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'BAU1' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'ISO1' ** Downref: Normative reference to an Historic RFC: RFC 1422 (ref. 'PEM1') -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'PKI1' Summary: 13 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 9 warnings (==), 6 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 PKIX Working Group S. Chokhani (CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.) 3 Internet Draft W. Ford (VeriSign, Inc.) 5 Expires in six months from September 30, 1997 7 Internet Public Key Infrastructure 8 Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework 10 12 Status of this Memo 14 This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working 15 documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, 16 and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute 17 working documents as Internet-Drafts. 19 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of 6 months 20 and may be updated, replaced, or may become obsolete by other 21 documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as 22 reference material or to cite them other than as work in progress. 24 To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the 25 1id-abstracts.txt listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow 26 Directories on ftp.is.co.za(Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), 27 munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or 28 ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). 30 Abstract 32 This document presents a framework to assist the writers of 33 certificate policies or certification practice statements for 34 certification authorities and public key infrastructures. In 35 particular, the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics 36 that potentially (at the writer's discretion) need to be covered in a 37 certificate policy definition or a certification practice statement. 38 It is intended that this document, when fully developed, be published 39 as an Informational RFC. 41 1. INTRODUCTION 43 1.1 BACKGROUND 45 A public-key certificate (hereinafter "certificate") binds a 46 public-key value to a set of information that identifies the 47 entity (such as person, organization, account, or site) associated 48 with use of the corresponding private key (this entity is known as 49 the "subject" of the certificate). A certificate is used by a 50 "certificate user" or "relying party" that needs to use, and rely 51 upon the accuracy of, the public key distributed via that 52 certificate (a certificate user is typically an entity that is 53 verifying a digital signature from the certificate's subject or an 54 entity sending encrypted data to the subject). The degree to 55 which a certificate user can trust the binding embodied in a 56 certificate depends on several factors. These factors include the 57 practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in 58 authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, 59 and security controls; the subject's obligations (for example, in 60 protecting the private key); and the stated undertakings and legal 61 obligations of the CA (for example, warranties and limitations on 62 liability). 64 A Version 3 X.509 certificate may contain a field declaring that 65 one or more specific certificate policies applies to that 66 certificate [ISO1]. According to X.509, a certificate policy is 67 "a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a 68 certificate to a particular community and/or class of application 69 with common security requirements." A certificate policy may be 70 used by a certificate user to help in deciding whether a 71 certificate, and the binding therein, is sufficiently trustworthy 72 for a particular application. The certificate policy concept is 73 an outgrowth of the policy statement concept developed for 74 Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail [PEM1] and expanded upon in [BAU1]. 76 A more detailed description of the practices followed by a CA in 77 issuing and otherwise managing certificates may be contained in a 78 certification practice statement (CPS) published by or referenced 79 by the CA. According to the American Bar Association Digital 80 Signature Guidelines (hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"), "a CPS is a 81 statement of the practices which a certification authority employs 82 in issuing certificates." [ABA1] 84 1.2 PURPOSE 86 The purpose of this document is to establish a clear relationship 87 between certificate policies and CPSs, and to present a framework 88 to assist the writers of certificate policies or CPSs with their 89 tasks. In particular, the framework identifies the elements that 90 may need to be considered in formulating a certificate policy or a 91 CPS. The purpose is not to define particular certificate policies 92 or CPSs, per se. 94 1.3 SCOPE 96 The scope of this document is limited to discussion of the 97 contents of a certificate policy (as defined in X.509) or CPS (as 98 defined in the ABA Guidelines). In particular, this document 99 describes the types of information that should be considered for 100 inclusion in a certificate policy definition or a CPS. While the 101 framework as presented generally assumes use of the X.509 version 102 3 certificate format, it is not intended that the material be 103 restricted to use of that certificate format. Rather, it is 104 intended that this framework be adaptable to other certificate 105 formats that may come into use. 107 The scope does not extend to defining security policies generally 108 (such as organization security policy, system security policy, or 109 data labeling policy) beyond the policy elements that are 110 considered of particular relevance to certificate policies or 111 CPSs. 113 This document does not define a specific certificate policy or 114 CPS. 116 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the general 117 concepts of digital signatures, certificates, and public-key 118 infrastructure, as used in X.509 and the ABA Guidelines. 120 2. DEFINITIONS 122 This document makes use of the following defined terms: 124 Activation data - Data values, other than keys, that are required 125 to operate cryptographic modules and that need to be protected 126 (e.g., a PIN, a passphrase, or a manually-held key share). 128 CA-certificate - A certificate for one CA's public key issued by 129 another CA. 131 Certificate policy - A named set of rules that indicates the 132 applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or 133 class of application with common security requirements. For 134 example, a particular certificate policy might indicate 135 applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of 136 electronic data interchange transactions for the trading of goods 137 within a given price range. 139 Certification path - An ordered sequence of certificates which, 140 together with the public key of the initial object in the path, 141 can be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path. 143 Certification Practice Statement (CPS) - A statement of the 144 practices which a certification authority employs in issuing 145 certificates. 147 Issuing certification authority (issuing CA) - In the context of a 148 particular certificate, the issuing CA is the CA that issued the 149 certificate (see also Subject certification authority). 151 Policy qualifier - Policy-dependent information that accompanies a 152 certificate policy identifier in an X.509 certificate. 154 Registration authority (RA) - An entity that is responsible for 155 identification and authentication of certificate subjects, but 156 that does not sign or issue certificates (i.e., an RA is delegated 157 certain tasks on behalf of a CA). [Note: The term Local 158 Registration Authority (LRA) is used elsewhere for the same 159 concept.] 161 Relying party - A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance 162 on that certificate and/or digital signatures verified using that 163 certificate. In this document, the terms "certificate user" and 164 "relying party" are used interchangeably. 166 Set of provisions - A collection of practice and/or policy 167 statements, spanning a range of standard topics, for use in 168 expressing a certificate policy definition or CPS employing the 169 approach described in this framework. 171 Subject certification authority (subject CA) - In the context of a 172 particular CA-certificate, the subject CA is the CA whose public 173 key is certified in the certificate (see also Issuing 174 certification authority). 176 3. CONCEPTS 178 This section explains the concepts of certificate policy and CPS, and 179 describes their relationship. Other related concepts are also 180 described. Some of the material covered in this section and in some 181 other sections is specific to certificate policies extensions as 182 defined X.509 version 3. Except for those sections, this framework 183 is intended to be adaptable to other certificate formats that may 184 come into use. 186 3.1 CERTIFICATE POLICY 188 When a certification authority issues a certificate, it is 189 providing a statement to a certificate user (i.e., a relying 190 party) that a particular public key is bound to a particular 191 entity (the certificate subject). However, the extent to which 192 the certificate user should rely on that statement by the CA needs 193 to be assessed by the certificate user. Different certificates 194 are issued following different practices and procedures, and may 195 be suitable for different applications and/or purposes. 197 The X.509 standard defines a certificate policy as "a named set of 198 rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a 199 particular community and/or class of application with common 200 security requirements"[ISO1]. An X.509 Version 3 certificate may 201 contain an indication of certificate policy, which may be used by 202 a certificate user to decide whether or not to trust a certificate 203 for a particular purpose. 205 A certificate policy, which needs to be recognized by both the 206 issuer and user of a certificate, is represented in a certificate 207 by a unique, registered Object Identifier. The registration 208 process follows the procedures specified in ISO/IEC and ITU 209 standards. The party that registers the Object Identifier also 210 publishes a textual specification of the certificate policy, for 211 examination by certificate users. Any one certificate will 212 typically declare a single certificate policy or, possibly, be 213 issued consistent with a small number of different policies. 