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Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == The document doesn't use any RFC 2119 keywords, yet seems to have RFC 2119 boilerplate text. -- The document date (October 15, 2018) is 2019 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Experimental ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6830 (Obsoleted by RFC 9300, RFC 9301) == Outdated reference: A later version (-13) exists of draft-ietf-lisp-eid-mobility-02 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 5 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group D. Farinacci 3 Internet-Draft lispers.net 4 Intended status: Experimental P. Pillay-Esnault 5 Expires: April 18, 2019 Huawei Technologies 6 W. Haddad 7 Ericsson 8 October 15, 2018 10 LISP EID Anonymity 11 draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-03 13 Abstract 15 This specification will describe how ephemeral LISP EIDs can be used 16 to create source anonymity. The idea makes use of frequently 17 changing EIDs much like how a credit-card system uses a different 18 credit-card numbers for each transaction. 20 Requirements Language 22 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 23 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 24 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 26 Status of This Memo 28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 34 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2019. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 50 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document. Please review these documents 52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 56 described in the Simplified BSD License. 58 Table of Contents 60 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 61 2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 4. Design Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 5. Other Types of Ephemeral-EIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 6. Interworking Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 7. Multicast Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 8. Performance Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 73 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 74 Appendix B. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 75 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-03 . . . . . . . 8 76 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 . . . . . . . 8 77 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 . . . . . . . 8 78 B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 . . . . . . . 9 79 B.5. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 . . . . 9 80 B.6. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 . . . . 9 81 B.7. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 . . . . 9 82 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 84 1. Introduction 86 The LISP architecture [RFC6830] specifies two namespaces, End-Point 87 IDs (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs). An EID identifies a node in 88 the network and the RLOC indicates the EID's topological location. 89 Typically EIDs are globally unique so a end-node system can connect 90 to any other end-node system on the Internet. Privately used EIDs 91 are allowed when scoped within a VPN but must always be unique within 92 that scope. Therefore, address allocation is required by network 93 administration to avoid address collisions or duplicate address use. 94 In a multiple namespace architecture like LISP, typically the EID 95 will stay fixed while the RLOC can change. This occurs when the EID 96 is mobile or when the LISP site the EID resides in changes its 97 connection to the Internet. 99 LISP creates the opportunity where EIDs are fixed and won't change. 100 This can create a privacy problem more so than what we have on the 101 Internet today. This draft will examine a technique to allow a end- 102 node system to use a temporary address. The lifetime of a temporary 103 address can be the same as a lifetime of an address in use today on 104 the Internet or can have traditionally shorter lifetimes, possibly on 105 the order of a day or even change as frequent as new connection 106 attempts. 108 2. Definition of Terms 110 Ephemeral-EID - is an IP address that is created randomly for use 111 for a temporary period of time. An Ephemeral-EID has all the 112 properties of an EID as defined in [RFC6830]. Ephemeral-EIDs are 113 not stored in the Domain Name System (DNS) and should not be used 114 in long-term address referrals. 116 Client End-Node - is a network node that originates and consumes 117 packets. It is a system that originates packets or initiates the 118 establishment of transport-layer connections. It does not offer 119 services as a server system would. It accesses servers and 120 attempts to do it anonymously. 122 3. Overview 124 A client end-node can assign its own ephemeral EID and use it to talk 125 to any system on the Internet. The system is acting as a client 126 where it initiates communication and desires to be an inaccessible 127 resource from any other system. The ephemeral EID is used as a 128 destination address solely to return packets to resources the 129 ephemeral EID connects to. 131 Here is the procedure a client end-node would use: 133 1. Client end-node desires to talk on the network. It creates and 134 assigns an ephemeral-EID on any interface. 