idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == There are 2 instances of lines with non-RFC6890-compliant IPv4 addresses in the document. If these are example addresses, they should be changed. == There are 2 instances of lines with non-RFC3849-compliant IPv6 addresses in the document. If these are example addresses, they should be changed. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == The document doesn't use any RFC 2119 keywords, yet seems to have RFC 2119 boilerplate text. -- The document date (April 23, 2018) is 2189 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Experimental ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6830 (Obsoleted by RFC 9300, RFC 9301) == Outdated reference: A later version (-03) exists of draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-02 == Outdated reference: A later version (-13) exists of draft-ietf-lisp-eid-mobility-01 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 6 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group D. Farinacci 3 Internet-Draft lispers.net 4 Intended status: Experimental P. Pillay-Esnault 5 Expires: October 25, 2018 Huawei Technologies 6 W. Haddad 7 Ericsson 8 April 23, 2018 10 LISP EID Anonymity 11 draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 13 Abstract 15 This specification will describe how ephemeral LISP EIDs can be used 16 to create source anonymity. The idea makes use of frequently 17 changing EIDs much like how a credit-card system uses a different 18 credit-card numbers for each transaction. 20 Requirements Language 22 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 23 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 24 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 26 Status of This Memo 28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 34 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 25, 2018. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 50 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document. Please review these documents 52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 56 described in the Simplified BSD License. 58 Table of Contents 60 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 61 2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 4. Design Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 5. Other Types of Ephemeral-EIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 6. Interworking Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 7. Multicast Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 8. Performance Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 73 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 74 Appendix B. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 75 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 . . . . . . . 8 76 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 . . . . . . . 8 77 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 . . . . . . . 8 78 B.4. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 . . . . 9 79 B.5. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 . . . . 9 80 B.6. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 . . . . 9 81 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 83 1. Introduction 85 The LISP architecture [RFC6830] specifies two namespaces, End-Point 86 IDs (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs). An EID identifies a node in 87 the network and the RLOC indicates the EID's topological location. 88 Typically EIDs are globally unique so a end-node system can connect 89 to any other end-node system on the Internet. Privately used EIDs 90 are allowed when scoped within a VPN but must always be unique within 91 that scope. Therefore, address allocation is required by network 92 administration to avoid address collisions or duplicate address use. 93 In a multiple namespace architecture like LISP, typically the EID 94 will stay fixed while the RLOC can change. This occurs when the EID 95 is mobile or when the LISP site the EID resides in changes its 96 connection to the Internet. 98 LISP creates the opportunity where EIDs are fixed and won't change. 99 This can create a privacy problem more so than what we have on the 100 Internet today. This draft will examine a technique to allow a end- 101 node system to use a temporary address. The lifetime of a temporary 102 address can be the same as a lifetime of an address in use today on 103 the Internet or can have traditionally shorter lifetimes, possibly on 104 the order of a day or even change as frequent as new connection 105 attempts. 107 2. Definition of Terms 109 Ephemeral-EID - is an IP address that is created randomly for use 110 for a temporary period of time. An Ephemeral-EID has all the 111 properties of an EID as defined in [RFC6830]. Ephemeral-EIDs are 112 not stored in the Domain Name System (DNS) and should not be used 113 in long-term address referrals. 115 Client End-Node - is a network node that originates and consumes 116 packets. It is a system that originates packets or initiates the 117 establishment of transport-layer connections. It does not offer 118 services as a server system would. It accesses servers and 119 attempts to do it anonymously. 121 3. Overview 123 A client end-node can assign its own ephemeral EID and use it to talk 124 to any system on the Internet. The system is acting as a client 125 where it initiates communication and desires to be an inaccessible 126 resource from any other system. The ephemeral EID is used as a 127 destination address solely to return packets to resources the 128 ephemeral EID connects to. 130 Here is the procedure a client end-node would use: 132 1. Client end-node desires to talk on the network. It creates and 133 assigns an ephemeral-EID on any interface. 