215 Certificate policies also constitute a basis for accreditation of 216 CAs. Each CA is accredited against one or more certificate 217 policies which it is recognized as implementing. When one CA 218 issues a CA-certificate for another CA, the issuing CA must assess 219 the set of certificate policies for which it trusts the subject CA 220 (such assessment may be based upon accreditation with respect to 221 the certificate policies involved). The assessed set of 222 certificate policies is then indicated by the issuing CA in the 223 CA-certificate. The X.509 certification path processing logic 224 employs these certificate policy indications in its well-defined 225 trust model. 227 3.2 CERTIFICATE POLICY EXAMPLES 229 For example purposes, suppose that IATA undertakes to define some 230 certificate policies for use throughout the airline industry, in a 231 public-key infrastructure operated by IATA in combination with 232 public-key infrastructures operated by individual airlines. Two 233 certificate policies are defined - the IATA General-Purpose 234 policy, and the IATA Commercial-Grade policy. 236 The IATA General-Purpose policy is intended for use by industry 237 personnel for protecting routine information (e.g., casual 238 electronic mail) and for authenticating connections from World 239 Wide Web browsers to servers for general information retrieval 240 purposes. The key pairs may be generated, stored, and managed 241 using low-cost, software-based systems, such as commercial 242 browsers. Under this policy, a certificate may be automatically 243 issued to anybody listed as an employee in the corporate directory 244 of IATA or any member airline who submits a signed certificate 245 request form to a network administrator in his or her 246 organization. 248 The IATA Commercial-Grade policy is used to protect financial 249 transactions or binding contractual exchanges between airlines. 250 Under this policy, IATA requires that certified key pairs be 251 generated and stored in approved cryptographic hardware tokens. 252 Certificates and tokens are provided to airline employees with 253 disbursement authority. These authorized individuals are required 254 to present themselves to the corporate security office, show a 255 valid identification badge, and sign an undertaking to protect the 256 token and use it only for authorized purposes, before a token and 257 a certificate are issued. 259 3.3 X.509 CERTIFICATE FIELDS 261 The following extension fields in an X.509 certificate are used to 262 support certificate policies: 264 * Certificate Policies extension; 265 * Policy Mappings extension; and 266 * Policy Constraints extension. 268 3.3.1 Certificate Policies Extension 270 The Certificate Policies extension has two variants - one with 271 the field flagged non-critical and one with the field flagged 272 critical. The purpose of the field is different in the two 273 cases. 275 A non-critical Certificate Policies field lists certificate 276 policies that the certification authority declares are 277 applicable. However, use of the certificate is not restricted 278 to the purposes indicated by the applicable policies. Using 279 the example of the IATA General-Purpose and Commercial-Grade 280 policies defined in Section 3.2, the certificates issued to 281 regular airline employees will contain the object identifier 282 for certificate policy for the General-Purpose policy. The 283 certificates issued to the employees with disbursement 284 authority will contain the object identifiers for both the 285 General-Purpose policy and the Commercial-Grade policy. The 286 Certificate Policies field may also optionally convey qualifier 287 values for each identified policy; use of qualifiers is 288 discussed in Section 3.4. 290 The non-critical Certificate Policies field is designed to be 291 used by applications as follows. Each application is pre- 292 configured to know what policy it requires. Using the example 293 in Section 3.2, electronic mail applications and Web servers 294 will be configured to require the General-Purpose policy. 295 However, an airline's financial applications will be configured 296 to require the Commercial-Grade policy for validating financial 297 transactions over a certain dollar value. 299 When processing a certification path, a certificate policy that 300 is acceptable to the certificate-using application must be 301 present in every certificate in the path, i.e., in CA- 302 certificates as well as end entity certificates. 304 If the Certificate Policies field is flagged critical, it 305 serves the same purpose as described above but also has an 306 additional role. It indicates that the use of the certificate 307 is restricted to one of the identified policies, i.e., the 308 certification authority is declaring that the certificate must 309 only be used in accordance with the provisions of one of the 310 listed certificate policies. This field is intended to protect 311 the certification authority against damage claims by a relying 312 party who has used the certificate for an inappropriate purpose 313 or in an inappropriate manner, as stipulated in the applicable 314 certificate policy definition. 316 For example, the Internal Revenue Service might issue 317 certificates to taxpayers for the purpose of protecting tax 318 filings. The Internal Revenue Service understands and can 319 accommodate the risks of accidentally issuing a bad 320 certificate, e.g., to a wrongly-authenticated person. However, 321 suppose someone used an Internal Revenue Service tax-filing 322 certificate as the basis for encrypting multi-million-dollar- 323 value proprietary secrets which subsequently fell into the 324 wrong hands because of an error in issuing the Internal Revenue 325 Service certificate. The Internal Revenue Service may want to 326 protect itself against claims for damages in such 327 circumstances. The critical-flagged Certificate Policies 328 extension is intended to mitigate the risk to the certificate 329 issuer in such situations. 331 3.3.2 Policy Mappings Extension 333 The Policy Mappings extension may only be used in CA- 334 certificates. This field allows a certification authority to 335 indicate that certain policies in its own domain can be 336 considered equivalent to certain other policies in the subject 337 certification authority's domain. 339 For example, suppose the ACE Corporation establishes an 340 agreement with the ABC Corporation to cross-certify each 341 others' public-key infrastructures for the purposes of mutually 342 protecting electronic data interchange (EDI). Further, suppose 343 that both companies have pre-existing financial transaction 344 protection policies called ace-e-commerce and abc-e-commerce, 345 respectively. One can see that simply generating cross 346 certificates between the two domains will not provide the 347 necessary interoperability, as the two companies' applications 348 are configured with and employee certificates are populated 349 with their respective certificate policies. One possible 350 solution is to reconfigure all of the financial applications to 351 require either policy and to reissue all the certificates with 352 both policies. Another solution, which may be easier to 353 administer, uses the Policy Mapping field. If this field is 354 included in a cross-certificate for the ABC Corporation 355 certification authority issued by the ACE Corporation 356 certification authority, it can provide a statement that the 357 ABC's financial transaction protection policy (i.e., abc-e- 358 commerce) can be considered equivalent to that of the ACE 359 Corporation (i.e., ace-e-commerce). 361 3.3.3 Policy Constraints Extension 363 The Policy Constraints extension supports two optional 364 features. The first is the ability for a certification 365 authority to require that explicit certificate policy 366 indications be present in all subsequent certificates in a 367 certification path. Certificates at the start of a 368 certification path may be considered by a certificate user to 369 be part of a trusted domain, i.e., certification authorities 370 are trusted for all purposes so no particular certificate 371 policy is needed in the Certificate Policies extension. Such 372 certificates need not contain explicit indications of 373 certificate policy. However, when a certification authority in 374 the trusted domain certifies outside the domain, it can 375 activate the requirement for explicit certificate policy in 376 subsequent certificates in the certification path. 378 The other optional feature in the Policy Constraints field is 379 the ability for a certification authority to disable policy 380 mapping by subsequent certification authorities in a 381 certification path. It may be prudent to disable policy 382 mapping when certifying outside the domain. This can assist in 383 controlling risks due to transitive trust, e.g., a domain A 384 trusts domain B, domain B trusts domain C, but domain A does 385 not want to be forced to trust domain C. 387 3.4 POLICY QUALIFIERS 389 The Certificate Policies extension field has a provision for 390 conveying, along with each certificate policy identifier, 391 additional policy-dependent information in a qualifier field. The 392 X.509 standard does not mandate the purpose for which this field 393 is to be used, nor does it prescribe the syntax for this field. 394 Policy qualifier types can be registered by any organization. 396 The following policy qualifier types are defined in PKIX Part I 397 [PKI1]: 399 (a) The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a 400 Certification Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA. 401 The pointer is in the form of a uniform resource identifier 402 (URI). 404 (b) The User Notice qualifier contains a text string that is to 405 be displayed to a certificate user (including subscribers and 406 relying parties) prior to the use of the certificate. The text 407 string may be an IA5String or a BMPString - a subset of the ISO 408 100646-1 multiple octet coded character set. A CA may invoke a 409 procedure that requires that the certficate user acknowledge 410 that the applicable terms and conditions have been disclosed or 411 accepted. 