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Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == The document doesn't use any RFC 2119 keywords, yet seems to have RFC 2119 boilerplate text. -- The document date (April 11, 2019) is 1841 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Experimental ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6830 (Obsoleted by RFC 9300, RFC 9301) == Outdated reference: A later version (-13) exists of draft-ietf-lisp-eid-mobility-03 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 5 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group D. Farinacci 3 Internet-Draft lispers.net 4 Intended status: Experimental P. Pillay-Esnault 5 Expires: October 13, 2019 Huawei Technologies 6 W. Haddad 7 Ericsson 8 April 11, 2019 10 LISP EID Anonymity 11 draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-06 13 Abstract 15 This specification will describe how ephemeral LISP EIDs can be used 16 to create source anonymity. The idea makes use of frequently 17 changing EIDs much like how a credit-card system uses a different 18 credit-card numbers for each transaction. 20 Requirements Language 22 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 23 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 24 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 26 Status of This Memo 28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 34 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 13, 2019. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 50 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document. Please review these documents 52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 56 described in the Simplified BSD License. 58 Table of Contents 60 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 61 2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 4. Design Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 5. Other Types of Ephemeral-EIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 6. Interworking Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 7. Multicast Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 8. Performance Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 73 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 74 Appendix B. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 75 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-06 . . . . . . . 8 76 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-05 . . . . . . . 8 77 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-04 . . . . . . . 9 78 B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-03 . . . . . . . 9 79 B.5. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 . . . . . . . 9 80 B.6. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 . . . . . . . 9 81 B.7. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 . . . . . . . 9 82 B.8. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 . . . . 9 83 B.9. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 . . . . 10 84 B.10. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 . . . . 10 85 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 87 1. Introduction 89 The LISP architecture [RFC6830] specifies two namespaces, End-Point 90 IDs (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs). An EID identifies a node in 91 the network and the RLOC indicates the EID's topological location. 92 Typically EIDs are globally unique so an end-node system can connect 93 to any other end-node system on the Internet. Privately used EIDs 94 are allowed when scoped within a VPN but must always be unique within 95 that scope. Therefore, address allocation is required by network 96 administration to avoid address collisions or duplicate address use. 97 In a multiple namespace architecture like LISP, typically the EID 98 will stay fixed while the RLOC can change. This occurs when the EID 99 is mobile or when the LISP site the EID resides in changes its 100 connection to the Internet. 102 LISP creates the opportunity where EIDs are fixed and won't change. 103 This draft will examine a technique to allow a end-node system to use 104 a temporary address. The lifetime of a temporary address can be the 105 same as a lifetime of an address in use today on the Internet or can 106 have traditionally shorter lifetimes, possibly on the order of a day 107 or even change as frequent as new connection attempts. 109 2. Definition of Terms 111 Ephemeral-EID - is an IP address that is created randomly for use 112 for a temporary period of time. An Ephemeral-EID has all the 113 properties of an EID as defined in [RFC6830]. Ephemeral-EIDs are 114 not stored in the Domain Name System (DNS) and should not be used 115 in long-term address referrals. 117 Client End-Node - is a network node that originates and consumes 118 packets. It is a system that originates packets or initiates the 119 establishment of transport-layer connections. It does not offer 120 services as a server system would. It accesses servers and 121 attempts to do it anonymously. 123 3. Overview 125 A client end-node can assign its own ephemeral EID and use it to talk 126 to any system on the Internet. The system is acting as a client 127 where it initiates communication and desires to be an inaccessible 128 resource from any other system. The ephemeral EID is used as a 129 destination address solely to return packets to resources the 130 ephemeral EID connects to. A client-node may simultaneously use a 131 traditional EID along with ephemeral EIDs in parallel and are not 132 mutually exclusive. A client may choose to use the ephemeral EIDs 133 with some peers only where it needs to preserve anonymity. 135 Here is the procedure a client end-node would use: 137 1. Client end-node desires to talk on the network. It creates and 138 assigns an ephemeral-EID on any interface. The client end-node 139 may also assign multiple ephemeral-EIDs on the same interface or 140 across different interfaces. 