idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-04.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- The document has examples using IPv4 documentation addresses according to RFC6890, but does not use any IPv6 documentation addresses. Maybe there should be IPv6 examples, too? Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (February 19, 2021) is 1163 days in the past. Is this intentional? -- Found something which looks like a code comment -- if you have code sections in the document, please surround them with '' and '' lines. Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'RFC-TBD' is mentioned on line 319, but not defined -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '0' on line 651 -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '3' on line 598 -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '6' on line 698 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5485 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 8805 == Outdated reference: A later version (-03) exists of draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-02 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7234 (Obsoleted by RFC 9111) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7482 (Obsoleted by RFC 9082) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 8 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: August 23, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 February 19, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-04 15 Abstract 17 This document describes how to find and authenticate geofeed data. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 23, 2021. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 55 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 68 1. Introduction 70 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 71 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 72 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 73 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 74 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 75 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 76 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 77 data given an IP address. 79 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 80 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC4012] inetnum: class [RFC2725] and 81 [INETNUM] to refer to geofeed data, and how to prudently use them. 82 In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed 83 [RFC4012] and [INET6NUM]. 85 An optional, but utterly awesome, means for authenticating geofeed 86 data is also defined. 88 1.1. Requirements Language 90 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 91 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 92 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 93 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 94 capitals, as shown here. 96 2. Geofeed Files 98 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 99 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 100 geographic locale(s). 102 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 103 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 104 Section 3 this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed 105 file given an IP address. 107 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 108 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 109 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 110 prefixes, as may be likely if the location data are maintained by a 111 different department than address management, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces 112 are represented, etc. 114 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 115 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 116 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 117 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 118 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 119 described in this document the operator should be aware of this 120 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 121 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 123 This document also suggests optional data for geofeed files to 124 provide stronger authenticity to the data. 126 3. inetnum: Class 128 RPSL, [RFC4012], as used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), 129 has been augmented with the inetnum: [INETNUM] and the inet6num: 130 [INET6NUM] classes; each of which describes an IP address range and 131 its attributes. 133 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 134 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 135 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 136 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format MUST be as in this example, 137 "remarks: Geofeed " followed by a URL which will vary. 139 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 140 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 142 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 143 parties, we suggest that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 144 class be simply "geofeed: " followed by a URL which will vary. 146 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 147 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 149 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 150 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 151 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 152 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 153 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 154 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 156 Any particular inetnum: object MAY have, at most, one geofeed 157 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when one 158 is defined. 160 inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, see [INETNUM] Section 4.2.4.1, 161 Hierarchy of INETNUM Objects. Geofeed references SHOULD be at the 162 lowest applicable inetnum: object. When fetching, the most specific 163 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 165 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 166 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 167 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 168 preferred. 170 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 171 the inetnum: which refers to them. 173 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 174 as the other registries; therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 175 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 176 "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum" and the 177 "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks". 179 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 181 The question arises of whether a particular geofeed data set is 182 valid, i.e. authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space and is 183 authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 184 geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately the RPSL in many 185 repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An approach where RPSL 186 was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be 187 deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair number of them. 189 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed file. It 190 would be essentially a digest of the main body of the file signed by 191 the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering 192 address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI 193 certificate with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 195 Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after text file 196 canonicalization (Sec 2.2), the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 197 [RFC5652] would be used to create a detached DER encoded signature 198 which is then BASE64 encoded and line wrapped to 72 or fewer 199 characters. 201 Both the address ranges of the signing certificate and of the 202 inetnum: MUST cover all prefixes in the geofeed file; and the address 203 range of the signing certificate must cover that of the inetnum:. 205 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 206 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 207 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 208 boundaries, while those of geofeed lines must. 210 As the signer would need to specify the covered RPKI resources 211 relevant to the signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: 212 object's address range would be included in the [RFC5652] CMS 213 SignedData certificates field. 215 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 216 getting the department with the HSM to sign the CMS blob is left as 217 an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the 218 signature requires no complexity; the certificate, which can be 219 validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key. 221 Until [RFC8805] is updated to formally define such an appendix, it 222 MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end of the 223 geofeed file. This is a cryptographically incorrect, albeit simple 224 example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 226 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 227 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 228 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 229 ... 230 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 231 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 232 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 234 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] describes and provides code for a 235 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile for a general purpose 236 listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource 237 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable, albeit 238 complex, code to sign geofeed files. 240 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 241 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 242 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 243 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 244 trust anchor is used. 246 5. Operational Considerations 248 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 249 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 250 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 251 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 252 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 253 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 254 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 256 The geofeed files SHOULD be published over and fetched using https 257 [RFC8446]. 259 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside of 260 the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 262 Iff the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then multiple 263 inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumer 264 MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by the 265 address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 267 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 268 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 269 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with a tweezers. 