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(See Section 2.2 of https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist for how to handle the case when there are no actions for IANA.) ** The document seems to lack separate sections for Informative/Normative References. All references will be assumed normative when checking for downward references. ** There are 13 instances of too long lines in the document, the longest one being 2 characters in excess of 72. ** There are 3 instances of lines with control characters in the document. ** The document seems to lack a both a reference to RFC 2119 and the recommended RFC 2119 boilerplate, even if it appears to use RFC 2119 keywords. RFC 2119 keyword, line 810: '... protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,...' RFC 2119 keyword, line 811: '... extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL...' RFC 2119 keyword, line 846: '... messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,...' RFC 2119 keyword, line 850: '... protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,...' 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'MvOV97' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'PKCS7' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'PKCS10' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'PKCS11' ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2104 Summary: 13 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 11 warnings (==), 30 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Internet Draft C. Adams (Entrust Technologies) 2 PKIX Working Group S. Farrell (SSE) 3 draft-ietf-pkix-ipki3cmp-05.txt 4 Expires in 6 months Oct. 1997 6 Internet Public Key Infrastructure 7 Certificate Management Protocols 9 Status of this Memo 11 This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working 12 documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and 13 its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working 14 documents as Internet-Drafts. 16 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of 6 months 17 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 18 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material 19 or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 21 To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the 22 "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow 23 Directories on ftp.is.co.za(Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), 24 munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or 25 ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). 27 Abstract 29 This is a draft of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) 30 Certificate Management Protocols. Protocol messages are defined for all 31 relevant aspects of certificate creation and management. 33 Introduction 35 The layout of this document is as follows: 37 - Section 1 contains an overview of PKI management; 38 - Section 2 contains discussion of assumptions and restrictions; 39 - Section 3 contains data structures used for PKI management messages; 40 - Section 4 defines the functions that are to be carried out in PKI 41 management by conforming implementations; 42 - Section 5 describes a simple protocol for transporting PKI messages; 43 - the Appendices specify profiles for conforming implementations and 44 provide an ASN.1 module containing the syntax for all defined 45 messages. 47 1 PKI Management Overview 49 The PKI must be structured to be consistent with the types of 50 individuals who must administer it. Providing such administrators with 51 unbounded choices not only complicates the software required but also 52 increases the chances that a subtle mistake by an administrator or 53 software developer will result in broader compromise. Similarly, 54 restricting administrators with cumbersome mechanisms will cause them 55 not to use the PKI. 57 Management protocols are required to support on-line interactions 58 between Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) components. For example, a 59 management protocol might be used between a CA and a client system with 60 which a key pair is associated, or between two CAs that cross-certify 61 each other. 63 1.1 PKI Management Model 65 Before specifying particular message formats and procedures we first 66 define the entities involved in PKI management and their interactions 67 (in terms of the PKI management functions required). We then group 68 these functions in order to accommodate different identifiable types of 69 end entities. 71 1.2 Definitions of PKI Entities 73 The entities involved in PKI management include the end entity (i.e., 74 the entity to be named in the subject field of a certificate) and the 75 certification authority (i.e., the entity named in the issuer field of a 76 certificate). A registration authority may also be involved in PKI 77 management. 79 1.2.1 Subjects and End Entities 81 The term "subject" is used here to refer to the entity named in the 82 subject field of a certificate; when we wish to distinguish the tools 83 and/or software used by the subject (e.g., a local certificate management 84 module) we will use the term "subject equipment". In general, the term 85 "end entity" rather than subject is preferred in order to avoid confusion 86 with the field name. 88 It is important to note that the end entities here will include not only 89 human users of applications, but also applications themselves (e.g., for 90 IP security). This factor influences the protocols which the PKI 91 management operations use; for example, application software is far more 92 likely to know exactly which certificate extensions are required than 93 are human users. PKI management entities are also end entities in the 94 sense that they are sometimes named in the subject field of a 95 certificate or cross-certificate. Where appropriate, the term "end- 96 entity" will be used to refer to end entities who are not PKI management 97 entities. 99 All end entities require secure local access to some information -- at a 100 minimum, their own name and private key, the name of a CA which is 101 directly trusted by this entity and that CA's public key (or a 102 fingerprint of the public key where a self-certified version is 103 available elsewhere). Implementations may use secure local storage for 104 more than this minimum (e.g., the end entity's own certificate or 105 application-specific information). The form of storage will also vary -- 106 from files to tamper-resistant cryptographic tokens. Such local trusted 107 storage is referred to here as the end entity's Personal Security 108 Environment (PSE). 110 Though PSE formats are beyond the scope of this document (they are very 111 dependent on equipment, et cetera), a generic interchange format for 112 PSEs is defined here - a certification response message may be used. 114 1.2.2 Certification Authority 116 The certification authority (CA) may or may not actually be a real 117 "third party" from the end entity's point of view. Quite often, the CA 118 will actually belong to the same organization as the end entities it 119 supports. 121 Again, we use the term CA to refer to the entity named in the issuer 122 field of a certificate; when it is necessary to distinguish the software 123 or hardware tools used by the CA we use the term "CA equipment". 125 The CA equipment will often include both an "off-line" component and an 126 "on-line" component, with the CA private key only available to the "off- 127 line" component. This is, however, a matter for implementers (though it 128 is also relevant as a policy issue). 130 We use the term "root CA" to indicate a CA that is directly trusted by 131 an end entity; that is, securely acquiring the value of a root CA public 132 key requires some out-of-band step(s). This term is not meant to imply 133 that a root CA is at the top of any hierarchy, simply that the CA in 134 question is trusted directly. 136 A "subordinate CA" is one that is not a root CA for the end entity in 137 question. Often, a subordinate CA will not be a root CA for any entity 138 but this is not mandatory. 140 1.2.3 Registration Authority 142 In addition to end-entities and CAs, many environments call for the 143 existence of a registration authority (RA) separate from the 144 certification authority. The functions which the registration authority 145 may carry out will vary from case to case but may include personal 146 authentication, token distribution, revocation reporting, name 147 assignment, key generation, archival of key pairs, et cetera. 149 This document views the RA as an optional component - when it is not 150 present the CA is assumed to be able to carry out the RA's functions so 151 that the PKI management protocols are the same from the end-entity's 152 point of view. 154 Again, we distinguish, where necessary, between the RA and the tools 155 used (the "RA equipment"). 157 Note that an RA is itself an end entity. We further assume that all RAs 158 are in fact certified end entities and that RA private keys are usable 159 for signing. How a particular CA equipment identifies some end entities 160 as RAs is an implementation issue (i.e., this document specifies no 161 special RA certification operation). We do not mandate that the RA is 162 certified by the CA with which it is interacting at the moment (so one 163 RA may work with more than one CA whilst only being certified once). 165 In some circumstances end entities will communicate directly with a CA 166 even where an RA is present. For example, for initial registration 167 and/or certification the subject may use its RA, but communicate 168 directly with the CA in order to refresh its certificate. 170 1.3 PKI Management Requirements 172 The protocols given here meet the following requirements on PKI 173 management. 175 1. PKI management must conform to ISO 9594-8 and the associated 176 amendments (certificate extensions) 178 2. PKI management must conform to the other parts of this series. 180 3. It must be possible to regularly update any key pair without 181 affecting any other key pair. 183 4. The use of confidentiality in PKI management protocols must be kept 184 to a minimum in order to ease regulatory problems. 186 5. PKI management protocols must allow the use of different industry- 187 standard cryptographic algorithms, (specifically including RSA, DSA, 188 MD5, SHA-1) -- this means that any given CA, RA, or end entity may, in 189 principle, use whichever algorithms suit it for its own key pair(s). 191 6. PKI management protocols must not preclude the generation of key 192 pairs by the end-entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA -- key 193 generation may also occur elsewhere, but for the purposes of PKI 194 management we can regard key generation as occurring wherever the key is 195 first present at an end entity, RA, or CA. 197 7. PKI management protocols must support the publication of 198 certificates by the end-entity concerned, by an RA, or by a CA. 199 Different implementations and different environments may choose any 200 of the above approaches. 202 8. PKI management protocols must support the production of CRLs by 203 allowing certified end entities to make requests for the revocation of 204 certificates - this must be done in such a way that the denial-of- 205 service attacks which are possible are not made simpler. 207 9. PKI management protocols must be usable over a variety of 208 "transport" mechanisms, specifically including mail, http, TCP/IP and 209 ftp. 211 10. Final authority for certification creation rests with the CA; no 212 RA or end-entity equipment can assume that any certificate issued by a 213 CA will contain what was requested -- a CA may alter certificate field 214 values or may add, delete or alter extensions according to its operating 215 policy; the only exception to this is the public key, which the CA must 216 not modify (assuming that the CA was presented with the public key 217 value). In other words, all PKI entities (end-entities, RAs, and CAs) 218 must be capable of handling responses to requests for certificates in 219 which the actual certificate issued is different from that requested 220 (for example, a CA may shorten the validity period requested). 222 11. A graceful, scheduled change-over from one non-compromised CA key 223 pair to the next (CA key update) must be supported (note that if the 224 CA key is compromised, re-initialization must be performed for all 225 entities in the domain of that CA). An end entity whose PSE contains 226 the new CA public key (following a CA key update) must also be able 227 to verify certificates verifiable using the old public key. End 228 entities who directly trust the old CA key pair must also be able to 229 verify certificates signed using the new CA private key. (Required for 230 situations where the old CA public key is "hardwired" into the end 231 entity's cryptographic equipment). 233 12. The Functions of an RA may, in some implementations or 234 environments, be carried out by the CA itself. The protocols must be 235 designed so that end entities will use the same protocol (but, of 236 course, not the same key!) regardless of whether the communication is 237 with an RA or CA. 239 13. Where an end entity requests a certificate containing a given 240 public key value, the end entity must be ready to demonstrate 241 possession of the corresponding private key value. This may be 242 accomplished in various ways, depending on the type of certification 243 request. See Section 2.3, "Proof of Possession of Private Key", for 244 details of the in-band methods defined for the PKIX-CMP messages. 246 PKI Management Operations 248 The following diagram shows the relationship between the entities 249 defined above in terms of the PKI management operations. The letters in 250 the diagram indicate "protocols" in the sense that a defined set of PKI 251 management messages can be sent along each of the lettered lines. 253 +---+ cert. publish +------------+ j 254 | | <--------------------- | End Entity | <------- 255 | C | g +------------+ "out-of-band" 256 | | | ^ loading 257 | e | | | initial 258 | r | a | | b registration/ 259 | t | | | certification 260 | | | | key pair recovery 261 | / | | | key pair update 262 | | | | certificate update 263 | C | PKI "USERS" V | revocation request 264 | R | -------------------+-+-----+-+------+-+------------------- 265 | L | PKI MANAGEMENT | ^ | ^ 266 | | ENTITIES a | | b a | | b 267 | | V | | | 268 | R | g +------+ d | | 269 | e | <------------ | RA | <-----+ | | 270 | p | cert. | | ----+ | | | 271 | o | publish +------+ c | | | | 272 | s | | | | | 273 | i | V | V | 274 | t | g +------------+ i 275 | o | <------------------------| CA |-------> 276 | r | h +------------+ "out-of-band" 277 | y | cert. publish | ^ publication 278 | | CRL publish | | 279 +---+ | | cross-certification 280 e | | f cross-certificate 281 | | update 282 | | 283 V | 284 +------+ 285 | CA-2 | 286 +------+ 288 Figure 1 - PKI Entities 290 At a high level the set of operations for which management messages are 291 defined can be grouped as follows. 293 1 CA establishment: When establishing a new CA, certain steps are 294 required (e.g., production of initial CRLs, export of CA public 295 key). 297 2 End entity initialization: this includes importing a root CA 298 public key and requesting information about the options 299 supported by a PKI management entity. 301 3 Certification: various operations result in the creation of new 302 certificates: 304 3.1 initial registration/certification: This is the process whereby 305 an end entity first makes itself known to a CA or RA, prior to the CA 306 issuing a certificate or certificates for that end entity. The end 307 result of this process (when it is successful) is that a CA issues a 308 certificate for an end entity's public key, and returns that 309 certificate to the end entity and/or posts that certificate in a 310 public repository. This process may, and typically will, involve 311 multiple "steps", possibly including an initialization of the end 312 entity's equipment. For example, the end entity's equipment must be 313 securely initialized with the public key of a CA, to be used in 314 validating certificate paths. Furthermore, an end entity typically 315 needs to be initialized with its own key pair(s). 317 3.2 key pair update: Every key pair needs to be updated regularly 318 (i.e., replaced with a new key pair), and a new certificate needs to 319 be issued. 321 3.3 certificate update: As certificates expire they may be 322 "refreshed" if nothing relevant in the environment has changed. 324 3.4 CA key pair update: As with end entities, CA key pairs need to 325 be updated regularly; however, different mechanisms are required. 327 3.5 cross-certification: An requesting CA provides to a responding 328 CA the information necessary for the responding CA to issue a 329 cross-certificate. Note: this action may be mutual, so that two 330 cross-certificates are issued (one in each direction). 