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Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5226 (ref. 'BCP26') (Obsoleted by RFC 8126) == Outdated reference: A later version (-15) exists of draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-14 == Outdated reference: A later version (-19) exists of draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-11 Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg 3 Internet-Draft T. Clausen 4 Intended status: Standards Track LIX, Ecole Polytechnique 5 Expires: January 28, 2011 July 27, 2010 7 MANET Cryptographical Signature TLV Definition 8 draft-ietf-manet-packetbb-sec-01 10 Abstract 12 This document describes general and flexible TLVs (type-length-value 13 structure) for representing cryptographic signatures as well as 14 timestamps, using the generalized MANET packet/message format 15 [RFC5444]. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two 16 Address Block TLVs, for affixing cryptographic signatures and 17 timestamps to a packet, message and address, respectively. 19 Status of this Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2011. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 4. Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 5. Protocol Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 6. Imported TLV Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 7. General Signature TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 7.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 8. General Timestamp TLV Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 9. Packet TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 9.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 10. Message TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 67 10.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 68 11. Address Block TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 69 11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 70 11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 71 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 12.1. TLV Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 73 12.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 10 74 12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 75 12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . 10 76 12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations . . . . . . . . 11 77 12.2. New IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 78 12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines . . . . . . . . 12 79 12.2.2. Hash Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 80 12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 81 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 82 14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 83 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 84 15.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 85 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 86 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 87 A.1. Example of a Signed Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 88 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 90 1. Introduction 92 This document specifies: 94 o two TLVs for carrying cryptographic signatures and timestamps in 95 packets, messages and address blocks as defined by [RFC5444], 97 o how cryptographic signatures are calculated, taking (for Message 98 TLVs) into account the mutable message header fields ( and ) where these fields are present in 100 messages. 102 This document requests from IANA: 104 o allocations for these Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs from 105 the 0-223 Packet TLV range, the 0-127 Message TLV range and the 106 0-127 Address Block TLV range from [RFC5444], 108 o creation of two IANA registries for recording code points for hash 109 function and signature calculation, respectively. 111 2. Terminology 113 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 114 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 115 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 116 [RFC2119]. 118 This document uses the terminology and notation defined in [RFC5444]. 120 3. Applicability Statement 122 MANET routing protocols using the format defined in [RFC5444] are 123 accorded the ability to carry additional information in control 124 messages and packets, through inclusion of TLVs. Information so 125 included MAY be used by a routing protocol, or by an extension of a 126 routing protocol, according to its specification. 128 This document specifies how to include a cryptographic signature for 129 a packet, message or address by way of such TLVs. This document also 130 specifies how to treat "mutable" fields ( and ), if present, in the message header when calculating 132 signatures, such that the resulting signature can be correctly 133 verified by any recipient, and how to include this signature. 135 4. Security Architecture 137 Basic MANET routing protocol specifications are often "oblivious to 138 security", however have a clause allowing a control message to be 139 rejected as "badly formed" prior to it being processed or forwarded. 140 Protocols such as [NHDP] and [OLSRv2] recognize external reasons 141 (such as failure to verify a signature) for rejecting a message as 142 "badly formed", and therefore "invalid for processing". This 143 architecture is a result of the observation that with respect to 144 security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" and that MANET routing 145 protocol deployment domains have varying security requirements 146 ranging from "unbreakable" to "virtually none". The virtue of this 147 approach is that MANET routing protocol specifications (and 148 implementations) can remain "generic", with extensions providing 149 proper deployment-domain specific security mechanisms. 151 The MANET routing protocol "security architecture", in which this 152 specification situates itself, can therefore be summarized as 153 follows: 155 o Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specifications, with a 156 clause allowing an extension to reject a message (prior to 157 processing/forwarding) as "badly formed". 159 o MANET routing protocol security extensions, rejecting messages as 160 "badly formed", as appropriate for a given deployment-domain 161 specific security requirement. 163 o Code-points and an exchange format for information, necessary for 164 specification of such MANET routing protocol security extensions. 166 This document addresses the last of these issues, by specifying a 167 common exchange format for cryptographic signatures, making 168 reservations from within the Packet TLV, Message TLV and Address 169 Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used (and shared) among 170 MANET routing protocol security extensions, establishing two IANA 171 registries for code-points for hash functions and cryptographic 172 functions adhering to [RFC5444]. 