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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group E. Beili 3 Internet-Draft Actelis Networks 4 Updates: 5066 (if approved) May 02, 2013 5 Intended status: Standards Track 6 Expires: November 3, 2013 8 Ethernet in the First Mile Copper (EFMCu) Interfaces MIB 9 draft-ietf-opsawg-rfc5066bis-02.txt 11 Abstract 13 This document updates RFC 5066. It amends that specification by 14 informing the internet community about the transition of the EFM-CU- 15 MIB module from the IETF Ethernet Interfaces and Hub MIB Working 16 Group to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 17 802.3 working group. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 3, 2013. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 3. Mapping between EFM-CU-MIB and IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB . . . . . . 3 56 4. Updating the MIB Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 1. Introduction 66 RFC 5066 [RFC5066] defines two MIB modules: 68 EFM-CU-MIB, with a set of objects for managing 10PASS-TS and 69 2BASE-TL Ethernet in the First Mile Copper (EFMCu) interfaces; 71 IF-CAP-STACK-MIB, with a set of objects describing cross-connect 72 capability of a managed device with multi-layer (stacked) 73 interfaces, extending the stack management objects in the 74 Interfaces Group MIB and the Inverted Stack Table MIB modules. 76 With the conclusion of the [HUBMIB] working group, the responsibility 77 for the maintenance and further development of the EFM-CU-MIB module 78 has been transfered to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 79 Engineers (IEEE) [802.3] working group. In 2011 the IEEE developed 80 IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB module, defined in IEEE Std 802.3.1-2011 81 [802.3.1] and based on the EFM-CU-MIB, defined in RFC 5066. 83 The IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB and EFM-CU-MIB are both valid MIB modules, 84 which can coexist. 86 Please note that IF-CAP-STACK-MIB module was not transfered to IEEE 87 and remains as defined in RFC 5066. This memo provides an updated 88 security considerations section for that module. 90 2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework 92 For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current 93 Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of 94 RFC 3410 [RFC3410]. 96 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 97 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 98 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 99 2119 [RFC2119]. 101 3. Mapping between EFM-CU-MIB and IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB 103 The initial version of IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB, defined in IEEE Std 104 802.3.1-2011, has MODULE-IDENTITY of ieee8023efmCuMIB with an object 105 identifier allocated under the { org ieee standards-association- 106 numbers-series-standards lan-man-stds ieee802dot3 ieee802dot3dot1mibs 107 } sub-tree. 109 The EFM-CU-MIB has MODULE-IDENTITY of efmCuMIB with an object 110 identifier allocated under the mib-2 sub-tree. 112 The names of the objects in IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB are identical to 113 those in EFM-CU-MIB. However, since both MIB modules have different 114 OID values, they can coexist, allowing the management of the newer 115 IEEE MIB-based devices, alongside the legacy IETF MIB-based devices. 117 4. Updating the MIB Modules 119 With the transfer of the responsibility for maintenance and further 120 development of the EFM-CU-MIB module to the IEEE 802.3 working group, 121 the EFM-CU-MIB defined in RFC 5066 becomes the last valid version of 122 that MIB. 124 All further development of the EFM Copper Interfaces MIB will be done 125 by the IEEE 802.3 working group in the IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB module. 126 Requests and comments pertaining to EFM Copper Interfaces MIB SHOULD 127 be sent to the IEEE 803.3.1 task force mailing list: 128 [stds-802-3-mib@listserv.ieee.org]. 130 The IF-CAP-STACK-MIB remains under IETF jurisdiction and is 131 maintained by the [OPSAWG] working group. 133 5. Security Considerations 135 There are no managed objects defined in IF-CAP-STACK-MIB module with 136 a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. 138 Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., those with 139 MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or 140 vulnerable in some network environments since they can reveal some 141 configuration aspects of the network interfaces. 143 In particular, ifCapStackStatus and ifInvCapStackStatus can identify 144 cross-connect capability of multi-layer (stacked) network interfaces, 145 potentially revealing the underlying hardware architecture of the 146 managed device. 148 It is thus important to control even GET access to these objects and 149 possibly even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them 150 over the network via SNMP. 152 SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security. 153 Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), 154 there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to 155 access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this 156 MIB module. 158 Implementations MUST provide the security features described by the 159 SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), including full support for 160 authentication and privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM) 161 [RFC3414] with the AES cipher algorithm [RFC3826]. Implementations 162 MAY also provide support for the Transport Security Model (TSM) 163 [RFC5591] in combination with a secure transport such as SSH 164 [RFC5592] or TLS/DTLS [RFC6353]. 166 Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT 167 RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to 168 enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator 169 responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an 170 instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to 171 the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate 172 rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them. 174 6. IANA Considerations 176 No action is required from IANA. 178 7. Acknowledgments 180 This document was produced by the OPSAWG working group, whose efforts 181 were advanced by the contributions of the following people (in 182 alphabetical order): 184 Dan Romascanu 186 David Harrington 188 Michael MacFaden 190 This document updates RFC 5066, authored by Edward Beili of Actelis 191 Networks, and produced by the, now concluded, HUBMIB working group. 193 8. References 195 8.1. Normative References 197 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use 198 in RFCs to Indicate Requirement 199 Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 200 March 1997. 202 [RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, 203 "User-based Security Model (USM) 204 for version 3 of the Simple 205 Network Management Protocol 206 (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, 207 December 2002. 209 [RFC3826] Blumenthal, U., Maino, F., and K. 210 McCloghrie, "The Advanced 211 Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher 212 Algorithm in the SNMP User-based 213 Security Model", RFC 3826, 214 June 2004. 216 8.2. Informative References 218 [802.3] IEEE, "802.3 Ethernet Working 219 Group", 220 . 222 [802.3.1] IEEE, "IEEE Standard for 223 Management Information Base (MIB) 224 Definitions for Ethernet", IEEE 225 Std 802.3.1-2011, July 2011. 227 [HUBMIB] IETF, "Ethernet Interfaces and 228 Hub MIB (hubmib) Charter", . 232 [OPSAWG] IETF, "Operations and Management 233 Area Working Group (opsawg) 234 Charter", . 238 [RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., 239 and B. Stewart, "Introduction and 240 Applicability Statements for 241 Internet-Standard Management 242 Framework", RFC 3410, 243 December 2002. 245 [RFC5066] Beili, E., "Ethernet in the First 246 Mile Copper (EFMCu) Interfaces 247 MIB", RFC 5066, November 2007. 249 [RFC5591] Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, 250 "Transport Security Model for the 251 Simple Network Management 252 Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5591, 253 June 2009. 255 [RFC5592] Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and 256 W. Hardaker, "Secure Shell 257 Transport Model for the Simple 258 Network Management Protocol 259 (SNMP)", RFC 5592, June 2009. 261 [RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer 262 Security (TLS) Transport Model 263 for the Simple Network Management 264 Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 6353, 265 July 2011. 267 [stds-802-3-mib@listserv.ieee.org] IEEE, "802.3 MIB Email 268 Reflector", . 272 Author's Address 274 Edward Beili 275 Actelis Networks 276 Bazel 25 277 Petach-Tikva 278 Israel 280 Phone: +972-3-924-3491 281 EMail: edward.beili@actelis.com