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Dearlove 3 Internet-Draft BAE Systems ATC 4 Updates: 7182 (if approved) September 4, 2014 5 Intended status: Standards Track 6 Expires: March 8, 2015 8 Identity-Based Signatures for MANET Routing Protocols 9 draft-ietf-manet-ibs-03 11 Abstract 13 This document updates RFC7182, which specifies a framework for, and 14 specific examples of, integrity check values (ICVs) for packets and 15 messages using the generalized packet/message format specified in 16 RFC5444. It does so by defining an additional cryptographic function 17 that allows the creation of an ICV that is an identity-based 18 signature, defined according to the ECCSI (Elliptic Curve-Based 19 Certificateless Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption) algorithm 20 specified in RFC6507. 22 Status of this Memo 24 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 25 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 27 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 28 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 29 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 30 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 32 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 33 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 34 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 35 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 37 This Internet-Draft will expire on March 8, 2015. 39 Copyright Notice 41 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 42 document authors. All rights reserved. 44 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 45 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 46 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 47 publication of this document. Please review these documents 48 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 49 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 50 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 51 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 52 described in the Simplified BSD License. 54 Table of Contents 56 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 4. Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 4.1. Cryptographic Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 4.2. ECCSI parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 4.3. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 69 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 72 1. Introduction 74 [RFC7182] defines ICV (integrity check value) TLVs for use in packets 75 and messages that use the generalized MANET packet/message format 76 defined in [RFC5444]. This specification extends the TLV definitions 77 therein by defining two new cryptographic function code points from 78 within the registries set up by [RFC7182]. This allows the use of an 79 identity-based signature (IBS) as an ICV. An IBS has an additional 80 property that is not shared by all of the previously specified ICVs, 81 it not only indicates that the protected packet or message is valid, 82 but also verifies the originator of the packet/message. 84 This specification assumes that each router (i.e., each originator of 85 [RFC5444] format packets/messages) has an identity that may be tied 86 to the packet or message. The router may have more than one 87 identity, but will only use one for each ICV TLV. The cryptographic 88 strength of the IBS is not dependent on the choice of identity. 90 Two options for the choice of identity are supported (as reflected by 91 the two code points allocated). In the first the identity can be any 92 octet sequence (up to 255 octets) included in the ICV TLV. In the 93 second, the octet sequence is preceded by an address, either the IP 94 source address for a packet TLV, or the message originator address 95 for a message or address block TLV. In particular, the second option 96 allows just the address to be used as an identity. 98 Identity-based signatures allow identifying the originator of 99 information in a packet or message. They thus allow additional 100 security functions, such as revocation of an identity, and removing 101 all information with a specific originator, if this is recorded - as 102 it is for OLSRv2 [RFC7181], an expected user of this specification. 103 When applied to messages (rather than packets) this can significantly 104 reduce the damage that a compromised router can inflict on the 105 network. 