174 With respect to [RFC5444], this document: 176 o is intended to be used in the non-normative, but intended, mode of 177 use of [RFC5444] as described in its Appendix B. 179 o is a specific example of the Security Considerations section of 180 [RFC5444] (the authentication part). 182 5. Protocol Overview and Functioning 184 This specification does not describe a protocol, nor does it mandate 185 specific router or protocol behavior. It represents a purely 186 syntactical representation of security related information for use 187 with [RFC5444] addresses, messages and packets, as well as 188 establishes IANA registrations and registries. 190 6. Imported TLV Fields 192 In this specification, the following TLV fields from [RFC5444] are 193 used: 195 - hop limit of a message, as specified in Section 196 5.2 of [RFC5444]. 198 - hop count of a message, as specified in Section 199 5.2 of [RFC5444]. 201 - length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1 202 of [RFC5444]. 204 7. General Signature TLV Structure 206 The following data structure allows representation of a cryptographic 207 signature, including specification of the appropriate hash function 208 and cryptographic function used for calculating the signature. This 209 data structure is specified, using the regular expression 210 syntax of [RFC5444], as: 212 := 213 214 215 217 where: 219 is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the 220 hash function. 222 is an 8-bit unsigned integer field 223 specifying the cryptographic function. 225 is an 8-bit unsigned integer field specifying the key 226 index of the key which was used to sign the message, which allows 227 unique identification of different keys with the same originator. 228 It is the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that 229 actively used keys that it issues have distinct key indices and 230 that all key indices have a value unequal to 0x00. Value 0x00 is 231 reserved for a pre-installed, shared key. 233 is an unsigned integer field, whose length is 234 -2, and which contains the cryptographic signature. 236 The basic version of this TLV assumes that calculating the signature 237 can be decomposed into: 239 signature-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content)) 241 The hash function and the cryptographic function correspond to the 242 entries in two IANA registries, set up by this specification in 243 Section 12. 245 7.1. Rationale 247 The rationale for separating the hash function and the cryptographic 248 function into two octets instead of having all combinations in a 249 single octet - possibly as TLV type extension - is twofold: First, if 250 further hash functions or cryptographic functions are added in the 251 future, the number space might not remain continuous. More 252 importantly, the number space of possible combinations would be 253 rapidly exhausted. As new or improved cryptographic mechanism are 254 continuously being developed and introduced, this format should be 255 able to accommodate such for the foreseeable future. 257 The rationale for not including a field that lists parameters of the 258 cryptographic signature in the TLV is, that before being able to 259 validate a cryptographic signature, routers have to exchange or 260 acquire keys (e.g. public keys). Any additional parameters can be 261 provided together with the keys in that bootstrap process. It is 262 therefore not necessary, and would even entail an extra overhead, to 263 transmit the parameters within every message. One inherently 264 included parameter is the length of the signature, which is 265 - 2 and which depends on the choice of the cryptographic function. 267 8. General Timestamp TLV Structure 269 The following data structure allows the representation of a 270 timestamp. This data structure is specified as: 272 := 274 where: 276 is an unsigned integer field, whose length is , 277 and which contains the timestamp. The value of this variable is 278 to be interpreted by the routing protocol as specified by the type 279 extension of the Timestamp TLV, see Section 12. 281 A timestamp is essentially "freshness information". As such, its 282 setting and interpretation is to be determined by the routing 283 protocol (or the extension to a routing protocol) that uses it, and 284 may e.g. correspond to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS timestamp or a simple 285 sequence number. 287 9. Packet TLVs 289 Two Packet TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic 290 signature of a packet, and for including the timestamp indicating the 291 time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. 293 9.1. Packet SIGNATURE TLV 295 A Packet SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described 296 in Section 7. When calculating the for a Packet, 297 the signature is calculated over the three fields , 298 and (in that order), 299 concatenated with the entire Packet, including the packet header, all 300 Packet TLVs (other than Packet SIGNATURE TLVs) and all included 301 Messages and their message headers. 303 The following considerations apply: 305 o As packets defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers, it 306 is unnecessary to consider mutable fields (e.g. 307 and ), if present, when calculating the signature. 309 o any Packet SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Packet TLV block 310 MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the Packet 311 TLV block size MUST be recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be 312 restored after having calculated the signature value. 314 The rationale for removing any Packet SIGNATURE TLV already present 315 prior to calculating the signature, is that several signatures may be 316 added to the same packet, e.g., using different signature functions. 318 9.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV 320 A Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described 321 in Section 8. If a packet contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE 322 TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any 323 SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the 324 signature. 326 10. Message TLVs 328 Two Message TLVs are defined, for including the cryptographic 329 signature of a message, and for including the timestamp indicating 330 the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. 332 10.1. Message SIGNATURE TLV 334 A Message SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as described 335 in Section 7. When determining the for a message, 336 the signature is calculated over the three fields , 337 , and (in that order), 338 concatenated with the entire message with the following 339 considerations: 341 o the fields and , if present, MUST 342 both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the 343 signature. 345 o any Message SIGNATURE TLVs already present in the Message TLV 346 block MUST be removed before calculating the signature, and the 347 message size as well as the Message TLV block size MUST be 348 recalculated accordingly. The TLVs can be restored after having 349 calculated the signature value. 