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Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the RFC 3978 Section 5.4 Copyright Line does not match the current year == Line 118 has weird spacing: '... reside on th...' == Using lowercase 'not' together with uppercase 'MUST', 'SHALL', 'SHOULD', or 'RECOMMENDED' is not an accepted usage according to RFC 2119. Please use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is what you mean). Found 'MUST not' in this paragraph: PANA MUST not assume a secure channel between the PaC and the PAA. PANA MUST be able to provide authentication especially in networks which are not protected against eavesdropping and spoofing. PANA MUST provide protection against replay attacks on both PaCs and PAAs. -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008. 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'8021X' ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2002 (ref. 'MIPV4') (Obsoleted by RFC 3220) == Outdated reference: A later version (-24) exists of draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-15 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3012 (ref. 'MNAAA') (Obsoleted by RFC 4721) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2461 (ref. 'NDISC') (Obsoleted by RFC 4861) -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'FMIPV4' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'FMIPV6' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'DHCP' ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3041 (ref. 'PRIVACY') (Obsoleted by RFC 4941) Summary: 8 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 10 warnings (==), 6 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 PANA Working Group Reinaldo Penno, Editor 3 INTERNET-DRAFT Alper E. Yegin 4 Date: June 2002 Yoshihiro Ohba 5 Expires: December 2002 George Tsirtsis 6 Cliff Wang 8 Protocol for Carrying Authentication for 9 Network Access (PANA) 10 Requirements and Terminology 11 13 Status of this Memo 15 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance 16 with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six 24 months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents 25 at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as 26 reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 Abstract 36 It is expected that future IP devices will have a variety of access 37 technologies to gain network connectivity. Currently there are 38 access-specific mechanisms for providing client information to the 39 network for authentication and authorization purposes. In addition 40 to being limited to specific access media (e.g., 802.1x for IEEE 802 41 links), some of these protocols are limited to specific network 42 topologies (e.g., PPP for point-to-point links). The goal of the 43 PANA is to provide a layer two agnostic and IPv4/IPv6 compatible 44 client-server protocol that allows a host to be authenticated for 45 network access. The protocol will run between a client's device 46 and an agent device in the network where the agent might be a client 47 of the AAA infrastructure. This document defines the common 48 terminology and identifies the requirements for PANA. 50 Table of Contents 52 Status of this Memo...............................................1 53 Abstract..........................................................1 54 Table of Contents.................................................2 55 1. Introduction...................................................2 56 2. Key Words......................................................3 57 3. Terminology....................................................4 58 4. Requirements...................................................4 59 4.1. Authentication...............................................4 60 4.1.1. Authentication of Client...................................4 61 4.1.2. Authorization, Accounting and Access Control...............5 62 4.1.3. Authentication Backend.....................................5 63 4.1.4. Identifiers................................................5 64 4.2. Network......................................................6 65 4.2.1. Multi-access...............................................6 66 4.2.2. Disconnect Indication......................................6 67 4.2.3. Location of PAA............................................7 68 4.2.4. Secure Channel.............................................7 69 4.3. Interaction with Other Protocols.............................7 70 4.4. Performance..................................................8 71 4.5. Reliability and Congestion Control...........................8 72 4.6. Miscellaneous................................................8 73 4.6.1. IP Version Independence....................................8 74 4.6.2. Denial of Service Attacks..................................8 75 4.6.3. Location Privacy...........................................8 76 4.7 Change Log....................................................8 77 Acknowledgements..................................................9 78 References........................................................9 79 Authors' Addresses................................................9 80 Full Copyright Statement.........................................10 82 1. Introduction 84 Network access technologies for wired and wireless media are 85 evolving rapidly. With the rapid growth in the number and type of 86 devices and terminals that support IP stacks and can access the 87 Internet, users can potentially use a single device having the 88 capability of attaching via different multiple access media and 89 technologies to interface to the network. 91 If a client can have more than one type of interface, using 92 access-specific authentication mechanisms leads to running a 93 collection of protocols on the client for the same purpose. 