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Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == The document doesn't use any RFC 2119 keywords, yet seems to have RFC 2119 boilerplate text. -- The document date (October 22, 2018) is 2013 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Experimental ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6830 (Obsoleted by RFC 9300, RFC 9301) == Outdated reference: A later version (-13) exists of draft-ietf-lisp-eid-mobility-02 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 5 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group D. Farinacci 3 Internet-Draft lispers.net 4 Intended status: Experimental P. Pillay-Esnault 5 Expires: April 25, 2019 Huawei Technologies 6 W. Haddad 7 Ericsson 8 October 22, 2018 10 LISP EID Anonymity 11 draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-04 13 Abstract 15 This specification will describe how ephemeral LISP EIDs can be used 16 to create source anonymity. The idea makes use of frequently 17 changing EIDs much like how a credit-card system uses a different 18 credit-card numbers for each transaction. 20 Requirements Language 22 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 23 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 24 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 26 Status of This Memo 28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 34 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 50 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document. Please review these documents 52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 56 described in the Simplified BSD License. 58 Table of Contents 60 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 61 2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 4. Design Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 5. Other Types of Ephemeral-EIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 6. Interworking Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 7. Multicast Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 8. Performance Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 73 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 74 Appendix B. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 75 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-04 . . . . . . . 8 76 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-03 . . . . . . . 8 77 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 . . . . . . . 9 78 B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 . . . . . . . 9 79 B.5. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 . . . . . . . 9 80 B.6. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 . . . . 9 81 B.7. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 . . . . 9 82 B.8. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 . . . . 9 83 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 85 1. Introduction 87 The LISP architecture [RFC6830] specifies two namespaces, End-Point 88 IDs (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs). An EID identifies a node in 89 the network and the RLOC indicates the EID's topological location. 90 Typically EIDs are globally unique so a end-node system can connect 91 to any other end-node system on the Internet. Privately used EIDs 92 are allowed when scoped within a VPN but must always be unique within 93 that scope. Therefore, address allocation is required by network 94 administration to avoid address collisions or duplicate address use. 95 In a multiple namespace architecture like LISP, typically the EID 96 will stay fixed while the RLOC can change. This occurs when the EID 97 is mobile or when the LISP site the EID resides in changes its 98 connection to the Internet. 100 LISP creates the opportunity where EIDs are fixed and won't change. 101 This can create a privacy problem more so than what we have on the 102 Internet today. This draft will examine a technique to allow a end- 103 node system to use a temporary address. The lifetime of a temporary 104 address can be the same as a lifetime of an address in use today on 105 the Internet or can have traditionally shorter lifetimes, possibly on 106 the order of a day or even change as frequent as new connection 107 attempts. 109 2. Definition of Terms 111 Ephemeral-EID - is an IP address that is created randomly for use 112 for a temporary period of time. An Ephemeral-EID has all the 113 properties of an EID as defined in [RFC6830]. Ephemeral-EIDs are 114 not stored in the Domain Name System (DNS) and should not be used 115 in long-term address referrals. 117 Client End-Node - is a network node that originates and consumes 118 packets. It is a system that originates packets or initiates the 119 establishment of transport-layer connections. It does not offer 120 services as a server system would. It accesses servers and 121 attempts to do it anonymously. 123 3. Overview 125 A client end-node can assign its own ephemeral EID and use it to talk 126 to any system on the Internet. The system is acting as a client 127 where it initiates communication and desires to be an inaccessible 128 resource from any other system. The ephemeral EID is used as a 129 destination address solely to return packets to resources the 130 ephemeral EID connects to. 132 Here is the procedure a client end-node would use: 134 1. Client end-node desires to talk on the network. It creates and 135 assigns an ephemeral-EID on any interface. The client end-node 136 may also assign multiple ephemeral-EIDs on the same interface or 137 across different interfaces. 