017, . 470 [RFC8179] Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property 471 Rights in IETF Technology", BCP 79, RFC 8179, 472 DOI 10.17487/RFC8179, May 2017, 473 . 475 [X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation 476 One.", ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002, 2002. 478 [X.681] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation 479 One: Information Object Specification.", ISO/ 480 IEC 8824-2:2002, 2002. 482 [X.682] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation 483 One: Constraint Specification.", ISO/IEC 8824-2:2002, 484 2002. 486 [X.683] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation 487 One: Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications.", ISO/ 488 IEC 8824-2:2002, 2002. 490 [X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules: 491 Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical 492 Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules 493 (DER).", ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, 2002. 495 10.2. Informative References 497 [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] 498 Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M., 499 and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key 500 Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping- 501 keyinfra-41 (work in progress), April 2020. 503 [RFC2307] Howard, L., "An Approach for Using LDAP as a Network 504 Information Service", RFC 2307, DOI 10.17487/RFC2307, 505 March 1998, . 507 [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., 508 Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext 509 Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, 510 DOI 10.17487/RFC2616, June 1999, 511 . 513 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 514 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 515 DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000, 516 . 518 [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer 519 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", 520 RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, 521 . 523 [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer 524 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, 525 DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, 526 . 528 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module 530 This annex provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the 531 structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in 532 [X.680], [X.681], [X.682] and [X.683]. 534 The ASN.1 modules makes imports from the ASN.1 modules in [RFC5212] 535 and [RFC6268]. 537 There is no ASN.1 Module in RFC 7030. This module has been created 538 by combining the lines that are contained in the document body. 540 PKIXEST-2019 541 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) 542 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 543 id-mod-est-2019(TBD) } 545 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 546 BEGIN 548 -- EXPORTS ALL -- 550 IMPORTS 552 Attribute 553 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- [RFC6268] 554 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 555 pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) 556 id-mod-cms-2009(58) } 558 ATTRIBUTE 559 FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- [RFC5912] 560 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) 561 mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ; 563 -- CSR Attributes 565 CsrAttrs ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID 567 AttrOrOID ::= CHOICE { 568 oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 569 attribute Attribute {{AttrSet}} } 571 AttrSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... } 573 -- Asymmetric Decrypt Key Identifier Attribute 575 aa-asymmDecryptKeyID ATTRIBUTE ::= 576 { TYPE AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier 577 IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-asymmDecryptKeyID } 579 id-aa-asymmDecryptKeyID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) 580 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 54 } 582 AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING 584 END 586 Authors' Addresses 588 Michael Richardson 589 Sandelman Software Works 591 Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca 593 Thomas Werner 594 Siemens 596 Email: thomas-werner@siemens.com 598 Wei Pan 599 Huawei Technologies 601 Email: william.panwei@huawei.com