135 2. If the client end-node is a LISP xTR, it will register the 136 ephemeral-EID with a globally routable RLOC. If the client end- 137 node is not a LISP xTR, it can send packets on the network where 138 a LISP router xTR will register the ephemeral-EID with its RLOC. 140 3. The client end-node originates packets with a source address 141 equal to the ephemeral-EID and will receive packets addressed to 142 the ephemeral-EID. 144 4. When the client end-node decides to stop using the ephemeral-EID, 145 it will deregister it from the mapping system and create and 146 assign a new ephemeral-EID, or decide to configure a static 147 global address, or participate in DHCP to get assigned a leased 148 address. 150 Note that the ephemeral-EID can be mobile just like any other EID so 151 if it is initially registered to the mapping system with one or more 152 RLOCs, later the RLOC-set can change as the ephemeral-EID roams. 154 4. Design Details 156 This specification proposes the use of the experimental LISP EID- 157 block 2001:5::/32 [RFC7954] when IPv6 is used. See IANA 158 Considerations section for a specific sub-block allocation request. 159 When IPv4 is used, the Class E block 240.0.0.0/4 is being proposed. 161 The client end-node system will use the rest of the host bits to 162 allocate a random number to be used as the ephemeral-EID. The EID 163 can be created manually or via a programatic interface. When the EID 164 address is going to change frequently, it is suggested to use a 165 programatic interface. The probability of address collision is 166 unlikely for IPv6 EIDs but could occur for IPv4 EIDs. A client end- 167 node can create a ephemeral-EID and then look it up in the mapping 168 system to see if it exists. If the EID exists in the mapping system, 169 the client end-node can attempt creation of a new random number for 170 the ephemeral-EID. See Section 8 where ephemeral-EIDs can be 171 preallocated and registered to the mapping system before use. 173 When the client end-node system is co-located with the RLOC and acts 174 as an xTR, it should register the binding before sending packets. 175 This eliminates a race condition for returning packets not knowing 176 where to encapsulate packets to the ephemeral-EID's RLOCs. See 177 Section 8 for alternatives for fixing this race condition problem. 178 When the client end-node system is not acting as an xTR, it should 179 send some packets so its ephemeral-EID can be discovered by an xTR 180 which supports EID-mobility [I-D.ietf-lisp-eid-mobility] so mapping 181 system registration can occur before the destination returns packets. 182 When the end-node system is acting as an xTR, the EID and RLOC-set is 183 co-located in the same node. So when the EID is created, the xTR can 184 register the mapping versus waiting for packet transmission. 186 5. Other Types of Ephemeral-EIDs 188 When IPv6 Ephemeral-EIDs are used, an alternative to a random number 189 can be used. For example, the low-order bits of the IPv6 address 190 could be a cryptographic hash of a public-key. Mechanisms from 191 [RFC3972] could be used for EIDs. Using this approach allows the 192 sender with a hashed EID to be authenticated. So packet signatures 193 can be verified by the corresponding public-key. When hashed EIDs 194 are used, the EID can change frequently as rekeying may be required 195 for enhanced security. LISP specific control message signature 196 mechanims can be found in [I-D.farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth]. 198 6. Interworking Considerations 200 If a client end-node is communicating with a system that is not in a 201 LISP site, the procedures from [RFC6832] should be followed. The 202 PITR will be required to originate route advertisements for the 203 ephemeral-EID sub-block [RFC7954] so it can attract packets sourced 204 by non-LISP sites destined to ephemeral-EIDs. However, in the 205 general case, the coarse block from [RFC7954] will be advertised 206 which would cover the sub-block. For IPv4, the 240.0.0.0/4 must be 207 advertised into the IPv4 routing system. 209 7. Multicast Considerations 211 A client end-node system can be a member of a multicast group fairly 212 easily since its address is not used for multicast communication as a 213 receiver. This is due to the design characteristics of IGMP 214 [RFC3376] [RFC2236] [RFC1112] and MLD [RFC2710] [RFC3810]. 216 When a client end-node system is a multicast source, there is 217 ephemeral (S,G) state that is created and maintained in the network 218 via multicast routing protocols such as PIM [RFC4602] and when PIM is 219 used with LISP [RFC6802]. In addition, when 220 [I-D.ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast] is used, ephemeral-EID state is 221 created in the mapping database. This doesn't present any problems 222 other than the amount of state that may exist in the network if not 223 timed out and removed promptly. 225 However, there exists a multicast source discovery problem when PIM- 226 SSM [RFC4607] is used. Members that join (S,G) channels via out of 227 band mechanisms. These mechanisms need to support ephemeral-EIDs. 228 Otherwise, PIM-ASM [RFC4602] or PIM-Bidir [RFC5015] will need to be 229 used. 231 8. Performance Improvements 233 An optimization to reduce the race condition between registering 234 ephemeral-EIDs and returning packets as well as reducing the 235 probability of ephemeral-EID address collision is to preload the 236 mapping database with a list of ephemeral-EIDs before using them. It 237 comes at a expense of rebinding all of registered ephemeral-EIDs when 238 there is an RLOC change. There is work in progress to consider 239 adding a level of indirection here so a single entry gets the RLOC 240 update and the list of ephemeral-EIDs point to the single entry. 