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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Internet Engineering Task Force P. Hallam-Baker 3 Internet-Draft Comodo Group Inc. 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Stradling 5 Expires: March 1, 2013 Comodo CA Ltd. 6 August 28, 2012 8 DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record 9 draft-ietf-pkix-caa-13 11 Abstract 13 The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record 14 allows a DNS domain name holder to specify one or more Certification 15 Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue certificates for that domain. 16 CAA resource records allow a public Certification Authority to 17 implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended 18 certificate mis-issue. This document defines the syntax of the CAA 19 record and rules for processing CAA records by certificate issuers. 21 Status of this Memo 23 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 24 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 28 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 29 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 This Internet-Draft will expire on March 1, 2013. 38 Copyright Notice 40 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 41 document authors. All rights reserved. 43 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 44 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 45 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 46 publication of this document. Please review these documents 47 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 48 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 49 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 50 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 51 described in the Simplified BSD License. 53 Table of Contents 55 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 2.2. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 3. The CAA RR type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 4. Certification Authority Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 4.1. Use of DNS Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 62 5. Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 5.1. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 5.1.1. Canonical Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 65 5.2. CAA issue Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 5.3. CAA issuewild Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 67 5.4. CAA iodef Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 68 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 69 6.1. Non-Compliance by Certification Authority . . . . . . . . 13 70 6.2. Mis-Issue by Authorized Certification Authority . . . . . 13 71 6.3. Suppression or spoofing of CAA records . . . . . . . . . . 13 72 6.4. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 73 6.5. Abuse of the Critical Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 74 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 75 7.1. Registration of the CAA Resource Record Type . . . . . . . 14 76 7.2. Certification Authority Authorization Properties . . . . . 15 77 7.3. Certification Authority Authorization Flags . . . . . . . 15 78 7.4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 79 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 80 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 81 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 82 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 84 1. Introduction 86 The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record 87 allows a DNS domain name holder to specify the Certification 88 Authorities authorized to issue certificates for that domain. 89 Publication of CAA resource records allow a public Certification 90 Authority (CA) to implement additional controls to reduce the risk of 91 unintended certificate mis-issue. 93 Like the TLSA record defined in DNS-Based Authentication of Named 94 Entities (DANE) [DANE], CAA records are used as a part of a mechanism 95 for checking PKIX certificate data. The distinction between the two 96 specifications is that CAA records specify a authorization control to 97 be performed by a certificate issuer before issue of a certificate 98 and TLSA records specify a verification control to be performed by a 99 Relying Party after the certificate is issued. 101 Conformance with a published CAA record is a necessary but not 102 sufficient condition for issueance of a certificate. Before issuing 103 a certificate, a PKIX CA is required to validate the request 104 according to the policies set out in its Certificate Policy. In the 105 case of a public CA that validates certificate requests as a third 106 party, the certificate will be typically issued under a public trust 107 anchor certificate embedded in one or more relevant Relying 108 Applications. 110 Criteria for inclusion of embedded trust anchor certificates in 111 applications are outside the scope of this document. Typically such 112 criteria require the CA to publish a Certificate Practices Statement 113 (CPS) that specifies how the requirements of the Certificate Policy 114 (CP) are achieved. It is also common for a CA to engage an 115 independent third party auditor to prepare an annual audit statement 116 of its performance against its CPS. 118 A set of CAA records describes only current grants of authority to 119 issue certificates for the corresponding DNS domain. Since a 120 certificate is typically valid for at least a year, it is possible 121 that a certificate that is not conformant with the CAA records 122 currently published was conformant with the CAA records published at 123 the time that the certificate was issued. Relying Applications MUST 124 NOT use CAA records as part of certificate validation. 