413 Policy qualifiers can be used to support the definition of 414 generic, or parameterized, certificate policy definitions. 415 Provided the base certificate policy definition so provides, 416 policy qualifier types can be defined to convey, on a per- 417 certificate basis, additional specific policy details that fill in 418 the generic definition. 419 3.5 CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT 421 The term certification practice statement (CPS) is defined by the 422 ABA Guidelines as: "A statement of the practices which a 423 certification authority employs in issuing certificates." [ABA1] 424 In the 1995 draft of the ABA guidelines, the ABA expands this 425 definition with the following comments: 427 A certification practice statement may take the form of a 428 declaration by the certification authority of the details of 429 its trustworthy system and the practices it employs in its 430 operations and in support of issuance of a certificate, or it 431 may be a statute or regulation applicable to the certification 432 authority and covering similar subject matter. It may also be 433 part of the contract between the certification authority and 434 the subscriber. A certification practice statement may also be 435 comprised of multiple documents, a combination of public law, 436 private contract, and/or declaration. 438 Certain forms for legally implementing certification practice 439 statements lend themselves to particular relationships. For 440 example, when the legal relationship between a certification 441 authority and subscriber is consensual, a contract would 442 ordinarily be the means of giving effect to a certification 443 practice statement. The certification authority's duties to a 444 relying person are generally based on the certification 445 authority's representations, which may include a certification 446 practice statement. 448 Whether a certification practice statement is binding on a 449 relying person depends on whether the relying person has 450 knowledge or notice of the certification practice statement. A 451 relying person has knowledge or at least notice of the contents 452 of the certificate used by the relying person to verify a 453 digital signature, including documents incorporated into the 454 certificate by reference. It is therefore advisable to 455 incorporate a certification practice statement into a 456 certificate by reference. 458 As much as possible, a certification practice statement should 459 indicate any of the widely recognized standards to which the 460 certification authority's practices conform. Reference to 461 widely recognized standards may indicate concisely the 462 suitability of the certification authority's practices for 463 another person's purposes, as well as the potential 464 technological compatibility of the certificates issued by the 465 certification authority with repositories and other systems. 467 3.6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION 468 PRACTICE STATEMENT 470 The concepts of certificate policy and CPS come from different 471 sources and were developed for different reasons. However, their 472 interrelationship is important. 474 A certification practice statement is a detailed statement by a 475 certification authority as to its practices, that potentially 476 needs to be understood and consulted by subscribers and 477 certificate users (relying parties). Although the level of detail 478 may vary among CPSs, they will generally be more detailed than 479 certificate policy definitions. Indeed, CPSs may be quite 480 comprehensive, robust documents providing a description of the 481 precise service offerings, detailed procedures of the life-cycle 482 management of certificates, and more - a level of detail which 483 weds the CPS to a particular (proprietary) implementation of a 484 service offering. 486 Although such detail may be indispensable to adequately disclose, 487 and to make a full assessment of trustworthiness in the absence of 488 accreditation or other recognized quality metrics, a detailed CPS 489 does not form a suitable basis for interoperability between CAs 490 operated by different organizations. Rather, certificate policies 491 best serve as the vehicle on which to base common interoperability 492 standards and common assurance criteria on an industry-wide (or 493 possibly more global) basis. A CA with a single CPS may support 494 multiple certificate policies (used for different application 495 purposes and/or by different certificate user communities). Also, 496 multiple different CAs, with non-identical certification practice 497 statements, may support the same certificate policy. 499 For example, the Federal Government might define a government-wide 500 certificate policy for handling confidential human resources 501 information. The certificate policy definition will be a broad 502 statement of the general characteristics of that certificate 503 policy, and an indication of the types of applications for which 504 it is suitable for use. Different departments or agencies that 505 operate certification authorities with different certification 506 practice statements might support this certificate policy. At the 507 same time, such certification authorities may support other 508 certificate policies. 510 The main difference between certificate policy and CPS can 511 therefore be summarized as follows: 513 (a) Most organizations that operate public or inter- 514 organizational certification authorities will document their 515 own practices in CPSs or similar statements. The CPS is one of 516 the organization's means of protecting itself and positioning 517 its business relationships with subscribers and other entities. 519 (b) There is strong incentive, on the other hand, for a 520 certificate policy to apply more broadly than to just a single 521 organization. If a particular certificate policy is widely 522 recognized and imitated, it has great potential as the basis of 523 automated certificate acceptance in many systems, including 524 unmanned systems and systems that are manned by people not 525 independently empowered to determine the acceptability of 526 different presented certificates. 528 In addition to populating the certificate policies field with the 529 certificate policy identifier, a certification authority may 530 include, in certificates it issues, a reference to its 531 certification practice statement. A standard way to do this, 532 using a certificate policy qualifier, is described in Section 3.4. 534 3.7 SET OF PROVISIONS 536 A set of provisions is a collection of practice and/or policy 537 statements, spanning a range of standard topics, for use in 538 expressing a certificate policy definition or CPS employing the 539 approach described in this framework. 541 A certificate policy can be expressed as a single set of 542 provisions. 544 A CPS can be expressed as a single set of provisions with each 545 component addressing the requirements of one or more certificate 546 policies, or, alternatively, as an organized collection of sets of 547 provisions. For example, a CPS could be expressed as a 548 combination of the following: 550 (a) a list of certificate policies supported by the CPS; 552 (b) for each certificate policy in (a), a set of provisions 553 which contains statements that refine that certificate policy 554 by filling in details not stipulated in that policy or 555 expressly left to the discretion of the CPS by that certificate 556 policy; such statements serve to state how this particular CPS 557 implements the requirements of the particular certificate 558 policy; 560 (c) a set of provisions that contains statements regarding the 561 certification practices on the CA, regardless of certificate 562 policy. 564 The statements provided in (b) and (c) may augment or refine the 565 stipulations of the applicable certificate policy definition, but 566 must not conflict with any of the stipulations of such certificate 567 policy definition. 569 This framework outlines the contents of a set of provisions, in 570 terms of eight primary components, as follows: 572 * Introduction; 574 * General Provisions; 576 * Identification and Authentication; 578 * Operational Requirements; 580 * Physical, Procedural, and Personnel Security Controls; 582 * Technical Security Controls; 584 * Certificate and CRL Profile; and 586 * Specification Administration. 588 Components can be further divided into subcomponents, and a 589 subcomponent may comprise multiple elements. Section 4 provides a 590 more detailed description of the contents of the above components, 591 and their subcomponents. 593 4. CONTENTS OF A SET OF PROVISIONS 595 This section expands upon the contents of a set of provisions, as 596 introduced in Section 3.7. The topics identified in this section 597 are, consequently, candidate topics for inclusion in a certificate 598 policy definition or CPS. 600 While many topics are identified, it is not necessary for a 601 certificate policy or a CPS to include a concrete statement for every 602 such topic. Rather, a particular certificate policy or CPS may 603 state "no stipulation" for a component, subcomponent, or element on 604 which the particular certificate policy or CPS imposes no 605 requirements. In this sense, the list of topics can be considered a 606 checklist of topics for consideration by the certificate policy or 607 CPS writer. It is recommended that each and every component and 608 subcomponent be included in a certificate policy or CPS, even if 609 there is "no stipulation"; this will indicate to the reader that a 610 conscious decision was made to include or exclude that topic. This 611 protects against inadvertent omission of a topic, while facilitating 612 comparison of different certificate policies or CPSs, e.g., when 613 making policy mapping decisions. 615 In a certificate policy definition, it is possible to leave certain 616 components, subcomponents, and/or elements unspecified, and to 617 stipulate that the required information will be indicated in a policy 618 qualifier. Such certificate policy definitions can be considered 619 parameterized definitions. The set of provisions should reference or 620 define the required policy qualifier types and should specify any 621 applicable default values. 