136 2. If the client end-node is a LISP xTR, it will register the 137 ephemeral-EID with a globally routable RLOC. If the client end- 138 node is not a LISP xTR, it can send packets on the network where 139 a LISP router xTR will register the ephemeral-EID with its RLOC. 141 3. The client end-node originates packets with a source address 142 equal to the ephemeral-EID and will receive packets addressed to 143 the ephemeral-EID. 145 4. When the client end-node decides to stop using the ephemeral-EID, 146 it will deregister it from the mapping system and create and 147 assign a new ephemeral-EID, or decide to configure a static 148 global address, or participate in DHCP to get assigned a leased 149 address. 151 Note that the ephemeral-EID can be mobile just like any other EID so 152 if it is initially registered to the mapping system with one or more 153 RLOCs, later the RLOC-set can change as the ephemeral-EID roams. 155 4. Design Details 157 This specification proposes the use of the experimental LISP EID- 158 block 2001:5::/32 [RFC7954] when IPv6 is used. See IANA 159 Considerations section for a specific sub-block allocation request. 160 When IPv4 is used, the Class E block 240.0.0.0/4 is being proposed. 162 The client end-node system will use the rest of the host bits to 163 allocate a random number to be used as the ephemeral-EID. The EID 164 can be created manually or via a programatic interface. When the EID 165 address is going to change frequently, it is suggested to use a 166 programatic interface. The probability of address collision is 167 unlikely for IPv6 EIDs but could occur for IPv4 EIDs. A client end- 168 node can create a ephemeral-EID and then look it up in the mapping 169 system to see if it exists. If the EID exists in the mapping system, 170 the client end-node can attempt creation of a new random number for 171 the ephemeral-EID. See Section 8 where ephemeral-EIDs can be 172 preallocated and registered to the mapping system before use. 174 When the client end-node system is co-located with the RLOC and acts 175 as an xTR, it should register the binding before sending packets. 176 This eliminates a race condition for returning packets not knowing 177 where to encapsulate packets to the ephemeral-EID's RLOCs. See 178 Section 8 for alternatives for fixing this race condition problem. 179 When the client end-node system is not acting as an xTR, it should 180 send some packets so its ephemeral-EID can be discovered by an xTR 181 which supports EID-mobility [I-D.ietf-lisp-eid-mobility] so mapping 182 system registration can occur before the destination returns packets. 183 When the end-node system is acting as an xTR, the EID and RLOC-set is 184 co-located in the same node. So when the EID is created, the xTR can 185 register the mapping versus waiting for packet transmission. 187 5. Other Types of Ephemeral-EIDs 189 When IPv6 Ephemeral-EIDs are used, an alternative to a random number 190 can be used. For example, the low-order bits of the IPv6 address 191 could be a cryptographic hash of a public-key. Mechanisms from 192 [RFC3972] could be used for EIDs. Using this approach allows the 193 sender with a hashed EID to be authenticated. So packet signatures 194 can be verified by the corresponding public-key. When hashed EIDs 195 are used, the EID can change frequently as rekeying may be required 196 for enhanced security. LISP specific control message signature 197 mechanims can be found in [I-D.farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth]. 199 6. Interworking Considerations 201 If a client end-node is communicating with a system that is not in a 202 LISP site, the procedures from [RFC6832] should be followed. The 203 PITR will be required to originate route advertisements for the 204 ephemeral-EID sub-block [RFC7954] so it can attract packets sourced 205 by non-LISP sites destined to ephemeral-EIDs. However, in the 206 general case, the coarse block from [RFC7954] will be advertised 207 which would cover the sub-block. For IPv4, the 240.0.0.0/4 must be 208 advertised into the IPv4 routing system. 210 7. Multicast Considerations 212 A client end-node system can be a member of a multicast group fairly 213 easily since its address is not used for multicast communication as a 214 receiver. This is due to the design characteristics of IGMP 215 [RFC3376] [RFC2236] [RFC1112] and MLD [RFC2710] [RFC3810]. 217 When a client end-node system is a multicast source, there is 218 ephemeral (S,G) state that is created and maintained in the network 219 via multicast routing protocols such as PIM [RFC4602] and when PIM is 220 used with LISP [RFC6802]. In addition, when 221 [I-D.ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast] is used, ephemeral-EID state is 222 created in the mapping database. This doesn't present any problems 223 other than the amount of state that may exist in the network if not 224 timed out and removed promptly. 226 However, there exists a multicast source discovery problem when PIM- 227 SSM [RFC4607] is used. Members that join (S,G) channels via out of 228 band mechanisms. These mechanisms need to support ephemeral-EIDs. 229 Otherwise, PIM-ASM [RFC4602] or PIM-Bidir [RFC5015] will need to be 230 used. 232 8. Performance Improvements 234 An optimization to reduce the race condition between registering 235 ephemeral-EIDs and returning packets as well as reducing the 236 probability of ephemeral-EID address collision is to preload the 237 mapping database with a list of ephemeral-EIDs before using them. It 238 comes at a expense of rebinding all of registered ephemeral-EIDs when 239 there is an RLOC change. There is work in progress to consider 240 adding a level of indirection here so a single entry gets the RLOC 241 update and the list of ephemeral-EIDs point to the single entry. 