242 9. Security Considerations 244 When LISP-crypto [RFC8061] is used the EID payload is more secure 245 through encryption providing EID obfuscation of the ephemeral-EID as 246 well as the global-EID it is communicating with. But the obfuscation 247 only occurs between xTRs. So the randomness of a ephemeral-EID 248 inside of LISP sites provide a new level of privacy. 250 10. IANA Considerations 252 This specification is requesting the sub-block 2001:5:ffff::/48 for 253 ephemeral-EID usage. 255 11. References 257 11.1. Normative References 259 [RFC1112] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5, 260 RFC 1112, DOI 10.17487/RFC1112, August 1989, 261 . 263 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 264 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 265 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 266 . 268 [RFC2236] Fenner, W., "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 269 2", RFC 2236, DOI 10.17487/RFC2236, November 1997, 270 . 272 [RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast 273 Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, 274 DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999, 275 . 277 [RFC3376] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A. 278 Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 279 3", RFC 3376, DOI 10.17487/RFC3376, October 2002, 280 . 282 [RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener 283 Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, 284 DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004, 285 . 287 [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", 288 RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, 289 . 291 [RFC4602] Pusateri, T., "Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse 292 Mode (PIM-SM) IETF Proposed Standard Requirements 293 Analysis", RFC 4602, DOI 10.17487/RFC4602, August 2006, 294 . 296 [RFC4607] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for 297 IP", RFC 4607, DOI 10.17487/RFC4607, August 2006, 298 . 300 [RFC5015] Handley, M., Kouvelas, I., Speakman, T., and L. Vicisano, 301 "Bidirectional Protocol Independent Multicast (BIDIR- 302 PIM)", RFC 5015, DOI 10.17487/RFC5015, October 2007, 303 . 305 [RFC6802] Baillargeon, S., Flinta, C., and A. Johnsson, "Ericsson 306 Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) Value-Added 307 Octets", RFC 6802, DOI 10.17487/RFC6802, November 2012, 308 . 310 [RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The 311 Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830, 312 DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013, 313 . 315 [RFC6832] Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller, 316 "Interworking between Locator/ID Separation Protocol 317 (LISP) and Non-LISP Sites", RFC 6832, 318 DOI 10.17487/RFC6832, January 2013, 319 . 321 [RFC7954] Iannone, L., Lewis, D., Meyer, D., and V. Fuller, 322 "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Endpoint Identifier 323 (EID) Block", RFC 7954, DOI 10.17487/RFC7954, September 324 2016, . 326 [RFC8061] Farinacci, D. and B. Weis, "Locator/ID Separation Protocol 327 (LISP) Data-Plane Confidentiality", RFC 8061, 328 DOI 10.17487/RFC8061, February 2017, 329 . 331 11.2. Informative References 333 [I-D.farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth] 334 Farinacci, D. and E. Nordmark, "LISP Control-Plane ECDSA 335 Authentication and Authorization", draft-farinacci-lisp- 336 ecdsa-auth-02 (work in progress), April 2018. 338 [I-D.ietf-lisp-eid-mobility] 339 Portoles-Comeras, M., Ashtaputre, V., Moreno, V., Maino, 340 F., and D. Farinacci, "LISP L2/L3 EID Mobility Using a 341 Unified Control Plane", draft-ietf-lisp-eid-mobility-01 342 (work in progress), November 2017. 344 [I-D.ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast] 345 Moreno, V. and D. Farinacci, "Signal-Free LISP Multicast", 346 draft-ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast-09 (work in 347 progress), March 2018. 349 Appendix A. Acknowledgments 351 The author would like to thank the LISP WG for their review and 352 acceptance of this draft. 354 Appendix B. Document Change Log 356 [RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC.] 358 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 360 o Posted April 2018. 362 o Update document timer and references. 364 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 366 o Posted October 2017. 368 o Add to section 5 that PKI can be used to authenticate EIDs. 370 o Update references. 372 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 374 o Posted August 2017. 376 o Made draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 a LISP working group 377 document. 379 B.4. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 381 o Posted April 2017. 383 o Added section describing how ephemeral-EIDs can use a public key 384 hash as an alternative to a random number. 386 o Indciate when an EID/RLOC co-located, that the xTR can register 387 the EID when it is configured or changed versus waiting for a 388 packet to be sent as in the EID/RLOC separated case. 390 B.5. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 392 o Posted October 2016. 394 o Update document timer. 396 B.6. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 398 o Posted April 2016. 400 o Initial posting. 402 Authors' Addresses 404 Dino Farinacci 405 lispers.net 406 San Jose, CA 407 USA 409 Email: farinacci@gmail.com 411 Padma Pillay-Esnault 412 Huawei Technologies 413 San Clara, CA 414 USA 416 Email: padma@huawei.com 418 Wassim Haddad 419 Ericsson 420 San Clara, CA 421 USA 423 Email: wassim.haddad@ericsson.com