332 3.6 cross-certificate update: Similar to a normal certificate update 333 but involving a cross-certificate. 335 4 Certificate/CRL discovery operations: some PKI management 336 operations result in the publication of certificates or CRLs: 338 4.1 certificate publication: Having gone to the trouble of producing 339 a certificate, some means for publishing it is needed. The "means" 340 defined in PKIX may involve the messages specified in Sections 341 3.3.13 - 3.3.16, or may involve other methods (LDAP, for example) as 342 described in the "Operational Protocols" documents of the PKIX series 343 of specifications. 345 4.2 CRL publication: As for certificate publication. 347 5 Recovery operations: some PKI management operations are used when 348 an end entity has "lost" its PSE: 350 5.1 key pair recovery: As an option, user client key materials 351 (e.g., a user's private key used for decryption purposes) may be backed 352 up by a CA, an RA, or a key backup system associated with a CA or RA. 353 If an entity needs to recover these backed up key materials (e.g., as a 354 result of a forgotten password or a lost key chain file), a protocol 355 exchange may be needed to support such recovery. 357 6 Revocation operations: some PKI operations result in the creation 358 of new CRL entries and/or new CRLs: 360 6.1 revocation request: An authorized person advises a CA of an 361 abnormal situation requiring certificate revocation. 363 7 PSE operations: whilst the definition of PSE operations (e.g., 364 moving a PSE, changing a PIN, etc.) are beyond the scope of this 365 specification, we do define a PKIMessage (CertRep) which can form the 366 basis of such operations. 368 Note that on-line protocols are not the only way of implementing the 369 above operations. For all operations there are off-line methods of 370 achieving the same result, and this specification does not mandate use 371 of on-line protocols. For example, when hardware tokens are used, many 372 of the operations may be achieved as part of the physical token 373 delivery. 375 Later sections define a set of standard messages supporting the above 376 operations. The protocols for conveying these exchanges in different 377 environments (file based, on-line, E-mail, and WWW) is also 378 specified. 380 2. Assumptions and restrictions 382 2.1 End entity initialization 384 The first step for an end entity in dealing with PKI management 385 entities is to request information about the PKI functions supported and 386 to securely acquire a copy of the relevant root CA public key(s). 388 2.2 Initial registration/certification 390 There are many schemes that can be used to achieve initial registration 391 and certification of end entities. No one method is suitable for all 392 situations due to the range of policies which a CA may implement and the 393 variation in the types of end entity which can occur. 395 We can however, classify the initial registration / certification 396 schemes that are supported by this specification. Note that the word 397 "initial", above, is crucial - we are dealing with the situation where 398 the end entity in question has had no previous contact with the PKI. 399 Where the end entity already possesses certified keys then some 400 simplifications/alternatives are possible. 402 Having classified the schemes that are supported by this specification 403 we can then specify some as mandatory and some as optional. The goal is 404 that the mandatory schemes cover a sufficient number of the cases which 405 will arise in real use, whilst the optional schemes are available for 406 special cases which arise less frequently. In this way we achieve a 407 balance between flexibility and ease of implementation. 409 We will now describe the classification of initial registration / 410 certification schemes. 412 2.2.1 Criteria used 414 2.2.1.1 Initiation of registration / certification 416 In terms of the PKI messages which are produced we can regard the 417 initiation of the initial registration / certification exchanges as 418 occurring wherever the first PKI message relating to the end entity is 419 produced. Note that the real-world initiation of the registration / 420 certification procedure may occur elsewhere (e.g., a personnel 421 department may telephone an RA operator). 423 The possible locations are at the end entity, an RA, or a CA. 425 2.2.1.2 End entity message origin authentication 427 The on-line messages produced by the end entity that requires a 428 certificate may be authenticated or not. The requirement here is to 429 authenticate the origin of any messages from the end entity to the PKI 430 (CA/RA). 432 In this specification, such authentication is achieved by the PKI 433 (CA/RA) issuing the end entity with a secret value (initial 434 authentication key) and reference value (used to identify the 435 transaction) via some out-of-band means. The initial authentication key 436 can then be used to protect relevant PKI messages. 438 We can thus classify the initial registration/certification scheme 439 according to whether or not the on-line end entity -> PKI messages are 440 authenticated or not. 442 Note 1: We do not discuss the authentication of the PKI -> end entity 443 messages here as this is always required. In any case, it can be 444 achieved simply once the root-CA public key has been installed at the 445 end entity�s equipment or it can be based on the initial authentication 446 key. 448 Note 2: An initial registration / certification procedure can be secure 449 where the messages from the end entity are authenticated via some out- 450 of-band means (e.g., a subsequent visit). 452 2.2.1.3 Location of key generation 454 In this specification, "key generation" is regarded as occurring 455 wherever either the public or private component of a key pair first 456 occurs in a PKIMessage. Note that this does not preclude a centralized 457 key generation service - the actual key pair may have been generated 458 elsewhere and transported to the end entity, RA, or CA using a 459 (proprietary or standardized) key generation request/response protocol 460 (outside the scope of this specification). 462 There are thus three possibilities for the location of "key 463 generation": the end entity, an RA, or a CA. 465 2.2.1.4 Confirmation of successful certification 467 Following the creation of an initial certificate for an end entity, 468 additional assurance can be gained by having the end entity explicitly 469 confirm successful receipt of the message containing (or indicating the 470 creation of) the certificate. Naturally, this confirmation message must 471 be protected (based on the initial authentication key or other means). 473 This gives two further possibilities: confirmed or not. 475 2.2.2 Mandatory schemes 477 The criteria above allow for a large number of initial registration / 478 certification schemes. This specification mandates that conforming CA 479 equipment, RA equipment, and EE equipment must support the second 480 scheme listed below. Any entity may additionally support other schemes, 481 if desired. 483 2.2.2.1 Centralized scheme 485 In terms of the classification above, this scheme is, in some ways, 486 the simplest possible, where: 488 - initiation occurs at the certifying CA; 489 - no on-line message authentication is required; 490 - "key generation" occurs at the certifying CA (see Section 2.2.1.3); 491 - no confirmation message is required. 493 In terms of message flow, this scheme means that the only message 494 required is sent from the CA to the end entity. The message must contain 495 the entire PSE for the end entity. Some out-of-band means must be 496 provided to allow the end entity to authenticate the message received 497 and decrypt any encrypted values. 499 2.2.2.2 Basic authenticated scheme 501 In terms of the classification above, this scheme is where: 503 - initiation occurs at the end entity; 504 - message authentication is required; 505 - "key generation" occurs at the end entity (see Section 2.2.1.3); 506 - a confirmation message is required. 508 In terms of message flow, the basic authenticated scheme is as follows: 510 End entity RA/CA 511 ========== ============= 512 out-of-band distribution of initial authentication 513 key (IAK) and reference value (RA/CA -> EE) 514 Key generation 515 Creation of certification request 516 Protect request with IAK 517 -->>--certification request-->>-- 518 verify request 519 process request 520 create response 521 --<<--certification response--<<-- 522 handle response 523 create confirmation 524 -->>--confirmation message-->>-- 525 verify confirmation 527 (Where verification of the confirmation message fails, the RA/CA must 528 revoke the newly issued certificate if necessary.) 529 2.3 Proof of Possession (POP) of Private Key 531 In order to prevent certain attacks and to allow a CA/RA to properly 532 check the validity of the binding between an end entity and a key pair, 533 the PKI management operations specified here make it possible for an end 534 entity to prove that it has possession of (i.e., is able to use) the 535 private key corresponding to the public key for which a certificate is 536 requested. A given CA/RA is free to choose how to enforce POP (e.g., 537 out-of-band procedural means versus PKIX-CMP in-band messages) in its 538 certification exchanges (i.e., this may be a policy issue). However, 539 it is MANDATED that CAs/RAs enforce POP by some means because there are 540 currently many non-PKIX operational protocols in use (various electronic 541 mail protocols are one example) that do not explicitly check the binding 542 between the end entity and the private key. Until operational protocols 543 that do verify the binding (for signature, encryption, and key agreement 544 key pairs) exist, and are ubiquitous, this binding can only be assumed 545 to have been verified by the CA/RA. Therefore, if the binding is not 546 verified by the CA/RA, certificates in the Internet Public-Key 547 Infrastructure end up being somewhat less meaningful. 549 POP is accomplished in different ways depending on the type of key for 550 which a certificate is requested. If a key can be used for multiple 551 purposes (e.g., an RSA key) then any of the methods may be used. 553 This specification explicitly allows for cases where an end entity 554 supplies the relevant proof to an RA and the RA subsequently attests to 555 the CA that the required proof has been received (and validated!). For 556 example, an end entity wishing to have a signing key certified could 557 send the appropriate signature to the RA which then simply notifies the 558 relevant CA that the end entity has supplied the required proof. Of 559 course, such a situation may be disallowed by some policies (e.g., CAs 560 may be the only entities permitted to verify POP during certification). 562 2.3.1 Signature Keys 564 For signature keys, the end entity can sign a value to prove possession 565 of the private key. 567 2.3.2 Encryption Keys 569 For encryption keys, the end entity can provide the private key to the 570 CA/RA, or can be required to decrypt a value in order to prove 571 possession of the private key (see Section 3.2.8). Decrypting a value 572 can be achieved either directly or indirectly. 574 The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to which 575 an immediate response by the EE is required. 577 The indirect method is to issue a certificate which is encrypted for the 578 end entity (and have the end entity demonstrate its ability to decrypt 579 this certificate in the confirmation message). This allows a CA to issue 580 a certificate in a form which can only be used by the intended end 581 entity. 583 This specification encourages the indirect method because this requires 584 no extra messages to be sent (i.e., the proof can be demonstrated using 585 the {request, response, confirmation} triple of messages). 587 2.3.3 Key Agreement Keys 589 For key agreement keys, the end entity and the PKI management entity 590 (i.e., CA or RA) must establish a shared secret key in order to prove 591 that the end entity has possession of the private key. 593 Note that this need not impose any restrictions on the keys that can be 594 certified by a given CA -- in particular, for Diffie-Hellman keys the 595 end entity may freely choose its algorithm parameters -- provided that 596 the CA can generate a short-term (or one-time) key pair with the 597 appropriate parameters when necessary. 599 2.4 Root CA key update 601 This discussion only applies to CAs that are a root CA for some end 602 entity. 604 The basis of the procedure described here is that the CA protects its 605 new public key using its previous private key and vice versa. Thus when 606 a CA updates its key pair it must generate two extra cACertificate 607 attribute values if certificates are made available using an X.500 608 directory (for a total of four: OldWithOld; OldWithNew; NewWithOld; 609 and NewWithNew). 611 When a CA changes its key pair those entities who have acquired the old 612 CA public key via "out-of-band" means are most affected. It is these end 613 entities who will need access to the new CA public key protected with 614 the old CA private key. However, they will only require this for a 615 limited period (until they have acquired the new CA public key via the 616 "out-of-band" mechanism). This will typically be easily achieved when 617 these end entities' certificates expire. 619 The data structure used to protect the new and old CA public keys is a 620 standard certificate (which may also contain extensions). There are no 621 new data structures required. 623 Note 1. This scheme does not make use of any of the X.509 v3 extensions 624 as it must be able to work even for version 1 certificates. The presence 625 of the KeyIdentifier extension would make for efficiency improvements. 627 Note 2. While the scheme could be generalized to cover cases where the 628 CA updates its key pair more than once during the validity period of 629 one of its end entities' certificates, this generalization seems of 630 dubious value. Not having this generalization simply means that the 631 validity period of a CA key pair must be greater than the validity 632 period of any certificate issued by that CA using that key pair. 634 Note 3.This scheme forces end entities to acquire the new CA public key 635 on the expiry of the last certificate they owned that was signed with 636 the old CA private key (via the "out-of-band" means). Certificate 637 and/or key update operations occurring at other times do not necessarily 638 require this (depending on the end entity's equipment). 640 2.4.1 CA Operator actions 642 To change the key of the CA, the CA operator does the following: 644 1.Generate a new key pair; 646 2.Create a certificate containing the old CA public key signed with 647 the new private key (the "old with new" certificate); 649 3.Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed with 650 the old private key (the "new with old" certificate); 652 4.Create a certificate containing the new CA public key signed with 653 the new private key (the "new with new" certificate); 655 5.Publish these new certificates via the directory and/or other means 656 (perhaps using a CAKeyUpdAnn message); 658 6.Export the new CA public key so that end entities may acquire it 659 using the "out-of-band" mechanism (if required). 661 The old CA private key is then no longer required. The old CA public key 662 will however remain in use for some time. The time when the old CA 663 public key is no longer required (other than for non-repudiation) will 664 be when all end entities of this CA have securely acquired the new CA 665 public key. 667 The "old with new" certificate must have a validity period starting at 668 the generation time of the old key pair and ending at the expiry date of 669 the old public key. 671 The "new with old" certificate must have a validity period starting at 672 the generation time of the new key pair and ending at the time by which 673 all end entities of this CA will securely possess the new CA public key 674 (at the latest, the expiry date of the old public key). 676 The "new with new" certificate must have a validity period starting at 677 the generation time of the new key pair and ending at the time by which 678 the CA will next update its key pair. 680 2.4.2 Verifying Certificates. 682 Normally when verifying a signature, the verifier verifies (among other 683 things) the certificate containing the public key of the signer. 684 However, once a CA is allowed to update its key there are a range of new 685 possibilities. These are shown in the table below. 