243 9. Security Considerations 245 When LISP-crypto [RFC8061] is used the EID payload is more secure 246 through encryption providing EID obfuscation of the ephemeral-EID as 247 well as the global-EID it is communicating with. But the obfuscation 248 only occurs between xTRs. So the randomness of a ephemeral-EID 249 inside of LISP sites provide a new level of privacy. 251 10. IANA Considerations 253 This specification is requesting the sub-block 2001:5:ffff::/48 for 254 ephemeral-EID usage. 256 11. References 258 11.1. Normative References 260 [RFC1112] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5, 261 RFC 1112, DOI 10.17487/RFC1112, August 1989, 262 . 264 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 265 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 266 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 267 . 269 [RFC2236] Fenner, W., "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 270 2", RFC 2236, DOI 10.17487/RFC2236, November 1997, 271 . 273 [RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast 274 Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, 275 DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999, 276 . 278 [RFC3376] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A. 279 Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 280 3", RFC 3376, DOI 10.17487/RFC3376, October 2002, 281 . 283 [RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener 284 Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, 285 DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004, 286 . 288 [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", 289 RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, 290 . 292 [RFC4602] Pusateri, T., "Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse 293 Mode (PIM-SM) IETF Proposed Standard Requirements 294 Analysis", RFC 4602, DOI 10.17487/RFC4602, August 2006, 295 . 297 [RFC4607] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for 298 IP", RFC 4607, DOI 10.17487/RFC4607, August 2006, 299 . 301 [RFC5015] Handley, M., Kouvelas, I., Speakman, T., and L. Vicisano, 302 "Bidirectional Protocol Independent Multicast (BIDIR- 303 PIM)", RFC 5015, DOI 10.17487/RFC5015, October 2007, 304 . 306 [RFC6802] Baillargeon, S., Flinta, C., and A. Johnsson, "Ericsson 307 Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) Value-Added 308 Octets", RFC 6802, DOI 10.17487/RFC6802, November 2012, 309 . 311 [RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The 312 Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830, 313 DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013, 314 . 316 [RFC6832] Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller, 317 "Interworking between Locator/ID Separation Protocol 318 (LISP) and Non-LISP Sites", RFC 6832, 319 DOI 10.17487/RFC6832, January 2013, 320 . 322 [RFC7954] Iannone, L., Lewis, D., Meyer, D., and V. Fuller, 323 "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Endpoint Identifier 324 (EID) Block", RFC 7954, DOI 10.17487/RFC7954, September 325 2016, . 327 [RFC8061] Farinacci, D. and B. Weis, "Locator/ID Separation Protocol 328 (LISP) Data-Plane Confidentiality", RFC 8061, 329 DOI 10.17487/RFC8061, February 2017, 330 . 332 11.2. Informative References 334 [I-D.farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth] 335 Farinacci, D. and E. Nordmark, "LISP Control-Plane ECDSA 336 Authentication and Authorization", draft-farinacci-lisp- 337 ecdsa-auth-03 (work in progress), September 2018. 339 [I-D.ietf-lisp-eid-mobility] 340 Portoles-Comeras, M., Ashtaputre, V., Moreno, V., Maino, 341 F., and D. Farinacci, "LISP L2/L3 EID Mobility Using a 342 Unified Control Plane", draft-ietf-lisp-eid-mobility-02 343 (work in progress), May 2018. 345 [I-D.ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast] 346 Moreno, V. and D. Farinacci, "Signal-Free LISP Multicast", 347 draft-ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast-09 (work in 348 progress), March 2018. 350 Appendix A. Acknowledgments 352 The author would like to thank the LISP WG for their review and 353 acceptance of this draft. 355 Appendix B. Document Change Log 357 [RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC.] 359 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-03 361 o Posted October 2018. 363 o Update document timer and references. 365 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 367 o Posted April 2018. 369 o Update document timer and references. 371 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 373 o Posted October 2017. 375 o Add to section 5 that PKI can be used to authenticate EIDs. 377 o Update references. 379 B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 381 o Posted August 2017. 383 o Made draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 a LISP working group 384 document. 386 B.5. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 388 o Posted April 2017. 390 o Added section describing how ephemeral-EIDs can use a public key 391 hash as an alternative to a random number. 393 o Indciate when an EID/RLOC co-located, that the xTR can register 394 the EID when it is configured or changed versus waiting for a 395 packet to be sent as in the EID/RLOC separated case. 397 B.6. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 399 o Posted October 2016. 401 o Update document timer. 403 B.7. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 405 o Posted April 2016. 407 o Initial posting. 409 Authors' Addresses 411 Dino Farinacci 412 lispers.net 413 San Jose, CA 414 USA 416 Email: farinacci@gmail.com 418 Padma Pillay-Esnault 419 Huawei Technologies 420 San Clara, CA 421 USA 423 Email: padma@huawei.com 424 Wassim Haddad 425 Ericsson 426 San Clara, CA 427 USA 429 Email: wassim.haddad@ericsson.com