126 CAA Records MAY be used by Certificate Evaluators as a possible 127 indicator of a security policy violation. Such use SHOULD take 128 account of the possibility that published CAA records changed between 129 the time a certificate was issued and the time at which the 130 certificate was observed by the Certificate Evaluator. 132 2. Definitions 134 2.1. Requirements Language 136 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 137 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 138 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 140 2.2. Defined Terms 142 The following terms are used in this document: 144 Authorization Entry: An authorization assertion that grants or 145 denies a specific set of permissions to a specific group of 146 entities. 148 Certificate: An X.509 Certificate, as specified in [RFC5280]. 150 Certificate Evaluator: A party other than a Relying Party that 151 evaluates the trustworthiness of certificates issued by 152 Certification Authorities. 154 Certification Authority (CA): An Issuer that issues Certificates in 155 accordance with a specified Certificate Policy. 157 Certificate Policy (CP): Specifies the criteria that a Certification 158 Authority undertakes to meet in its issue of certificates. See 159 [RFC3647]. 161 Certification Practices Statement (CPS): Specifies the means by 162 which the criteria of the Certificate Policy are met. In most 163 cases this will be the document against which the operations of 164 the Certification Authority are audited. See [RFC3647]. 166 Domain: A DNS Domain Name. 168 Domain Name: A DNS Domain name as specified in [STD13]. 170 Domain Name System (DNS): The Internet naming system specified in 171 [STD13]. 173 DNS Security (DNSSEC): Extensions to the DNS that provide 174 authentication services as specified in [RFC4033], [RFC4034], 175 [RFC4035], [RFC5155] and revisions. 177 Issuer: An entity that issues Certificates. See [RFC5280]. 179 Property: The tag-value portion of a CAA Resource Record. 181 Property Tag: The tag portion of a CAA Resource Record. 183 Property Value: The value portion of a CAA Resource Record. 185 Public Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX): Standards and specifications 186 issued by the IETF that apply the [X.509] certificate standards 187 specified by the ITU to Internet applications as specified in 188 [RFC5280] and related documents. 190 Resource Record (RR): A particular entry in the DNS including the 191 owner name, class, type, time to live, and data, as defined in 192 [RFC1035] and [RFC2181]. 194 Resource Record Set(RRSet): A set of Resource Records or a 195 particularowner name, classand type. The time to live on all RRs 196 with an RRSet is always the same but the data may be different 197 among RRs in the RRSet. 199 Relying Party: A party that makes use of an application whose 200 operation depends on use of a Certificate for making a security 201 decision. See [RFC5280]. 203 Relying Application: An application whose operation depends on use 204 of a Certificate for making a security decision. 206 3. The CAA RR type 208 A CAA RR consists of a flags byte and a tag-value pair referred to as 209 a property. Multiple properties MAY be associated with the same 210 domain name by publishing multiple CAA RRs at that domain name. The 211 following flag is defined: 213 Issuer Critical: If set (=1), indicates that the corresponding 214 property entry tag MUST be understood if the semantics of the CAA 215 record are to be correctly interpreted by an issuer. 217 Issuers MUST NOT issue certificates for a domain if the relevant 218 CAA Resource Record set contains unknown property entry tags that 219 have the Critical bit set. 221 The following property tags are defined: 223 issue [; ]* : The issue property 224 entry authorizes the holder of the domain name or a party acting under the explicit authority of the holder 226 of that domain name to issue certificates for the domain in which 227 the property is published. 229 iodef : Specifies a URL to which an issuer MAY report 230 certificate issue requests that are inconsistent with the issuer's 231 Certification Practices or Certificate Policy, or that a 232 certificate evaluator may use to report observation of a possible 233 policy violation. The IODEF format is used [RFC5070]. 235 The following example is a DNS zone file (see [RFC1035]) that informs 236 CAs that certificates are not to be issued except by the holder of 237 the domain name 'ca.example.net' or an authorized agent thereof. 