107 Identity-based signatures are based on forms of asymmetric (public 108 key) cryptography - identity-based encryption (IBE). Compared to 109 symmetric cryptographic methods (such as HMAC and AES), IBE and IBS 110 methods avoid requiring a shared secret key that results in a single 111 point of failure vulnerability. Compared to more widely used 112 asymmetric (public key) cryptographic methods (such as RSA and 113 ECDSA), IBE and IBS methods have a major advantage, and a major 114 disadvantage. 116 The advantage referred to is that each router can be configured once 117 (for its key lifetime) by a trusted authority, independently of all 118 other routers. Thus a router can connect to the authority (typically 119 in a secure environment) to receive a private key, or can have a 120 private key delivered securely (out of band) from the authority. 121 During normal operation of the MANET, there is no need for the 122 trusted authority to be connected to the MANET, or even to still 123 exist. Additional routers can be authorized, with no reference to 124 previously authorized routers (the trusted authority must still exist 125 in this case). A router's public key is its identity, which when 126 tied to a packet or message (as is the case when using an address as, 127 or as part of, the identity) means that there is no need for public 128 key certificates or a certificate authority, and a router need not 129 retain key material for any other routers. 131 The disadvantage referred to is that the trusted authority has 132 complete authority, even more so than a conventional certificate 133 authority. Routers cannot generate their own private keys, only the 134 trusted authority can do that. Through the master secret held by the 135 trusted authority, it could impersonate any router (existing or not). 136 When used for identity-based encryption (not part of this 137 specification) the trusted authority can decrypt anything. However, 138 note that the shared secret key options described in [RFC7182] also 139 have this limitation. 141 There are alternative mathematical realizations of identity-based 142 signatures. This specification uses one that has been previously 143 published as [RFC6507], known as ECCSI (Elliptic Curve-Based 144 Certificateless Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption). In common 145 with other identity-based encryption/signature approaches, it is 146 based on the use of elliptic curves. Unlike some, it does not use 147 "pairings" (bilinear maps from a product of two elliptic curve groups 148 to another group). It thus may be easier to implement, and more 149 efficient, than some alternatives, although with a greater signature 150 size than some. This specification allows the use of any elliptic 151 curve that may be used by [RFC6507]. 153 The computational load imposed by ECCSI (and, perhaps more so, other 154 IBS methods) is not trivial, though depending significantly on the 155 quality of implementation of the required elliptic curve and other 156 mathematical functions. For a security level of 128 bits, the ICV 157 data length is 129 octets, which is longer than for alternative ICVs 158 specified in [RFC7182] (e.g., 32 octets for the similar strength 159 HMAC-SHA-256). The signature format used could have been slightly 160 shortened (to 97 octets) by using a compressed representation of an 161 elliptic curve point, however at the expense of some additional work 162 when verifying a signature, and loss of direct compatibility with 163 [RFC6507], and implementations thereof. 165 The trusted authority is referred to in [RFC6507] as the KMS (Key 166 Management Service). That term will be used in the rest of this 167 specification. 169 2. Terminology 171 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 172 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 173 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 174 [RFC2119]. 176 Additionally, this document uses the terminology of [RFC5444], 177 [RFC6507], and [RFC7182]. 179 3. Applicability Statement 181 This specification adds an additional option to the framework 182 specified in [RFC7182] for use by [RFC5444] formatted packets and 183 messages. It is applicable as described in [RFC7182], and subject to 184 the additional comments in Section 6, particularly regarding the role 185 of the trusted authority (KMS). 187 Specific examples of protocols for which this specification is 188 suitable are NHDP [RFC6130] and OLSRv2 [RFC7181]. 