687 Repository contains NEW Repository contains only OLD 688 and OLD public keys public key (due to, e.g., 689 delay in publication) 691 PSE PSE Contains PSE Contains PSE Contains 692 Contains OLD public NEW public OLD public 693 NEW public key key key 694 key 696 Signer's Case 1: Case 3: Case 5: Case 7: 697 certifi- This is In this case Although the In this case 698 cate is the the verifier CA operator the CA 699 protected standard must access has not operator has 700 using NEW case where the updated the not updated 701 public the directory in directory the the directory 702 key verifier order to get verifier can and so the 703 can the value of verify the verification 704 directly the NEW certificate will FAIL 705 verify the public key directly - 706 certificate this is thus 707 without the same as 708 using the case 1. 709 directory 711 Signer's Case 2: Case 4: Case 6: Case 8: 712 certifi- In this In this case The verifier Although the 713 cate is case the the verifier thinks this CA operator 714 protected verifier can directly is the has not 715 using OLD must verify the situation of updated the 716 public access the certificate case 2 and directory the 717 key directory without will access verifier can 718 in order using the the verify the 719 to get the directory directory; certificate 720 value of however, the directly - 721 the OLD verification this is thus 722 public key will FAIL the same as 723 case 4. 725 2.4.2.1 Verification in cases 1, 4, 5 and 8. 727 In these cases the verifier has a local copy of the CA public key which 728 can be used to verify the certificate directly. This is the same as the 729 situation where no key change has occurred. 731 Note that case 8 may arise between the time when the CA operator has 732 generated the new key pair and the time when the CA operator stores the 733 updated attributes in the directory. Case 5 can only arise if the CA 734 operator has issued both the signer's and verifier's certificates during 735 this "gap" (the CA operator should avoid this as it leads to the failure 736 cases described below). 738 2.4.2.2 Verification in case 2. 740 In case 2 the verifier must get access to the old public key of the CA. 741 The verifier does the following: 743 1. Look up the caCertificate attribute in the directory and pick the 744 OldWithNew certificate (determined based on validity periods); 745 2. Verify that this is correct using the new CA key (which the 746 verifier has locally); 747 3. If correct, check the signer's certificate using the old CA key. 749 Case 2 will arise when the CA operator has issued the signer's 750 certificate, then changed key and then issued the verifier's 751 certificate, so it is quite a typical case. 753 2.4.2.3 Verification in case 3. 755 In case 3 the verifier must get access to the new public key of the CA. 756 The verifier does the following: 758 1. Look up the CACertificate attribute in the directory and pick the 759 NewWithOld certificate (determined based on validity periods); 760 2. Verify that this is correct using the old CA key (which the verifier 761 has stored locally); 762 3.If correct, check the signer's certificate using the new CA key. 764 Case 3 will arise when the CA operator has issued the verifier's 765 certificate, then changed key and then issued the signer's certificate, 766 so it is also quite a typical case. 768 2.4.2.4 Failure of verification in case 6. 770 In this case the CA has issued the verifier's PSE containing the new key 771 without updating the directory attributes. This means that the verifier 772 has no means to get a trustworthy version of the CA's old key and so 773 verification fails. 775 Note that the failure is the CA operator's fault. 777 2.4.2.5 Failure of verification in case 7. 779 In this case the CA has issued the signer's certificate protected with 780 the new key without updating the directory attributes. This means that 781 the verifier has no means to get a trustworthy version of the CA's new 782 key and so verification fails. 784 Note that the failure is again the CA operator's fault. 786 2.4.3 Revocation - Change of CA key 788 As we saw above the verification of a certificate becomes more complex 789 once the CA is allowed to change its key. This is also true for 790 revocation checks as the CA may have signed the CRL using a newer 791 private key than the one that is within the user's PSE. 793 The analysis of the alternatives is as for certificate verification. 795 3. Data Structures 797 This section contains descriptions of the data structures required for 798 PKI management messages. Section 4 describes constraints on their values 799 and the sequence of events for each of the various PKI management 800 operations. Section 5 describes how these may be encapsulated in various 801 transport mechanisms. 803 3.1 Overall PKI Message 805 All of the messages used in PKI management use the following structure: 807 PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 808 header PKIHeader, 809 body PKIBody, 810 protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, 811 extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL 812 } 814 The PKIHeader contains information which is common to many PKI messages. 816 The PKIBody contains message-specific information. 818 The PKIProtection, when used, contains bits that protect the PKI 819 message. 821 The extraCerts field can contain certificates that may be useful to the 822 recipient. For example, this can be used by a CA or RA to present an end 823 entity with certificates that it needs to verify its own new certificate 824 (if, for example, the CA that issued the end entity�s certificate is not 825 a root CA for the end entity). Note that this field does not 826 necessarily contain a certification path - the recipient may have to 827 sort, select from, or otherwise process the extra certificates in order 828 to use them. 830 3.1.1 PKI Message Header 832 All PKI messages require some header information for addressing and 833 transaction identification. Some of this information will also be 834 present in a transport-specific envelope; however, if the PKI message is 835 protected then this information is also protected (i.e., we make no 836 assumption about secure transport). 838 The following data structure is used to contain this information: 840 PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { 841 pvno INTEGER { ietf-version1 (0) }, 842 sender GeneralName, 843 -- identifies the sender 844 recipient GeneralName, 845 -- identifies the intended recipient 846 messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, 847 -- time of production of this message (used when sender 848 -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., 849 -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) 850 protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 851 -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits 852 senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, 853 recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, 854 -- to identify specific keys used for protection 855 transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 856 -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in 857 -- corresponding request, response and confirmation messages 858 senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 859 recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 860 -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce 861 -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce 862 -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by 863 -- the intended recipient of this message 864 freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, 865 -- this may be used to indicate context-specific 866 -- instructions (this field is intended for human 867 -- consumption) 868 generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 869 InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL 870 -- this may be used to convey context-specific information 871 -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) 872 } 874 PKIFreeText ::= CHOICE { 875 iA5String [0] IA5String, 876 bMPString [1] BMPString 877 } -- note that the text included here would ideally be in the 878 -- preferred language of the recipient 880 The pvno field is fixed (at zero) for this version of this 881 specification. 883 The sender field contains the name of the sender of the PKIMessage. This 884 name (in conjunction with senderKID, if supplied) should be usable to 885 verify the protection on the message. If nothing about the sender is 886 known to the sending entity (e.g., in the InitReq message, where the 887 end entity may not know its own DN, e-mail name, IP address, etc.), 888 then the "sender" field must contain a "NULL" value; that is, the 889 SEQUENCE OF relative distinguished names is of zero length. In such a 890 case the senderKID field must hold an identifier (i.e., a reference 891 number) which indicates to the receiver the appropriate shared secret 892 information to use to verify the message. 894 The recipient field contains the name of the recipient of the 895 PKIMessage. This name (in conjunction with recipKID, if supplied) should 896 be usable to verify the protection on the message. 898 The protectionAlg field specifies the algorithm used to protect the 899 message. If no protection bits are supplied (note that PKIProtection 900 is optional) then this field must be omitted; if protection bits are 901 supplied then this field must be supplied. 903 senderKID and recipKID are usable to indicate which keys have been used 904 to protect the message (recipKID will normally only be required where 905 protection of the message uses DH keys). 907 The transactionID field within the message header is required so that 908 the recipient of a response message can correlate this with a previously 909 issued request. For example, in the case of an RA there may be many 910 requests "outstanding" at a given moment. 912 The senderNonce and recipNonce fields protect the PKIMessage against 913 replay attacks. 915 The messageTime field contains the time at which the sender created the 916 message. This may be useful to allow end entities to correct their local 917 time to be consistent with the time on a central system. 919 The freeText field may be used to send a human-readable message to the 920 recipient (in the preferred language of the recipient). 922 The generalInfo field may be used to send machine-processable additional 923 data to the recipient. 925 3.1.2 PKI Message Body 927 PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements 928 ir [0] InitReqContent, 929 ip [1] InitRepContent, 930 cr [2] CertReqContent, 931 cp [3] CertRepContent, 932 p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, 933 -- the PKCS #10 certification request (see [PKCS10]) 934 popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, 935 popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, 936 kur [7] KeyUpdReqContent, 937 kup [8] KeyUpdRepContent, 938 krr [9] KeyRecReqContent, 939 krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, 940 rr [11] RevReqContent, 941 rp [12] RevRepContent, 942 ccr [13] CrossCertReqContent, 943 ccp [14] CrossCertRepContent, 944 ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, 945 cann [16] CertAnnContent, 946 rann [17] RevAnnContent, 947 crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, 948 conf [19] PKIConfirmContent, 949 nested [20] NestedMessageContent, 950 genm [21] GenMsgContent, 951 genp [22] GenRepContent, 952 error [23] ErrorMsgContent 953 } 955 The specific types are described in section 3.3 below. 957 3.1.3 PKI Message Protection 959 Some PKI messages will be protected for integrity. (Note that if an 960 asymmetric algorithm is used to protect a message and the relevant 961 public component has been certified already, then the origin of message 962 can also be authenticated. On the other hand, if the public component 963 is uncertified then the message origin cannot be automatically 964 authenticated, but may be authenticated via out-of-band means.) 966 When protection is applied the following structure is used: 968 PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING 970 The input to the calculation of PKIProtection is the DER encoding 971 of the following data structure: 973 ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { 974 header PKIHeader, 975 body PKIBody 976 } 978 There may be cases in which the PKIProtection BIT STRING is deliberately 979 not used to protect a message (i.e., this OPTIONAL field is omitted) 980 because other protection, external to PKIX, will instead be applied. 981 Such a choice is explicitly allowed in this specification. Examples of 982 such external protection include PKCS #7 [PKCS7] and Security Multiparts 983 [RFC1847] encapsulation of the PKIMessage (examples of external 984 protection using PKCS #7 will be provided in a separate document). It 985 is noted, however, that many such external mechanisms require that the 986 end entity already possesses a public-key certificate, and/or a unique 987 Distinguished Name, and/or other such infrastructure-related information. 988 Thus, they may not be appropriate for initial registration, key-recovery, 989 or any other process with "boot-strapping" characteristics. For those 990 cases it may be necessary that the PKIProtection parameter be used. In 991 the future, if/when external mechanisms are modified to accommodate 992 boot-strapping scenarios, the use of the PKIProtection parameter may 993 become rare or non-existent. 995 Depending on the circumstances the PKIProtection bits may contain a MAC 996 or signature. Only the following cases can occur: 998 - shared secret information 1000 In this case the sender and recipient share secret information 1001 (established via out-of-band means or from a previous PKI management 1002 operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the 1003 protectionAlg will be the following: 1005 PasswordBasedMac ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1007 PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { 1008 salt OCTET STRING, 1009 owf AlgorithmIdentifier, 1010 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) 1011 iterationCount INTEGER, 1012 -- number of times the OWF is applied 1013 mac AlgorithmIdentifier 1014 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], 1015 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104]) 1017 In the above protectionAlg the salt value is appended to the shared 1018 secret input. The OWF is then applied iterationCount times, where the 1019 salted secret is the input to the first iteration and, for each 1020 successive iteration, the input is set to be the output of the previous 1021 iteration. The output of the final iteration (called "BASEKEY" for ease 1022 of reference, with a size of "H") is what is used to form the symmetric 1023 key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key and K <= H, then the most 1024 significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If K > H, then all of BASEKEY is 1025 used for the most significant H bits of the key, OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is 1026 used for the next most significant H bits of the key, OWF("2" || 1027 BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H bits of the key, and so 1028 on, until all K bits have been derived. [Here "N" is the ASCII byte 1029 encoding the number N and "||" represents concatenation.] 1030 - DH key pairs 1032 Where the sender and receiver possess Diffie-Hellman certificates with 1033 compatible DH parameters, then in order to protect the message the end 1034 entity must generate a symmetric key based on its private DH key value 1035 and the DH public key of the recipient of the PKI message. 1036 PKIProtection will contain a MAC value keyed with this derived 1037 symmetric key and the protectionAlg will be the following: 1039 DHBasedMac ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1041 DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { 1042 owf AlgorithmIdentifier, 1043 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) 1044 mac AlgorithmIdentifier 1045 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], 1046 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104]) 1048 In the above protectionAlg OWF is applied to the result of the Diffie- 1049 Hellman computation. The OWF output (called "BASEKEY" for ease of 1050 reference, with a size of "H") is what is used to form the symmetric 1051 key. If the MAC algorithm requires a K-bit key and K <= H, then the most 1052 significant K bits of BASEKEY are used. If K > H, then all of BASEKEY is 1053 used for the most significant H bits of the key, OWF("1" || BASEKEY) is 1054 used for the next most significant H bits of the key, OWF("2" || 1055 BASEKEY) is used for the next most significant H bits of the key, and so 1056 on, until all K bits have been derived. [Here "N" is the ASCII byte 1057 encoding the number N and "||" represents concatenation.] 1059 - signature 1061 Where the sender possesses a signature key pair it may simply sign the 1062 PKI message. PKIProtection will contain the signature value and the 1063 protectionAlg will be an AlgorithmIdentifier for a digital signature 1064 (e.g., md5WithRSAEncryption or dsaWithSha-1). 