351 The rationale for removing any Message SIGNATURE TLV already present 352 prior to calculating the signature, is that several signatures may be 353 added to the same message, e.g., using different signature functions. 355 10.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV 357 A Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as described 358 in Section 8. If a message contains a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE 359 TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the 360 SIGNATURE TLV, in order that it be included in the calculation of the 361 signature. 363 11. Address Block TLVs 365 Two Address Block TLVs are defined, for associating a cryptographic 366 signature to an address, and for including the timestamp indicating 367 the time at which the cryptographic signature was calculated. 369 11.1. Address Block SIGNATURE TLV 371 An Address Block SIGNATURE TLV is an example of a Signature TLV as 372 described in Section 7. The signature is calculated over the three 373 fields , , and (in 374 that order), concatenated with the address, concatenated with any 375 other values, for example, any other TLV value that is associated 376 with that address. A routing protocol or routing protocol extension 377 using Address Block SIGNATURE TLVs MUST specify how to include any 378 such concatenated attribute of the address in the verification 379 process of the signature. 381 11.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV 383 An Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV as 384 described in Section 8. If both a TIMESTAMP TLV and a SIGNATURE TLV 385 are associated with an address, the timestamp value should be 386 considered when calculating the value of the signature. 388 12. IANA Considerations 390 This section specifies requests to IANA. 392 12.1. TLV Registrations 394 This specification defines: 396 o two Packet TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-223 range 397 of the "Assigned Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as 398 specified in Table 1, 400 o two Message TLV types which must be allocated from the 0-127 range 401 of the "Assigned Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444] as 402 specified in Table 2, 404 o and two Address Block TLV types which must be allocated from the 405 0-127 range of the "Assigned Address Block TLV Types" repository 406 of [RFC5444] as specified in Table 3. 408 This specification requests: 410 o set up of type extension registries for these TLV types. 412 IANA is requested to assign the same numerical value to the Packet 413 TLV, Message TLV and Address Block TLV types with the same name. 415 12.1.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines 417 For the registries for TLV type extensions where an Expert Review is 418 required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general 419 recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444]. 421 For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet, 422 Message and Address TLVs should be numbered identically. 424 12.1.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations 426 The Packet TLVs as specified in Table 1 must be allocated from the 427 "Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. 429 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 430 | Name | Type | Type | Description | 431 | | | Extension | | 432 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 433 | SIGNATURE | TBD3 | 0 | Signature of a packet | 434 | | | 1-223 | Expert Review | 435 | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | 436 | TIMESTAMP | TBD4 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | 437 | | | | length, given by the TLV length | 438 | | | | field. The MANET routing protocol | 439 | | | | has to define how to interpret | 440 | | | | this timestamp | 441 | | | 1-223 | Expert Review | 442 | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | 443 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 445 Table 1: Packet TLV types 447 12.1.3. Message TLV Type Registrations 449 The Message TLVs as specified in Table 2 must be allocated from the 450 "Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. 452 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 453 | Name | Type | Type | Description | 454 | | | Extension | | 455 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 456 | SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of a message | 457 | | | 1-223 | Expert Review | 458 | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | 459 | TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | 460 | | | | length, given by the TLV length | 461 | | | | field. | 462 | | | 1-223 | Expert Review | 463 | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | 464 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 466 Table 2: Message TLV types 468 12.1.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations 470 The Address Block TLVs as specified in Table 3 must be allocated from 471 the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444]. 473 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 474 | Name | Type | Type | Description | 475 | | | Extension | | 476 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 477 | SIGNATURE | TBD1 | 0 | Signature of an object (e.g. an | 478 | | | | address) | 479 | | | 1-223 | Expert Review | 480 | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | 481 | TIMESTAMP | TBD2 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary | 482 | | | | length, given by the TLV length | 483 | | | | field. | 484 | | | 1-223 | Expert Review | 485 | | | 224-255 | Experimental Use | 486 +-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+ 488 Table 3: Address Block TLV types 490 12.2. New IANA Registries 492 This document introduces three namespaces that have been registered: 493 Packet TLV Types, Message TLV Types, and Address Block TLV Types. 494 This section specifies IANA registries for these namespaces and 495 provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 496 regarding registrations in these namespaces. 498 The following terms are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]: 499 "Namespace", "Assigned Value", "Registration", "Unassigned", 500 "Reserved", "Hierarchical Allocation", and "Designated Expert". 502 The following policies are used with the meanings defined in [BCP26]: 503 "Private Use", "Expert Review", and "Standards Action". 505 12.2.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines 507 For the registries for the following tables where an Expert Review is 508 required, the designated expert SHOULD take the same general 509 recommendations into consideration as are specified by [RFC5444]. 511 12.2.2. Hash Function 513 IANA is requested to create a new registry for the hash functions 514 that can be used when creating a signature. The initial assignments 515 and allocation policies are specified in Table 4. 