142 2. If the client end-node is a LISP xTR, it will register ephemeral- 143 EIDs mapped to underlay routable RLOCs. If the client end-node 144 is not a LISP xTR, it can send packets on the network where a 145 LISP router xTR will register the ephemeral-EIDs with its RLOC- 146 set. 148 3. The client end-node originates packets with a source address 149 equal to the ephemeral-EID and will receive packets addressed to 150 the ephemeral-EID. 152 4. When the client end-node decides to stop using an ephemeral-EID, 153 it will deregister it from the mapping system and create and 154 assign a new ephemeral-EID, or decide to configure a static 155 global address, or participate in DHCP to get assigned a leased 156 address. 158 Note that the ephemeral-EID can be mobile just like any other EID so 159 if it is initially registered to the mapping system with one or more 160 RLOCs, later the RLOC-set can change as the ephemeral-EID roams. 162 4. Design Details 164 This specification proposes the use of the experimental LISP EID- 165 block 2001:5::/32 [RFC7954] when IPv6 is used. See IANA 166 Considerations section for a specific sub-block allocation request. 167 When IPv4 is used, the Class E block 240.0.0.0/4 is being proposed. 169 The client end-node system will use the rest of the host bits to 170 allocate a random number to be used as the ephemeral-EID. The EID 171 can be created manually or via a programatic interface. When the EID 172 address is going to change frequently, it is suggested to use a 173 programatic interface. The probability of address collision is 174 unlikely for IPv6 EIDs but could occur for IPv4 EIDs. A client end- 175 node can create an ephemeral-EID and then look it up in the mapping 176 system to see if it exists. If the EID exists in the mapping system, 177 the client end-node can attempt creation of a new random number for 178 the ephemeral-EID. See Section 8 where ephemeral-EIDs can be 179 preallocated and registered to the mapping system before use. 181 When the client end-node system is co-located with the RLOC and acts 182 as an xTR, it should register the binding before sending packets. 183 This eliminates a race condition for returning packets not knowing 184 where to encapsulate packets to the ephemeral-EID's RLOCs. See 185 Section 8 for alternatives for fixing this race condition problem. 186 When the client end-node system is not acting as an xTR, it should 187 send some packets so its ephemeral-EID can be discovered by an xTR 188 which supports EID-mobility [I-D.ietf-lisp-eid-mobility] so mapping 189 system registration can occur before the destination returns packets. 190 When the end-node system is acting as an xTR, the EID and RLOC-set is 191 co-located in the same node. So when the EID is created, the xTR can 192 register the mapping versus waiting for packet transmission. 194 5. Other Types of Ephemeral-EIDs 196 When IPv6 Ephemeral-EIDs are used, an alternative to a random number 197 can be used. For example, the low-order bits of the IPv6 address 198 could be a cryptographic hash of a public-key. Mechanisms from 199 [RFC3972] could be used for EIDs. Using this approach allows the 200 sender with a hashed EID to be authenticated. So packet signatures 201 can be verified by the corresponding public-key. When hashed EIDs 202 are used, the EID can change frequently as rekeying may be required 203 for enhanced security. LISP specific control message signature 204 mechanims can be found in [I-D.farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth]. 206 6. Interworking Considerations 208 If a client end-node is communicating with a system that is not in a 209 LISP site, the procedures from [RFC6832] should be followed. The 210 PITR will be required to originate route advertisements for the 211 ephemeral-EID sub-block [RFC7954] so it can attract packets sourced 212 by non-LISP sites destined to ephemeral-EIDs. However, in the 213 general case, the coarse block from [RFC7954] will be advertised 214 which would cover the sub-block. For IPv4, the 240.0.0.0/4 must be 215 advertised into the IPv4 routing system. 217 7. Multicast Considerations 219 A client end-node system can be a member of a multicast group fairly 220 easily since its address is not used for multicast communication as a 221 receiver. This is due to the design characteristics of IGMP 222 [RFC3376] [RFC2236] [RFC1112] and MLD [RFC2710] [RFC3810]. 224 When a client end-node system is a multicast source, there is 225 ephemeral (S,G) state that is created and maintained in the network 226 via multicast routing protocols such as PIM [RFC4602] and when PIM is 227 used with LISP [RFC6802]. In addition, when 228 [I-D.ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast] is used, ephemeral-EID state is 229 created in the mapping database. This doesn't present any problems 230 other than the amount of state that may exist in the network if not 231 timed out and removed promptly. 233 However, there exists a multicast source discovery problem when PIM- 234 SSM [RFC4607] is used. Members that join (S,G) channels via out of 235 band mechanisms. These mechanisms need to support ephemeral-EIDs. 236 Otherwise, PIM-ASM [RFC4602] or PIM-Bidir [RFC5015] will need to be 237 used. 239 8. Performance Improvements 241 An optimization to reduce the race condition between registering 242 ephemeral-EIDs and returning packets as well as reducing the 243 probability of ephemeral-EID address collision is to preload the 244 mapping database with a list of ephemeral-EIDs before using them. It 245 comes at the expense of rebinding all of registered ephemeral-EIDs 246 when there is an RLOC change. There is work in progress to consider 247 adding a level of indirection here so a single entry gets the RLOC 248 update and the list of ephemeral-EIDs point to the single entry. 250 9. Security Considerations 252 When LISP-crypto [RFC8061] is used the EID payload is more secure 253 through encryption providing EID obfuscation of the ephemeral-EID as 254 well as the global-EID it is communicating with. But the obfuscation 255 only occurs between xTRs. So the randomness of a ephemeral-EID 256 inside of LISP sites provide a new level of privacy. 