190 4. Specification 192 4.1. Cryptographic Function 194 This specification defines a cryptographic function named ECCSI that 195 is implemented as specified as the "sign" function in Section 5.2.1 196 of [RFC6507]. To use that specification: 198 o The ICV is not calculated as cryptographic-function(hash- 199 function(content)) as defined in [RFC7182], but (like the HMAC 200 ICVs defined in [RFC7182]) uses the hash function within the 201 cryptographic function. The option "none" is not permitted for 202 hash-function, and the hash function must have a known fixed 203 length of N octets, as specified in Section 4.2. 205 o M in [RFC6507] is "content" as specified in in [RFC7182]. 207 o ID, used in [RFC6507], is as specified in Section 4.3. 209 o KPAK, SSK and PVT, used in [RFC6507], are as specified in Sections 210 4.2 and 5.1.1 of [RFC6507], provided by the KMS. 212 The length of the signature is 4N+1 octets, as specified in 213 [RFC6507], whose affine coordinate format (including an octet valued 214 0x04 to identify this) is used unchanged. 216 Verification of the ICV is not implemented by the receiver 217 recalculating the ICV and comparing with the received ICV, as it is 218 necessarily incapable of doing so. Instead the receiver evaluates 219 the "verify" function described in Section 5.2.2 of [RFC6507], which 220 may pass or fail. 222 To use that function M, KPAK, SSK and PVT are as specified above, 223 while ID is deduced from the received packet or message, as specified 224 in Section 4.3, using the element in the . This 225 element need not match that used by the receiver, and thus when using 226 this cryptographic function, multiple ICV TLVs differing only in 227 their , or in the choice of cryptographic function from the 228 two defined in this specification, SHOULD NOT be used unless routers 229 are administratively configured to recognize which to verify. 231 Routers MAY be administratively configured to reject a packet or 232 message ICV TLV using ECCSI based on part or all of ; for 233 example if this encodes a time after which this identity is no longer 234 valid. 236 4.2. ECCSI parameters 238 Section 4.1 of [RFC6507] specifies parameters n, N, p, E, B, G, and 239 q. The first of these, n, is specified as "A security parameter; the 240 size in bits of the prime p over which elliptic curve cryptography is 241 to be performed." For typical security levels (e.g., 128, 192 and 242 256 bits), n must be at least twice the required bits of security, 243 see Section 5.6.1 of [NIST-SP-800-57]. 245 Selection of an elliptic curve, and all related parameters, MUST be 246 by administrative means, and known to all routers. This 247 specification follows [RFC6507] with a RECOMMENDED selection to 248 follow Appendix D.1.2 of [NIST-FIPS-186-4]. (Note that n in that 249 document is q in [RFC6507].) 251 The parameter that is required by this specification is N, which is 252 defined as Ceiling(n/8). The hash function used must create an 253 output of size N octets. In particular for 128 bit security, and 254 hence n = 256, N = 32, and the RECOMMENDED hash function is SHA-256. 255 The signature (i.e. ) length is 4N + 1 octets, i.e., 129 256 octets for N = 32. 258 Note: [RFC6507] actually refers to the predecessor to 259 [NIST-FIPS-186-4], but the latest version is specified here; there 260 are no significant differences in this regard. 262 4.3. Identity 264 There are two options for the identity ID used by [RFC6507], which 265 are indicated by there being two code points allocated for this 266 cryptographic function, see Section 5. 268 o For the cryptographic function ECCSI, ID is the element 269 defined in Section 12.1 of [RFC7182]. This MUST NOT be empty. 271 o For the cryptographic function ECCSI-ADDR, ID is the concatenation 272 of an address (in network byte order) and the element 273 defined in Section 12.1 of [RFC7182], where the latter MAY be 274 empty. 276 * For a packet TLV this address is the IP source address of the 277 IP datagram in which this packet is included. 279 * For a message TLV or an address block TLV this address is the 280 message originator address (the element defined 281 in [RFC5444]) if that address is present, if not present and 282 the message is known to have travelled only one hop, then the 283 IP source address of the IP datagram in which this message is 284 included is used, otherwise no address is defined and the 285 message MUST be rejected. (Note that HELLO messages specified 286 in NHDP [RFC6130] and used in OLSRv2 [RFC7181] always only 287 travel one hop, and hence their IP source address SHOULD be 288 used if no originator address is present.) 