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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 MSEC WG L. Dondeti 3 Internet-Draft QUALCOMM 4 Expires: April 2, 2006 J. Xiang 5 Nortel Networks 6 September 29, 2005 8 GKDP: Group Key Distribution Protocol 9 draft-ietf-msec-gkdp-00 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on April 2, 2006. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). 40 Abstract 42 This document specifies a group key distribution protocol (GKDP) 43 based on IKEv2, the IPsec key management protocol; the new protocol 44 is similar to IKEv2 in message and payload formats, and message 45 semantics to a large extent. The protocol in conformance with MSEC 46 key management architecture contains two components: member 47 registration and group rekeying, and downloads a group security 48 association from the GCKS to a member. This protocol is independent 49 of IKEv2 except in its likeness. 51 Conventions Used In This Document 53 This document recommends, as policy, what specifications for Internet 54 protocols -- and, in particular, IETF standards track protocol 55 documents -- should include as normative language within them. The 56 capitalized keywords "SHOULD", "MUST", "REQUIRED", etc. are used in 57 the sense of how they would be used within other documents with the 58 meanings as specified in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 60 Table of Contents 62 1. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 2. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64 2.1. Why do we need another GSA management protocol? . . . . . 3 65 2.2. GKDP usage scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 3. GKDP protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 67 3.1. Member registration and secure channel establishment . . . 4 68 3.1.1. Initial exchange:GSA_INIT_EXCH . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 69 3.1.2. Authenticated exchange:GSA_AUTH_EXCH . . . . . . . . . 6 70 3.2. GSA maintenance channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 71 3.2.1. GSA rekey protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 3.3. Informational exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 73 3.3.1. Notify exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 74 3.3.2. Error message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 75 4. GKDP protocol design details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 76 5. Header and payload formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 77 5.1. GKDP header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 78 6. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 79 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 80 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 81 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 82 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 83 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 84 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 85 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 14 87 1. Revision History 89 GKDP-xx: Draft tag and title changed to gkdp-xx 90 Version 01: The protocol has been renamed GKDP for Group Key 91 Distribution Protocol as per discussions at the MSEC meeting at 92 IETF-60 and mailing list discussions. The name GDOIv2 will be 93 used for a revision of GDOI which may retain the DOI concept and 94 build upon RFC 3547. 95 Version 02: This is a major revision with the following additions to 96 the specification: 98 * 100 2. Introduction and Overview 102 Security encapsulation protocols such as IPsec and SRTP provide 103 confidentiality, message integrity, replay protection, and in some 104 instances access control, and data origin authentication. These 105 security services require state establishment, maintenance, and 106 teardown for correct operation. While these security associations 107 can be managed manually, automatic key management protocols are 108 essential for efficient and scalable operation. In case of point-to- 109 point security associations, IKE and its successor IKEv2 are widely 110 used for IPsec SAs, and MIKEY for SRTP associations. For multi-point 111 SAs or group SAs (GSA), GDOI, GSAKMP, and MIKEY have been specified 112 by the MSEC WG. GKDP is designed to be a counterpart - for GSA 113 distribution and maintenance - to IKEv2 so we can reuse the work put 114 in to its design and analysis, and of course implementation. 