1066 - multiple protection 1068 In cases where an end entity sends a protected PKI message to an RA, the 1069 RA may forward that message to a CA, attaching its own protection. This 1070 is accomplished by nesting the entire message sent by the end entity 1071 within a new PKI message. The structure used is as follows. 1073 NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessage 1075 3.2 Common Data Structures 1077 Before specifying the specific types that may be placed in a PKIBody we 1078 define some data structures that are used in more than one case. 1080 3.2.1 Requested Certificate Contents 1082 Various PKI management messages require that the originator of the 1083 message indicate some of the fields that are required to be present in 1084 a certificate. The CertTemplate structure allows an end entity or RA to 1085 specify as much as it wishes about the certificate it requires. 1086 CertTemplate is identical to a Certificate but with all fields optional. 1088 Note that even if the originator completely specifies the contents of a 1089 certificate it requires, a CA is free to modify fields within the 1090 certificate actually issued. 1092 CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { 1093 version [0] Version OPTIONAL, 1094 -- used to ask for a particular syntax version 1095 serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, 1096 -- used to ask for a particular serial number 1097 signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1098 -- used to ask the CA to use this alg. for signing the cert 1099 issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL, 1100 validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL, 1101 subject [5] Name OPTIONAL, 1102 publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, 1103 issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1104 subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1105 extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL 1106 -- the extensions which the requester would like in the cert. 1107 } 1109 OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE { 1110 notBefore [0] CertificateValidityDate OPTIONAL, 1111 notAfter [1] CertificateValidityDate OPTIONAL 1112 } 1114 CertificateValidityDate ::= CHOICE { 1115 utcTime UTCTime, 1116 generalTime GeneralizedTime 1117 } 1119 3.2.2 Encrypted Values 1121 Where encrypted values (restricted, in this specification, to be either 1122 private keys or certificates) are sent in PKI messages the following 1123 data structure is used. 1125 EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE { 1126 encValue BIT STRING, 1127 -- the encrypted value itself 1128 intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1129 -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used 1130 symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1131 -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value 1132 encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL, 1133 -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value 1134 keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL 1135 -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key 1136 } 1138 Use of this data structure requires that the creator and intended 1139 recipient respectively be able to encrypt and decrypt. Typically, this 1140 will mean that the sender and recipient have, or are able to generate, a 1141 shared secret key. 1143 If the recipient of the PKIMessage already possesses a private key 1144 usable for decryption, then the encSymmKey field may contain a session 1145 key encrypted using the recipient's public key. 1147 3.2.3 Status codes and Failure Information for PKI messages 1149 All response messages will include some status information. The 1150 following values are defined. 1152 PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { 1153 granted (0), 1154 -- you got exactly what you asked for 1155 grantedWithMods (1), 1156 -- you got something like what you asked for; the 1157 -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences 1158 rejection (2), 1159 -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message 1160 waiting (3), 1161 -- the request body part has not yet been processed, 1162 -- expect to hear more later 1163 revocationWarning (4), 1164 -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is 1165 -- imminent 1166 revocationNotification (5), 1167 -- notification that a revocation has occurred 1168 keyUpdateWarning (6) 1169 -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in 1170 -- FullCertTemplate 1171 } 1173 Responders may use the following syntax to provide more information 1174 about failure cases. 1176 PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { 1177 -- since we can fail in more than one way! 1178 -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. 1179 badAlg (0), 1180 -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier 1181 badMessageCheck (1), 1182 -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) 1183 badRequest (2), 1184 -- transaction not permitted or supported 1185 badTime (3), 1186 -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, 1187 -- as defined by local policy 1188 badCertId (4), 1189 -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria 1190 badDataFormat (5), 1191 -- the data submitted has the wrong format 1192 wrongAuthority (6), 1193 -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the 1194 -- one creating the response token 1195 incorrectData (7), 1196 -- the requester's data is incorrect (used for notary services) 1197 missingTimeStamp (8) 1198 -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there (by policy) 1199 } 1201 PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1202 status PKIStatus, 1203 statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, 1204 failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL 1205 } 1207 3.2.4 Certificate Identification 1209 In order to identify particular certificates the following data 1210 structure is used. 1212 CertId ::= SEQUENCE { 1213 issuer GeneralName, 1214 serialNumber INTEGER 1215 } 1217 3.2.5 "Out-of-band" root CA public key 1219 Each root CA must be able to publish its current public key via some 1220 "out-of-band" means. While such mechanisms are beyond the scope of this 1221 document, we define data structures which can support such mechanisms. 1223 There are generally two methods available: either the CA directly 1224 publishes its self-signed certificate; or this information is available 1225 via the Directory (or equivalent) and the CA publishes a hash of this 1226 value to allow verification of its integrity before use. 1228 OOBCert ::= Certificate 1230 The fields within this certificate are restricted as follows: 1232 - The certificate must be self-signed (i.e., the signature must be 1233 verifiable using the subjectPublicKey field); 1234 - The subject and issuer fields must be identical; 1235 - If the subject field is NULL then both subjectAltNames and 1236 issuerAltNames extensions must be present and have exactly the same 1237 value; 1238 - The values of all other extensions must be suitable for a self-signed 1239 certificate (e.g., key identifiers for subject and issuer must be the 1240 same). 1242 OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { 1243 hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1244 certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, 1245 hashVal BIT STRING 1246 -- hashVal is calculated over the self-signed 1247 -- certificate with the identifier certID. 1248 } 1250 The intention of the hash value is that anyone who has securely 1251 received the hash value (via the out-of-band means) can verify a self- 1252 signed certificate for that CA. 1254 3.2.6 Archive Options 1256 Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to archive a private key 1257 value using the following structure: 1259 PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE { 1260 encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedValue, 1261 -- the actual value of the private key 1262 keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters, 1263 -- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated 1264 archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN 1265 -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private 1266 -- key of a key pair which the receiver generates in response to 1267 -- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired. 1268 } 1269 KeyGenParameters ::= OCTET STRING 1270 -- an alternative to sending the key is to send the information 1271 -- about how to re-generate the key (e.g., for many RSA 1272 -- implementations one could send the first random numbers tested 1273 -- for primality). 1274 -- The actual syntax for this parameter may be defined in a 1275 -- subsequent version of this document or in another standard. 1277 3.2.7 Publication Information 1278 Requesters may indicate that they wish the PKI to publish a certificate 1279 using the structure below. 1281 If the dontPublish option is chosen, the requester indicates that the 1282 PKI should not publish the certificate (this may indicate that the 1283 requester intends to publish the certificate him/herself). 1285 If the dontCare method is chosen, the requester indicates that the PKI 1286 may publish the certificate using whatever means it chooses. 1288 The pubLocation field, if supplied, indicates where the requester would 1289 like the certificate to be found (note that the CHOICE within 1290 GeneralName includes a URL and an IP address, for example). 1292 PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1293 action INTEGER { 1294 dontPublish (0), 1295 pleasePublish (1) 1296 }, 1297 pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL 1298 -- pubInfos must not be present if action is "dontPublish" 1299 -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted, 1300 -- "dontCare" is assumed) 1301 } 1303 SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1304 pubMethod INTEGER { 1305 dontCare (0), 1306 x500 (1), 1307 web (2), 1308 ldap (3) 1309 }, 1310 pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL 1311 } 1313 3.2.8 "Full" Request Template 1315 The following structure groups together the fields which may be sent as 1316 part of a certification request: 1318 FullCertTemplates ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF FullCertTemplate 1319 FullCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { 1320 certReqId INTEGER, 1321 -- a non-negative value to match this request with corresponding 1322 -- response (note: must be unique over all FullCertReqs in this 1323 -- message) 1324 certTemplate CertTemplate, 1325 popoPrivKeyVerified BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, 1326 popoSigningKey [0] POPOSigningKey OPTIONAL, 1327 archiveOptions [1] PKIArchiveOptions OPTIONAL, 1328 publicationInfo [2] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL, 1329 oldCertId [3] CertId OPTIONAL 1330 -- id. of cert. which is being updated by this one 1331 } 1333 When the certification request is made by an RA on behalf of some other 1334 end entity, then the RA may indicate to the CA that it has already 1335 verified proof-of-possession (of the private key corresponding to the 1336 public key for which a certificate is being requested) by setting 1337 popoPrivKeyVerified to TRUE. If the proof-of-possession has not yet 1338 been verified, or if the request is not being made by an RA, then the 1339 popoPrivKeyVerified field is omitted (defaulting to FALSE) and the 1340 popoSigningKey field or the challenge-response protocol described below 1341 may be used to prove possession (depending on the type of key involved). 1343 If the certification request is for a signing key pair (i.e., a request 1344 for a verification certificate), then the proof of possession of the 1345 private signing key is demonstrated through use of the POPOSigningKey 1346 structure. 1348 POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1349 poposkInput POPOSKInput, 1350 alg AlgorithmIdentifier, 1351 signature BIT STRING 1352 -- the signature (using "alg") on the DER-encoded 1353 -- value of poposkInput 1354 } 1356 POPOSKInput ::= CHOICE { 1357 popoSigningKeyInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput, 1358 certificationRequestInfo CertificationRequestInfo 1359 -- imported from [PKCS10] (note that if this choice is used, 1360 -- POPOSigningKey is simply a standard PKCS #10 request; this 1361 -- allows a bare PKCS #10 request to be augmented with other 1362 -- desired information in the FullCertTemplate before being 1363 -- sent to the CA/RA) 1364 } 1365 POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE { 1366 authInfo CHOICE { 1367 sender [0] GeneralName, 1368 -- from PKIHeader (used only if an authenticated identity 1369 -- has been established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a 1370 -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate) 1371 publicKeyMAC [1] BIT STRING 1372 -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for 1373 -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC 1374 -- (using the protectionAlg AlgId from PKIHeader) on the 1375 -- DER-encoded value of publicKey 1376 }, 1377 publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo -- from CertTemplate 1378 } 1380 On the other hand, if the certification request is for an encryption key 1381 pair (i.e., a request for an encryption certificate), then the proof of 1382 possession of the private decryption key may be demonstrated in one of 1383 three ways. 1385 1) By the inclusion of the private key (encrypted) in the 1386 FullCertTemplate (in the PKIArchiveOptions structure). 1388 2) By having the CA return not the certificate, but an encrypted 1389 certificate (i.e., the certificate encrypted under a randomly-generated 1390 symmetric key, and the symmetric key encrypted under the public key for 1391 which the certification request is being made) -- this is the "indirect" 1392 method mentioned previously in Section 2.3.2. The end entity proves 1393 knowledge of the private decryption key to the CA by MACing the 1394 PKIConfirm message using a key derived from this symmetric key. [Note 1395 that if several FullCertTemplates are included in the PKIMessage, then 1396 the CA uses a different symmetric key for each FullCertTemplate and the 1397 MAC uses a key derived from the concatenation of all these keys.] The 1398 MACing procedure uses the PasswordBasedMac AlgId defined in Section 3.1. 1400 3) By having the end entity engage in a challenge-response protocol 1401 (using the messages POPODecKeyChall and POPODecKeyResp; see below) 1402 between the CertReq and CertRep messages -- this is the "direct" method 1403 mentioned previously in Section 2.3.2. [This method would typically 1404 be used in an environment in which an RA verifies POP and then makes a 1405 certification request to the CA on behalf of the end entity. In such a 1406 scenario, the CA trusts the RA to have done POP correctly before the RA 1407 requests a certificate for the end entity.] The complete protocol then 1408 looks as follows (note that req' does not necessarily encapsulate req as 1409 a nested message): 1410 EE RA CA 1411 ---- req ----> 1412 <--- chall --- 1413 ---- resp ---> 1414 ---- req' ---> 1415 <--- rep ----- 1416 ---- conf ---> 1417 <--- rep ----- 1418 ---- conf ---> 1420 This protocol is obviously much longer than the 3-way exchange given in 1421 choice (2) above, but allows a local Registration Authority to be 1422 involved and has the property that the certificate itself is not 1423 actually created until the proof of possession is complete. 1425 If the cert. request is for a key agreement key (KAK) pair, then the 1426 POP can use any of the 3 ways described above for enc. key pairs, with 1427 the following changes: (1) the parenthetical text of bullet 2) is 1428 replaced with "(i.e., the certificate encrypted under the symmetric key 1429 derived from the CA's private KAK and the public key for which the 1430 certification request is being made)"; (2) the first parenthetical text 1431 of the challenge field of "Challenge" below is replaced with "(using 1432 PreferredSymmAlg (see Appendix B6) and a symmetric key derived from 1433 the CA's private KAK and the public key for which the certification 1434 request is being made)". 1436 3.3 Operation-Specific Data Structures 1438 3.3.1 Initialization Request 1440 An Initialization request message contains as the PKIBody an 1441 InitReqContent data structure which specifies the requested 1442 certificate(s). Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity 1443 are the template fields which may be supplied for each certificate 1444 requested (see Appendix B profiles for further information). 1446 InitReqContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1447 protocolEncKey [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, 1448 fullCertTemplates FullCertTemplates 1449 } 1451 3.3.2 Initialization Response 1453 An Initialization response message contains as the PKIBody an 1454 InitRepContent data structure which has for each certificate requested 1455 a PKIStatusInfo field, a subject certificate, and possibly a private 1456 key (normally encrypted with a session key, which is itself encrypted 1457 with the protocolEncKey). 