idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-07.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- The document has examples using IPv4 documentation addresses according to RFC6890, but does not use any IPv6 documentation addresses. Maybe there should be IPv6 examples, too? Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (May 10, 2021) is 1081 days in the past. Is this intentional? -- Found something which looks like a code comment -- if you have code sections in the document, please surround them with '' and '' lines. Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'RFC-TBD' is mentioned on line 363, but not defined -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '0' on line 699 -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '3' on line 646 -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '6' on line 746 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5485 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 8805 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7234 (Obsoleted by RFC 9111) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 7482 (Obsoleted by RFC 9082) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 8 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ & Arrcus 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Candela 5 Expires: November 11, 2021 NTT 6 W. Kumari 7 Google 8 R. Housley 9 Vigil Security 10 May 10, 2021 12 Finding and Using Geofeed Data 13 draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-07 15 Abstract 17 This document describes how to find and authenticate geofeed data. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2021. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Geofeed Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. inetnum: Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 61 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 62 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 64 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 65 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 67 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 69 1. Introduction 71 Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to 72 customize those services based on the geographic location of the user 73 of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used 74 to contact the service. Also, infrastructure and other services 75 might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] 76 defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP 77 addresses. But it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed 78 data given an IP address. 80 This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy 81 Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC4012] inetnum: class to refer 82 specifically to geofeed data CSV files, and how to prudently use 83 them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be 84 assumed [RFC4012]. 86 The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and 87 certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database 88 classes. 90 An optional, utterly awesome but slightly complex, means for 91 authenticating geofeed data is also defined. 93 1.1. Requirements Language 95 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 96 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 97 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 98 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 99 capitals, as shown here. 101 2. Geofeed Files 103 Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility 104 for an IP address resource 'owner' to associate those IP addresses to 105 geographic locale(s). 107 Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address 108 to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In 109 Section 3 this document specifies how to find the relevant [RFC8805] 110 geofeed file given an IP address. 112 Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale 113 and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be 114 even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many 115 prefixes, dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc. 117 Geofeed data do have privacy considerations, see Section 6 119 This document also suggests optional signature, which authenticates 120 the data when present, for geofeed files to provide stronger 121 authenticity to the data. 123 3. inetnum: Class 125 The Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL), [RFC4012] used by 126 the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) specifies the inetnum: 127 database class. Each of these objects describes an IP address range 128 and its attributes. The inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on 129 the address space. 131 Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: 132 attribute in the inetnum: class. Until such time, this document 133 defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute which contains an 134 HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed 135 attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ", where the 136 token "Geofeed" is case sensitive, followed by a URL which will vary, 137 but MUST refer only to a single [RFC8805] geofeed file. 139 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 140 remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed.csv 142 While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant 143 parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: 144 class be simply "geofeed: " followed by a URL which will vary, but 145 MUST refer only to a [RFC8805] geofeed file. 147 inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example 148 geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed.csv 150 The URL's use of the web PKI can not provide authentication of IP 151 address space ownership. It is only used to authenticate a pointer 152 to the geofeed file and transport integrity of the data. In 153 contrast, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI, see 154 [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP space ownership; see 155 optional authentication in Section 4. 157 Until all producers of inetnum:s, i.e. the RIRs, state that they have 158 migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at 159 inetnum:s to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the 160 remarks: and geofeed: forms. This not only implies that the RIRs 161 support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have 162 migrated any inetnum:s from remarks: use to geofeed:s. 164 Any particular inetnum: object MUST have at most, one geofeed 165 reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it 166 is implemented. If there is more than one, all are ignored. 