95 For example, the authentication mechanisms in PPP are being used 96 for many wired access scenarios as well as some wireless access, 97 which requires using PPP encapsulation for the data packets. Using 98 PPP just for client authentication is viewed as a sub-optimal 99 solution as it causes extra round-trips, overhead of encapsulation 100 and processing, 101 and forces the network topology into a point-to-point 102 model. A point in case is PPPoE which is used over multi-access 103 networks primarily for the purpose of exploiting the authentication 104 scheme provided by PPP. Also, IEEE 802 relies on 802.1X which 105 provides EAP authentication that is limited to IEEE 802 link layers. 107 It is clearly advantageous to use a general protocol to authenticate 108 the client for network access on any type of technology. There is 109 currently no general protocol to be used by a client for gaining 110 network access, and the PANA Working Group will attempt to 111 fill that hole. 113 The protocol design will be limited to defining a client-server 114 messaging protocol (i.e., a carrier) that will allow authentication 115 payload to be carried between the host/client (PaC) and an 116 agent/server (PAA) in the access network for authentication and 117 authorization purposes regardless of the AAA infrastructure that 118 may (or may not) reside on the network. As a network-layer 119 protocol, it will be independent of the underlying access 120 technologies. It will also be applicable to any network topology. 122 The Working Group will not invent new security protocols and 123 mechanisms but instead will use the existing mechanisms. In 124 particular, the Working Group will not define authentication 125 protocols, key distribution or key agreement protocols, or key 126 derivation. The desired protocol can be viewed as the front-end 127 of the AAA protocol or any other protocol/mechanisms the network 128 is running at the background to authenticate its clients. It will 129 act as a carrier for an already defined security protocol or 130 mechanism. 132 As an example, Mobile IP Working Group has already defined such a 133 carrier for Mobile IPv4 [MIPV4]. Mobile IPv4 registration request 134 message is used as the carrier for authentication extensions (MN-FA 135 [MIPV4], or MN-AAA [MNAAA]) to receive forwarding service from the 136 foreign agents. In that sense, designing the equivalent of Mobile 137 IPv4 registration request messages for general network access is the 138 goal of this work, but not defining the equivalent of MN-FA or MN- 139 AAA extensions. 141 This document defines the common terminology and identifies the 142 requirements of a protocol for PANA. These terminology and 143 requirements will be used to define and limit the scope of the work 144 to be done in this group. 146 2. Key Words 148 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 149 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 150 document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS]. 152 3. Terminology 154 Device Identifier (DI) 156 The identifier used by the network as a handle to control and 157 police the network access of a client. Depending on the access 158 technology, identifier might contain any of IP address, link- 159 layer address, switch port number, etc. of a device. PANA 160 authentication agent keeps a table for binding device 161 identifiers to the PANA clients. At most one PANA client 162 should be associated with a DI on a PANA authentication agent. 164 PANA Client (PaC) 166 The entity wishing to obtain network access from a PANA 167 authentication agent within a network. A PANA client is 168 associated with a network device and a set of credentials to 169 prove its identity within the scope of PANA. 171 PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) 173 The entity whose responsibility is to authenticate the 174 credentials provided by a PANA client and grant network 175 access service to the device associated with the client 176 and identified by a DI. 178 4. Requirements 180 4.1. Authentication 182 4.1.1. Authentication of Client 184 PANA MUST authenticate a PaC for network access. A PaC can be 185 identified by the credentials (identifier, authenticator) supplied 186 by one of the users of the device or the device itself. PANA MUST 187 only grant network access service to the device identified by the 188 DI, rather than granting separate access to multiple simultaneous 189 users of the device. Once the network access is granted to the 190 device, the methods used by the device on arbitrating which one of 191 its users can access the network is outside the scope of PANA. 193 PANA MUST NOT define new security protocols or mechanisms. Instead 194 it must be defined as a "carrier" for such protocols. PANA MUST 195 identify which specific security protocol(s) or mechanism(s) it can 196 carry (the "payload"). The current thinking is that a sufficient 197 solution would be for PANA to carry EAP. If PANA WG decides that 198 extensions to EAP are needed, it will define requirements for an 199 EAP WG instead of defining these extensions. 201 Authentication and encryption of data traffic sent to and from an 202 authenticated PaC is outside the scope of PANA. Providing a complete 203 secure network access solution by also securing router discovery 204 [RDISC], neighbor discovery [NDISC], and address resolution 205 protocols [ARP] is outside the scope as well. 207 Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to authenticate each other for 208 network access. Providing capability of only PAA authenticating the 209 PaC is not sufficient. 211 PANA MUST be capable of carrying out both periodic and on-demand re- 212 authentication. Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to initiate 213 both the initial authentication and the re-authentication process. 