238 This policy applies to all subordinate domains under example.com. 240 $ORIGIN example.com 241 . CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net" 243 If the domain name holder specifies one or more iodef properties, a 244 certificate issuer MAY report invalid certificate requests to that 245 address. In the following example the domain name holder specifies 246 that reports may be made by means of email with the IODEF data as an 247 attachment, a Web service [RFC6546] or both: 249 $ORIGIN example.com 250 . CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net" 251 . CAA 0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com" 252 . CAA 0 iodef "http://iodef.example.com/" 254 A certificate issuer MAY specify additional parameters that allow 255 customers to specify additional parameters governing certificate 256 issuance. This might be the Certificate Policy under which the 257 certificate is to be issued, the authentication process to be used 258 might be specified or an account number specified by the CA to enable 259 these parameters to be retrieved. 261 For example, the CA 'ca.example.net' has requested its customer 262 'example.com' to specify the CA's account number '230123' in each of 263 the customer's CAA records. 265 $ORIGIN example.com 266 . CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net; account=230123" 268 The syntax of additional parameters is a sequence of tag-value pairs 269 as defined in section Section 5.2. The semantics of such parameters 270 is left to site policy and is outside the scope of this document. 272 The critical flag is intended to permit future versions CAA to 273 introduce new semantics that MUST be understood for correct 274 processing of the record, preventing conforming CAs that do not 275 recognize the new semantics from issuing certificates for the 276 indicated domains. 278 In the following example, the property 'tbs' is flagged as critical. 279 Neither the example.net CA, nor any other issuer is authorized to 280 issue under either policy unless the processing rules for the 'tbs' 281 property tag are understood. 283 $ORIGIN example.com 284 . CAA 0 issue "ca.example.net; policy=ev" 285 . CAA 128 tbs "Unknown" 287 Note that the above restrictions only apply to issue of certificates. 288 Since the validity of an end entity certificate is typically a year 289 or more, it is quite possible that the CAA records published at a 290 domain will change between the time a certificate was issued and 291 validation by a relying party. 293 4. Certification Authority Processing 295 Before issuing a certificate, a compliant CA MUST check for 296 publication of an relevant CAA Resource Record set. If such a record 297 set exists, a CA MUST NOT issue a certificate unless the CA 298 determines that either (1) the certificate request is consistent with 299 the applicable CAA Resource Record set or (2) that an exception 300 specified in the relevant Certificate Policy or Certification 301 Practices Statement Applies. 303 A certificate request MAY specify more than one domain name and MAY 304 specify wildcard domains. Issuers MUST verify authorization for all 305 the domains and wildcard domains specified in the request. 307 Given a request for a specific domain X, or a request for a wildcard 308 domain *.X, the relevant record set R(X) is determined as follows: 310 Let CAA(X) be the record set returned in response to performing a CAA 311 record query on the label X, P(X) be the DNS label immediately above 312 X in the DNS hierarchy and A(X) be the target of a CNAME or DNAME 313 alias record specified at the label X. 315 o If CAA(X) is not empty, R(X) = CAA (X), otherwise 317 o If A(X) is not null, and R(A(X)) is not empty, then R(X) = 318 R(A(X)), otherwise 320 o If X is not a top level domain then R(X) = R(P(X), otherwise 322 o R(X) is empty. 324 For example, if a certificate is requested for X.Y.Z the issuer will 325 search for the relevant CAA record set in the following order: 327 X.Y.Z 329 Alias (X.Y.Z) 331 Y.Z 333 Alias (Y.Z) 335 Z 337 Alias (Z) 339 Return Empty 341 4.1. Use of DNS Security 343 Use of DNSSEC to authenticate CAA RRs is strongly RECOMMENDED but not 344 required. An issuer MUST NOT issue certificates if doing so would 345 conflict with the relevant CAA Resource Record set, irrespective of 346 whether the corresponding DNS records are signed. 348 DNSSEC provides a proof of non-existence for both DNS domains and RR 349 set within domains. DNSSEC verification thus enables an issuer to 350 determine if the answer to a CAA record query is empty because the RR 351 set is empty or if it is non-empty but the response has been 352 supressed. 354 Use of DNSSEC allows an issuer to acquire and archive a proof that 355 they were authorized to issue certificates for the domain. 356 Verification of such archives MAY be an audit requirement to verify 357 CAA record processing compliance. Publication of such archives MAY 358 be a transparency requirement to verify CAA record processing 359 compliance. 361 5. Mechanism 363 5.1. Syntax 365 A CAA RR contains a single property entry consisting of a tag value 366 pair. Each tag represents a property of the CAA record. The value 367 of a CAA property is that specified in the corresponding value field. 369 A domain name MAY have multiple CAA RRs associated with it and a 370 given property MAY be specified more than once. 372 The CAA data field contains one property entry. A property entry 373 consists of the following data fields: 375 +0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-|0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-| 376 | Flags | Tag Length = n | 377 +----------------+----------------+...+---------------+ 378 | Tag char 0 | Tag Char 1 |...| Tag Char n-1 | 379 +----------------+----------------+...+---------------+ 380 +----------------+----------------+.....+----------------+ 381 | Value byte 0 | Value byte 1 |.....