290 Note that this identity is formatted by [RFC6507], and thus does not 291 need a length field incorporated into it by this specification. 293 5. IANA Considerations 295 IANA has, in accordance with [RFC7182], defined a registry 296 "Cryptographic Functions" under "Mobile Ad Hoc NETwork Parameters". 297 IANA is requested to make two new allocations from this registry, and 298 modify the unassigned range, as indicated. 300 +-------+------------+------------------------------+---------------+ 301 | Value | Algorithm | Description | Reference | 302 +-------+------------+------------------------------+---------------+ 303 | 7 | ECCSI | ECCSI [RFC6507] | This | 304 | | | | specification | 305 | 8 | ECCSI-ADDR | ECCSI [RFC6507] with an | This | 306 | | | address (source or | specification | 307 | | | originator) joined to | | 308 | | | identity | | 309 | 9-251 | | Unassigned; Expert Review | | 310 +-------+------------+------------------------------+---------------+ 312 Table 1: Cryptographic Function Registry 314 6. Security Considerations 316 This specification extends the security framework for MANET routing 317 protocols specified in [RFC7182] by the addition of an additional 318 cryptographic function, in two forms according to how identity is 319 specified. 321 This cryptographic function implements a form of identity-based 322 signature (IBS), a stronger form of integrity check value (ICV) that 323 verifies not just that the received packet or message is valid but 324 that the packet or message originated at a router that was assigned a 325 private key for the specified identity. 327 For a message the identity is, and for a packet it is recommended 328 that it is, either the originator address of the router (i.e., an 329 address unique to that router), or the originator address with 330 additional information appended. The use of that additional 331 information is outside the scope of this specification, a typical use 332 may be to indicate an expiry time for signatures created using that 333 identity. 335 In common with other forms of IBS, a feature of the form of IBS 336 (known as ECCSI) used in this specification is that it requires a 337 trusted authority (KMS) that issues all private keys, and has 338 complete cryptographic information about all possible private keys. 339 However to set against that, the solution is scalable, as all routers 340 can be independently keyed, and does not need the KMS in the network. 341 If no future keys will be required, then the KMS's master secret can 342 be destroyed. As routers are individually keyed, key revocation (by 343 blacklist and time expiry of keys) is possible, but is beyond the 344 scope of this specification. 346 ECCSI is based on elliptic curve mathematics. This specification 347 follows [RFC6507] in its recommendation of elliptic curves, but any 348 suitable (prime power) elliptic curve may be used; this must be 349 administratively specified. Implementation of this specification 350 will require an available implementation of suitable mathematical 351 functions. Unlike some other forms of IBS, ECCSI requires only basic 352 elliptic curve operations, it does not require "pairings" (bilinear 353 functions of a product of two elliptic curve groups). This increases 354 the available range of suitable mathematical libraries. 356 7. Acknowledgments 358 The author would like to thank his colleagues who have been involved 359 in identity-based security for ad hoc networks, including (in 360 alphabetical order) Alan Cullen, Peter Smith and Bill Williams. He 361 would also like to thank Benjamin Smith (INRIA/Ecole Polytechnique) 362 for independently recreating the signature and other values in 363 Appendix A to ensure their correctness, and Thomas Clausen (Ecole 364 Polytechnique) for additional comments. 366 8. References 368 8.1. Normative References 370 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 371 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 373 [RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih, 374 "Generalized Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Packet/Message 375 Format", RFC 5444, February 2009. 377 [RFC6507] Groves, M., "Elliptic Curve-Based Certificateless 378 Signatures for Identity-Based Encryption (ECCSI)", 379 RFC 6507, February 2012. 381 [RFC7182] Herberg, U., Clausen, T., and C. Dearlove, "Integrity 382 Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for Mobile Ad 383 Hoc Networks (MANETs)", RFC 7182, April 2014. 