168 If a geofeed CSV file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP 169 address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from 170 multiple inetnum: objects. 172 As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, Geofeed references SHOULD be at 173 the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant prefixes 174 in the referenced geofeed file. When fetching, the most specific 175 inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used. 177 When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects 178 which have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on 179 the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be 180 preferred. 182 It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than 183 the inetnum: which refers to them. I.e. an INETNUM object for a 184 prefix P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been sub- 185 divided into one or more longer prefixes. 187 Currently, the registry data published by ARIN is not the same RPSL 188 as the other registries; therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP 189 [RFC0959], whois [RFC3912], RDAP [RFC7482], or whatever, the 190 "NetRange" attribute/key MUST be treated as "inetnum" and the 191 "Comment" attribute MUST be treated as "remarks". 193 4. Authenticating Geofeed Data 195 The question arises of whether a particular [RFC8805] geofeed data 196 set is valid, i.e. authorized by the 'owner' of the IP address space 197 and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: which points to the 198 [RFC8805] geofeed file provides some assurance. Unfortunately the 199 RPSL in many repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An 200 approach where RPSL was signed a la [RFC7909] would be good, except 201 it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a 202 fair number of them. 204 An optional authenticator MAY be appended to a [RFC8805] geofeed 205 file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by the 206 private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for the covering address 207 range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI certificate 208 with the signature and the digest of the geofeed text. 210 The canonicalization procedure converts the data from its internal 211 character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding, 212 and the sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of 213 text. Trailing space characters MUST NOT appear on a line of text. 214 That is, the space or tab characters must not be followed by the 215 sequence. Thus, a blank line is represented solely by the 216 sequence. Other nonprintable characters, such as backspace, 217 are not expected. For robustness, any nonprintable characters MUST 218 NOT be changed by canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT 219 appear at the end of the file. That is, the file must not end with 220 multiple consecutive sequences. Any end-of-file marker used 221 by an operating system is not considered to be part of the file 222 content. When present, such end-of-file markers MUST NOT be 223 processed by the digital signature algorithm. Borrowing detached 224 signatures from [RFC5485], after file canonicalization, the 225 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] would be used to create 226 a detached DER encoded signature which is then BASE64 encoded and 227 line wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. 229 The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes 230 in the geofeed file it signs; and therefore must be covered by the 231 range of the inetnum:. 233 An address range A 'covers' address range B if the range of B is 234 identical to or a subset of A. 'Address range' is used here because 235 inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on CIDR prefix 236 boundaries, while those of the CSV lines in the geofeed file do. 238 Validation of the signing certificate needs to ensure that it is part 239 of the current manifest and that the resources are covered by the 240 RPKI certificate. 242 As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the 243 signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's 244 address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData 245 certificates field. 247 Identifying the private key associated with the certificate, and 248 getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to 249 sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the 250 other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the 251 certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the 252 needed public key. 254 The appendix MUST be 'hidden' as a series of "#" comments at the end 255 of the geofeed file. The following is a cryptographically incorrect, 256 albeit simple example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A. 258 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 259 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 260 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 261 ... 262 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 263 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 264 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 266 The signature does not cover the signature lines. 268 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] describes and provides code for a 269 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile for a general purpose 270 listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource 271 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable, albeit 272 complex, code to sign geofeed files. 274 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] describes a Cryptographic Message Syntax 275 (CMS) profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) 276 based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in 277 the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root 278 trust anchor is used. 280 5. Operational Considerations 282 To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to 283 register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with 284 their RIR/NIR and/or any provider LIR which has assigned prefixes to 285 them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain 286 inetnum: objects. They also provide means of [sub-]assigning IP 287 address resources and allowing the assignee to create whois data, 288 including inetnum: objects, and thereby referring to geofeed files. 