139 2. If the client end-node is a LISP xTR, it will register ephemeral- 140 EIDs mapped to underlay routable RLOCs. If the client end-node 141 is not a LISP xTR, it can send packets on the network where a 142 LISP router xTR will register the ephemeral-EIDs with its RLOC- 143 set. 145 3. The client end-node originates packets with a source address 146 equal to the ephemeral-EID and will receive packets addressed to 147 the ephemeral-EID. 149 4. When the client end-node decides to stop using an ephemeral-EID, 150 it will deregister it from the mapping system and create and 151 assign a new ephemeral-EID, or decide to configure a static 152 global address, or participate in DHCP to get assigned a leased 153 address. 155 Note that the ephemeral-EID can be mobile just like any other EID so 156 if it is initially registered to the mapping system with one or more 157 RLOCs, later the RLOC-set can change as the ephemeral-EID roams. 159 4. Design Details 161 This specification proposes the use of the experimental LISP EID- 162 block 2001:5::/32 [RFC7954] when IPv6 is used. See IANA 163 Considerations section for a specific sub-block allocation request. 164 When IPv4 is used, the Class E block 240.0.0.0/4 is being proposed. 166 The client end-node system will use the rest of the host bits to 167 allocate a random number to be used as the ephemeral-EID. The EID 168 can be created manually or via a programatic interface. When the EID 169 address is going to change frequently, it is suggested to use a 170 programatic interface. The probability of address collision is 171 unlikely for IPv6 EIDs but could occur for IPv4 EIDs. A client end- 172 node can create a ephemeral-EID and then look it up in the mapping 173 system to see if it exists. If the EID exists in the mapping system, 174 the client end-node can attempt creation of a new random number for 175 the ephemeral-EID. See Section 8 where ephemeral-EIDs can be 176 preallocated and registered to the mapping system before use. 178 When the client end-node system is co-located with the RLOC and acts 179 as an xTR, it should register the binding before sending packets. 180 This eliminates a race condition for returning packets not knowing 181 where to encapsulate packets to the ephemeral-EID's RLOCs. See 182 Section 8 for alternatives for fixing this race condition problem. 183 When the client end-node system is not acting as an xTR, it should 184 send some packets so its ephemeral-EID can be discovered by an xTR 185 which supports EID-mobility [I-D.ietf-lisp-eid-mobility] so mapping 186 system registration can occur before the destination returns packets. 187 When the end-node system is acting as an xTR, the EID and RLOC-set is 188 co-located in the same node. So when the EID is created, the xTR can 189 register the mapping versus waiting for packet transmission. 191 5. Other Types of Ephemeral-EIDs 193 When IPv6 Ephemeral-EIDs are used, an alternative to a random number 194 can be used. For example, the low-order bits of the IPv6 address 195 could be a cryptographic hash of a public-key. Mechanisms from 196 [RFC3972] could be used for EIDs. Using this approach allows the 197 sender with a hashed EID to be authenticated. So packet signatures 198 can be verified by the corresponding public-key. When hashed EIDs 199 are used, the EID can change frequently as rekeying may be required 200 for enhanced security. LISP specific control message signature 201 mechanims can be found in [I-D.farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth]. 203 6. Interworking Considerations 205 If a client end-node is communicating with a system that is not in a 206 LISP site, the procedures from [RFC6832] should be followed. The 207 PITR will be required to originate route advertisements for the 208 ephemeral-EID sub-block [RFC7954] so it can attract packets sourced 209 by non-LISP sites destined to ephemeral-EIDs. However, in the 210 general case, the coarse block from [RFC7954] will be advertised 211 which would cover the sub-block. For IPv4, the 240.0.0.0/4 must be 212 advertised into the IPv4 routing system. 214 7. Multicast Considerations 216 A client end-node system can be a member of a multicast group fairly 217 easily since its address is not used for multicast communication as a 218 receiver. This is due to the design characteristics of IGMP 219 [RFC3376] [RFC2236] [RFC1112] and MLD [RFC2710] [RFC3810]. 221 When a client end-node system is a multicast source, there is 222 ephemeral (S,G) state that is created and maintained in the network 223 via multicast routing protocols such as PIM [RFC4602] and when PIM is 224 used with LISP [RFC6802]. In addition, when 225 [I-D.ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast] is used, ephemeral-EID state is 226 created in the mapping database. This doesn't present any problems 227 other than the amount of state that may exist in the network if not 228 timed out and removed promptly. 230 However, there exists a multicast source discovery problem when PIM- 231 SSM [RFC4607] is used. Members that join (S,G) channels via out of 232 band mechanisms. These mechanisms need to support ephemeral-EIDs. 233 Otherwise, PIM-ASM [RFC4602] or PIM-Bidir [RFC5015] will need to be 234 used. 236 8. Performance Improvements 238 An optimization to reduce the race condition between registering 239 ephemeral-EIDs and returning packets as well as reducing the 240 probability of ephemeral-EID address collision is to preload the 241 mapping database with a list of ephemeral-EIDs before using them. It 242 comes at a expense of rebinding all of registered ephemeral-EIDs when 243 there is an RLOC change. There is work in progress to consider 244 adding a level of indirection here so a single entry gets the RLOC 245 update and the list of ephemeral-EIDs point to the single entry. 247 9. Security Considerations 249 When LISP-crypto [RFC8061] is used the EID payload is more secure 250 through encryption providing EID obfuscation of the ephemeral-EID as 251 well as the global-EID it is communicating with. But the obfuscation 252 only occurs between xTRs. So the randomness of a ephemeral-EID 253 inside of LISP sites provide a new level of privacy. 