517 +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ 518 | Hash | Algorithm | Description | 519 | function | | | 520 | value | | | 521 +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ 522 | 0 | none | The "identity function": the hash value | 523 | | | of an object is the object itself | 524 | 1-223 | | Expert Review | 525 | 224-255 | | Experimental Use | 526 +-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+ 528 Table 4: Hash-Function registry 530 12.2.3. Cryptographic Algorithm 532 IANA is requested to create a new registry for the cryptographic 533 function. Initial assignments and allocation policies are specified 534 in Table 5. 536 +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ 537 | Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description | 538 | function value | | | 539 +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ 540 | 0 | none | The "identity function": the value | 541 | | | of an encrypted hash is the hash | 542 | | | itself | 543 | 1-223 | | Expert Review | 544 | 224-255 | | Experimental Use | 545 +----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+ 547 Table 5: Cryptographic function registry 549 13. Security Considerations 551 This document does not specify a protocol itself. However, it 552 provides a syntactical component for cryptographic signatures of 553 messages and packets as defined in [RFC5444]. It can be used to 554 address security issues of a protocol or extension that uses the 555 component specified in this document. As such, it has the same 556 security considerations as [RFC5444]. 558 In addition, a protocol that includes this component MUST specify the 559 usage as well as the security that is attained by the cryptographic 560 signatures of a message or a packet. 562 As an example, a routing protocol that uses this component to reject 563 "badly formed" messages if a control message does not contain a valid 564 signature, should indicate the security assumption that if the 565 signature is valid, the message is considered valid. It also should 566 indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this measure 567 (e.g. link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that are not 568 counteracted (e.g. compromised keys). 570 14. Acknowledgements 572 The authors would like to thank Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique) 573 for his advice as cryptographer. In addition, many thanks to Bo 574 Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE), Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher 575 Dearlove (BAE), Paul Lambert (Marvell), and Henning Rogge (FGAN) for 576 their constructive comments on the document. 578 15. References 580 15.1. Normative References 582 [BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 583 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26, 584 May 2008. 586 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 587 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. 589 [RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih, 590 "Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444, 591 February 2009. 593 15.2. Informative References 595 [NHDP] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "MANET 596 Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", work in 597 progress draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-14.txt, July 2010. 599 [OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and P. Jacquet, "The Optimized 600 Link State Routing Protocol version 2", work in 601 progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-11.txt, April 2010. 603 Appendix A. Examples 605 A.1. Example of a Signed Message 607 The sample message depicted in Figure 1 is derived from the appendix 608 of [RFC5444]. A SIGNATURE Message TLV has been added, with the value 609 representing a 15 octet long signature of the whole message. 611 0 1 2 3 612 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 613 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 614 |0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0| Packet Sequence Number | Message Type | 615 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 616 |1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0| Orig Addr | 617 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 618 | Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit | 619 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 620 | Hop Count | Message Sequence Number |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| 621 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 622 |0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0| SIGNATURE |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0| 623 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 624 | Hash Func | Crypto Func | Key Index | Sign. Value | 625 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 626 | Signature Value (cont) | 627 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 628 | Signature Value (cont) | 629 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 630 | Signature Value (cont) | 631 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 632 | Signature Value (cont) | TLV Type |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0| 633 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 634 |0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0| Value | 635 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 636 | Value (cont) |0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| 637 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 638 |0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| Mid | 639 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 640 | Mid | Prefix Length |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0| 641 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 642 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1|1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| 643 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 644 | Head | Mid | 645 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 646 | Mid | Mid | 647 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 648 |0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1| TLV Type |0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0| 649 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 650 |0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| Value | TLV Type | 651 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 652 |0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0| Index Start | Index Stop | 653 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 655 Figure 1: Example message with signature 657 Authors' Addresses 659 Ulrich Herberg 660 LIX, Ecole Polytechnique 661 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, 662 France 664 Phone: +33-1-6933-4126 665 Email: ulrich@herberg.name 666 URI: http://www.herberg.name/ 668 Thomas Heide Clausen 669 LIX, Ecole Polytechnique 670 91128 Palaiseau Cedex, 671 France 673 Phone: +33 6 6058 9349 674 Email: T.Clausen@computer.org 675 URI: http://www.thomasclausen.org/