290 The geofeed files SHOULD be published over and fetched using https 291 [RFC8446]. 293 When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside of 294 the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range. 296 If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 4, then 297 multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the 298 consumer MUST use only geofeed lines where the prefix is covered by 299 the address range of the inetnum: object they have followed. 301 To minimize the load on RIR whois [RFC3912] services, use of the 302 RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be the preferred access. This 303 also provides bulk access instead of fetching with tweezers. 305 Currently, geolocation providers have bulk whois data access at all 306 the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for 307 all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for 308 users without such authorization the same result can be achieved with 309 extra RDAP effort. There is open source code to pass over such data 310 across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them 311 [geofeed-finder]. 313 An entity fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do 314 frequent real-time look-ups to prevent load on RPSL and geofeed 315 servers. [RFC8805] Section 3.4 suggests use of the [RFC7234] HTTP 316 Expires Caching Header to signal when geofeed data should be 317 refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of 318 such an HTTP Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more 319 frequently than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic 320 times such as midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too 321 many others are likely to do the same. 323 6. Privacy Considerations 325 [RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP 326 address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an 327 individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy 328 guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this 329 exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as 330 described in this document the operator should be aware of this 331 exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy 332 considerations of [RFC8805] Section 4 apply to this document. 334 7. Security Considerations 336 It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use 337 other sources to cross-validate the data. All of the Security 338 Considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well. 340 As mentioned in Section 4, many RPSL repositories have weak if any 341 authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to 342 malicious geofeed files. Section 4 suggests an unfortunately complex 343 method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI. 345 If an inetnum: for a wide prefix (e.g. a /16) points to an RPKI- 346 signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned 347 equal or narrower (e.g. a /24) inetnum: in a whois registry which has 348 weak authorization. 350 The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers 351 due to too-frequent queries. Usually they throttle by the querying 352 IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be 353 deployed by geofeed file servers. 355 8. IANA Considerations 357 IANA is asked to register object identifiers for one content type in 358 the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 359 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows: 361 Description OID Specification 362 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 363 id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47 [RFC-TBD] 365 9. Acknowledgments 367 Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue. George 368 Michaelson for the first, and a substantial, external review. Erik 369 Kline who was too shy to agree to co-authorship. Additionally, we 370 express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno 371 Schepers, Flavio Luciani, Eric Dugas, Job Snijders who provided 372 running code, and Kevin Pack. Also to geolocation providers that are 373 consuming geofeeds with this described solution, Jonathan Kosgei 374 (ipdata.co), Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat 375 (bigdatacloud.com). For reviews, we thank Adrian Farrel, Antonio 376 Prado, Rob Wilton, and George Michaelson, the document shepherd. 378 10. References 380 10.1. Normative References 382 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 383 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 384 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 385 . 387 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 388 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 389 2003, . 391 [RFC4012] Blunk, L., Damas, J., Parent, F., and A. Robachevsky, 392 "Routing Policy Specification Language next generation 393 (RPSLng)", RFC 4012, DOI 10.17487/RFC4012, March 2005, 394 . 396 [RFC5485] Housley, R., "Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft 397 Documents", RFC 5485, DOI 10.17487/RFC5485, March 2009, 398 . 400 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 401 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 402 . 404 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 405 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 406 DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, 407 . 409 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 410 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 411 May 2017, . 413 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 414 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 415 . 417 [RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W. 418 Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation 419 Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020, 420 . 422 10.2. Informative References 424 [geofeed-finder] 425 Massimo Candela, "geofeed-finder", 426 . 428 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] 429 Michaelson, G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T., 430 and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged 431 Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work 432 in progress), January 2021. 