623 4.1 INTRODUCTION 625 This component identifies and introduces the set of provisions, 626 and indicates the types of entities and applications for which the 627 specification is targeted. 629 This component has the following subcomponents: 630 * Overview; 632 * Identification; 634 * Community and Applicability; and 636 * Contact Details. 638 4.1.1 Overview 640 This subcomponent provides a general introduction to the 641 specification. 643 4.1.2 Identification 645 This subcomponent provides any applicable names or other 646 identifiers, including ASN.1 object identifiers, for the set of 647 provisions. 649 4.1.3 Community and Applicability 651 This subcomponent describes the types of entities that issue 652 certificates or that are certified as subject CAs (2, 3), the 653 types of entities that perform RA functions (4), and the types 654 of entities that are certified as subject end entities or 655 subscribers. (5, 6) 657 This subcomponent also contains: 659 * A list of applications for which the issued certificates 660 are suitable. 662 * A list of applications for which use of the issued 663 certificates is restricted. (This list implicitly prohibits 664 all other uses for the certificates.) 665 * A list of applications for which use of the issued 666 certificates is prohibited. 668 4.1.4 Contact Details 670 This subcomponent includes the name and mailing address of the 671 authority that is responsible for the registration, 672 maintenance, and interpretation of this certificate policy or 673 CPS. It also includes the name, electronic mail address, 674 telephone number, and fax number of a contact person. 676 4.2 GENERAL PROVISIONS 678 This component specifies any applicable presumptions on a range of 679 legal and general practices topics. 681 This component contains the following subcomponents: 683 * Obligations; 685 * Liability; 687 * Financial Responsibility; 689 * Interpretation and Enforcement; 691 * Fees; 693 * Publication and Repositories; 695 * Compliance Audit; 697 * Confidentiality; and 699 * Intellectual Property Rights. 701 Each subcomponent may need to separately state provisions applying 702 to the entity types: CA, repository, RA, subscriber, and relying 703 party. (Specific provisions regarding subscribers and relying 704 parties are only applicable in the Liability and Obligations 705 subcomponents.) 706 4.2.1 Obligations 708 This subcomponent contains, for each entity type, any 709 applicable provisions regarding the entity's obligations to 710 other entities. Such provisions may include: 712 * CA and/or RA obligations: 713 * Notification of issuance of a certificate to the 714 subscriber who is the subject of the certificate being 715 issued; 716 * Notification of issuance of a certificate to others 717 than the subject of the certificate; 718 * Notification of revocation or suspension of a 719 certificate to the subscriber whose certificate is being 720 revoked or suspended; and 721 * Notification of revocation or suspension of a 722 certificate to others than the subject whose certificate 723 is being revoked or suspended. 725 * Subscriber obligations: 727 * Accuracy of representations in certificate application; 728 * Protection of the entity's private key; 729 * Restrictions on private key and certificate use; and 730 * Notification upon private key compromise. 732 * Relying party obligations: 734 * Purposes for which certificate is used; 735 * Digital signature verification responsibilities; 736 * Revocation and suspension checking responsibilities; 737 and 738 * Acknowledgment of applicable liability caps and 739 warranties. 741 * Repository obligations 743 * Timely publication of certificates and revocation 744 information 746 4.2.2 Liability 748 This subcomponent contains, for each entity type, any 749 applicable provisions regarding apportionment of liability, 750 such as: 752 * Warranties and limitations on warranties; 754 * Kinds of damages covered (e.g., indirect, special, 755 consequential, incidental, punitive, liquidated damages, 756 negligence and fraud) and disclaimers; 758 * Loss limitations (caps) per certificate or per 759 transaction; and 761 * Other exclusions (e.g., Acts of God, other party 762 responsibilities). 764 4.2.3 Financial Responsibility 766 This subcomponent contains, for CAs, repository, and RAs, any 767 applicable provisions regarding financial responsibilities, 768 such as: 770 * Indemnification of CA and/or RA by relying parties; 772 * Fiduciary relationships (or lack thereof) between the 773 various entities; and 775 * Administrative processes (e.g., accounting, audit). 777 4.2.4 Interpretation and Enforcement 779 This subcomponent contains any applicable provisions regarding 780 interpretation and enforcement of the certificate policy or 781 CPS, addressing such topics as: 783 * Governing law; 785 * Severability of provisions, survival, merger, and notice; 786 and 788 * Dispute resolution procedures. 790 4.2.5 Fees 792 This subcomponent contains any applicable provisions regarding 793 fees charged by CAs, repositories, or RAs, such as: 795 * Certificate issuance or renewal fees; 797 * Certificate access fee; 799 * Revocation or status information access fee; 801 * Fees for other services such as policy information; and 803 * Refund policy. 805 4.2.6 Publication and Repositories 807 This subcomponent contains any applicable provisions regarding: 809 * A CA's obligations to publish information regarding its 810 practices, its certificates, and the current status of such 811 certificates; 813 * Frequency of publication; 815 * Access control on published information objects including 816 certificate policy definitions, CPS, certificates, 817 certificate status, and CRLs; and 819 * Requirements pertaining to the use of repositories 820 operated by CAs or by other independent parties. 822 4.2.7 Compliance Audit 824 This subcomponent addresses the following: 826 * Frequency of compliance audit for each entity; 828 * Identity of the auditor; 830 * Auditor's relationship to the entity being audited; (30) 832 * List of topics covered under the compliance audit; (31) 834 * Actions taken as a result of a deficiency found during 835 compliance audit; (32) 837 * Compliance audit results: who they are shared with (e.g., 838 subject CA, RA, and/or end entities), who provides them 839 (e.g., entity being audited or auditor), how they are 840 communicated. 842 4.2.8 Confidentiality Policy 844 This subcomponent addresses the following: 846 * Types of information that must be kept confidential by CA 847 or RA; 849 * Types of information that are not considered confidential; 851 * Who is entitled to be informed of reasons for revocation 852 and suspension of certificates; 854 * Policy on release of information to law enforcement 855 officials; 857 * Information that can be revealed as part of civil 858 discovery; 860 * Conditions upon which CA or RA may disclose upon owner's 861 request; and 863 * Any other circumstances under which confidential 864 information may be disclosed. 866 4.2.9 Intellectual Property Rights 868 This subcomponent addresses ownership rights of certificates, 869 practice/policy specifications, names, and keys. 871 4.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 873 This component describes the procedures used to authenticate a 874 certificate applicant to a CA or RA prior to certificate issuance. 875 It also describes how parties requesting rekey or revocation are 876 authenticated. This component also addresses naming practices, 877 including name ownership recognition and name dispute resolution. 879 This component has the following subcomponents: 881 * Initial Registration; 883 * Routine Rekey; 885 * Rekey After Revocation; and 886 * Revocation Request. 888 4.3.1 Initial Registration 890 This subcomponent includes the following elements regarding 891 identification and authentication procedures during entity 892 registration or certificate issuance: 894 * Types of names assigned to the subject (7); 896 * Whether names have to be meaningful or not (8); 898 * Rules for interpreting various name forms; 900 * Whether names have to be unique; 902 * How name claim disputes are resolved; 904 * Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks; 906 * If and how the subject must prove possession of the 907 companion private key for the public key being registered 908 (9); 910 * Authentication requirements for organizational identity of 911 subject (CA, RA, or end entity) (10); 913 * Authentication requirements for a person acting on behalf 914 of a subject (CA, RA, or end entity) (11), including: 916 * Number of pieces of identification required; 917 * How a CA or RA validates the pieces of identification 918 provided; 919 * If the individual must present personally to the 920 authenticating CA or RA; 921 * How an individual as an organizational person is 922 authenticated (12). 924 4.3.2 Routine Rekey 926 This subcomponent describes the identification and 927 authentication procedures for routine rekey for each subject 928 type (CA, RA, and end entity). (13) 930 4.3.3 Rekey After Revocation -- No Key Compromise 932 This subcomponent describes the identification and 933 authentication procedures for rekey for each subject type (CA, 934 RA, and end entity) after the subject certificate has been 935 revoked. (14) 937 4.3.4 Revocation Request 939 This subcomponent describes the identification and 940 authentication procedures for a revocation request by each 941 subject type (CA, RA, and end entity). (16) 943 4.4 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 945 This component is used to specify requirements imposed upon 946 issuing CA, subject CAs, RAs, or end entities with respect to 947 various operational activities. 949 This component consists of the following subcomponents: 951 * Certificate Application; 953 * Certificate Issuance; 955 * Certificate Acceptance; 957 * Certificate Suspension and Revocation; 959 * Security Audit Procedures; 961 * Records Archival; 963 * Key Changeover; 965 * Compromise and Disaster Recovery; and 967 * CA Termination. 969 Within each subcomponent, separate consideration may need to be 970 given to issuing CA, repository, subject CAs, RAs, and end 971 entities. 973 4.4.1 Certificate Application 975 This subcomponent is used to state requirements regarding 976 subject enrollment and request for certificate issuance. 978 4.4.2 Certificate Issuance 980 This subcomponent is used to state requirements regarding 981 issuance of a certificate and notification to the applicant of 982 such issuance. 