| Value byte m-1 | 382 +----------------+----------------+.....+----------------+ 384 Where n is the length specified in the Tag length field and m is the 385 remaining octets in the Value field (m = d - n - 2) where d is the 386 length of the RDATA section. 388 The data fields are defined as follows: 390 Flags: One octet containing the following fields: 392 Bit 0: Issuer Critical Flag If the value is set (1), the critical 393 flag is asserted and the property MUST be understood if the CAA 394 record is to be correctly processed by a certificate issuer. 396 A Certification Authority MUST NOT issue certificates for any 397 Domain that contains a CAA critical property for an unknown or 398 unsupported property tag that for which the issuer critical 399 flag is set. 401 Note that according to the conventions set out in [RFC1035], Bit 0 402 is the Most Significant Bit and Bit 7 is the Least Significant 403 Bit. Thus the Flags value 1 means that bit 7 is set while a value 404 of 128 means that bit 0 is set according to this convention. 406 All other bit positions are reserved for future use. 408 To ensure compatibility with future extensions to CAA, DNS records 409 compliant with this version of the CAA specification MUST clear 410 (set to "0") all reserved flags bits. Applications that interpret 411 CAA records MUST ignore the value of all reserved flag bits. 413 Tag Length: A single octet containing an unsigned integer specifying 414 the tag length in octets. The tag length MUST be at least 1 and 415 SHOULD be no more than 15. 417 Tag: The property identifier, a sequence of ASCII characters. 419 Tag values MAY contain ASCII characters 'a' through 'z', 'A' 420 through 'Z' and the numbers 0 through 9. Tag values SHOULD NOT 421 contain any other characters. Matching of tag values is case 422 insensitive. 424 Tag values submitted for registration by IANA MUST NOT contain any 425 characters other than the (lowercase) ASCII characters 'a' through 426 'z' and the numbers 0 through 9. 428 Value: A sequence of octets representing the property value. 429 Property values are encoded as binary values and MAY employ sub- 430 formats. 432 The length of the value field is specified implicitly as the 433 remaining length of the enclosing Resource Record data field. 435 5.1.1. Canonical Presentation Format 437 The canonical presentation format of the CAA record is as follows: 439 CAA 441 Where: 443 Flags: Is an unsigned integer between 0 and 255. 445 Tag: Is a non-zero sequence of ASCII letter and numbers in lower 446 case. 448 Value: Is the US-ASCII text Encoding of the value field 450 5.2. CAA issue Property 452 The issue property tag is used to request that certificate issuers 453 perform CAA issue restriction processing for the domain and to grant 454 authorization to specific certificate issuers. 456 The CAA issue property value has the following sub-syntax (specified 457 in ABNF as per [RFC5234]). 459 Property = space [domain] space [";" space * (parameter space) 461 domain = label *("." label) 462 label = (ALPHA / DIGIT) * ( ["-"] (ALPHA / DIGIT )) 464 space = *(SP / HTAB) 466 parameter = / space tag "=" value 468 tag = 1* (ALPHA / DIGIT) 470 value = *VCHAR | DQUOTE *(%x20-21 / %x23-7E) DQUOTE 472 For consistency with other aspects of DNS administration, Domain name 473 values are specified in Letter-Digit-Hyphen Label (LDH-Label) form. 475 A CAA record with an issue parameter tag that does not specify a 476 domain name is a request that certificate issuers perform CAA issue 477 restriction processing for the corresponding domain without granting 478 authorization to any certificate issuer. 480 This form of issue restriction would be appropriate to specify that 481 no certificates are to be issued for the domain in question. 483 For example, the following CAA record set requests that no 484 certificates be issued for the domain 'nocerts.example.com' by any 485 certificate issuer. 487 nocerts.example.com CAA 0 issue ";" 489 A CAA record with an issue parameter tag that specifies a domain name 490 is a request that certificate issuers perform CAA issue restriction 491 processing for the corresponding domain and grants authorization to 492 the certificate issuer specified by the domain name. 494 For example, the following CAA record set requests that no 495 certificates be issued for the domain 'certs.example.com' by any 496 certificate issuer other than the example.net certificate issuer. 498 certs.example.com CAA 0 issue "example.net" 500 CAA authorizations are additive. thus the result of specifying both 501 the empty issuer and a specified issuer is the same as specifying 502 just the specified issuer alone. 504 An issuer MAY choose to specify issuer-parameters that further 505 constrain the issue of certificates by that issuer. For example 506 specifying that certificates are to be subject to specific validation 507 polices, billed to certain accounts or issued under specific trust 508 anchors. 510 The semantics of issuer-parameters are determined by the issuer 511 alone. 513 5.3. CAA issuewild Property 515 The issuewild property has the same syntax and semantics as the issue 516 property except that issuewild properties only grant authorization to 517 issue certificates that specify a wildcard domain and issuewild 518 properties take precedence over issue properties when specified. 519 Specifically: 521 issuewild properties MUST be ignored when processing a request for 522 a domain that is not a wildcard domain. 