434 [I-D.spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc] 435 Snijders, J., "RPKI Signed Checklists", draft-spaghetti- 436 sidrops-rpki-rsc-03 (work in progress), February 2021. 438 [INET6NUM] 439 RIPE, "Description of the INET6NUM Object", 440 . 445 [INETNUM] RIPE, "Description of the INETNUM Object", 446 . 451 [RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", 452 STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985, 453 . 455 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 456 DOI 10.17487/RFC3912, September 2004, 457 . 459 [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, 460 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", 461 RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, 462 . 464 [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 465 Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, 466 DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, 467 . 469 [RFC7909] Kisteleki, R. and B. Haberman, "Securing Routing Policy 470 Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public 471 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures", RFC 7909, 472 DOI 10.17487/RFC7909, June 2016, 473 . 475 Appendix A. Example 477 This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CA 478 certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, an end-entity 479 certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a 480 detached signature. 482 The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As 483 usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 484 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers. 486 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 487 MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 488 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 489 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB 490 AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 491 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH 492 XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe 493 g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb 494 O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq 495 jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd 496 BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU 497 GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw 498 GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI 499 KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 500 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u 501 ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 502 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD 503 AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN 504 BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe 505 xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH 506 cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM 507 Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA 508 rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a 509 x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== 510 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 512 The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate 513 grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two 514 AS numbers (64496 and 64497). 516 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 517 MIIFBzCCA++gAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDKowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 518 BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTAyMTlaFw0yMTA5 519 MDMxOTAyMTlaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG 520 QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc 521 zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 522 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo 523 j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ 524 liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n 525 YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE 526 TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIvMIICKzAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 527 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYD 528 VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr 529 BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u 530 ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz 531 Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v 532 cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr 533 BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu 534 bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz 535 Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF 536 hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH 537 AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA 538 +/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnLu+d1ZsUTiX3YWGueTHIalW4ad0 539 Kupi7pYMV2nXbxNGmdJMol9BkzVz9tj55ReMghUU4YLm/ICYe4fz5e0T8o9s/vIm 540 cGS29+WoGuiznMitpvbS/379gaMezk6KpqjH6Brw6meMqy09phmcmvm3x3WTmx09 541 mLlQneMptwk8qSYcnMUmGLJs+cVqmkOa3sWRdw8WrGu6QqYtQz3HFZQojF06YzEq 542 V/dBdCFdEOwTfVl2n2XqhoJl/oEBdC4uu2G0qRk3+WVs+uwVHP0Ttsbt7TzFgZfY 543 yxqvOg6QoldxZVZmHHncKmETu/BqCDGJot9may31ukrx34Bu+XFMVihm0w== 544 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 546 The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate 547 grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). 548 Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data 549 signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the certificate. 551 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 552 MIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZuMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL 553 BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC 554 Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAxOTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNV 555 BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi 556 MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW 557 yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c 558 K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm 559 BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp 560 tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog 561 qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB 562 AAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j 563 BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8B 564 Af8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFag 565 VKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF 566 RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcB 567 AQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBv 568 c2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIu 569 Y2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwEDAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUH 570 AQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90 571 aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHP 572 TArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYiblMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh 573 6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b 574 +YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8adS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1ar 575 Kelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aaaEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfO 576 MkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztcOxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh4 577 5Q== 578 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 580 The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For 581 brevity, the other two certificates are not. 583 0 1197: SEQUENCE { 584 4 917: SEQUENCE { 585 8 3: [0] { 586 10 1: INTEGER 2 587 : } 588 13 20: INTEGER 27AD394083D7F2B5B99B8670C775B2B96EE166E3 589 35 13: SEQUENCE { 590 37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 591 : sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 592 48 0: NULL 593 : } 594 50 51: SEQUENCE { 595 52 49: SET { 596 54 47: SEQUENCE { 597 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 598 61 40: PrintableString 599 : '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642' 600 : } 601 : } 602 : } 603 103 30: SEQUENCE { 604 105 13: UTCTime 03/09/2020 19:05:17 GMT 605 120 13: UTCTime 30/06/2021 19:05:17 GMT 606 : } 607 135 51: SEQUENCE { 608 137 49: SET { 609 139 47: SEQUENCE { 610 141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 611 146 40: PrintableString 612 : '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187' 613 : } 614 : } 615 : } 616 188 290: SEQUENCE { 617 192 13: SEQUENCE { 618 194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption 619 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 620 205 0: NULL 621 : } 622 207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 623 212 266: SEQUENCE { 624 216 257: INTEGER 625 : 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8 626 : 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65 627 : B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE 628 : 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13 629 : 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37 630 : 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE 631 : E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED 632 : 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89 633 : F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E 634 : 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19 635 : BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65 636 : 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28 637 : 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9 638 : 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A 639 : 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41 640 : FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C 641 : EB 642 477 3: INTEGER 65537 643 : } 644 : } 645 : } 646 482 439: [3] { 647 486 435: SEQUENCE { 648 490 29: SEQUENCE { 649 492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 650 497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 651 499 20: OCTET STRING 652 : 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB 653 : F0 53 A1 87 654 : } 655 : } 656 521 31: SEQUENCE { 657 523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 658 528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 659 530 22: SEQUENCE { 660 532 20: [0] 661 : 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97 662 : B3 77 86 42 663 : } 664 : } 665 : } 666 554 12: SEQUENCE { 667 556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 668 561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 669 564 2: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 670 566 0: SEQUENCE {} 671 : } 672 : } 673 568 14: SEQUENCE { 674 570 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 675 575 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 676 578 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 677 580 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits 678 : '1'B (bit 0) 679 : } 680 : } 681 584 24: SEQUENCE { 682 586 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 683 591 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 684 594 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 685 596 12: SEQUENCE { 686 598 10: SEQUENCE { 687 600 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER 688 : resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2) 689 : } 690 : } 691 : } 692 : } 693 610 97: SEQUENCE { 694 612 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 695 617 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 696 619 88: SEQUENCE { 697 621 86: SEQUENCE { 698 623 84: [0] { 699 625 82: [0] { 700 627 80: [6] 701 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 702 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl' 703 : } 704 : } 705 : } 706 : } 707 : } 708 : } 709 709 108: SEQUENCE { 710 711 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess 711 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 712 721 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 713 723 94: SEQUENCE { 714 725 92: SEQUENCE { 715 727 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2) 716 737 80: [6] 717 : 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE2CEF4F' 718 : 'B21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer' 719 : } 720 : } 721 : } 722 : } 723 819 33: SEQUENCE { 724 821 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7) 725 831 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 726 834 18: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 727 836 16: SEQUENCE { 728 838 6: SEQUENCE { 729 840 2: OCTET STRING 00 01 730 844 0: NULL 731 : } 732 846 6: SEQUENCE { 733 848 2: OCTET STRING 00 02 734 852 0: NULL 735 : } 736 : } 737 : } 738 : } 739 854 69: SEQUENCE { 740 856 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectInfoAccess 741 : (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11) 742 866 57: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 743 868 