984 4.4.3 Certificate Acceptance 986 This subcomponent is used to state requirements regarding 987 acceptance of an issued certificate and for consequent 988 publication of certificates. 990 4.4.4 Certificate Suspension and Revocation 992 This subcomponent addresses the following: 994 * Circumstances under which a certificate may be revoked; 996 * Who can request the revocation of the entity certificate; 998 * Procedures used for certificate revocation request; 1000 * Revocation request grace period available to the subject; 1002 * Circumstances under which a certificate may be suspended; 1004 * Who can request the suspension of a certificate; 1006 * Procedures to request certificate suspension; 1008 * How long the suspension may last; 1010 * If a CRL mechanism is used, the issuance frequency; 1012 * Requirements on relying parties to check CRLs; 1014 * On-line revocation/status checking availability; 1016 * Requirements on relying parties to perform on-line 1017 revocation/status checks; 1019 * Other forms of revocation advertisements available; and 1020 * Requirements on relying parties to check other forms of 1021 revocation advertisements. 1023 * Any variations on the above stipulations when the 1024 suspension or revocation is the result of private key 1025 compromise (as opposed to other reasons for suspension or 1026 revocation). 1028 4.4.5 Security Audit Procedures 1030 This subcomponent is used to describe event logging and audit 1031 systems, implemented for the purpose of maintaining a secure 1032 environment. Elements include the following: 1034 * Types of events recorded; (28) 1036 * Frequency with which audit logs are processed or audited; 1038 * Period for which audit logs are kept; 1040 * Protection of audit logs: 1042 - Who can view audit logs; 1043 - Protection against modification of audit log; and 1044 - Protection against deletion of audit log. 1046 * Audit log back up procedures; 1048 * Whether the audit log accumulation system is internal or 1049 external to the entity; 1051 * Whether the subject who caused an audit event to occur is 1052 notified of the audit action; and 1054 * Vulnerability assessments. 1055 4.4.6 Records Archival 1057 This subcomponent is used to describe general records archival 1058 (or records retention) policies, including the following: 1060 * Types of events recorded; (29) 1062 * Retention period for archive; 1064 * Protection of archive: 1066 - Who can view the archive; 1067 - Protection against modification of archive; and 1068 - Protection against deletion of archive. 1070 * Archive backup procedures; 1072 * Requirements for time-stamping of records; 1074 * Whether the archive collection system is internal or 1075 external; and 1077 * Procedures to obtain and verify archive information. 1079 4.4.7 Key Changeover 1081 This subcomponent describes the procedures to provide a new 1082 public key to a CA's users. 1084 4.4.8 Compromise and Disaster Recovery 1086 This subcomponent describes requirements relating to 1087 notification and recovery procedures in the event of compromise 1088 or disaster. Each of the following circumstances may need to 1089 be addressed separately: 1091 * The recovery procedures used if computing resources, 1092 software, and/or data are corrupted or suspected to be 1093 corrupted. These procedures describe how a secure 1094 environment is reestablished, which certificates are 1095 revoked, whether the entity key is revoked, how the new 1096 entity public key is provided to the users, and how the 1097 subjects are recertified. 1099 * The recovery procedures used if the entity public key is 1100 revoked. These procedures describe how a secure environment 1101 is reestablished, how the new entity public key is provided 1102 to the users, and how the subjects are recertified. 1104 * The recovery procedures used if the entity key is 1105 compromised. These procedures describe how a secure 1106 environment is reestablished, how the new entity public key 1107 is provided to the users, and how the subjects are 1108 recertified. 1110 4.4.9 CA Termination 1112 This subcomponent describes requirements relating to procedures 1113 for termination and for termination notification of a CA or RA, 1114 including the identity of the custodian of CA and RA archival 1115 records. 1117 4.5 PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS 1119 This component describes non-technical security controls (that is, 1120 physical, procedural, and personnel controls) used by the issuing 1121 CA to perform securely the functions of key generation, subject 1122 authentication, certificate issuance, certificate revocation, 1123 audit, and archival. 1125 This component can also be used to define non-technical security 1126 controls on repository, subject CAs, RAs, and end entities. The 1127 non technical security controls for the subject CAs, RAs, and end 1128 entities could be the same, similar, or very different. 1130 These non-technical security controls are critical to trusting the 1131 certificates since lack of security may compromise CA operations 1132 resulting, for example, in the creation of certificates or CRLs 1133 with erroneous information or the compromise of the CA private 1134 key. 1136 This component consists of three subcomponents: 1138 * Physical Security Controls; 1140 * Procedural Controls; and 1142 * Personnel Security Controls. 1144 Within each subcomponent, separate consideration will, in general, 1145 need to be given to each entity type, that is, issuing CA, 1146 repository, subject CAs, RAs, and end entities. 1148 4.5.1 Physical Security Controls 1150 In this subcomponent, the physical controls on the facility 1151 housing the entity systems are described.(21) Topics addressed 1152 may include: 1154 * Site location and construction; 1156 * Physical access; 1158 * Power and air conditioning; 1160 * Water exposures; 1162 * Fire prevention and protection; 1164 * Media storage; 1166 * Waste disposal; and 1168 * Off-site backup. 1170 4.5.2 Procedural Controls 1172 In this subcomponent, requirements for recognizing trusted 1173 roles are described, together with the responsibilities for 1174 each role.(22) 1176 For each task identified for each role, it should also be 1177 stated how many individuals are required to perform the task (n 1178 out m rule). Identification and authentication requirements 1179 for each role may also be defined. 1181 4.5.3 Personnel Security Controls 1183 This subcomponent addresses the following: 1185 * Background checks and clearance procedures required for 1186 the personnel filling the trusted roles; (23) 1188 * Background checks and clearance procedures requirements 1189 for other personnel, including janitorial staff; (24) 1191 * Training requirements and training procedures for each 1192 role; 1194 * Any retraining period and retraining procedures for each 1195 role; 1196 * Frequency and sequence for job rotation among various 1197 roles; 1199 * Sanctions against personnel for unauthorized actions, 1200 unauthorized use of authority, and unauthorized use of 1201 entity systems; (25) 1203 * Controls on contracting personnel, including: 1205 - Bonding requirements on contract personnel; 1206 - Contractual requirements including indemnification for 1207 damages due to the actions of the contractor personnel; 1208 - Audit and monitoring of contractor personnel; and 1209 - Other controls on contracting personnel. 1211 * Documentation to be supplied to personnel. 1213 4.6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS 1215 This component is used to define the security measures taken by 1216 the issuing CA to protect its cryptographic keys and activation 1217 data (e.g., PINs, passwords, or manually-held key shares). This 1218 component may also be used to impose constraints on repositories, 1219 subject CAs and end entities to protect their cryptographic keys 1220 and critical security parameters. Secure key management is 1221 critical to ensure that all secret and private keys and activation 1222 data are protected and used only by authorized personnel. 1224 This component also describes other technical security controls 1225 used by the issuing CA to perform securely the functions of key 1226 generation, user authentication, certificate registration, 1227 certificate revocation, audit, and archival. Technical controls 1228 include life-cycle security controls (including software 1229 development environment security, trusted software development 1230 methodology) and operational security controls. 1232 This component can also be used to define other technical security 1233 controls on repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and end entities. 1235 This component has the following subcomponents: 1237 * Key Pair Generation and Installation; 1239 * Private Key Protection; 1241 * Other Aspects of Key Pair Management; 1243 * Activation Data; 1244 * Computer Security Controls; 1246 * Life-Cycle Security Controls; 1248 * Network Security Controls; and 1250 * Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls. 1252 4.6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation 1254 Key pair generation and installation need to be considered for 1255 the issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and subject end 1256 entities. For each of these types of entities, the following 1257 questions potentially need to be answered: 1259 1. Who generates the entity public, private key pair? 1261 2. How is the private key provided securely to the entity? 1263 3. How is the entity's public key provided securely to the 1264 certificate issuer? 1266 4. If the entity is a CA (issuing or subject) how is the 1267 entity's public key provided securely to the users? 1269 5. What are the key sizes? 1271 6. Who generates the public key parameters? 1273 7. Is the quality of the parameters checked during key 1274 generation? 1276 8. Is the key generation performed in hardware or software? 1278 9. For what purposes may the key be used, or for what 1279 purposes should usage of the key be restricted (for X.509 1280 certificates, these purposes should map to the key usage 1281 flags in the Version 3, X.509 certificates)? 