271 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 272 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 273 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 274 users without such authorization the same result can be achieved with 275 extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such data 276 across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them 277 [geofeed-finder]. 279 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 280 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 281 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 282 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 283 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 284 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors MUST NOT fetch more frequently 285 than weekly. It would be wise not to fetch at magic times such as 286 midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others 287 are likely to do the same. 289 6. Security Considerations 291 It would be generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also 292 use other sources to cross-validate the data. All of the Security 293 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 295 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 296 authentication. This would allow spoofing of inetnum: objects 297 pointing to malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an 298 unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the 299 RPKI. 301 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 302 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned 303 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 304 weak authorization. 306 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 307 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 308 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 309 deployed by geofeed file servers. 311 7. IANA Considerations 313 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 314 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 315 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 317 Description OID Specification 318 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 319 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 321 8. Acknowledgments 323 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 324 Michaelson for the first, and a substantial, external review. Erik 325 Kline who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we 326 express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno 327 Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided 328 running code, and Kevin Pack. Also to geolocation providers that are 329 consuming geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei 330 (ipdata.co), Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat 331 (bigdatacloud.com). For reviews, we thank Adrian Farrel, Antonio 332 Prado, and George Michaelson, the document shepherd. 334 9. References 336 9.1. Normative References 338 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 339 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 340 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 341 . 343 [RFC2725] Villamizar, C., Alaettinoglu, C., Meyer, D., and S. 344 Murphy, "Routing Policy System Security", RFC 2725, 345 DOI 10.17487/RFC2725, December 1999, 346 . 348 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 349 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 350 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 351 . 353 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 354 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 355 . 357 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 358 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 359 . 361 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 362 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 363 May 2017, . 365 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 366 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 367 . 369 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 370 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 371 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 372 . 374 9.2. Informative References 376 [geofeed-finder] 377 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 378 . 380 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] 381 Michaelson, G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T., 382 and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 383 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work 384 in progress), January 2021. 386 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] 387 Snijders, J., "RPKI Signed Checklists", draft-spaghetti- 388 sidrops-rpki-rsc-02 (work in progress), February 2021. 390 [INET6NUM] 391 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 392 . 397 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 398 . 403 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 404 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 405 . 407 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 408 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 409 . 411 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 412 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 413 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 414 . 416 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 417 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 418 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 419 . 421 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 422 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 423 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 424 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 425 . 427 Appendix A. Example 429 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 430 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 431 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 432 detached signature. 434 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 435 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 436 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 438 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 439 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 440 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 441 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 442 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 443 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 444 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 445 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 446 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 447 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 448 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 449 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 450 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 451 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 452 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 453 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 454 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 455 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 456 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 457 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 458 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 459 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 460 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 461 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 462 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 464 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 465 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 466 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 468 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 469 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 470 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 471 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 472 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 473 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 474 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 475 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 476 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 477 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 478 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 479 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 480 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 481 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 482 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 483 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 484 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 485 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 486 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 487 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 488 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 489 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 490 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 491 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 492 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 493 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 494 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 495 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 496 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 498 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 499 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 500 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 501 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 503 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 504 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 505 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 506 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 507 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 508 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 509 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 510 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 511 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 512 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 513 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 514 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 515 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 516 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 517 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 518 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 519 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 520 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 521 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 522 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 523 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 524 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 525 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 526 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 527 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 528 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 529 5Q== 530 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 532 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 533 