215 When the DI is carried explicitly as part of the PANA payload, the 216 authentication computation MUST also include this field to provide 217 integrity protection for the DI. When the DI is carried implicitly 218 as the source of the PANA message, the protocol has to make sure 219 that the DI's integrity is protected by some other means (e.g., 220 physical verification of incoming port number of the PANA message in 221 the case of switch port number as a DI and PAA co-located with the 222 link-layer access device). Protecting PaCs against DI theft is 223 outside the scope of PANA. 225 4.1.2. Authorization, Accounting and Access Control 227 In addition to carrying authentication information, PANA MUST also 228 provides only a binary authorization to indicate whether the PaC 229 is allowed to access full IP services on the network. Providing 230 finer granularity authorization, such as negotiating QoS parameters, 231 authorizing individual services (http vs. ssh), individual users 232 sharing the same device, etc. is outside the scope of PANA. 234 Providing access control functionality in the network is outside the 235 scope of PANA. Client access authentication should be followed by 236 access control to make sure only authenticated and authorized 237 clients can send and receive IP packets via access network. Access 238 control can involve setting access control lists on the enforcement 239 points. Identification of clients which are authorized to access 240 the network is done by the PANA protocol exchange. 242 Carrying accounting data is outside the scope of PANA. 244 4.1.3. Authentication Backend 246 PANA protocol MUST NOT make any assumptions on the backend 247 authentication protocol or mechanisms. PAA may interact with 248 backend AAA infrastructures such as RADIUS or Diameter, but it is 249 not a requirement. When the access network doesn't rely on a 250 IETF-defined AAA protocol (e.g., RADIUS, Diameter), then it can 251 still use a proprietary backend system, or rely on the information 252 locally stored on the authentication agents. 254 The interaction between the PAA and the backend authentication 255 entities is outside the scope of PANA. 257 4.1.4. Identifiers 259 PANA SHOULD allow various types of identifiers to be used for the 260 PaC (e.g., NAI, IP address, FQDN, etc.) 262 PANA SHOULD allow various types of identifiers to be used as the DI 263 (IP address, link-layer address, port number of a switch, etc.) 265 PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the 266 associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. The DI MUST be carried 267 either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as the 268 source of the PANA message, or both. This binding is used for access 269 control and accounting in the network as described in section 4.1.2. 271 4.1.5. IP Address Assignment 273 PANA does not perform any address assignment functions but MUST 274 only be invoked after the client has a usable IP address 275 (e.g., a link-local address in IPv6 or a DHCP-learned address 276 in IPv4) 278 4.2. Network 280 4.2.1. Multi-access 282 Protocol MUST support PaCs with multiple interfaces, and networks 283 with multiple routers on multi-access links. 285 4.2.2. Disconnect Indication 287 PANA MUST NOT assume connection-oriented links. Links may or may not 288 provide disconnect indication. Such notification is desirable in 289 order for the PAA to cleanup resources when a client moves away 290 from the network (e.g., inform the enforcement points that the 291 client is no longer connected). PANA SHOULD have a mechanism to 292 provide disconnect indication. 294 This mechanism must allow PAAs to detect the departure of a PaC from 295 the network. This mechanism SHOULD also allow a PaC to detect the 296 discontinuation of the network access service. Access 297 discontinuation can happen due to various reasons such as network 298 systems going down, or a change in access policy. 300 Several mechanisms can be used to provide disconnect indication, 301 e.g., frequent re-authentication; but the use of a heartbeat 302 function is not recommended. 304 4.2.3. Location of PAA 306 The PAA must be on an IP capable network element on the same 307 IP link as the PaC. Hence it can be on the NAS or WLAN AP or first 308 hop router (most likely scenario). The use of PANA when the PAA is 309 not on the same link as the PAA is outside the scope of PANA. 311 Since a PaC may not be pre-configured with the IP address of PAA, 312 but may have to dynamically discover instead. Therefore PANA 313 protocol must define a dynamic discovery method. Given that 314 the PAA is on the same link as the PaC, there are number 315 of discovery techniques that could be used (e.g., multicast or 316 anycast) by the PaC to find out the address of the PAA. 318 PANA does not assumes the PAA is co-located with the enforcement 319 point. Network access enforcement can be provided by one or more 320 nodes on the same IP subnet as the client (e.g., multiple routers), 321 or on another subnet in the access domain (e.g., gateway to the 322 Internet, depending on the network architecture). When the PAA and 323 the enforcement point(s) are separated, there needs to be another 324 transport for client provisioning. This transport is needed to 325 create access control lists to allow authenticated and authorized 326 clients on the enforcement points. This WG will identify a 327 (preferably existing) protocol solution that allows the PAA 328 to deliver the authorization information to one or more EPs 329 when the PAA is separated from EPs. 331 4.2.4. Secure Channel 333 PANA MUST not assume a secure channel between the PaC and the PAA. 334 PANA MUST be able to provide authentication especially in networks 335 which are not protected against eavesdropping and spoofing. PANA 336 MUST provide protection against replay attacks on both PaCs and 337 PAAs. 339 Alternatively a combination of PANA with its chosen payload (EAP) 340 can be used to meet the requirements stated above. 