55: SEQUENCE { 744 870 53: SEQUENCE { 745 872 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 13' 746 882 41: [6] 747 : 'https://rrdp.example.net/notification.xml' 748 : } 749 : } 750 : } 751 : } 752 : } 753 : } 754 : } 755 925 13: SEQUENCE { 756 927 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption 757 : (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) 758 938 0: NULL 759 : } 760 940 257: BIT STRING 761 : 05 1D 93 D2 A4 F6 57 56 65 B1 98 E3 FB 21 CF 4C 762 : 0A C8 54 11 02 64 54 82 74 FF 9B 25 3B 1E F3 94 763 : EA 62 26 E5 32 C3 52 F7 21 2E D9 23 5B 69 93 0D 764 : 2E E4 92 88 07 DF 62 8A 21 E2 72 18 AB F4 61 EB 765 : EC 46 B3 59 F8 DB B2 59 52 89 28 78 BB 58 D1 45 766 : 1B D9 F2 2C B9 AF 49 16 8F 18 19 39 E9 A8 33 06 767 : 7B EC 67 A5 B2 74 48 24 A8 06 52 42 22 3F 9B F9 768 : 84 BC 59 78 C4 1E DD 8A 5B AC 32 03 F0 5C 35 2F 769 : 1A 75 2D A9 11 4C 02 D9 CB 3F 59 CC 33 81 BB 6D 770 : 9E 47 27 1B BF F0 92 B4 37 A2 AC E9 0B 56 AB 29 771 : E9 72 CF B3 C6 20 85 C9 1B 2F 67 17 C0 B7 FD A6 772 : 9A 12 91 DD ED 48 08 CA F5 D8 B8 26 3F 96 A5 93 773 : 9B DE E3 0F 18 06 21 81 82 EF AE B4 9A D7 CE 32 774 : 40 7C 60 5E A4 51 4F AD 77 67 43 42 C3 33 B5 C3 775 : B1 6F 3A A2 1A 78 9C 99 E2 5F 07 01 B6 96 2E 8E 776 : D2 FA 2B 5B 87 79 88 83 93 2A 94 32 A9 F8 78 E5 777 : } 779 To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity 780 private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are 781 not. 783 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 784 MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW 785 /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP 786 Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 787 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ 788 eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm 789 gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 790 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio 791 pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z 792 ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ 793 mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 794 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF 795 t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt 796 MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M 797 Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 798 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l 799 nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm 800 FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 801 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo 802 Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz 803 vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc 804 DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf 805 taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc 806 PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ 807 E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV 808 iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= 809 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 811 Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), 812 yields the following detached CMS signature. 814 # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 815 # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ 816 # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu 817 # MwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR 818 # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMDA5MDMxOTA1MTdaFw0yMTA2MzAx 819 # OTA1MTdaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM 820 # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT 821 # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg 822 # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm 823 # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha 824 # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG 825 # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ 826 # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggG3MIIBszAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R 827 # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI 828 # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg 829 # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ 830 # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 831 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 832 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 833 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMCEGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBIwE 834 # DAGBAIAAQUAMAYEAgACBQAwRQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEOTA3MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilo 835 # dHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDANBgkqhki 836 # G9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEABR2T0qT2V1ZlsZjj+yHPTArIVBECZFSCdP+bJTse85TqYi 837 # blMsNS9yEu2SNbaZMNLuSSiAffYooh4nIYq/Rh6+xGs1n427JZUokoeLtY0UUb2 838 # fIsua9JFo8YGTnpqDMGe+xnpbJ0SCSoBlJCIj+b+YS8WXjEHt2KW6wyA/BcNS8a 839 # dS2pEUwC2cs/WcwzgbttnkcnG7/wkrQ3oqzpC1arKelyz7PGIIXJGy9nF8C3/aa 840 # aEpHd7UgIyvXYuCY/lqWTm97jDxgGIYGC7660mtfOMkB8YF6kUU+td2dDQsMztc 841 # OxbzqiGnicmeJfBwG2li6O0vorW4d5iIOTKpQyqfh45TGCAaowggGmAgEDgBSRR 842 # lKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhkiG9w0BCQMx 843 # DQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIwMDkxMzE4NDUxMFowLwY 844 # JKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4VtBHypfcEWMA 845 # 0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAHUrA4PaJG42BD3hpF8U0usnV3Dg5NQh97SfyKTk7 846 # YHhhwu/936gkmAew8ODRTCddMvMObWkjj7/XeR+WKffaTF1EAdZ1L6REV+GlV91 847 # cYnFkT9ldn4wHQnNNncfAehk5PClYUUQ0gqjdJT1hdaolT83b3ttekyYIiwPmHE 848 # xRaNkSvKenlNqcriaaf3rbQy9dc2d1KxrL2429n134ICqjKeRnHkXXrCWDmyv/3 849 # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa 850 # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk= 851 # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 853 Authors' Addresses 855 Randy Bush 856 IIJ & Arrcus 857 5147 Crystal Springs 858 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 859 United States of America 861 Email: randy@psg.com 862 Massimo Candela 863 NTT 864 Siriusdreef 70-72 865 Hoofddorp 2132 WT 866 Netherlands 868 Email: massimo@ntt.net 870 Warren Kumari 871 Google 872 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway 873 Mountain View, CA 94043 874 US 876 Email: warren@kumari.net 878 Russ Housley 879 Vigil Security, LLC 880 516 Dranesville Road 881 Herndon, VA 20170 882 USA 884 Email: housley@vigilsec.com