116 2.1. Why do we need another GSA management protocol? 118 Given the collection of key management protocols mentioned above, 119 there is a question on the need for yet another group key management 120 protocol. First a look back at history: So far, we have two 121 experimental RFCs, viz., RFC 1949 [RFC1949] and RFC 2093 [RFC2093], 122 and a standards track RFC, RFC 3547 [RFC3547] specifying or 123 describing group key management protocols. Furthermore there is 124 GSAKMP, currently a standards track MSEC I-D, which borrows quite a 125 few concepts from IKEv2, but not quite similar to IKEv2. The 126 protocol we propose is mainly to reuse as much as the IKEv2 codebase, 127 similar to GDOI reusing payload and message formats of IKE [RFC2409] 128 and ISAKMP [RFC2408] . Consequently, GKDP requires fewer messages 129 compared to GDOI, specifically 4 in most cases, compared to 10 in 130 main mode and 7 in aggressive mode of GDOI. We discuss the 131 advantages of GKDP, the shortcomings and remedies to address those 132 shortcomings. 134 2.2. GKDP usage scenarios 136 GKDP is a key download protocol. Key download as opposed to key 137 negotiation has several interesting use cases. 139 o The first application is multicast security. As with GDOI, the 140 current version of the GKDP spec limits the scope to single sender 141 multicast applications. 142 o The second intended application is point to point data security 143 associations facilitated by a centralized group key server. 144 o Others to be listed! 146 3. GKDP protocol 148 3.1. Member registration and secure channel establishment 150 The first of two components in GSA establishment and maintenance is 151 member registration. 153 3.1.1. Initial exchange:GSA_INIT_EXCH 155 The first step in the registration protocol is to establish a secure 156 channel with the group controller and key server (GCKS). This 157 exchange is similar to IKE_SA_INIT exchange of IKEv2. The 158 registering member proposes various combinations of algorithms in 159 SAi1 to constitute the secure channel, along with a nonce, Ni, and a 160 DH exponent, KEi. The GCKS has several options: 162 o In the first, it honors the member's request for registration and 163 sends the necessary information to complete the DH exchange: it 164 selects and specifies the parameters of the secure channel, and 165 includes a nonce Nr, and a public DH value of its own, KEr. 166 o The second option is for the GCKS to consider if the request for 167 secure channel establishment is spurious. The GCCKS has no way to 168 tell except to throttle such requests by making the initiator do 169 some work before it invests any computing resources. We refer to 170 this mode as the denial-of-service or DoS protection mode 171 specified in detail in Section 3.1.1.1 . 172 o Finally, if none of the proposals are acceptable to the GCKS, it 173 may reject the initial exchange itself. 175 GSA_INIT_EXCH message is as follows: 177 Member->GCKS: M1: HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni 178 GCKS->Member: M2: HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ] 180 Figure 1: Secure channel establishment 182 3.1.1.1. DoS protection mode 184 In typical deployments of multicast or group security services, the 185 GCKS address is well-known, which allows adversaries to launch a DoS 186 attack by sending bogus GSA_INIT_EXCH messages. In the normal mode 187 of operation, the GCKS responds and needs to maintain state 188 (including storing Messages 1 and 2) corresponding to each exchange 189 in progress. Notice that this process might result in the GCKS 190 storing unnecessary state about bogus exchanges. To avoid this 191 attack, the GCKS may first choose to verify whether the Intiator is 192 live and responding to and processing GKDP messages. 194 The GCKS verifies whether a prospective member (or the initiatior of 195 the key exchange protocol) is live using the following procedure. 196 The GCKS responds to the Initiator's message, by sending a challenge 197 - a notify message (see Section 3.3), containing a a random value or 198 generally referred to as a COOKIE; the GCKS MUST choose the COOKIE 199 size between 1 and 64 octets. The Intiator is expected to include 200 the received COOKIE as part of modified Message 1, which we refer to 201 as "Response Message." (see Figure 2). 