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 535 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 536 4 917: SEQUENCE { 537 8 3: [0] { 538 10 1: INTEGER 2 539 : } 540 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 541 35 13: SEQUENCE { 542 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 543 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 544 48 0: NULL 545 : } 546 50 51: SEQUENCE { 547 52 49: SET { 548 54 47: SEQUENCE { 549 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 550 61 40: PrintableString 551 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 552 : } 553 : } 554 : } 555 103 30: SEQUENCE { 556 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 557 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 558 : } 559 135 51: SEQUENCE { 560 137 49: SET { 561 139 47: SEQUENCE { 562 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 563 146 40: PrintableString 564 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 565 : } 566 : } 567 : } 568 188 290: SEQUENCE { 569 192 13: SEQUENCE { 570 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 571 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 572 205 0: NULL 573 : } 574 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 575 212 266: SEQUENCE { 576 216 257: INTEGER 577 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 578 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 579 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 580 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 581 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 582 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 583 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 584 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 585 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 586 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 587 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 588 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 589 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 590 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 591 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 592 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 593 : EB 594 477 3: INTEGER 65537 595 : } 596 : } 597 : } 598 482 439: [3] { 599 486 435: SEQUENCE { 600 490 29: SEQUENCE { 601 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 602 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 603 499 20: OCTET STRING 604 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 605 : F0 53 A1 87 606 : } 607 : } 608 521 31: SEQUENCE { 609 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 610 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 611 530 22: SEQUENCE { 612 532 20: [0] 613 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 614 : B3 77 86 42 615 : } 616 : } 617 : } 618 554 12: SEQUENCE { 619 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 620 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 621 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 622 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 623 : } 624 : } 625 568 14: SEQUENCE { 626 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 627 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 628 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 629 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 630 : '1'B (bit 0) 631 : } 632 : } 633 584 24: SEQUENCE { 634 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 635 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 636 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 637 596 12: SEQUENCE { 638 598 10: SEQUENCE { 639 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 640 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 641 : } 642 : } 643 : } 644 : } 645 610 97: SEQUENCE { 646 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 647 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 648 619 88: SEQUENCE { 649 621 86: SEQUENCE { 650 623 84: [0] { 651 625 82: [0] { 652 627 80: [6] 653 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 654 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 655 : } 656 : } 657 : } 658 : } 659 : } 660 : } 661 709 108: SEQUENCE { 662 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 663 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 664 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 665 723 94: SEQUENCE { 666 725 92: SEQUENCE { 667 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 668 737 80: [6] 669 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 670 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 671 : } 672 : } 673 : } 674 : } 675 819 33: SEQUENCE { 676 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 677 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 678 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 679 836 16: SEQUENCE { 680 838 6: SEQUENCE { 681 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 682 844 0: NULL 683 : } 684 846 6: SEQUENCE { 685 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 686 852 0: NULL 687 : } 688 : } 689 : } 690 : } 691 854 69: SEQUENCE { 692 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 693 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 694 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 695 868 55: SEQUENCE { 696 870 53: SEQUENCE { 697 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 698 882 41: [6] 699 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 700 : } 701 : } 702 : } 703 : } 704 : } 705 : } 706 : } 707 925 13: SEQUENCE { 708 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 709 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 710 938 0: NULL 711 : } 712 940 257: BIT STRING 713 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 714 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 715 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 716 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 717 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 718 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 719 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 720 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 721 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 722 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 723 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 724 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 725 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 726 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 727 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 728 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 729 : } 731 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 732 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 733 not. 735 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 736 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 737 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 738 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 739 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 740 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 741 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 742 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 743 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 744 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 745 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 746 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 747 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 748 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 749 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 750 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 751 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 752 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 753 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 754 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 755 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 756 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 757 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 758 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 759 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 760 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 761 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 763 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 764 yields the following detached CMS signature. 766 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 767 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 768 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 769 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 770 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 771 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 772 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 773 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 774 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 775 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 776 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 777 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 778 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 779 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 780 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 781 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 782 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 783 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 784 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 785 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 786 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 787 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 788 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 789 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 790 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 791 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 792 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 793 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 794 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 795 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 796 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 797 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 798 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 799 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 800 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 801 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 802 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 803 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 805 Authors' Addresses 807 Randy Bush 808 IIJ & Arrcus 809 5147 Crystal Springs 810 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 811 United States of America 813 Email: randy@psg.com 814 Massimo Candela 815 NTT 816 Siriusdreef 70-72 817 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 818 Netherlands 820 Email: massimo@ntt.net 822 Warren Kumari 823 Google 824 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 825 Mountain View, CA 94043 826 US 828 Email: warren@kumari.net 830 Russ Housley 831 Vigil Security, LLC 832 516 Dranesville Road 833 Herndon, VA 20170 834 USA 836 Email: housley@vigilsec.com