258 10. IANA Considerations 260 This specification is requesting the sub-block 2001:5:ffff::/48 for 261 ephemeral-EID usage. 263 11. References 265 11.1. Normative References 267 [RFC1112] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5, 268 RFC 1112, DOI 10.17487/RFC1112, August 1989, 269 . 271 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 272 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 273 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 274 . 276 [RFC2236] Fenner, W., "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 277 2", RFC 2236, DOI 10.17487/RFC2236, November 1997, 278 . 280 [RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast 281 Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, 282 DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999, 283 . 285 [RFC3376] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A. 286 Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 287 3", RFC 3376, DOI 10.17487/RFC3376, October 2002, 288 . 290 [RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener 291 Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, 292 DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004, 293 . 295 [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", 296 RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, 297 . 299 [RFC4602] Pusateri, T., "Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse 300 Mode (PIM-SM) IETF Proposed Standard Requirements 301 Analysis", RFC 4602, DOI 10.17487/RFC4602, August 2006, 302 . 304 [RFC4607] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for 305 IP", RFC 4607, DOI 10.17487/RFC4607, August 2006, 306 . 308 [RFC5015] Handley, M., Kouvelas, I., Speakman, T., and L. Vicisano, 309 "Bidirectional Protocol Independent Multicast (BIDIR- 310 PIM)", RFC 5015, DOI 10.17487/RFC5015, October 2007, 311 . 313 [RFC6802] Baillargeon, S., Flinta, C., and A. Johnsson, "Ericsson 314 Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) Value-Added 315 Octets", RFC 6802, DOI 10.17487/RFC6802, November 2012, 316 . 318 [RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The 319 Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830, 320 DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013, 321 . 323 [RFC6832] Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller, 324 "Interworking between Locator/ID Separation Protocol 325 (LISP) and Non-LISP Sites", RFC 6832, 326 DOI 10.17487/RFC6832, January 2013, 327 . 329 [RFC7954] Iannone, L., Lewis, D., Meyer, D., and V. Fuller, 330 "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Endpoint Identifier 331 (EID) Block", RFC 7954, DOI 10.17487/RFC7954, September 332 2016, . 334 [RFC8061] Farinacci, D. and B. Weis, "Locator/ID Separation Protocol 335 (LISP) Data-Plane Confidentiality", RFC 8061, 336 DOI 10.17487/RFC8061, February 2017, 337 . 339 11.2. Informative References 341 [I-D.farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth] 342 Farinacci, D. and E. Nordmark, "LISP Control-Plane ECDSA 343 Authentication and Authorization", draft-farinacci-lisp- 344 ecdsa-auth-03 (work in progress), September 2018. 346 [I-D.ietf-lisp-eid-mobility] 347 Portoles-Comeras, M., Ashtaputre, V., Moreno, V., Maino, 348 F., and D. Farinacci, "LISP L2/L3 EID Mobility Using a 349 Unified Control Plane", draft-ietf-lisp-eid-mobility-03 350 (work in progress), November 2018. 352 [I-D.ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast] 353 Moreno, V. and D. Farinacci, "Signal-Free LISP Multicast", 354 draft-ietf-lisp-signal-free-multicast-09 (work in 355 progress), March 2018. 357 Appendix A. Acknowledgments 359 The author would like to thank the LISP WG for their review and 360 acceptance of this draft. 362 Appendix B. Document Change Log 364 [RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC.] 366 B.1. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-06 368 o Posted end of March 2019. 370 o Padma had more basic edits and some clarification text. 372 B.2. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-05 374 o Posted March IETF week 2019. 376 o Do not state that ephemeral EIDs make the privacy problem worse. 378 B.3. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-04 380 o Posted October 2018 before Bangkok IETF deadline. 382 o Made Padma requested changes to refer to ephemeral-EIDs allowed to 383 have many on one interface and can be registered with more than 1 384 RLOC but one RLOC-set. 386 B.4. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-03 388 o Posted October 2018. 390 o Update document timer and references. 392 B.5. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 394 o Posted April 2018. 396 o Update document timer and references. 398 B.6. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 400 o Posted October 2017. 402 o Add to section 5 that PKI can be used to authenticate EIDs. 404 o Update references. 406 B.7. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 408 o Posted August 2017. 410 o Made draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 a LISP working group 411 document. 413 B.8. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-02 415 o Posted April 2017. 417 o Added section describing how ephemeral-EIDs can use a public key 418 hash as an alternative to a random number. 420 o Indciate when an EID/RLOC co-located, that the xTR can register 421 the EID when it is configured or changed versus waiting for a 422 packet to be sent as in the EID/RLOC separated case. 424 B.9. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-01 426 o Posted October 2016. 428 o Update document timer. 430 B.10. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-eid-anonymity-00 432 o Posted April 2016. 434 o Initial posting. 436 Authors' Addresses 438 Dino Farinacci 439 lispers.net 440 San Jose, CA 441 USA 443 Email: farinacci@gmail.com 445 Padma Pillay-Esnault 446 Huawei Technologies 447 San Clara, CA 448 USA 450 Email: padma@huawei.com 452 Wassim Haddad 453 Ericsson 454 San Clara, CA 455 USA 457 Email: wassim.haddad@ericsson.com