203 The GCKS may choose to store the COOKIE and other relevant additional 204 information such as Initiator's identity (thus reducing the amount of 205 state to be stored, but not entirely eliminating it), to verify that 206 the Initiator indeed used the COOKIE that was sent by the GCKS. 207 Alternatively, it may generate the COOKIE following a local procedure 208 (that the Initiator cannot repeat to generate another valid cookie) 209 to encode the Initiator's identity, Message 1 etc. For instance the 210 IKEv2 specification suggests the following derivation to generate 211 cookies: 213 COOKIE = VersionIDofGCKS-Secret | Hash(Ni | IPi | SPIi | GCKS-secret) 215 The GCKS may use (TBD) method to expand or truncate the above value 216 to generate the COOKIE of size (MUST be between 1-64 octets) based on 217 local policy. 219 DoS protection exchange is as follows: 221 Member->GCKS: M1: HDR(A,0), SAi1, KEi, Ni 222 GCKS->Member: CM: HDR(A,0), N(COOKIE) 224 Member->GCKS: RM: HDR(A,0), N(COOKIE), SAi1, KEi, Ni 225 GCKS->Member: M2: HDR(A,B), SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ] 227 CM: Challenge Message from the GCKS 228 RM: Challenge-Response Message from the Member 230 Figure 2: DoS protection mode of GSA_INIT_EXCH 232 3.1.2. Authenticated exchange:GSA_AUTH_EXCH 234 The GSA_INIT_EXCH (2 message or 4 message version) establishes an 235 unauthenticated secure channel between a prospective member and the 236 GCKS. The next step is for the member to request the GCKS to join a 237 group; the GCKS evaluates the request and based on the evaluation a) 238 accept the request and send the corresponding GSA 240 GSA_AUTH_EXCH message is as follows: 242 Member->GCKS: M3: HDR, SK{ G-ID, IDi, [ID_CERT,] [ID_CERTREQ,] AUTH, 243 [IDr,] [GM_CERT,] [GM_CERTREQ,] [POP_I] } 244 GCKS->Member: M4: HDR, SK{ IDr, [ID_CERT,] AUTH, GSA, [,KD] [,SEQ] 245 [GCKS_CERT,] [,POP_R]} 247 Figure 3: Authenticated Exchange 249 The various payloads in the GSA_AUTH_EXCH messages have the following 250 purposes: 252 o G-ID: The group identity payload constructed using the IKEv2 253 Identification Payload specifies the secure group that M3 wants to 254 join. 255 o ID_CERT: The optional ID_CERT payload contains a certificate(s) 256 asserting the GCKS's or a member's claimed identity as in IDi or 257 IDr payloads. 258 o GM_CERT: The optional GM_CERT payload contains a certificate 259 asserting the group member's authorization to join the group G-ID 260 as member. 262 o GCKS_CERT: The optional GCKS_CERT payload contains a certificate 263 asserting the GCKS's authorization to serve the role of a group 264 controller and key server for the group G-ID. 265 o AUTH: The AUTH payload constitues the "authenticated" portion of 266 the 4 or 6 message AKE. In other words, the member in M3 and the 267 GCKS in M4 prove that they are indeed the entities that sent M1 268 and M2 respectively. A pre-established shared secret or a 269 certificate (optionally specified in the CERT payload) may be used 270 for entity authentication. 271 o POP: Similar to the AUTH payload's use in providing host/entity 272 authentication, the POP payload is for member/GCKS authorization 273 to assume their claimed roles. The GM_CERT or GCKS_CERT is used 274 to sign a block of data, specified below, to constitute the POP 275 payload. 276 o GSA: The GSA payload contains the rekey and data security SA 277 payloads. Note that this SA is not negotiated; the GCKS simply 278 sends this SA. 279 o KD: The KD payload contains the secret keys corresponding the 280 rekey and the data security SAs included in the GSA payload. 281 o SEQ: The optional SEQ payload MUST be included if the GSA payload 282 contains a rekey SA. The SEQ payload contains a SEQ number for 283 replay protection of the rekey messages. 285 3.1.2.1. Key material computation 287 The key material computation and the AUTH payload are identical to 288 that described in the IKEv2 specification. 290 Key material and registration SA keys are computed as follows: 292 SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir) 294 {SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr } 295 = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr ), where 297 prf+ is defined as follows: 299 prf+ (K,S) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ... 