524 If at least one issuewild property is specified in the relevant 525 CAA record set, all issue properties MUST be ignored when 526 processing a request for a domain that is a wildcard domain. 528 5.4. CAA iodef Property 530 The iodef property specifies a means of reporting certificate issue 531 requests or cases of certificate issue for the corresponding domain, 532 that violate the security policy of the issuer or the domain name 533 holder. 535 The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC5070] is 536 used to present the incident report in machine readable form. 538 The iodef property takes a URL as its parameter. The URL scheme type 539 determines the method used for reporting: 541 mailto: The IODEF incident report is reported as a MIME email 542 attachment to an SMTP email that is submitted to the mail address 543 specified. The mail message sent SHOULD contain a brief text 544 message to alert the recipient to the nature of the attachment. 546 http or https: The IODEF report is submitted as a web service 547 request to the HTTP address specified using the protocol specified 548 in [RFC6546]. 550 6. Security Considerations 552 CAA Records assert a security policy that the holder of a domain name 553 wishes to be observed by certificate issuers. The effectiveness of 554 CAA records as an access control mechanism is thus dependent on 555 observance of CAA constraints by issuers. 557 The objective of the CAA record properties described in this document 558 is to reduce the risk of certificate mis-issue rather than avoid 559 reliance on a certificate that has ben mis-issued. DANE [DANE] 560 describes a mechanism for avoiding reliance on mis-issued 561 certificates. 563 6.1. Non-Compliance by Certification Authority 565 CAA records offer CAs a cost-effective means of mitigating the risk 566 of certificate mis-issue: The cost of implementing CAA checks is very 567 small and the potential costs of a mis-issue event include the 568 removal of an embedded trust anchor. 570 6.2. Mis-Issue by Authorized Certification Authority 572 Use of CAA records does not prevent mis-issue by an authorized 573 Certification Authority. , i.e., a CA that is authorized to issue 574 certificates for the domain in question by CAA records.. 576 Domain name holders SHOULD verify that the CAs they authorize to 577 issue certificates for their domains employ appropriate controls to 578 ensure that certificates are issued only to authorized parties within 579 their organization. 581 Such controls are most appropriately determined by the domain name 582 holder and the authorized CA(s) directly and are thus out of scope of 583 this document. 585 6.3. Suppression or spoofing of CAA records 587 Suppression of the CAA record or insertion of a bogus CAA record 588 could enable an attacker to obtain a certificate from an issuer that 589 was not authorized to issue for that domain name. 591 Where possible, Issuers SHOULD perform DNSSEC validation to detect 592 missing or modified CAA record sets. 594 In cases where DNSSEC is not deployed in a corresponding domain, an 595 issuer SHOULD attempt to mitigate this risk by employing appropriate 596 DNS security controls. For example all portions of the DNS lookup 597 process SHOULD be performed against the authoritative name server. 599 Data cached by third parties MUST NOT be relied on but MAY be used to 600 support additional anti-spoofing or anti-suppression controls. 602 6.4. Denial of Service 604 Introduction of a malformed or malicious CAA RR could in theory 605 enable a Denial of Service attack. 607 This specific threat is not considered to add significantly to the 608 risk of running an insecure DNS service. 610 An attacker could, in principle, perform a Denial of Service attack 611 against an issuer by requesting a certificate with a maliciously long 612 DNS name. In practice, the DNS protocol imposes a maximum name 613 length and CAA processing does not exacerbate the existing need to 614 mitigate Denial of Service attacks to any meaningful degree. 616 6.5. Abuse of the Critical Flag 618 A Certification Authority could make use of the critical flag to 619 trick customers into publishing records which prevent competing 620 Certification Authorities from issuing certificates even though the 621 customer intends to authorize multiple providers. 623 In practice, such an attack would be of minimal effect since any 624 competent competitor that found itself unable to issue certificates 625 due to lack of support for a property marked critical SHOULD 626 investigate the cause and report the reason to the customer who will 627 thus discover that they had been deceived. 629 7. IANA Considerations 631 7.1. Registration of the CAA Resource Record Type 633 [Note to IANA, the CAA resource record has already been assigned. On 634 issue of this draft as an RFC, the record should be updated to 635 reflect this document as the authoritative specification and this 636 paragraph (but not the following ones deleted] 638 IANA has assigned Resource Record Type 257 for the CAA Resource 639 Record Type and added the line depicted below to the registry named 640 Resource Record (RR) TYPEs and QTYPEs as defined in BCP 42 [RFC6195] 641 and located at http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters. 643 RR Name Value and meaning Reference 644 ----------- --------------------------------------------- --------- 645 CAA 257 Certification Authority Restriction [RFC-THIS] 646 7.2. Certification Authority Authorization Properties 648 [Note to IANA, this is a new registry that needs to be created and 649 this paragraph but not the following ones deleted.] 