1459 InitRepContent ::= CertRepContent 1461 3.3.3 Registration/Certification Request 1463 A Registration/Certification request message contains as the PKIBody a 1464 CertReqContent data structure which specifies the requested 1465 FullCertTemplates. 1467 Alternatively, for the cases in which it can be used, the PKIBody may 1468 be a CertificationRequest. This structure is fully specified by 1469 the ASN.1 structure CertificationRequest given in [PKCS10]. 1471 CertReqContent ::= FullCertTemplates 1473 The challenge-response messages for proof of possession of a private 1474 decryption key are specified as follows (see [MvOV97, p.404], for 1475 details). Note that this challenge-response exchange is associated with 1476 the preceding cert. request message (and subsequent cert. response and 1477 confirmation messages) by the nonces used in the PKIHeader and by the 1478 protection (MACing or signing) applied to the PKIMessage. 1480 POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge 1481 -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the 1482 -- same order as these requests appear in FullCertTemplates). 1484 Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { 1485 owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 1486 -- must be present in the first Challenge; may be omitted in any 1487 -- subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if omitted, 1488 -- then the owf used in the immediately preceding Challenge is 1489 -- to be used). 1490 witness OCTET STRING, 1491 -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a 1492 -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different 1493 -- INTEGER must be used for each Challenge.] 1494 challenge OCTET STRING 1495 -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. 1496 -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as 1497 -- Rand ::= SEQUENCE { 1498 -- int INTEGER, 1499 -- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) 1500 -- sender GeneralName 1501 -- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) 1502 -- } 1503 } 1505 POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER 1506 -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the 1507 -- same order as these requests appear in FullCertTemplates). The 1508 -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the 1509 -- corresponding Challenge. 1511 3.3.4 Registration/Certification Response 1513 A registration response message contains as the PKIBody a 1514 CertRepContent data structure which has a CA public key, a status 1515 value and optionally failure information, a subject certificate, and 1516 an encrypted private key. 1518 CertRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1519 caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL, 1520 response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse 1521 } 1523 CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { 1524 certReqId INTEGER, 1525 -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value 1526 -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the 1527 -- corresponding request) 1528 status PKIStatusInfo, 1529 certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL 1530 } 1532 CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { 1533 certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, 1534 privateKey [0] EncryptedValue OPTIONAL, 1535 publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL 1536 } 1538 CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { 1539 certificate [0] Certificate, 1540 encryptedCert [1] EncryptedValue 1541 } 1543 Only one of the failInfo (in PKIStatusInfo) and certificate (in 1544 CertifiedKeyPair) fields can be present in each CertResponse (depending 1545 on the status). For some status values (e.g., waiting) neither of the 1546 optional fields will be present. 1548 Given an EncryptedCert and the relevant decryption key the certificate 1549 may be obtained. The purpose of this is to allow a CA to return the 1550 value of a certificate, but with the constraint that only the intended 1551 recipient can obtain the actual certificate. The benefit of this 1552 approach is that a CA may reply with a certificate even in the absence 1553 of a proof that the requester is the end entity which can use the 1554 relevant private key (note that the proof is not obtained until the 1555 PKIConfirm message is received by the CA). Thus the CA will not have to 1556 revoke that certificate in the event that something goes wrong with the 1557 proof of possession. 1559 3.3.5 Key update request content 1561 For key update requests the following syntax is used. Typically, 1562 SubjectPublicKeyInfo, KeyId, and Validity are the template fields which 1563 may be supplied for each key to be updated. 1565 KeyUpdReqContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1566 protocolEncKey [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, 1567 fullCertTemplates [1] FullCertTemplates OPTIONAL 1568 } 1570 3.3.6 Key Update response content 1572 For key update responses the syntax used is identical to the 1573 initialization response. 1575 KeyUpdRepContent ::= InitRepContent 1577 3.3.7 Key Recovery Request content 1579 For key recovery requests the syntax used is identical to the 1580 initialization request InitReqContent. Typically, SubjectPublicKeyInfo 1581 and KeyId are the template fields which may be used to supply a 1582 signature public key for which a certificate is required (see Appendix B 1583 profiles for further information). 1585 KeyRecReqContent ::= InitReqContent 1587 3.3.8 Key recovery response content 1589 For key recovery responses the following syntax is used. For some 1590 status values (e.g., waiting) none of the optional fields will be 1591 present. 1593 KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1594 status PKIStatusInfo, 1595 newSigCert [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, 1596 caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 1597 Certificate OPTIONAL, 1598 keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 1599 CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL 1600 } 1602 3.3.9 Revocation Request Content 1604 When requesting revocation of a certificate (or several certificates) 1605 the following data structure is used. The name of the requester is 1606 present in the PKIHeader structure. 1608 RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails 1610 RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { 1611 certDetails CertTemplate, 1612 -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about 1613 -- the cert. for which revocation is requested 1614 -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) 1615 revocationReason ReasonFlags, 1616 -- from the DAM, so CA knows what to use in Dist. point 1617 badSinceDate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, 1618 -- indicates best knowledge of sender 1619 crlEntryDetails Extensions 1620 -- requested crlEntryExtensions 1621 } 1623 3.3.10 Revocation Response Content 1625 The response to the above message. If produced, this is sent to the 1626 requester of the revocation. (A separate revocation announcement message 1627 may be sent to the subject of the certificate for which revocation was 1628 requested.) 1630 RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1631 status PKIStatusInfo, 1632 revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, 1633 -- identifies the certs for which revocation was requested 1634 crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL 1635 -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) 1636 } 1638 3.3.11 Cross certification request content 1640 Cross certification requests use the same syntax as for normal 1641 certification requests with the restriction that the key pair must have 1642 been generated by the requesting CA and the private key must not be sent 1643 to the responding CA. 1645 CrossCertReqContent ::= CertReqContent 1647 3.3.12 Cross certification response content 1649 Cross certification responses use the same syntax as for normal 1650 certification responses with the restriction that no encrypted private 1651 key can be sent. 1653 CrossCertRepContent ::= CertRepContent 1655 3.3.13 CA Key Update Announcement content 1657 When a CA updates its own key pair the following data structure may be 1658 used to announce this event. 1660 CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1661 oldWithNew Certificate, -- old pub signed with new priv 1662 newWithOld Certificate, -- new pub signed with old priv 1663 newWithNew Certificate -- new pub signed with new priv 1664 } 1666 3.3.14 Certificate Announcement 1668 This data structure may be used to announce the existence of 1669 certificates. 1671 Note that this message is intended to be used for those cases (if any) 1672 where there is no pre-existing method for publication of certificates; 1673 it is not intended to be used where, for example, X.500 is the 1674 method for publication of certificates. 1676 CertAnnContent ::= Certificate 1678 3.3.15 Revocation Announcement 1680 When a CA has revoked, or is about to revoke, a particular certificate 1681 it may issue an announcement of this (possibly upcoming) event. 1683 RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1684 status PKIStatus, 1685 certId CertId, 1686 willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, 1687 badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, 1688 crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL 1689 -- extra CRL details(e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) 1690 } 1692 A CA may use such an announcement to warn (or notify) a subject that its 1693 certificate is about to be (or has been) revoked. This would typically 1694 be used where the request for revocation did not come from the subject 1695 concerned. 1697 The willBeRevokedAt field contains the time at which a new entry will be 1698 added to the relevant CRLs. 1700 3.3.16 CRL Announcement 1702 When a CA issues a new CRL (or set of CRLs) the following data structure 1703 may be used to announce this event. 1705 CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList 1707 3.3.17 PKI Confirmation content 1709 This data structure is used in three-way protocols as the final 1710 PKIMessage. Its content is the same in all cases - actually there is no 1711 content since the PKIHeader carries all the required information. 1713 PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL 1715 3.3.18 PKI General Message content 1717 InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { 1718 infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 1719 infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL 1720 } 1721 -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited to: 1722 -- { CAProtEncCert = {id-it 1}, Certificate } 1723 -- { SignKeyPairTypes = {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier } 1724 -- { EncKeyPairTypes = {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier } 1725 -- { PreferredSymmAlg = {id-it 4}, AlgorithmIdentifier } 1726 -- { CAKeyUpdateInfo = {id-it 5}, CAKeyUpdAnnContent } 1727 -- { CurrentCRL = {id-it 6}, CertificateList } 1728 -- where {id-it} = {id-pkix 4} = {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4} 1729 -- This construct may also be used to define new PKIX Certificate 1730 -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general- 1731 -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for 1732 -- specific environments. 1734 GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue 1735 -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). 1736 -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will typically 1737 -- be omitted for some of the examples given above. The receiver is 1738 -- free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does not recognize. 1739 -- If sent from EE to CA, the empty set indicates that the CA may send 1740 -- any/all information that it wishes. 1742 3.3.19 PKI General Response content 1744 GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue 1745 -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does 1746 -- not recognize. 1748 3.3.20 Error Message content 1750 ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { 1751 pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, 1752 errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, 1753 -- implementation-specific error codes 1754 errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL 1755 -- implementation-specific error details 1756 } 1758 4. Mandatory PKI Management functions 1760 The PKI management functions outlined in section 1 above are described 1761 in this section. 1763 This section deals with functions that are "mandatory" in the sense 1764 that all end entity and CA/RA implementations must be able to provide 1765 the functionality described (perhaps via one of the transport mechanisms 1766 defined in Section 5). This part is effectively the profile of the PKI 1767 management functionality that must be supported. 1769 Note that not all PKI management functions result in the creation of a 1770 PKI message. 1772 4.1 Root CA initialization 1774 [See Section 1.2.2 for this document's definition of "root CA".] 1776 A newly created root CA must produce a "self-certificate" which is a 1777 Certificate structure with the profile defined for the "newWithNew" 1778 certificate issued following a root CA key update. 1780 In order to make the CA�s self certificate useful to end entities that 1781 do not acquire this information via "out-of-band" means, the CA must 1782 also produce a fingerprint for its public key. End entities that 1783 acquire this value securely via some "out-of-band" means can then verify 1784 the CA�s self-certificate and hence the other attributes contained 1785 therein. 1787 The data structure used to carry the fingerprint is the OOBCertHash. 1789 4.2 Root CA key update 1791 CA keys (as all other keys) have a finite lifetime and will have to be 1792 updated on a periodic basis. The certificates NewWithNew, NewWithOld, 1793 and OldWithNew (see Section 2.4.1) are issued by the CA to aid existing 1794 end entities who hold the current self-signed CA certificate 1795 (OldWithOld) to transition securely to the new self-signed CA 1796 certificate (NewWithNew), and to aid new end entities who will hold 1797 NewWithNew to acquire OldWithOld securely for verification of existing 1798 data. 1800 4.3 Subordinate CA initialization 1802 [See Section 1.2.2 for this document's definition of "subordinate CA".] 1804 >From the perspective of PKI management protocols the initialization of a 1805 subordinate CA is the same as the initialization of an end entity. The 1806 only difference is that the subordinate CA must also produce an initial 1807 revocation list. 1809 4.4 CRL production 1811 Before issuing any certificates a newly established CA (which issues 1812 CRLs) must produce "empty" versions of each CRL which is to be 1813 periodically produced. 1815 4.5 PKI information request 1817 When a PKI entity (CA, RA, or EE) wishes to acquire information about 1818 the current status of a CA it may send that CA a request for such 1819 information. 1821 The CA must respond to the request by providing (at least) all of the 1822 information requested by the requester. If some of the information 1823 cannot be provided then an error must be conveyed to the requester. 1825 If PKIMessages are used to request and supply this PKI information, 1826 then the request must be the GenMsg message, the response must be the 1827 GenRep message, and the error must be the Error message. These 1828 messages are protected using a MAC based on shared secret information 1829 (i.e., PasswordBasedMAC) or any other authenticated means (if the end 1830 entity has an existing certificate). 1832 4.6 Cross certification 1834 The requester CA is the CA that will become the subject of the cross- 1835 certificate; the responder CA will become the issuer of the cross- 1836 certificate. 1838 The requester CA must be "up and running" before initiating the cross- 1839 certification operation. 1841 4.6.1 One-way request-response scheme: 1843 The cross-certification scheme is essentially a one way operation; that 1844 is, when successful, this operation results in the creation of one new 1845 cross-certificate. If the requirement is that cross-certificates be 1846 created in "both directions" then each CA in turn must initiate a cross- 1847 certification operation (or use another scheme). 1849 This scheme is suitable where the two CAs in question can already verify 1850 each other�s signatures (they have some common points of trust) or where 1851 there is an out-of-band verification of the origin of the certification 1852 request. 