301 where: 302 T1 = prf (K, S | 0x01) 303 T2 = prf (K, T1 | S | 0x02) 304 T3 = prf (K, T2 | S | 0x03) 305 T4 = prf (K, T3 | S | 0x04) 307 Figure 4: Registration SA key material computation 309 3.1.2.2. Member and GCKS authentication and authorization 311 GKDP requires mutual authentication between each member and a GCKS, 312 as well as mutual authorization. First the member and the GCKS 313 authenticate to each other using pre-shared keys or certificates 314 prior to establishing a secure channel. M3 and M4 contain AUTH 315 payloads that essentially protect against man-in-the-middle attacks 316 against the DH exchange in M1 and M2. The member and the GCKS 317 construct AUTH payloads by computing an HMAC over or signing a block 318 of data containing the message M1 or M2 they sent earlier, the other 319 party's nonce payload, and a prf over own identity. More formally, 320 the block of data for HMAC or signature is as follows: 322 Auth payload computation: 324 Auth payload in M3 is computed over: 326 auth-block-M3: M1 || Nr-Payload || prf(SK_pi, IDi-Payload) 328 Auth payload in M4 is computed over: 330 auth-block-M4: M2 || Ni-Payload || prf(SK_pr, IDr-Payload) 332 For shared secret based host authentication AUTH payload is 333 computed as follows: 335 AUTH = prf(prf(Shared Secret,"KeyPad:GKDP-AUTH-MX"), 336 ) 338 Figure 5: Auth payload computation 340 3.1.2.2.1. Use of asymmetric authentication methods 342 GKDP also allows the member and the GCKS to use different 343 authentication methods, similar to TLS and IKEv2. More specifically, 344 the GCKS uses a cert to authenticate itself and establish a secure 345 channel, and the member uses EAP to send its authentication 346 information via the secure channel. 348 Members may also use EAP to prove their authorization to join a 349 secure group. For instance, consider a use case where a member may 350 use a SIM card for authentication, or a pre-paid SIM card to pay for 351 content distributed to a secure group. In these cases, the 352 authentication or authorization information can be sent via EAP. 354 3.1.2.2.2. Proof of possession 356 Proof of possession payload (POP) provides a mechanism so that 357 members and/or GCKS can prove to the other party that they are indeed 358 authorized to be a member or the GCKS, respectively. For POP payload 359 derivation in GKDP, the member or the GCKS first constructs a message 360 block, POP-HASH, containing the two nonces exchanged in GSA_INIT_EXCH 361 and the prf over the ID payload as defined in the AUTH payload 362 construction. Next, the member or the GCKS signs the POP-HASH value. 364 POP-HASH construction is as follows: 366 POP payload : 368 POP payload in M3 is constructed over the following message block: 370 POP-HASH-M3: "KeyPad:GKDP-POP-M3" || 371 Ni-Payload || Nr-Payload || prf(SK_pi, IDi-Payload) 373 POP payload in M4 is computed over: 375 POP-HASH-M4: "KeyPad:GKDP-POP-M4" || 376 Ni-Payload || Nr-Payload || prf(SK_pr, IDr-Payload) 378 Figure 6: POP payload computation block 380 3.2. GSA maintenance channel 382 3.2.1. GSA rekey protocol 384 GSA rekey protocol is optional to implement, but it plays a crucial 385 role for large and dynamic groups. 387 The GCKS is responsible for rekeying of the secure group as per the 388 group policy. The GCKS uses multicast or multi-unicast to transport 389 the rekey message. When multi-unicast is used, it may be appropriate 390 in some scenarios to have a reply message from the member(s) to the 391 GCKS. The reply message is optional. 393 Rekey message is as follows: 395 Multicast: 396 GCKS->Member: HDR, SK {[N], SEQ, GSA, KD, [GCKS_CERT,] SIG} 398 Unicast: 399 GCKS->Member: HDR, SK {N, SEQ, GSA, KD, [GCKS_CERT,] SIG} 400 [Member->GCKS]: [HDR, SK {N, SEQ, AUTH}] 402 Figure 7: Rekey message 404 3.3. Informational exchange 406 3.3.1. Notify exchange 408 3.3.2. Error message 410 4. GKDP protocol design details 412 5. Header and payload formats 414 GKDP payload design is based on IKEv2 payloads, to allow reuse of the 415 IKEv2 payload processing code. Furthermore, we draw on the GDOI 416 design specified in RFC3547, where possible and appropriate to avoid 417 reinvention. 419 5.1. GKDP header 421 GKDP messages use UDP ports GKDP-PORT and GKDP-NAT-PORT (TBA-IANA), 422 with one GKDP message per datagram. The source and destination IP 423 addresses from the IP header are used with role reversal to send the 424 response messages. GKDP messages sent/received on UDP port GKDP-PORT 425 follow the format of a UDP header followed by a GDKP header. GKDP 426 messages sent/received on UDP port GKDP-NAT-PORT have four octets of 427 zero immediately following the UDP header; the GKDP header follows 428 the zeros. The zeros are not part of part of the GKDP message and 429 therefore not part of the payload length fields. All GKDP messages 430 begin with the GKDP header. 