1283 4.6.2 Private Key Protection 1285 Requirements for private key protection need to be considered 1286 for the issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and subject 1287 end entities. For each of these types of entity, the following 1288 questions potentially need to be answered: 1290 1. What standards, if any, are required for the module used 1291 to generate the keys? For example, are the keys certified 1292 by the infrastructure required to be generated using modules 1293 complaint with the US FIPS 140-1? If so, what is the 1294 required FIPS 140-1 level of the module? 1296 2. Is the private key under n out of m multi-person 1297 control?(18) If yes, provide n and m (two person control is 1298 a special case of n out of m, where n = m = 2)? 1300 3. Is the private key escrowed? (19) If so, who is the 1301 escrow agent, what form is the key escrowed in (examples 1302 include plaintext, encrypted, split key), and what are the 1303 security controls on the escrow system? 1305 4. Is the private key backed up? If so, who is the backup 1306 agent, what form is the key backed up in (examples include 1307 plaintext, encrypted, split key), and what are the security 1308 controls on the backup system? 1310 5. Is the private key archived? If so, who is the archival 1311 agent, what form is the key archived in (examples include 1312 plaintext, encrypted, split key), and what are the security 1313 controls on the archival system? 1315 6. Who enters the private key in the cryptographic module? 1316 In what form (i.e., plaintext, encrypted, or split key)? 1317 How is the private key stored in the module (i.e., 1318 plaintext, encrypted, or split key)? 1320 7. Who can activate (use) the private key? What actions 1321 must be performed to activate the private key (e.g., login, 1322 power on, supply PIN, insert token/key, automatic, etc.)? 1323 Once the key is activated, is the key active for an 1324 indefinite period, active for one time, or active for a 1325 defined time period? 1327 8. Who can deactivate the private key and how? Example of 1328 how might include, logout, power off, remove token/key, 1329 automatic, or time expiration. 1331 9. Who can destroy the private key and how? Examples of how 1332 might include token surrender, token destruction, or key 1333 overwrite. 1335 4.6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management 1337 Other aspects of key management need to be considered for the 1338 issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and subject end 1339 entities. For each of these types of entity, the following 1340 questions potentially need to be answered: 1342 1. Is the public key archived? If so, who is the archival 1343 agent and what are the security controls on the archival 1344 system? The archival system should provide integrity 1345 controls other than digital signatures since: the archival 1346 period may be greater than the cryptanalysis period for the 1347 key and the archive requires tamper protection, which is not 1348 provided by digital signatures. 1350 2. What are the usage periods, or active lifetimes, for the 1351 public and the private key respectively? 1353 4.6.4 Activation Data 1355 Activation data refers to data values other than keys that are 1356 required to operate cryptographic modules and that need to be 1357 protected. (20) Protection of activation data potentially 1358 needs to be considered for the issuing CA, subject CAs, RAs, 1359 and end entities. Such consideration potentially needs to 1360 address the entire life-cycle of the activation data from 1361 generation through archival and destruction. For each of the 1362 entity types (issuing CA, repository, subject CA, RA, and end 1363 entity) all of the questions listed in 4.6.1 through 4.6.3 1364 potentially need to be answered with respect to activation data 1365 rather than with respect to keys. 1367 4.6.5 Computer Security Controls 1369 This subcomponent is used to describe computer security 1370 controls such as: use of the trusted computing base concept, 1371 discretionary access control, labels, mandatory access 1372 controls, object reuse, audit, identification and 1373 authentication, trusted path, security testing, and penetration 1374 testing. Product assurance may also be addressed. 1376 A computer security rating for computer systems may be 1377 required. The rating could be based, for example, on the 1378 Trusted System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), Canadian Trusted 1379 Products Evaluation Criteria, European Information Technology 1380 Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), or the Common Criteria. 1381 This subcomponent can also address requirements for product 1382 evaluation analysis, testing, profiling, product certification, 1383 and/or product accreditation related activity undertaken. 1385 4.6.6 Life Cycle Security Controls 1387 This subcomponent addresses system development controls and 1388 security management controls. 1390 System development controls include development environment 1391 security, development personnel security, configuration 1392 management security during product maintenance, software 1393 engineering practices, software development methodology, 1394 modularity, layering, use of failsafe design and implementation 1395 techniques (e.g., defensive programming) and development 1396 facility security. 1398 Security management controls include execution of tools and 1399 procedures to ensure that the operational systems and networks 1400 adhere to configured security. These tools and procedures 1401 include checking the integrity of the security software, 1402 firmware, and hardware to ensure their correct operation. 1404 This subcomponent can also address life-cycle security ratings 1405 based, for example, on the Trusted Software Development 1406 Methodology (TSDM) level IV and V, independent life-cycle 1407 security controls audit, and the Software Engineering 1408 Institute's Capability Maturity Model (SEI-CMM). 1410 4.6.7 Network Security Controls 1412 This subcomponent addresses network security related controls, 1413 including firewalls. 1415 4.6.8 Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls (26) 1417 This subcomponent addresses the following aspects of a 1418 cryptographic module: identification of the cryptographic 1419 module boundary, input/output, roles and services, finite state 1420 machine, physical security, software security, operating system 1421 security, algorithm compliance, electromagnetic compatibility, 1422 and self tests. Requirements may be expressed through 1423 reference to a standard such as U.S. FIPS 140-1. (27) 1425 4.7 CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES 1427 This component is used to specify the certificate format and, if 1428 CRLs are used, the CRL format. Assuming use of the X.509 1429 certificate and CRL formats, this includes information on 1430 profiles, versions, and extensions used. 1432 This component has two subcomponents: 1434 * Certificate Profile; and 1436 * CRL Profile. 1438 4.7.1 Certificate Profile 1440 This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following 1441 (potentially by reference to a separate profile definition, 1442 such as the PKIX Part I profile): 1444 * Version number(s) supported; 1446 * Certificate extensions populated and their criticality; 1448 * Cryptographic algorithm object identifiers; 1450 * Name forms used for the CA, RA, and end entity names; 1452 * Name constraints used and the name forms used in the name 1453 constraints; 1455 * Applicable certificate policy Object Identifier(s); 1457 * Usage of the policy constraints extension; 1459 * Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics; and 1461 * Processing semantics for the critical certificate policy 1462 extension. 1464 4.7.2 CRL Profile 1466 This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following 1467 (potentially by reference to a separate profile definition, 1468 such as the PKIX Part I profile): 1470 * Version numbers supported for CRLs; and 1472 * CRL and CRL entry extensions populated and their 1473 criticality. 1475 4.8 SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION 1477 This component is used to specify how this particular certificate 1478 policy definition or CPS will be maintained. 1480 It contains the following subcomponents: 1482 * Specification Change Procedures; 1484 * Publication and Notification Procedures; and 1486 * CPS Approval Procedures. 1488 4.8.1 Specification Change Procedures 1490 It will occasionally be necessary to change certificate 1491 policies and Certification Practice Statements. Some of these 1492 changes will not materially reduce the assurance that a 1493 certificate policy or its implementation provides, and will be 1494 judged by the policy administrator as not changing the 1495 acceptability of certificates asserting the policy for the 1496 purposes for which they have been used. Such changes to 1497 certificate policies and Certification Practice Statements need 1498 not require a change in the certificate policy Object 1499 Identifier or the CPS pointer (URL). Other changes to a 1500 specification will change the acceptability of certificates for 1501 specific purposes, and these changes will require changes to 1502 the certificate policy Object Identifier or CPS pointer (URL). 1504 This subcomponent contains the following information: 1506 * A list of specification components, subcomponents, and/or 1507 elements thereof that can be changed without notification 1508 and without changes to the certificate policy Object 1509 Identifier or CPS pointer (URL). 1511 * A list of specification components, subcomponents, and/or 1512 elements thereof that may change following a notification 1513 period without changing the certificate policy Object 1514 Identifier or CPS pointer (URL). The procedures to be used 1515 to notify interested parties (relying parties, certification 1516 authorities, etc.) of the certificate policy or CPS changes 1517 are described. The description of notification procedures 1518 includes the notification mechanism, notification period for 1519 comments, mechanism to receive, review and incorporate the 1520 comments, mechanism for final changes to the policy, and the 1521 period before final changes become effective. 1523 * A list of specification components, subcomponents, and/or 1524 elements, changes to which require a change in certificate 1525 policy Object Identifier or CPS pointer (URL).. 