1854 Detailed Description: 1856 Cross certification is initiated at one CA known as the responder. The 1857 CA administrator for the responder identifies the CA it wants to cross 1858 certify and the responder CA equipment generates an authorization code. 1859 The responder CA administrator passes this authorization code by out-of- 1860 band means to the requester CA administrator. The requester CA 1861 administrator enters the authorization code at the requester CA in order 1862 to initiate the on-line exchange. 1864 The authorization code is used for authentication and integrity 1865 purposes. This is done by generating a symmetric key based on the 1866 authorization code and using the symmetric key for generating Message 1867 Authentication Codes (MACs) on all messages exchanged. 1869 The requester CA initiates the exchange by generating a random number 1870 (requester random number). The requester CA then sends to the responder 1871 CA the message CrossCertReq. The fields in this message are protected 1872 from modification with a MAC based on the authorization code. 1874 Upon receipt of the CrossCertReq message, the responder CA checks the 1875 protocol version, saves the requester random number, generates its own 1876 random number (responder random number) and validates the MAC. It then 1877 generates (and archives, if desired) a new requester certificate that 1878 contains the requester CA public key and is signed with the responder 1879 CA signature private key. The responder CA responds with the message 1880 CrossCertRep. The fields in this message are protected from modification 1881 with a MAC based on the authorization code. 1883 Upon receipt of the CrossCertRep message, the requester CA checks that 1884 its own system time is close to the responder CA system time, checks the 1885 received random numbers and validates the MAC. The requester CA 1886 responds with the PKIConfirm message. The fields in this message are 1887 protected from modification with a MAC based on the authorization code. 1888 The requester CA writes the requester certificate to the Repository. 1890 Upon receipt of the PKIConfirm message, the responder CA checks the 1891 random numbers and validates the MAC. 1893 Notes: 1895 1.The CrossCertReq must contain a "complete" certification request, that 1896 is, all fields (including, e.g., a BasicConstraints extension) must be 1897 specified by the requester CA. 1898 2.The CrossCertRep message should contain the verification certificate 1899 of the responder CA - if present, the requester CA must then verify 1900 this certificate (for example, via the "out-of-band" mechanism). 1902 4.7 End entity initialization 1904 As with CAs, end entities must be initialized. Initialization of end 1905 entities requires at least two steps: 1907 - acquisition of PKI information 1908 - out-of-band verification of one root-CA public key 1910 (other possible steps include the retrieval of trust condition 1911 information and/or out-of-band verification of other CA public keys). 1913 4.7.1 Acquisition of PKI information 1915 The information required is: 1917 - the current root-CA public key 1918 - (if the certifying CA is not a root-CA) the certification path from 1919 the root CA to the certifying CA together with appropriate revocation 1920 lists 1921 - the algorithms and algorithm parameters which the certifying CA 1922 supports for each relevant usage 1924 Additional information could be required (e.g., supported extensions 1925 or CA policy information) in order to produce a certification request 1926 which will be successful. However, for simplicity we do not mandate that 1927 the end entity acquires this information via the PKI messages. The end 1928 result is simply that some certification requests may fail (e.g., if the 1929 end entity wants to generate its own encryption key but the CA doesn�t 1930 allow that). 1932 The required information may be acquired as described in Section 4.5. 1934 4.7.2 Out-of-Band Verification of Root-CA Key 1936 An end entity must securely possess the public key of its root CA. One 1937 method to achieve this is to provide the end entity with the CA�s self- 1938 certificate fingerprint via some secure "out-of-band" means. The end 1939 entity can then securely use the CA�s self-certificate. 1941 See Section 4.1 for further details. 1943 4.8 Certificate Request 1945 An initialized end entity may request a certificate at any time (as part 1946 of an update procedure, or for any other purpose). This request will be 1947 made using the CertReq message. If the end entity already possesses a 1948 signing key pair (with a corresponding verification certificate), then 1949 this CertReq message will typically be protected by the entity's 1950 digital signature. The CA returns the new certificate (if the request 1951 is successful) in a CertRep message. 1953 4.9 Key Update 1955 When a key pair is due to expire the relevant end entity may request 1956 a key update - that is, it may request that the CA issue a new 1957 certificate for a new key pair. The request is made using a KeyUpdReq 1958 message. If the end entity already possesses a signing key pair (with a 1959 corresponding verification certificate), then this KeyUpdReq message 1960 will typically be protected by the entity's digital signature. The CA 1961 returns the new certificate (if the request is successful) in a 1962 KeyUpdRep message, which is syntactically identical to a CertRep message. 1964 5. Transports 1966 The transport protocols specified below allow end entities, RAs and CAs 1967 to pass PKI messages between them. There is no requirement for specific 1968 security mechanisms to be applied at this level if the PKI messages are 1969 suitably protected (that is, if the optional PKIProtection parameter is 1970 used as specified for each message). 1972 5.1 File based protocol 1974 A file containing a PKI message must contain only the DER encoding of 1975 one PKI message, i.e., there must be no extraneous header or trailer 1976 information in the file. 1978 Such files can be used to transport PKI messages using, e.g., FTP. 1980 5.2 Socket based Management Protocol 1982 The following simple socket based protocol is to be used for transport 1983 of PKI messages. This protocol is suitable for cases where an end entity 1984 (or an RA) initiates a transaction and can poll to pick up the results. 1986 If a transaction is initiated by a PKI entity (RA or CA) then an end 1987 entity must either supply a listener process or be supplied with a 1988 polling reference (see below) in order to allow it to pick up the PKI 1989 message from the PKI management component. 1991 The protocol basically assumes a listener process on an RA or CA which 1992 can accept PKI messages on a well-defined port (port number 829). 1993 Typically an initiator binds to this port and submits the initial PKI 1994 message for a given transaction ID. The responder replies with a PKI 1995 message and/or with a reference number to be used later when polling for 1996 the actual PKI message response. 1998 If a number of PKI response messages are to be produced for a given 1999 request (say if some part of the request is handled more quickly than 2000 another) then a new polling reference is also returned. 2002 When the final PKI response message has been picked up by the initiator 2003 then no new polling reference is supplied. 2005 The initiator of a transaction sends a "socket PKI message" to the 2006 recipient. The recipient responds with a similar message. 2008 A "socket PKI message" consists of: 2010 length (32-bits), flag (8-bits), value (defined below) 2012 The length field contains the number of octets of the remainder of the 2013 message (i.e., number of octets of "value" plus one). 2015 Message name flag value 2017 msgReq �00�H DER-encoded PKI message 2018 -- PKI message from initiator 2019 pollRep �01�H polling reference (32 bits), 2020 time-to-check-back (32 bits) 2021 -- poll response where no PKI message response ready; use polling 2022 -- reference value (and estimated time value) for later polling 2023 pollReq �02�H polling reference (32 bits) 2024 -- request for a PKI message response to initial message 2025 negPollRep �03�H �00�H 2026 -- no further polling responses (i.e., transaction complete) 2027 partialMsgRep �04�H next polling reference (32 bits), 2028 time-to-check-back (32 bits), 2029 DER-encoded PKI message 2030 -- partial response to initial message plus new polling reference 2031 -- (and estimated time value) to use to get next part of response 2032 finalMsgRep �05�H DER-encoded PKI message 2033 -- final (and possibly sole) response to initial message 2034 errorMsgRep �06�H human readable error message 2035 -- produced when an error is detected (e.g., a polling reference is 2036 -- received which doesn�t exist or is finished with) 2038 Where a PKIConfirm message is to be transported (always from the 2039 initiator to the responder) then a msgReq message is sent and a 2040 negPollRep is returned. 2042 The sequence of messages which can occur is then: 2044 a) end entity sends msgReq and receives one of pollRep, negPollRep, 2045 partialMsgRep or finalMsgRep in response. 2046 b) end entity sends pollReq message and receives one of negPollRep, 2047 partialMsgRep, finalMsgRep or errorMsgRep in response. 2049 The "time-to-check-back" parameter is a 32-bit integer, defined to be 2050 the number of seconds which have elapsed since midnight, January 1, 2051 1970, coordinated universal time. It provides an estimate of the time 2052 that the end entity should send its next pollReq. 2054 5.3 Management Protocol via E-mail 2056 This subsection specifies a means for conveying ASN.1-encoded messages 2057 for the protocol exchanges described in Section 4 via Internet mail. 2059 A simple MIME object is specified as follows. 2061 Content-Type: application/x-pkixcmp 2062 Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 2064 <> 2066 This MIME object can be sent and received using common MIME processing 2067 engines and provides a simple Internet mail transport for PKIX-CMP 2068 messages. 2070 5.4 Management Protocol via HTTP 2072 This subsection specifies a means for conveying ASN.1-encoded messages 2073 for the protocol exchanges described in Section 4 via the HyperText 2074 Transfer Protocol. 2076 A simple MIME object is specified as follows. 2078 Content-Type: application/x-pkixcmp 2080 <> 2082 This MIME object can be sent and received using common HTTP processing 2083 engines over WWW links and provides a simple browser-server transport 2084 for PKIX-CMP messages. 2086 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 2088 This entire memo is about security mechanisms. 2090 One cryptographic consideration is worth explicitly spelling out. In 2091 the protocols specified above, when an end entity is required to 2092 prove possession of a decryption key, it is effectively challenged 2093 to decrypt something (its own certificate). This scheme (and many 2094 others!) could be vulnerable to an attack if the possessor of the 2095 decryption key in question could be fooled into decrypting an 2096 arbitrary challenge and returning the cleartext to an attacker. 2097 Although in this specification a number of other failures in 2098 security are required in order for this attack to succeed, it is 2099 conceivable that some future services (e.g., notary, trusted time) 2100 could potentially be vulnerable to such attacks. For this reason we 2101 re-iterate the general rule that implementations should be very 2102 careful about decrypting arbitrary "ciphertext" and revealing 2103 recovered "plaintext" since such a practice can lead to serious 2104 security vulnerabilities. 2106 References 2108 [MvOV97] A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. Vanstone, "Handbook of 2109 Applied Cryptography", CRC Press, 1997. 2111 [PKCS7] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards 2112 (PKCS)", RSA Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California, 2113 November 1993 Release. 2115 [PKCS10] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards 2116 (PKCS)", RSA Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California, 2117 November 1993 Release. 2119 [PKCS11] RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards - 2120 PKCS #11: Cryptographic token interface standard", RSA 2121 Data Security Inc., Redwood City, California, April 28, 2122 1995. 2124 [RFC1847] J. Galvin, S. Murphy, S. Crocker, N. Freed, "Security 2125 Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and Multipart/ 2126 Encrypted", Internet Request for Comments 1847, October 2127 1995. 2129 [RFC2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed Hashing 2130 for Message Authentication", Internet Request for Comments 2131 2104, February, 1997. 2133 Acknowledgements 2135 The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of various members 2136 of the PKIX Working Group. Many of these contributions significantly 2137 clarified and improved the utility of this specification. 2139 Authors' Addresses 2141 Carlisle Adams 2142 Entrust Technologies 2143 750 Heron Road, Suite E08, 2144 Ottawa, Ontario 2145 Canada K1V 1A7 2146 cadams@entrust.com 2148 Stephen Farrell 2149 Software and Systems Engineering Ltd. 2150 Fitzwilliam Court 2151 Leeson Close 2152 Dublin 2 2153 IRELAND 2154 stephen.farrell@sse.ie 2156 APPENDIX A: Reasons for the presence of RAs 2158 The reasons which justify the presence of an RA can be split into those 2159 which are due to technical factors and those which are organizational in 2160 nature. Technical reasons include the following. 2162 -If hardware tokens are in use, then not all end entities will have 2163 the equipment needed to initialize these; the RA equipment can include 2164 the necessary functionality (this may also be a matter of policy). 2166 -Some end entities may not have the capability to publish 2167 certificates; again, the RA may be suitably placed for this. 2169 -The RA will be able to issue signed revocation requests on behalf of 2170 end entities associated with it, whereas the end entity may not be able 2171 to do this (if the key pair is completely lost). 2173 Some of the organizational reasons which argue for the presence of an 2174 RA are the following. 2176 -It may be more cost effective to concentrate functionality in the RA 2177 equipment than to supply functionality to all end entities (especially 2178 if special token initialization equipment is to be used). 2180 -Establishing RAs within an organization can reduce the number of CAs 2181 required, which is sometimes desirable. 2183 -RAs may be better placed to identify people with their "electronic" 2184 names, especially if the CA is physically remote from the end entity. 2186 -For many applications there will already be in place some 2187 administrative structure so that candidates for the role of RA are easy 2188 to find (which may not be true of the CA). 2190 Appendix B. PKI Management Message Profiles. 2192 This appendix contains detailed profiles for those PKIMessages which 2193 must be supported by conforming implementations (see Section 4). 2195 Profiles for the PKIMessages used in the following PKI management 2196 operations are provided: 2198 - root CA key update 2199 - information request/response 2200 - cross-certification (1-way) 2201 - initial registration/certification 2202 - basic authenticated scheme 2203 - certificate request 2204 - key update 2206 <> 2210 - revocation request 2211 - certificate publication 2212 - CRL publication 2213 B1. General Rules for interpretation of these profiles. 2215 1.Where OPTIONAL or DEFAULT fields are not mentioned in individual 2216 profiles, they should be absent from the relevant message (i.e., a 2217 receiver can validly reject a message containing such fields as 2218 being syntactically incorrect). 2219 Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value 2220 (e.g., pvno). 2221 2.Where structures occur in more than one message, they are 2222 separately profiled as appropriate. 2223 3.The algorithmIdentifiers from PKIMessage structures are profiled 2224 separately. 2225 4.A "special" X.500 DN is called the "NULL-DN"; this means a DN 2226 containing a zero-length SEQUENCE OF RDNs (its DER encoding is 2227 then �3000�H). 2228 5.Where a GeneralName is required for a field but no suitable 2229 value is available (e.g., an end entity produces a request before 2230 knowing its name) then the GeneralName is to be an X.500 NULL-DN 2231 (i.e., the Name field of the CHOICE is to contain a NULL-DN). 2232 This special value can be called a "NULL-GeneralName". 2233 6.Where a profile omits to specify the value for a GeneralName 2234 then the NULL-GeneralName value is to be present in the relevant 2235 PKIMessage field. This occurs with the sender field of the 2236 PKIHeader for some messages. 2237 7.Where any ambiguity arises due to naming of fields, the profile 2238 names these using a "dot" notation (e.g., "certTemplate.subject" 2239 means the subject field within a field called certTemplate). 