432 Following the GKDP header -denoted by HDR in GKDP messages - are one 433 or more GKDP payloads each identified by a "Next Payload" field in 434 the preceding payload. Payloads are processed in the order in which 435 they appear in an GKDP message by invoking the appropriate processing 436 routine according to the "Next Payload" field in the IKE header and 437 subsequently according to the "Next Payload" field in the IKE payload 438 itself until a "Next Payload" field of zero indicates that no 439 payloads follow. If a payload of type "Encrypted" is found, that 440 payload is decrypted and its contents parsed as additional payloads. 441 An Encrypted payload MUST be the last payload in a packet and an 442 encrypted payload MUST NOT contain another encrypted payload. 444 IPsecbis multicast group address or the destination address in the IP 445 header and the Recipient SPI in the GKDP header identifies an 446 instance of an GKDP security association. 448 The format of the GKDP header is shown in Figure Figure 8: 450 1 2 3 451 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 452 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 453 ! GKDP Initiator's SPI ! 454 ! ! 455 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 456 ! GKDP Responder's SPI ! 457 ! ! 458 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 459 ! Next Payload ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type ! Flags ! 460 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 461 ! Message ID ! 462 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 463 ! Length ! 464 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 466 Figure 8: GKDP Header Format 468 6. Security considerations 470 TBD 472 7. IANA Considerations 474 TBD 476 8. Acknowledgments 478 GKDP is based on IKEv2 and GDOI. Several sections of this document 479 are quite identical to IKEv2 and GDOI specifications; in some cases 480 the text may be identical to the text in those specifications. We 481 included the text for completeness of this specification. We 482 appreciate the efforts of the contributors and editors of those 483 protocols. 485 9. References 487 9.1. Normative References 489 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 490 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 492 [RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The 493 Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003. 495 [I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2] 496 Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", 497 draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17 (work in progress), 498 October 2004. 500 9.2. Informative References 502 [RFC1949] Ballardie, T., "Scalable Multicast Key Distribution", 503 RFC 1949, May 1996. 505 [RFC2093] Harney, H. and C. Muckenhirn, "Group Key Management 506 Protocol (GKMP) Specification", RFC 2093, July 1997. 508 [RFC2408] Maughan, D., Schneider, M., and M. Schertler, "Internet 509 Security Association and Key Management Protocol 510 (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998. 512 [RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange 513 (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998. 515 [I-D.ipsec-rfc2401bis] 516 "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", 517 draft-ipsec-rfc2401bis-00 (work in progress), 518 October 2003. 520 Authors' Addresses 522 Lakshminath Dondeti 523 QUALCOMM 524 5775 Morehouse Drive 525 San Diego, CA 92121 526 US 528 Phone: +1 858 845 1267 529 Email: ldondeti@qualcomm.com 531 Jing Xiang 532 Nortel Networks 533 600 Technology Park drive 534 Billerica, MA 01821 535 US 537 Phone: +1 978 288 8985 538 Email: jxiang@nortel.com 540 Intellectual Property Statement 542 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 543 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 544 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 545 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 546 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 547 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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