385 8.2. Informative References 387 [NIST-FIPS-186-4] 388 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital 389 Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-4, July 2013. 391 [NIST-SP-800-57] 392 National Institute of Standards and Technology, 393 "Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General 394 (Revision 3)", SP 800-57, Part 1, Revision 3, July 2012. 396 [RFC5497] Clausen, T. and C. Dearlove, "Representing Multi-Value 397 Time in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)", RFC 5497, 398 March 2009. 400 [RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and J. Dean, "Mobile Ad Hoc 401 Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", 402 RFC 6130, April 2011. 404 [RFC7181] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P., and U. Herberg, 405 "The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol Version 2", 406 RFC 7181, April 2014. 408 Appendix A. Example 410 Appendix C of [RFC6130] contains this example of a HELLO message. 411 (Note that normally, a TIMESTAMP ICV would also be added before the 412 ICV TLV, but for simplicity that step has been omitted here.) 413 0 1 2 3 414 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 415 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 416 | HELLO | MF=7 | MAL=3 | Message Length = 45 | 417 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 418 | Hop Limit = 1 | Hop Count = 0 | Message Sequence Number | 419 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 420 | Message TLV Block Length = 8 | VALIDITY_TIME | MTLVF = 16 | 421 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 422 | Value Len = 1 | Value (Time) | INTERVAL_TIME | MTLVF = 16 | 423 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 424 | Value Len = 1 | Value (Time) | Num Addrs = 5 | ABF = 128 | 425 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 426 | Head Len = 3 | Head | 427 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 428 | Mid 0 | Mid 1 | Mid 2 | Mid 3 | 429 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 430 | Mid 4 | Address TLV Block Length = 14 | LOCAL_IF | 431 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 432 | ATLVF = 80 | Index = 0 | Value Len = 1 | THIS_IF | 433 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 434 | LINK_STATUS | ATLV = 52 | Strt Indx = 1 | Stop Indx = 4 | 435 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 436 | Value Len = 4 | HEARD | HEARD | SYMMETRIC | 437 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 438 | LOST | 439 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 441 In order to provide an example of an ECCSI ICV Message TLV that may 442 be added to this message, the fields shown need to all have numerical 443 values, both by inserting defined numerical values (e.g., 0 for 444 HELLO) and by selecting example values where needed. The latter 445 consists of: 447 o The message sequence number will be zero. 449 o The five addresses will be 192.0.2.1 to 192.0.2.5. 451 o The message validity time will be 6 seconds, and the message 452 interval time will be 2 seconds, each encoded with a constant 453 value C = 1/1024 seconds, as described in [RFC5497], as referenced 454 from [RFC6130]. 456 In addition, when calculating an ICV, the hop count and hop limit are 457 both set to zero. This results in the message: 459 0 1 2 3 460 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 461 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 462 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1| 463 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 464 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| 465 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 466 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0| 467 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 468 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0| 469 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 470 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1|1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| 471 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 472 |0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1|1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| 473 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 474 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0| 475 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 476 |0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| 477 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 478 |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| 479 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 480 |0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1|0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0| 481 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 482 |0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1| 483 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 484 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| 485 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 487 Or in hexadecimal form 489 M := 0x 0073002D 00000000 00080110 01640010 490 01580580 03C00002 01020304 05000E02 491 50000100 03340104 04020201 00 493 The ICV TLV that will be added will have cryptographic function 494 ECCSI-ADDR, and hash function SHA-256. This message has no 495 originator address, but it travels a single hop, and its IP source 496 address can be used. This will be assumed to be 192.0.2.0, with an 497 empty , thus the sender's identity will be, in hexadecimal 498 form: 500 ID := 0x C0000200 502 Parameters for [RFC6507] will thus be n = 256, N = 32. The same 503 parameters and master key will be used as in Appendix A of [RFC6507], 504 i.e., the elliptic curve P-256, with parameters: 506 p := 0x FFFFFFFF 00000001 00000000 00000000 507 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 509 B := 0x 5AC635D8 AA3A93E7 B3EBBD55 769886BC 510 651D06B0 CC53B0F6 3BCE3C3E 27D2604B 512 q := 0x FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 513 BCE6FAAD A7179E84 F3B9CAC2 FC632551 515 G := 0x 04 516 6B17D1F2 E12C4247 F8BCE6E5 63A440F2 517 77037D81 2DEB33A0 F4A13945 D898C296 518 4FE342E2 FE1A7F9B 8EE7EB4A 7C0F9E16 519 2BCE3357 6B315ECE CBB64068 37BF51F5 521 KSAK := 0x 12345; 523 KPAK := 0x 04 524 50D4670B DE75244F 28D2838A 0D25558A 525 7A72686D 4522D4C8 273FB644 2AEBFA93 526 DBDD3755 1AFD263B 5DFD617F 3960C65A 527 8C298850 FF99F203 66DCE7D4 367217F4 529 The remaining steps to creating a private key for ID use the same 530 "random" value v as Appendix A of [RFC6507] and are: 532 v := 0x 23456 534 PVT := 0x 04 535 758A1427 79BE89E8 29E71984 CB40EF75 536 8CC4AD77 5FC5B9A3 E1C8ED52 F6FA36D9 537 A79D2476 92F4EDA3 A6BDAB77 D6AA6474 538 A464AE49 34663C52 65BA7018 BA091F79 540 HS := hash( 0x 04 541 6B17D1F2 E12C4247 F8BCE6E5 63A440F2 542 77037D81 2DEB33A0 F4A13945 D898C296 543 4FE342E2 FE1A7F9B 8EE7EB4A 7C0F9E16 544 2BCE3357 6B315ECE CBB64068 37BF51F5 545 04 546 50D4670B DE75244F 28D2838A 0D25558A 547 7A72686D 4522D4C8 273FB644 2AEBFA93 548 DBDD3755 1AFD263B 5DFD617F 3960C65A 549 8C298850 FF99F203 66DCE7D4 367217F4 550 C0000200 551 04 552 758A1427 79BE89E8 29E71984 CB40EF75 553 8CC4AD77 5FC5B9A3 E1C8ED52 F6FA36D9 554 A79D2476 92F4EDA3 A6BDAB77 D6AA6474 555 A464AE49 34663C52 65BA7018 BA091F79 ) 557 = 0x F64FFD76 D2EC3E87 BA670866 C0832B80 558 B740C2BA 016034C8 1A6F5E5B 5F9AD8F3 560 The remaining steps to creating a signature for M use the same 561 "random" value j as Appendix A of [RFC6507] and are: 563 j := 0x 34567 565 J := 0x 04 566 269D4C8F DEB66A74 E4EF8C0D 5DCC597D 567 DFE6029C 2AFFC493 6008CD2C C1045D81 568 6DDA6A13 10F4B067 BD5DABDA D741B7CE 569 F36457E1 96B1BFA9 7FD5F8FB B3926ADB 571 r := 0x 269D4C8F DEB66A74 E4EF8C0D 5DCC597D 572 DFE6029C 2AFFC493 6008CD2C C1045D81 574 HE := hash( 0x 575 F64FFD76 D2EC3E87 BA670866 C0832B80 576 B740C2BA 016034C8 1A6F5E5B 5F9AD8F3 577 269D4C8F DEB66A74 E4EF8C0D 5DCC597D 578 DFE6029C 2AFFC493 6008CD2C C1045D81 579 0073002D 00000000 00080110 01640010 580 01580580 03C00002 01020304 05000E02 581 50000100 03340104 04020201 00 ) 583 = 0x FE236B30 CF72E060 28E229ED 5751D796 584 91DED33C 24D2F661 28EA0804 30D8A832 586 s' := 0x C8C739D5 FB3EFB75 221CB818 8CAAB86A 587 2E2669CF 209EA622 7D7072BA A83C2509 589 s := 0x C8C739D5 FB3EFB75 221CB818 8CAAB86A 590 2E2669CF 209EA622 7D7072BA A83C2509 592 Signature := 0x 269D4C8F DEB66A74 E4EF8C0D 5DCC597D 593 DFE6029C 2AFFC493 6008CD2C C1045D81 594 C8C739D5 FB3EFB75 221CB818 8CAAB86A 595 2E2669CF 209EA622 7D7072BA A83C2509 596 04 597 758A1427 79BE89E8 29E71984 CB40EF75 598 8CC4AD77 5FC5B9A3 E1C8ED52 F6FA36D9 599 A79D2476 92F4EDA3 A6BDAB77 D6AA6474 600 A464AE49 34663C52 65BA7018 BA091F79 602 Author's Address 604 Christopher Dearlove 605 BAE Systems Advanced Technology Centre 606 West Hanningfield Road 607 Great Baddow, Chelmsford 608 United Kingdom 610 Phone: +44 1245 242194 611 Email: chris.dearlove@baesystems.com 612 URI: http://www.baesystems.com/