2240 8.Where a "SEQUENCE OF types" is part of a message, a zero-based 2241 array notation is used to describe fields within the SEQUENCE OF 2242 (e.g., FullCertTemplates[0].certTemplate.subject refers to a 2243 subfield of the first FullCertTemplate contained in a request 2244 message). 2245 9.All PKI message exchanges in Sections B7-B10 require a PKIConfirm 2246 message to be sent by the initiating entity. This message is not 2247 included in some of the profiles given since its body is NULL and 2248 its header contents are clear from the context. Any authenticated 2249 means can be used for the protectionAlg (e.g., password-based MAC, 2250 if shared secret information is known, or signature). 2252 B2. Algorithm Use Profile 2254 The following table contains definitions of algorithm uses within PKI 2255 management protocols. 2257 The columns in the table are: 2259 Name: an identifier used for message profiles 2260 Use: description of where and for what the algorithm is used 2261 Mandatory: an AlgorithmIdentifier which must be supported by 2262 conforming implementations 2263 Others: alternatives to the mandatory AlgorithmIdentifier 2264 Name Use Mandatory Others 2266 MSG_SIG_ALG Protection of PKI DSA/SHA-1 RSA/MD5... 2267 messages using signature 2268 MSG_MAC_ALG protection of PKI PasswordBasedMac HMAC, 2269 messages using MACing X9.9... 2270 SYM_PENC_ALG symmetric encryption of 3-DES (3-key- RC5, 2271 an end entity�s private EDE, CBC mode) CAST-128... 2272 key where symmetric 2273 key is distributed 2274 out-of-band 2275 PROT_ENC_ALG asymmetric algorithm D-H RSA 2276 used for encryption of 2277 (symmetric keys for 2278 encryption of) private 2279 keys transported in 2280 PKIMessages 2281 PROT_SYM_ALG symmetric encryption 3-DES (3-key- RC5, 2282 algorithm used for EDE, CBC mode) CAST-128... 2283 encryption of private 2284 key bits (a key of this 2285 type is encrypted using 2286 PROT_ENC_ALG) 2288 Mandatory AlgorithmIdentifiers and Specifications: 2290 DSA/SHA-1: 2291 AlgId: {1 3 14 3 2 27} 2292 X9.30-3, ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography Using Irreversible Algorithms 2293 for the Financial Services Industry: Part 3: Certificate Management 2294 for DSA" 2295 Public Modulus size: 1024 bits 2297 PasswordBasedMac: 2298 {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} 2299 (this specification) 2301 3-DES: 2302 {1 2 840 113549 3 7} 2303 (used in RSA's BSAFE and in S/MIME) 2305 D-H: 2306 AlgId: {1 2 840 113549 1 3 1} 2307 "PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard", in RSA Laboratories, 2308 "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)", RSA Data Security 2309 Inc., Redwood City, California, November 1993 Release. 2310 Public Modulus Size: 1024 bits 2312 B3. "Self-signed" certificates 2314 Profile of how a Certificate structure may be "self-signed". These 2315 structures are used for distribution of "root" CA public keys. This can 2316 occur in one of three ways (see section 2.4 above for a description of 2317 the use of these structures): 2319 Type Function 2321 newWithNew a true "self-signed" certificate; the contained public 2322 key must be usable to verify the signature (though this 2323 provides only integrity and no authentication whatsoever) 2324 oldWithNew previous root CA public key signed with new private key 2325 newWithOld new root CA public key signed with previous private key 2327 <> 2332 B4. Proof of Possession Profile 2334 "POPO" fields for use when proving possession of a private signing key 2335 which corresponds to a public verification key for which a certificate 2336 has been requested. 2338 Field Value Comment 2340 alg MSG_SIG_ALG only signature protection is 2341 allowed for this proof 2342 signature present bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG 2344 <> 2349 Not every CA/RA will do Proof-of-Possession (of signing key, decryption 2350 key, or key agreement key) in the PKIX-CMP in-band certification request 2351 protocol (how POP is done may ultimately be a policy issue which is 2352 made explicit for any given CA in its publicized Policy OID and 2353 Certification Practice Statement). However, this specification MANDATES 2354 that CA/RA entities must do POP (by some means) as part of the 2355 certification process. All end entities must be prepared to provide POP 2356 (i.e., these components of the PKIX-CMP protocol must be supported). 2358 B5. Root CA Key Update 2360 A root CA updates its key pair. It then produces a CA key update 2361 announcement message which can be made available (via one of the 2362 transport mechanisms) to the relevant end entities. No PKIConfirm 2363 message is required from the end entities. 2365 ckuann message: 2367 Field Value Comment 2369 sender CA name responding CA name 2370 body ckuann(CAKeyUpdAnnContent) 2371 oldWithNew present see section B3 above 2372 newWithOld present see section B3 above 2373 newWithNew present see section B3 above 2374 extraCerts optionally present can be used to "publish" 2375 certificates (e.g., 2376 certificates signed using 2377 the new private key) 2379 B6. PKI Information request/response 2381 End entity sends general message to the PKI requesting details which 2382 will be required for later PKI management operations. RA/CA responds 2383 with general response. If an RA generates the response then it will 2384 simply forward the equivalent message which it previously received from 2385 the CA, with the possible addition of the certificates to the extraCerts 2386 fields of the PKIMessage. No PKIConfirm message is required from the 2387 end entity. 2389 Message Flows: 2391 Step# End entity PKI 2393 1 format genm 2394 2 -> genm -> 2395 3 handle genm 2396 4 produce genp 2397 5 <- genp <- 2398 6 handle genp 2400 genm: 2402 Field Value 2404 recipient CA name 2405 -- the name of the CA as contained in issuerAltName extensions or 2406 -- issuer fields within certificates 2407 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG 2408 -- any authenticated protection alg. 2409 SenderKID present if required 2410 -- must be present if required for verification of message protection 2411 freeText any valid value 2412 body genr (GenReqContent) 2413 GenMsgContent empty SEQUENCE 2414 -- all relevant information requested 2415 protection present 2416 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG 2418 genp: 2420 Field Value 2422 sender CA name 2423 -- name of the CA which produced the message 2424 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG 2425 -- any authenticated protection alg. 2426 senderKID present if required 2427 -- must be present if required for verification of message protection 2428 body genp (GenRepContent) 2429 CAProtEncCert present (object identifier one 2430 of PROT_ENC_ALG), with relevant 2431 value 2432 -- to be used if end entity needs to encrypt information for the CA 2433 -- (e.g., private key for recovery purposes) 2434 SignKeyPairTypes present, with relevant value 2435 -- the set of signature algorithm identifiers which this CA will 2436 -- certify for subject public keys 2437 EncKeyPairTypes present, with relevant value 2438 -- the set of encryption/key agreement algorithm identifiers which 2439 -- this CA will certify for subject public keys 2440 PreferredSymmAlg present (object identifier one 2441 of PROT_SYM_ALG) , with relevant 2442 value 2443 -- the symmetric algorithm which this CA expects to be used in later 2444 -- PKI messages (for encryption) 2445 CAKeyUpdateInfo optionally present, with 2446 relevant value 2447 -- the CA may provide information about a relevant root CA key pair 2448 -- using this field (note that this does not imply that the responding 2449 -- CA is the root CA in question) 2451 CurrentCRL optionally present, with relevant value 2452 -- the CA may provide a copy of a complete CRL (i.e., fullest possible 2453 -- one) 2454 protection present 2455 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG 2456 extraCerts optionally present 2457 -- can be used to send some certificates to the end entity. An RA may 2458 -- add its certificate here. 2460 B7. Cross certification (1-way) 2462 Creation of a single cross-certificate (i.e., not two at once). The 2463 requesting CA is responsible for publication of the cross-certificate 2464 created by the responding CA. 2466 Preconditions: 2468 1. Responding CA can verify the origin of the request (possibly 2469 requiring out-of-band means) before processing the request. 2470 2. Requesting CA can authenticate the authenticity of the origin of the 2471 response (possibly requiring out-of-band means) before processing the 2472 response 2474 Message Flows: 2476 Step# Requesting CA Responding CA 2477 1 format ccr 2478 2 -> ccr -> 2479 3 handle ccr 2480 4 produce ccp 2481 5 <- ccp <- 2482 6 handle ccp 2483 7 format conf 2484 8 -> conf -> 2485 9 handle conf 2487 ccr: 2488 Field Value 2490 sender Requesting CA name 2491 -- the name of the CA who produced the message 2492 recipient Responding CA name 2493 -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate 2494 messageTime time of production of message 2495 -- current time at requesting CA 2496 protectionAlg MSG_SIG_ALG 2497 -- only signature protection is allowed for this request 2498 senderKID present if required 2499 -- must be present if required for verification of message protection 2500 transactionID present 2501 -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to requesting CA. 2502 -- [If already in use at responding CA then a rejection message 2503 -- to be produced by responding CA] 2505 senderNonce present 2506 -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits 2507 freeText any valid value 2508 body ccr (CrossCertReqContent) 2509 only one FullCertTemplate 2510 allowed 2511 -- if multiple cross certificates are required they must be packaged 2512 -- in separate PKIMessages 2513 certTemplate present 2514 -- details below 2515 version v1 or v3 2516 -- <> 2517 signingAlg present 2518 -- the requesting CA must know in advance with which algorithm it 2519 -- wishes the certificate to be signed 2521 subject present 2522 -- may be NULL-DN only if subjectAltNames extension value proposed 2523 validity present 2524 -- must be completely specified (i.e., both fields present) 2525 issuer present 2526 -- may be NULL-DN only if issuerAltNames extension value proposed 2527 publicKey present 2528 -- the key to be certified which must be for a signing algorithm 2529 extensions optionally present 2530 -- a requesting CA must propose values for all extensions which it 2531 -- requires to be in the cross-certificate 2532 popoSigningKey present 2533 -- see "Proof of possession profile" (section B4) 2534 protection present 2535 -- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG 2536 extraCerts optionally present 2537 -- can contain certificates usable to verify the protection on 2538 -- this message 2540 ccp: 2541 Field Value 2543 sender Responding CA name 2544 -- the name of the CA who produced the message 2545 recipient Requesting CA name 2546 -- the name of the CA who asked for production of a certificate 2547 messageTime time of production of message 2548 -- current time at responding CA 2549 protectionAlg MSG_SIG_ALG 2550 -- only signature protection is allowed for this message 2551 senderKID present if required 2552 -- must be present if required for verification of message 2553 -- protection 2554 recipKID present if required 2555 transactionID present 2556 -- value from corresponding ccr message 2557 senderNonce present 2558 -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits 2559 recipNonce present 2560 -- senderNonce from corresponding ccr message 2561 freeText any valid value 2562 body ccp (CrossCertRepContent) 2563 only one CertResponse allowed 2564 -- if multiple cross certificates are required they must be packaged 2565 -- in separate PKIMessages 2566 response present 2567 status present 2568 PKIStatusInfo.status present 2569 -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is one of: 2570 -- granted, or 2571 -- grantedWithMods, 2572 -- then certifiedKeyPair to be present and failInfo to be absent 2573 failInfo present depending on 2574 PKIStatusInfo.status 2575 -- if PKIStatusInfo.status is: 2576 -- rejection 2577 -- then certifiedKeyPair to be absent and failInfo to be present 2578 -- and contain appropriate bit settings 2580 certifiedKeyPair present depending on 2581 PKIStatusInfo.status 2582 certificate present depending on 2583 certifiedKeyPair 2584 -- content of actual certificate must be examined by requesting CA 2585 -- before publication 2586 protection present 2587 -- bits calculated using MSG_SIG_ALG 2588 extraCerts optionally present 2589 -- can contain certificates usable to verify the protection on 2590 -- this message 2592 B8. Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme) 2594 An (uninitialized) end entity requests a (first) certificate from a CA. 2595 When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate, the end 2596 entity replies with a confirmation. All messages are authenticated. 2598 This scheme allows the end entity to request certification of a locally- 2599 generated public key (typically a signature key). The end entity may 2600 also choose to request the centralized generation and certification of 2601 another key pair (typically an encryption key pair). 2603 Certification may only be requested for one locally generated public key 2604 (for more, use separate PKIMessages). 2606 The end entity must support proof-of-possession of the private key 2607 associated with the locally-generated public key. 2609 Preconditions: 2611 1.The end entity can authenticate the CA�s signature based on out-of- 2612 band means 2613 2.The end entity and the CA share a symmetric MACing key 2615 Message flow: 2617 Step# End entity PKI 2618 1 format ir 2619 2 -> ir -> 2620 3 handle ir 2621 4 produce ip 2622 5 <- ip <- 2623 6 handle ip 2624 7 format conf 2625 8 -> conf -> 2626 9 handle conf 2628 For this profile, we mandate that the end entity must include all 2629 (i.e., one or two) fullCertTemplates in a single PKIMessage and that 2630 the PKI (CA) must produce a single response PKIMessage which contains 2631 the complete response (i.e., including the optional second key pair, 2632 if it was requested and if centralized key generation is supported). 2633 For simplicity, we also mandate that this message be the final one 2634 (i.e., no use of "waiting" status value). 2636 ir: 2637 Field Value 2639 recipient CA name 2640 -- the name of the CA who is being asked to produce a certificate 2641 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG 2642 -- only MAC protection is allowed for this request, based on 2643 -- initial authentication key 2645 senderKID referenceNum 2646 -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to 2647 -- the end entity (together with the MACing key) 2648 transactionID present 2649 -- implementation-specific value, meaningful to end entity. 2650 -- [If already in use at the CA then a rejection message to be 2651 -- produced by the CA] 2652 senderNonce present 2653 -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits 2654 freeText any valid value 2655 body ir (InitReqContent) 2656 only one or two FullCertTemplates 2657 are allowed 2658 -- if more certificates are required requests must be packaged in 2659 -- separate PKIMessages 2660 protocolEncKey optionally present. 2661 [If present, object identifier 2662 must be PROT_ENC_ALG] 2663 -- if supplied (and if centralized key generation is supported by 2664 -- this CA), this short-term asymmetric encryption key (generated 2665 -- by the end entity) will be used by the CA to encrypt (a symmetric 2666 -- key used to encrypt) a private key generated by the CA on behalf 2667 -- of the end entity 2668 fullCertTemplates one or two present 2669 -- see below for details, note: fct[0] means the first (which must 2670 -- be present), fct[1] means the second (which is optional, and used 2671 -- to ask for a centrally-generated key) 2672 fct[0]. fixed value of zero 2673 certReqId 2674 -- this is the index of the template within the message 2675 fct[0]. present 2676 certTemplate 2677 -- must include subject public key value, otherwise unconstrained 2678 fct[0]. optionally present if public key 2679 popoSigningKey from fct[0].certTemplate is a 2680 signing key 2681 -- proof of possession may be required in this exchange (see section 2682 -- B4 for details) 2683 fct[0]. optionally present 2684 archiveOptions 2685 -- the end entity may request that the locally-generated private key 2686 -- be archived 2687 fct[0]. optionally present 2688 publicationInfo 2689 -- the end entity may ask for publication of resulting cert. 2690 fct[1]. fixed value of one 2691 certReqId 2692 -- the index of the template within the message 2693 fct[1]. present if protocolEncKey is 2694 certTemplate present 2695 -- must not include actual public key bits, otherwise unconstrained 2696 -- (e.g., the names need not be the same as in fct[0]) 2698 fct[1]. optionally present 2699 archiveOptions 2700 fct[1]. 