1527 4.8.2 Publication and Notification Procedures 1529 This subcomponent contains the following elements: 1531 * A list of components, subcomponents, and elements thereof 1532 that exist but that are not made publicly available; (33) 1534 * Descriptions of mechanisms used to distribute the 1535 certificate policy definition or CPS, including access 1536 controls on such distribution. 1538 4.8.3 CPS Approval Procedures 1540 In a certificate policy definition, this subcomponent describes 1541 how the compliance of a specific CPS with the certificate 1542 policy can be determined. 1544 5. OUTLINE OF A SET OF PROVISIONS 1546 This section contains a possible outline for a set of provisions, 1547 intended to serve as a checklist or (with some further development) a 1548 standard template for use by certificate policy or CPS writers. Such 1549 a common outline will facilitate: 1551 (a) Comparison of two certificate policies during cross- 1552 certification (for the purpose of equivalency mapping). 1554 (b) Comparison of a CPS with a certificate policy definition to 1555 ensure that the CPS faithfully implements the policy. 1557 (c) Comparison of two CPSs. 1559 1. INTRODUCTION 1561 1.1 Overview 1563 1.2 Identification 1565 1.3 Community and Applicability 1566 1.3.1 Certification authorities 1567 1.3.2 Registration authorities 1568 1.3.3 End entities 1569 1.3.4 Applicability 1571 1.4 Contact Details 1572 1.4.1 Specification administration organization 1573 1.4.2 Contact person 1574 1.4.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy 1576 2. GENERAL PROVISIONS 1578 2.1 Obligations 1580 2.1.1 CA obligations 1581 2.1.2 RA obligations 1582 2.1.3 Subscriber obligations 1583 2.1.4 Relying party obligations 2.1.5 Repository obligations 1585 2.2 Liability 1587 2.2.1 CA liability 1588 2.2.2 RA liability 1590 2.3 Financial responsibility 1592 2.3.1 Indemnification by relying parties 1593 2.3.2 Fiduciary relationships 1594 2.3.3 Administrative processes 1596 2.4 Interpretation and Enforcement 1598 2.4.1 Governing law 1599 2.4.2 Severability, survival, merger, notice 1600 2.4.3 Dispute resolution procedures 1602 2.5 Fees 1603 2.5.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees 1604 2.5.2 Certificate access fees 1605 2.5.3 Revocation or status information access fees 1606 2.5.4 Fees for other services such as policy information 1607 2.5.5 Refund policy 1609 2.6 Publication and Repository 1611 2.6.1 Publication of CA information 1612 2.6.2 Frequency of publication 1613 2.6.3 Access controls 1614 2.6.4 Repositories 1616 2.7 Compliance audit 1618 2.7.1 Frequency of entity compliance audit 1619 2.7.2 Identity/qualifications of auditor 1620 2.7.3 Auditor's relationship to audited party 1621 2.7.4 Topics covered by audit 1622 2.7.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency 1623 2.7.6 Communication of results 1625 2.8 Confidentiality 1627 2.8.1 Types of information to be kept confidential 1628 2.8.2 Types of information not considered confidential 1629 2.8.3 Disclosure of certificate revocation/suspension information 1630 2.8.4 Release to law enforcement officials 1631 2.8.5 Release as part of civil discovery 1632 2.8.6 Disclosure upon owner's request 1633 2.8.7 Other information release circumstances 1635 2.9 Intellectual Property Rights 1637 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (34) 1639 3.1 Initial Registration 1640 3.1.1 Types of names 1641 3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful 1642 3.1.3 Rules for interpreting various name forms 1643 3.1.4 Uniqueness of names 1644 3.1.5 Name claim dispute resolution procedure 1645 3.1.6 Recognition, authentication and role of trademarks 1646 3.1.7 Method to prove possession of private key 1647 3.1.8 Authentication of organization identity 1648 3.1.9 Authentication of individual identity 1650 3.2 Routine Rekey 1651 3.3 Rekey after Revocation 1653 3.4 Revocation Request 1655 4. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (34) 1657 4.1 Certificate Application 1659 4.2 Certificate Issuance 1661 4.3 Certificate Acceptance 1663 4.4 Certificate Suspension and Revocation 1664 4.4.1 Circumstances for revocation 1665 4.4.2 Who can request revocation 1666 4.4.3 Procedure for revocation request 1667 4.4.4 Revocation request grace period 1668 4.4.5 Circumstances for suspension 1669 4.4.6 Who can request suspension 1670 4.4.7 Procedure for suspension request 1671 4.4.8 Limits on suspension period 1672 4.4.9 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable) 1673 4.4.10 CRL checking requirements 1674 4.4.11 On-line revocation/status checking availability 1675 4.4.12 On-line revocation checking requirements 1676 4.4.13 Other forms of revocation advertisements available 1677 4.4.14 Checking requirements for other forms of revocation 1678 advertisements 1679 4.4.15 Special requirements re key compromise 1681 4.5 Security Audit Procedures 1682 4.5.1 Types of event recorded 1683 4.5.2 Frequency of processing log 1684 4.5.3 Retention period for audit log 1685 4.5.4 Protection of audit log 1686 4.5.5 Audit log backup procedures 1687 4.5.6 Audit collection system (internal vs external) 1688 4.5.7 Notification to event-causing subject 1689 4.5.8 Vulnerability assessments 1691 4.6 Records Archival 1693 4.6.1 Types of event recorded 1694 4.6.2 Retention period for archive 1695 4.6.3 Protection of archive 1696 4.6.4 Archive backup procedures 1697 4.6.5 Archive collection system (internal or external) 1698 4.6.6 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information 1700 4.7 Key changeover 1702 4.8 Compromise and Disaster Recovery 1704 4.9 CA Termination 1706 5. PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS (34) 1708 5.1 Physical Controls 1709 5.1.1 Site location and construction 1710 5.1.2 Physical access 1711 5.1.3 Power and air conditioning 1712 5.1.4 Water exposures 1713 5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection 1714 5.1.6 Media storage 1715 5.1.7 Waste disposal 1716 5.1.8 Off-site backup 1718 5.2 Procedural Controls 1719 5.2.1 Trusted roles 1720 5.2.2 Number of persons required per task 1721 5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role 1723 5.3 Personnel Controls 1724 5.3.1 Background, qualifications, experience, and clearance 1725 requirements 1726 5.3.2 Background check procedures 1727 5.3.3 Training requirements 1728 5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements 1729 5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence 1730 5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions 1731 5.3.7 Contracting personnel requirements 1732 5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel 1734 6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS (34) 1736 6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation 1737 6.1.1 Key pair generation 1738 6.1.2 Private key delivery to entity 1739 6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer 1740 6.1.4 CA public key delivery to users 1741 6.1.5 Key sizes 1742 6.1.6 Public key parameters generation 1743 6.1.7 Parameter quality checking 1744 6.1.8 Hardware/software key generation 1745 6.1.9 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) 1747 6.2 Private Key Protection 1748 6.2.1 Standards for cryptographic module 1749 6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control 1750 6.2.3 Private key escrow 1751 6.2.4 Private key backup 1752 6.2.5 Private key archival 1753 6.2.6 Private key entry into cryptographic module 1754 6.2.7 Method of activating private key 1755 6.2.8 Method of deactivating private key 1756 6.2.9 Method of destroying private key 1758 6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management 1759 6.3.1 Public key archival 1760 6.3.2 Usage periods for the public and private keys 1762 6.4 Activation Data 1763 6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation 1764 6.4.2 Activation data protection 1765 6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data 1767 6.5 Computer Security Controls 1768 6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements 1769 6.5.2 Computer security rating 1771 6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls 1772 6.6.1 System development controls 1773 6.6.2 Security management controls 1774 6.6.3 Life cycle security ratings 1776 6.7 Network Security Controls 1778 6.8 Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 1780 7. CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES 1782 7.1 Certificate Profile 1784 7.1.1 Version number(s) 1785 7.1.2 Certificate extensions 1786 7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers 1787 7.1.4 Name forms 1788 7.1.5 Name constraints 1789 7.1.6 Certificate policy Object Identifier 1790 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension 1791 7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics 1792 7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical certificate policy 1793 extension 1795 7.2 CRL Profile 1797 7.2.1 Version number(s) 1798 7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions 1800 8. SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION 1802 8.1 Specification change procedures 1804 8.2 Publication and notification policies 1806 8.3 CPS approval procedures 1808 6. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 1810 This entire memo deals with security. 1812 7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1814 The development of this document was supported by the Government of 1815 Canada's Policy Management Authority (PMA) Committee, the National 1816 Security Agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 1817 (NIST), and the American Bar Association Information Security 1818 Committee Accreditation Technical Working Group. Special thanks are 1819 due to Dave Fillingham, Jim Brandt, and Edmond Van Hees for their 1820 inspiration, support, and valuable inputs. 1822 The following individuals also deserve credit for their review and 1823 input: 1825 Teresa Acevedo, A&N Associates; 1826 Michael Baum; VeriSign; 1827 Sharon Boeyen, Entrust; 1828 Bob Burger, McCarter & English; 1829 Bill Burr, NIST; 1830 Patrick Cain, BBN; 1831 Michael Harrop, Government of Canada Treasury Board; 1832 Rick Hornbeck, Digital Commerce Services; 1833 Francois Marinier, Domus Software; 1834 John Morris, CygnaCom Solutions; 1835 Tim Moses, Entrust; 1836 Noel Nazario, NIST; 1837 John Nicolletos, A&N Associates; 1838 Jean Petty, CygnaCom Solutions; 1839 Denis Pinkas, Bull; 1840 J.-F. Sauriol, Domus Software; 1841 Robert Shirey, BBN; 1842 Mark Silvern, VeriSign; 1843 David Simonetti, Booz, Allen and Hamilton; and 1844 Darryl Stal, Entrust. 