651 IANA has created the Certification Authority Authorization Properties 652 registry with the following initial values: 654 Tag Meaning Reference 655 ----------- ---------------------------------- --------- 656 issue Authorization Entry by Domain [RFC-THIS] 657 issuewild Authorization Entry by Domain [RFC-THIS] 658 iodef Report incident by IODEF report [RFC-THIS] 659 auth Reserved 660 path Reserved 661 policy Reserved 663 Although [HB2011]" has expired, deployed clients implement the CAA 664 properties specified in the draft and re-use of these property tags 665 for a different purtpose could cause unexpected behavior. 667 Addition of tag identifiers requires a public specification and 668 expert review as set out in [RFC6195] Section 3.1.1.. 670 The tag space is designed to be sufficiently large that exhausting 671 the possible tag space need not be a concern. The scope of expert 672 review SHOULD be limited to the question of whether the specification 673 provided is sufficiently clear to permit implementation and to avoid 674 unnecessary duplication of functionality. 676 7.3. Certification Authority Authorization Flags 678 IANA has created the Certification Authority Authorization Flags 679 registry with the following initial values: 681 Flag Meaning Reference ----------- ---------------------------------- 682 --------- 0 Issuer Critical Flag [RFC-THIS] 1-7 Reserved> [RFC-THIS] 684 Assignment of new flags follows the 'RFC Required' policy set out in 685 [RFC5226] section 4.1. 687 7.4. Acknowledgements 689 The authors would like to thank the following people who contributed 690 to the design and documentation of this work item: Chris Evans, 691 Stephen Farrell, Jeff Hodges, Paul Hoffman, Stephen Kent, Adam 692 Langley, Ben Laurie, Chris Palmer, Scott Schmit, Sean Turner and Ben 693 Wilson. 695 8. References 697 8.1. Normative References 699 [DANE] P. Hoffman., J. Schlyter, "draft-ietf-dane-protocol-23: 700 Replace with reference to RFC before issue.", 2012. 702 [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", 703 STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. 705 [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and 706 specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. 708 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 709 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 711 [RFC2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS 712 Specification", RFC 2181, July 1997. 714 [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 715 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", 716 RFC 4033, March 2005. 718 [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 719 Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", 720 RFC 4034, March 2005. 722 [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 723 Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security 724 Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. 726 [RFC5070] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident 727 Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070, 728 December 2007. 730 [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS 731 Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of 732 Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008. 734 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 735 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, 736 May 2008. 738 [RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax 739 Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008. 741 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 742 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 743 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 744 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 746 [RFC6195] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) IANA 747 Considerations", BCP 42, RFC 6195, March 2011. 749 [RFC6546] Trammell, B., "Transport of Real-time Inter-network 750 Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC 6546, 751 April 2012. 753 [STD13] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", 754 STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. 756 Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and 757 specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. 759 [X.509] International Telecommunication Union, "ITU-T 760 Recommendation X.509 (11/2008): Information technology - 761 Open systems interconnection - The Directory: Public-key 762 and attribute certificate frameworks", ITU-T 763 Recommendation X.509, November 2008. 765 8.2. Informative References 767 [HB2011] Hallam-Baker, P., Stradling, R., and B. Laurie, "DNS 768 Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource 769 Record", draft-hallambaker-donotissue-04 (work in 770 progress), May 2011. 772 [RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S. 773 Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 774 Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647, 775 November 2003. 777 Authors' Addresses 779 Phillip Hallam-Baker 780 Comodo Group Inc. 782 Email: philliph@comodo.com 783 Rob Stradling 784 Comodo CA Ltd. 786 Email: rob.stradling@comodo.com