342 4.3. Interaction with Other Protocols 344 Mobility management is outside the scope of PANA. Though, PANA MUST 345 be able to co-exist and not interfere with various mobility 346 management protocols, such as Mobile IPv4 [MIPV4], Mobile IPv6 347 [MIPV6], fast handover protocols [FMIPV4, FMIPV6], and other 348 standard protocols like IPv6 stateless address auto-configuration 349 [ADDRCONF] (including privacy extensions [PRIVACY]), and DHCP 350 [DHCP]. It MUST NOT make any assumptions on the protocols or 351 mechanisms used for IP address configuration of the PaC. 353 4.4. Performance 355 PANA design SHOULD give consideration to efficient handling of 356 authentication process. This is important for gaining network access 357 with minimum latency. As an example, a method like minimizing the 358 protocol signaling by creating local security associations can be 359 used for this purpose. 361 4.5. Reliability and Congestion Control 363 PANA MUST provide reliability and congestion control. It can do so 364 by using techniques like re-transmissions, cyclic redundancy check, 365 delayed initialization and exponential back-off. 367 In order to satisfy the these requirements, the PANA MAY specify 368 that high layer protocols, such as EAP, provide these 369 services 371 4.6. Miscellaneous 373 4.6.1. IP Version Independence 375 PANA MUST work for both IPv4 and IPv6. 377 4.6.2. Denial of Service Attacks 379 PANA MUST be robust against a class of DoS attacks such as blind 380 masquerade attacks through IP spoofing that swamp the PAA in 381 spending much resources and prevent legitimate clients� attempts of 382 network access. 384 4.6.3. Location Privacy 386 Location privacy is outside the scope of PANA. 388 4.7. Change Log 390 Version 03 392 * In section 4.2.2 the requirement for a heartbeat mechanism to 393 provide disconnect indication was removed. Rewording of the 394 section was done 396 * In section 4.2.3 and 4.1.2 rewording was done to account for 397 the separation of PAA and EP and the protocol between them. 399 * In section 4.2.4 new text was added to account for the possibility 400 to rely on the high layer protocol (EAP) to meet the requirements 401 stated 403 * In section 4.5 new text was added to allow reliability and 404 congestion control to be provided by the payload protocol, e.g., 405 EAP. 407 Acknowledgements 409 We would like to thank Basavaraj Patil, Subir Das, and the PANA 410 Working Group members for their valuable contributions to the 411 discussions and preparation of this document. 413 References 415 [KEYWORDS] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 416 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. 418 [8021X] "IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: 419 Port Based Network Access Control", IEEE Draft 802.1X/D11, March 420 2001. 422 [PPP] W. Simpson (editor), "The Point-To-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 423 51, RFC 1661, July 1994. 425 [MIPV4] C. Perkins (editor), "IP Mobility Support", RFC 2002, 426 October 1996. 428 [MIPV6] D. Johnson and C. Perkins, "Mobility Support in IPv6", 429 draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-15.txt, July 2001. Work in progress. 431 [MNAAA] C. Perkins, P. Calhoun, "Mobile IPv4 Challenge/Response 432 Extensions", RFC3012, November 2000. 434 [RDISC] S. Deering, "ICMP Router Discovery Messages", RFC 1256, 435 September 1991. 437 [NDISC] T. Narten, E. Nordmark, and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery 438 for IP Version 6 (IPv6)",RFC 2461, December 1998. 440 [ARP] D. Plummer, "An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol", STD 37, 441 RFC 826, November 1982. 443 [FMIPV4] K. ElMalki (editor), et. al., "Low latency Handoffs in 444 Mobile IPv4", November 2001. Work in progress. 446 [FMIPV6] G. Dommety (editor), et. al., "Fast Handovers for Mobile 447 IPv6", July 2001. Work in progress. 449 [DHCP] R. Droms (editor), et. al., "Dynamic Host Configuration 450 Protocol for IPv6", December 2001. Work in progress. 452 [PRIVACY] T. Narten, R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless 453 Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001. 455 Authors' Addresses 457 Alper E. Yegin 458 DoCoMo USA Labs 459 181 Metro Drive, Suite 300 460 San Jose, CA, 95110 461 USA 462 Phone: +1 408 451 4743 463 Email: alper@docomolabs-usa.com 465 Yoshihiro Ohba 466 Toshiba America Research, Inc. 467 P.O. Box 136 468 Convent Station, NJ, 07961-0136 469 USA 470 Phone: +1 973 829 5174 471 Email: yohba@tari.toshiba.com 473 Reinaldo Penno 474 Nortel Networks 475 600 Technology Park 476 Billerica, MA, 01821 477 USA 478 Phone: +1 978 288 8011 479 Email: rpenno@nortelnetworks.com 481 George Tsirtsis 482 Flarion Technologies 483 Bedminster One 484 135 Route 202/206 South 485 Bedminster, NJ, 07921 486 USA 487 Phone : +44 20 88260073 488 E-mail: G.Tsirtsis@Flarion.com, gtsirt@hotmail.com 489 Cliff Wang 490 Smart Pipes 491 565 Metro Place South 492 Dublin, OH, 43017 493 USA 494 Phone: +1 614 923 6241 495 Email: cwang@smartpipes.com 497 Full Copyright Statement 499 "Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. 500 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to 501 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it 502 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published 503 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any 504 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph 505 are included on all such copies and derivative works. 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