1846 Johnny Hsiung, and Chris Miller assisted in the preparation of the 1847 manuscript. 1849 8. REFERENCES 1851 [ABA1] American Bar Association, Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal 1852 Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Electronic Commerce, 1853 1995. 1855 [BAU1] Michael. S. Baum, Federal Certification Authority Liability 1856 and Policy, NIST-GCR-94-654, June 1994. 1858 [ISO1] ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T Recommendation X.509, "Information 1859 Technology - Open Systems Interconnection: The Directory: 1860 Authentication Framework," 1997 edition. (Pending publication of 1997 1861 edition, use 1993 edition with the following amendment applied: 1862 Final Text of Draft Amendment DAM 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-8 on Certificate 1863 Extensions, June 1996.) 1865 [PEM1] S. Kent, "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail, 1866 Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management," Internet RFC 1422, 1993. 1868 [PKI1] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, D. Solo, "Internet Public Key 1869 Infrastructure, X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile," RFC [tbd], 1997. 1871 9. AUTHORS' ADDRESSES 1873 Santosh Chokhani 1874 CygnaCom Solutions, Inc. 1875 Suite 100 West 1876 7927 Jones Branch Drive 1877 McLean, VA 22102 1879 Phone: (703) 848-0883 1880 Fax: (703) 848-0960 1881 EMail: chokhani@cygnacom.com 1883 Warwick Ford 1884 VeriSign, Inc. 1885 One Alewife Center 1886 Cambridge, MA 02140 1888 Phone: (617) 492-2816 x225 1889 Fax: (617) 661-0716 1890 EMail: wford@verisign.com 1892 NOTES 1894 1 The ABA Digital Signature Guidelines can be purchased from the ABA. 1895 See http://www.abanet.com for ordering details. 1897 2 Examples of types of entity for subject CAs are a subordinate 1898 organization (e.g., branch or division), a federal government agency, 1899 or a state or provincial government department. 1901 3 This statement can have significant implications. For example, 1902 suppose a bank claims that it issues CA certificates to its branches 1903 only. Now, the user of a CA certificate issued by the bank can 1904 assume that the subject CA in the certificate is a branch of the bank 1906 4 Examples of the types of subject RA entities are branch and 1907 division of an organization. 1909 5 Examples of types of subject end entities are bank customers, 1910 telephone company subscribers, and employees of a government 1911 department 1913 6 This statement can have significant implications. For example, 1914 suppose Government CA claims that it issues certificates to 1915 Government employees only. Now, the user of a certificate issued by 1916 the Government CA can assume that the subject of the certificate is a 1917 Government employee. 1919 7 Examples include X.500 distinguished name, Internet e-mail address, 1920 and URL. 1922 8 The term "meaningful" means that the name form has commonly 1923 understood semantics to determine identity of the person and/or 1924 organization. Directory names and RFC 822 names may be more or less 1925 meaningful. 1927 9 Examples of proof include the issuing CA generating the key, or 1928 requiring the subject to send an electronically signed request or to 1929 sign a challenge. 1931 10 Examples of organization identity authentication are: articles of 1932 incorporation, duly signed corporate resolutions, company seal, and 1933 notarized documents. 1935 11 Examples of individual identity authentication are: biometrics 1936 (thumb print, ten finger print, face, palm, and retina scan), 1937 driver's license, passport, credit card, company badge, and 1938 government badge. 1940 12 Examples include duly signed authorization papers or corporate ID 1941 badge. 1943 13 The identification policy for routine rekey should be the same as 1944 the one for initial registration since the same subject needs 1945 rekeying. The rekey authentication may be accomplished using the 1946 techniques for initial I&A or using digitally signed requests. 1948 14 This identification and authentication policy could be the same as 1949 that for initial registration. 1951 15 This policy could be the same as the one for initial registration. 1953 16 The identification policy for Revocation request could be the same 1954 as that for initial registration since the same subject certificate 1955 needs to be revoked. The authentication policy could accept a 1956 Revocation request digitally signed by subject. The authentication 1957 information used during initial registration could be acceptable for 1958 Revocation request. Other less stringent authentication policy could 1959 be defined. 1961 17 The identification policy for key compromise notification could be 1962 the same as the one for initial registration since the same subject 1963 certificate needs to be revoked. The authentication policy could 1964 accept a Revocation request digitally signed by subject. The 1965 authentication information used during initial registration could be 1966 acceptable for key compromise notification. Other less stringent 1967 authentication policy could be defined. 1969 18 The n out of m rule allows a key to be split in m parts. The m 1970 parts may be given to m different individuals. Any n parts out of 1971 the m parts may be used to fully reconstitute the key, but having any 1972 n-1 parts provides one with no information about the key. 1974 19 A key may be escrowed, backed up or archived. Each of these 1975 functions have different purpose. Thus, a key may go through any 1976 subset of these functions depending on the requirements. The purpose 1977 of escrow is to allow a third party (such as an organization or 1978 government) to legally obtain the key without the cooperation of the 1979 subject. The purpose of back up is to allow the subject to 1980 reconstitute the key in case of the destruction of the key. The 1981 purpose of archive is to provide for reuse of the key in future, 1982 e.g., use the private key to decrypt a document. 1984 20 An example of activation data is a PIN or passphrase. 1986 21 Examples of physical access controls are: monitored facility , 1987 guarded facility, locked facility, access controlled using tokens, 1988 access controlled using biometrics, and access controlled through an 1989 access list. 1991 22 Examples of the roles include system administrator, system 1992 security officer, and system auditor. The duties of the system 1993 administrator are to configure, generate, boot, and operate the 1994 system. The duties of the system security officer are to assign 1995 accounts and privileges. The duties of the system auditor are to set 1996 up system audit profile, perform audit file management, and audit 1997 review. 1999 23 The background checks may include clearance level (e.g., none, 2000 sensitive, confidential, secret, top secret, etc.) and the clearance 2001 granting authority name. In lieu of or in addition to a defined 2002 clearance, the background checks may include types of background 2003 information (e.g., name, place of birth, date of birth, home address, 2004 previous residences, previous employment, and any other information 2005 that may help determine trustworthiness). The description should 2006 also include which information was verified and how. 2008 24 For example, the certificate policy may impose personnel security 2009 requirements on the network system administrator responsible for a 2010 CA's network access. 2012 25 Each authorized person should be accountable for his/her actions. 2014 26 A cryptographic module is hardware, software, or firmware or any 2015 combination of them. 2017 27 The compliance description should be specific and detailed. For 2018 example, for each FIPS 140-1 requirement, describe the level and 2019 whether the level has been certified by an accredited laboratory. 2021 28 Example of audit events are: request to create a certificate, 2022 request to revoke a certificate, key compromise notification, 2023 creation of a certificate, revocation of a certificate, issuance of a 2024 certificate, issuance of a CRL, issuance of key compromise CRL, 2025 establishment of trusted roles on the CA, actions of truste 2026 personnel, changes to CA keys, etc. 2028 29 Example of archive events are: request to create a certificate, 2029 request to revoke a certificate, key compromise notification, 2030 creation of a certificate, revocation of a certificate, issuance of a 2031 certificate, issuance of a CRL, issuance of key compromise CRL, and 2032 changes to CA keys. 2034 30 A parent CA is an example of audit relationship. 2036 31 Example of compliance audit topics: sample check on the various 2037 I&A policies, comprehensive checks on key management policies, 2038 comprehensive checks on system security controls, comprehensive 2039 checks on operations policy, and comprehensive checks on certificate 2040 profiles. 2042 32 The examples include, temporary suspension of operations until 2043 deficiencies are corrected, revocation of entity certificate, change 2044 in personnel, invocation of liability policy, more frequent 2045 compliance audit, etc. 2047 33 An organization may choose not to make public some of its security 2048 controls, clearance procedures, or some others elements due to their 2049 sensitivity. 2051 34 All or some of the following items may be different for the 2052 various types of entities, i.e., CA, RA, and end entities. 2054 LIST OF ACRONYMS 2056 ABA - American Bar Association 2057 CA - Certification Authority 2058 CPS - Certification Practice Statement 2059 CRL - Certificate Revocation List 2060 DAM - Draft Amendment 2061 FIPS - Federal Information Processing Standard 2062 I&A - Identification and Authentication 2063 IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission 2064 IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force 2065 IP - Internet Protocol 2066 ISO - International Organization for Standardization 2067 ITU - International Telecommunications Union 2068 NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology 2069 OID - Object Identifier 2070 PIN - Personal Identification Number 2071 PKI - Public Key Infrastructure 2072 PKIX - Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) (IETF Working Group) 2073 RA - Registration Authority 2074 RFC - Request For Comment 2075 URL - Uniform Resource Locator 2076 US - United States 2078 36