255 10. IANA Considerations 257 This specification is requesting the sub-block 2001:5:ffff::/48 for 258 ephemeral-EID usage. 260 11. References 262 11.1. Normative References 264 [RFC1112] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5, 265 RFC 1112, DOI 10.17487/RFC1112, August 1989, 266 . 268 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 269 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 270 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 271 . 273 [RFC2236] Fenner, W., "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 274 2", RFC 2236, DOI 10.17487/RFC2236, November 1997, 275 . 277 [RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast 278 Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, 279 DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999, 280 . 282 [RFC3376] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A. 283 Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 284 3", RFC 3376, DOI 10.17487/RFC3376, October 2002, 285 . 287 [RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener 288 Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, 289 DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004, 290 . 292 [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", 293 RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, 294 . 296 [RFC4602] Pusateri, T., "Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse 297 Mode (PIM-SM) IETF Proposed Standard Requirements 298 Analysis", RFC 4602, DOI 10.17487/RFC4602, August 2006, 299 . 301 [RFC4607] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for 302 IP", RFC 4607, DOI 10.17487/RFC4607, August 2006, 303 . 305 [RFC5015] Handley, M., Kouvelas, I., Speakman, T., and L. Vicisano, 306 "Bidirectional Protocol Independent Multicast (BIDIR- 307 PIM)", RFC 5015, DOI 10.17487/RFC5015, October 2007, 308 . 310 [RFC6802] Baillargeon, S., Flinta, C., and A. Johnsson, "Ericsson 311 Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) Value-Added 312 Octets", RFC 6802, DOI 10.17487/RFC6802, November 2012, 313 . 315 [RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The 316 Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830, 317 DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013, 318 . 320 [RFC6832] Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller, 321 "Interworking between Locator/ID Separation Protocol 322 (LISP) and Non-LISP Sites", RFC 6832, 323 DOI 10.17487/RFC6832, January 2013, 324 . 326 [RFC7954] Iannone, L., Lewis, D., Meyer, D., and V. Fuller, 327 "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Endpoint Identifier 328 (EID) Block", RFC 7954, DOI 10.17487/RFC7954, September 329 2016, . 331 [RFC8061] Farinacci, D. and B. Weis, "Locator/ID Separation Protocol 332 (LISP) Data-Plane Confidentiality", RFC 8061, 333 DOI 10.17487/RFC8061, February 2017, 334 . 336 11.2. Informative References 338 [I-D.farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth] 339 Farinacci, D. and E. Nordmark, "LISP Control-Plane ECDSA 340 Authentication and Authorization", draft-farinacci-lisp- 341 ecdsa-auth-03 (work in progress), September 2018. 343 [I-D.ietf-lisp-eid-mobility] 344 Portoles-Comeras, M., Ashtaputre, V., Moreno, V., Maino, 345 F., and D. Farinacci, "LISP L2/L3 EID Mobility Using a 346 Unified Control Plane", draft-ietf-lisp-eid-mobility-02 347 (work in progress), May 2018. 349 [I-D.ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast] 350 Moreno, V. and D. Farinacci, "Signal-Free LISP Multicast", 351 draft-ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast-09 (work in 352 progress), March 2018. 354 Appendix A. Acknowledgments 356 The author would like to thank the LISP WG for their review and 357 acceptance of this draft. 359 Appendix B. Document Change Log 361 [RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC.] 363 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-04 365 o Posted October 2018 before Bangkok IETF deadline. 367 o Made Padma requested changes to refer to ephemeral-EIDs allowed to 368 have many on one interface and can be registered with more than 1 369 RLOC but one RLOC-set. 371 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-03 373 o Posted October 2018. 375 o Update document timer and references. 377 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 379 o Posted April 2018. 381 o Update document timer and references. 383 B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 385 o Posted October 2017. 387 o Add to section 5 that PKI can be used to authenticate EIDs. 389 o Update references. 391 B.5. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 393 o Posted August 2017. 395 o Made draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 a LISP working group 396 document. 398 B.6. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 400 o Posted April 2017. 402 o Added section describing how ephemeral-EIDs can use a public key 403 hash as an alternative to a random number. 405 o Indciate when an EID/RLOC co-located, that the xTR can register 406 the EID when it is configured or changed versus waiting for a 407 packet to be sent as in the EID/RLOC separated case. 409 B.7. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 411 o Posted October 2016. 413 o Update document timer. 415 B.8. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 417 o Posted April 2016. 419 o Initial posting. 421 Authors' Addresses 423 Dino Farinacci 424 lispers.net 425 San Jose, CA 426 USA 428 Email: farinacci@gmail.com 430 Padma Pillay-Esnault 431 Huawei Technologies 432 San Clara, CA 433 USA 435 Email: padma@huawei.com 437 Wassim Haddad 438 Ericsson 439 San Clara, CA 440 USA 442 Email: wassim.haddad@ericsson.com