2701 publicationInfo optionally present 2702 protection present 2703 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG 2705 ip: 2706 Field Value 2708 sender CA name 2709 -- the name of the CA who produced the message 2710 messageTime present 2711 -- time at which CA produced message 2712 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG 2713 -- only MAC protection is allowed for this response 2714 recipKID referenceNum 2715 -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to the 2716 -- end entity (together with the MACing key) 2717 transactionID present 2718 -- value from corresponding ir message 2719 senderNonce present 2720 -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits 2721 recipNonce present 2722 -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ir message 2723 freeText any valid value 2724 body ir (CertRepContent) 2725 contains exactly one response 2726 for each request 2727 -- The PKI (CA) responds to either one or two requests as appropriate. 2728 -- crc[0] denotes the first (always present); crc[1] denotes the 2729 -- second (only present if the ir message contained two requests and 2730 -- if the CA supports centralized key generation). 2731 crc[0]. fixed value of zero 2732 certReqId 2733 -- must contain the response to the first request in the corresponding 2734 -- ir message 2735 crc[0].status. present, positive values allowed: 2736 status "granted", "grantedWithMods" 2737 negative values allowed: 2738 "rejection" 2739 crc[0].status. present if and only if 2740 failInfo crc[0].status.status is "rejection" 2741 crc[0]. present if and only if 2742 certifiedKeyPair crc[0].status.status is 2743 "granted" or "grantedWithMods" 2744 certificate present unless end entity�s public 2745 key is an encryption key and POP 2746 is done in this in-band exchange 2747 encryptedCert present if and only if end entity�s 2748 public key is an encryption key and 2749 POP done in this in-band exchange 2751 publicationInfo optionally present 2752 -- indicates where certificate has been published (present at 2753 -- discretion of CA) 2754 crc[1]. fixed value of one 2755 certReqId 2756 -- must contain the response to the second request in the 2757 -- corresponding ir message 2758 crc[1].status. present, positive values allowed: 2759 status "granted", "grantedWithMods" 2760 negative values allowed: 2761 "rejection" 2762 crc[1].status. present if and only if 2763 failInfo crc[0].status.status is "rejection" 2764 crc[1]. present if and only if 2765 certifiedKeyPair crc[0].status.status is "granted" 2766 or "grantedWithMods" 2767 certificate present 2768 privateKey present 2769 publicationInfo optionally present 2770 -- indicates where certificate has been published (present at 2771 -- discretion of CA) 2772 protection present 2773 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG 2774 extraCerts optionally present 2775 -- the CA may provide additional certificates to the end entity 2777 conf: 2778 Field Value 2780 recipient CA name 2781 -- the name of the CA who was asked to produce a certificate 2782 transactionID present 2783 -- value from corresponding ir and ip messages 2784 senderNonce present 2785 -- value from recipNonce in corresponding ir message 2786 recipNonce present 2787 -- value from senderNonce in corresponding ip message 2788 protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG 2789 -- only MAC protection is allowed for this message. The MAC is 2790 -- based on the initial authentication key if only a signing key 2791 -- pair has been sent in ir for certification, or if POP is not 2792 -- done in this in-band exchange. Otherwise, the MAC is based on 2793 -- a key derived from the symmetric key used to decrypt the 2794 -- returned encryptedCert. 2795 senderKID referenceNum 2796 -- the reference number which the CA has previously issued to the 2797 -- end entity (together with the MACing key) 2798 body conf (PKIConfirmContent) 2799 -- this is an ASN.1 NULL 2800 protection present 2801 -- bits calculated using MSG_MAC_ALG 2803 B9. Certificate Request 2805 An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (for any 2806 reason). When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate, 2807 the end entity replies with a confirmation. All messages are 2808 authenticated. 2810 The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in Section B8 2811 with the following exceptions: 2813 - protectionAlg may be MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG in request, response, 2814 and confirm messages (the determination in the confirm message being 2815 dependent upon POP considerations for encryption certificate 2816 requests); 2817 - senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message 2818 verification; 2819 - body is cr or cp; 2820 - protocolEncKey is not present; 2821 - protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg field. 2823 B10. Key Update Request 2825 An (initialized) end entity requests a certificate from a CA (to update 2826 the key pair and corresponding certificate that it already possesses). 2827 When the CA responds with a message containing a certificate, the end 2828 entity replies with a confirmation. All messages are authenticated. 2830 The profile for this exchange is identical to that given in Section B8 2831 with the following exceptions: 2833 - protectionAlg may be MSG_MAC_ALG or MSG_SIG_ALG in request, response, 2834 and confirm messages (the determination in the confirm message being 2835 dependent upon POP considerations for encryption certificate 2836 requests); 2837 - senderKID and recipKID are only present if required for message 2838 verification; 2839 - body is kur or kup; 2840 - protection bits are calculated according to the protectionAlg field. 2842 Appendix C: "Compilable" ASN.1 Module 2844 -- note that tagging is EXPLICIT in this module 2846 PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 2847 header PKIHeader, 2848 body PKIBody, 2849 protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, 2850 extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL 2851 } 2853 PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { 2854 pvno INTEGER { ietf-version1 (0) }, 2855 sender GeneralName, 2856 -- identifies the sender 2857 recipient GeneralName, 2858 -- identifies the intended recipient 2859 messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, 2860 -- time of production of this message (used when sender 2861 -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e., 2862 -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt) 2863 protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 2864 -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits 2865 senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, 2866 recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, 2867 -- to identify specific keys used for protection 2868 transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 2869 -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in 2870 -- corresponding request, response and confirmation messages 2871 senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 2872 recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 2873 -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce 2874 -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce 2875 -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by 2876 -- the intended recipient of this message 2877 freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, 2878 -- this may be used to indicate context-specific 2879 -- instructions (this field is intended for human 2880 -- consumption) 2881 generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 2882 InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL 2883 -- this may be used to convey context-specific information 2884 -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) 2885 } 2887 PKIFreeText ::= CHOICE { 2888 iA5String [0] IA5String, 2889 bMPString [1] BMPString 2890 } -- note that the text included here would ideally be in the 2891 -- preferred language of the recipient 2893 PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements 2894 ir [0] InitReqContent, 2895 ip [1] InitRepContent, 2896 cr [2] CertReqContent, 2897 cp [3] CertRepContent, 2898 p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, -- imported from [PKCS10] 2899 popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, 2900 popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, 2901 kur [7] KeyUpdReqContent, 2902 kup [8] KeyUpdRepContent, 2903 krr [9] KeyRecReqContent, 2904 krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, 2905 rr [11] RevReqContent, 2906 rp [12] RevRepContent, 2907 ccr [13] CrossCertReqContent, 2908 ccp [14] CrossCertRepContent, 2909 ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, 2910 cann [16] CertAnnContent, 2911 rann [17] RevAnnContent, 2912 crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, 2913 conf [19] PKIConfirmContent, 2914 nested [20] NestedMessageContent, 2915 genm [21] GenMsgContent, 2916 genp [22] GenRepContent, 2917 error [23] ErrorMsgContent 2918 } 2920 PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING 2922 ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE { 2923 header PKIHeader, 2924 body PKIBody 2925 } 2927 PasswordBasedMac ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2929 PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { 2930 salt OCTET STRING, 2931 owf AlgorithmIdentifier, 2932 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) 2933 iterationCount INTEGER, 2934 -- number of times the OWF is applied 2935 mac AlgorithmIdentifier 2936 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], 2937 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104]) 2939 DHBasedMac ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2941 DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { 2942 owf AlgorithmIdentifier, 2943 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) 2944 mac AlgorithmIdentifier 2945 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], 2946 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104]) 2947 NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessage 2949 CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { 2950 version [0] Version OPTIONAL, 2951 -- used to ask for a particular syntax version 2952 serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, 2953 -- used to ask for a particular serial number 2954 signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 2955 -- used to ask the CA to use this alg. for signing the cert 2956 issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL, 2957 validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL, 2958 subject [5] Name OPTIONAL, 2959 publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, 2960 issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 2961 subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 2962 extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL 2963 -- the extensions which the requester would like in the cert. 2964 } 2966 OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE { 2967 notBefore [0] CertificateValidityDate OPTIONAL, 2968 notAfter [1] CertificateValidityDate OPTIONAL 2969 } 2971 CertificateValidityDate ::= CHOICE { 2972 utcTime UTCTime, 2973 generalTime GeneralizedTime 2974 } 2976 EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE { 2977 encValue BIT STRING, 2978 -- the encrypted value itself 2979 intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 2980 -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used 2981 symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 2982 -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value 2983 encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL, 2984 -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value 2985 keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL 2986 -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key 2987 } 2988 PKIStatus ::= INTEGER { 2989 granted (0), 2990 -- you got exactly what you asked for 2991 grantedWithMods (1), 2992 -- you got something like what you asked for; the 2993 -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences 2994 rejection (2), 2995 -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message 2996 waiting (3), 2997 -- the request body part has not yet been processed, 2998 -- expect to hear more later 2999 revocationWarning (4), 3000 -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is 3001 -- imminent 3002 revocationNotification (5), 3003 -- notification that a revocation has occurred 3004 keyUpdateWarning (6) 3005 -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in 3006 -- FullCertTemplate 3007 } 3009 PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING { 3010 -- since we can fail in more than one way! 3011 -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required. 3012 badAlg (0), 3013 -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier 3014 badMessageCheck (1), 3015 -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify) 3016 badRequest (2), 3017 -- transaction not permitted or supported 3018 badTime (3), 3019 -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time, 3020 -- as defined by local policy 3021 badCertId (4), 3022 -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria 3023 badDataFormat (5), 3024 -- the data submitted has the wrong format 3025 wrongAuthority (6), 3026 -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the 3027 -- one creating the response token 3028 incorrectData (7), 3029 -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services) 3030 missingTimeStamp (8) 3031 -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there (by policy) 3032 } 3034 PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 3035 status PKIStatus, 3036 statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, 3037 failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL 3038 } 3039 CertId ::= SEQUENCE { 3040 issuer GeneralName, 3041 serialNumber INTEGER 3042 } 3044 OOBCert ::= Certificate 3046 OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE { 3047 hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 3048 certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL, 3049 hashVal BIT STRING 3050 -- hashVal is calculated over DER encoding of the 3051 -- subjectPublicKey field of the corresponding cert. 3052 } 3054 PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE { 3055 encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedValue, 3056 -- the actual value of the private key 3057 keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters, 3058 -- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated 3059 archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN 3060 -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private 3061 -- key of a key pair which the receiver generates in response to 3062 -- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired. 3063 } 3065 KeyGenParameters ::= OCTET STRING 3066 -- an alternative to sending the key is to send the information 3067 -- about how to re-generate the key (e.g., for many RSA 3068 -- implementations one could send the first random number tested 3069 -- for primality). 3070 -- The actual syntax for this parameter may be defined in a 3071 -- subsequent version of this document or in another standard. 3073 PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 3074 action INTEGER { 3075 dontPublish (0), 3076 pleasePublish (1) 3077 }, 3078 pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL 3079 -- pubInfos must not be present if action is "dontPublish" 3080 -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted, 3081 -- "dontCare" is assumed) 3082 } 3084 SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 3085 pubMethod INTEGER { 3086 dontCare (0), 3087 x500 (1), 3088 web (2), 3089 ldap (3) 3090 }, 3091 pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL 3092 } 3093 FullCertTemplates ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF FullCertTemplate 3095 FullCertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { 3096 certReqId INTEGER, 3097 -- a non-negative value to match this request with corresponding 3098 -- response (note: must be unique over all FullCertReqs in this 3099 -- message) 3100 certTemplate CertTemplate, 3101 popoPrivKeyVerified BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, 3102 popoSigningKey [0] POPOSigningKey OPTIONAL, 3103 archiveOptions [1] PKIArchiveOptions OPTIONAL, 3104 publicationInfo [2] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL, 3105 oldCertId [3] CertId OPTIONAL 3106 -- id. of cert. which is being updated by this one 3107 } 3109 POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE { 3110 poposkInput POPOSKInput, 3111 alg AlgorithmIdentifier, 3112 signature BIT STRING 3113 -- the signature (using "alg") on the DER-encoded 3114 -- value of poposkInput 3115 } 3117 POPOSKInput ::= CHOICE { 3118 popoSigningKeyInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput, 3119 certificationRequestInfo CertificationRequestInfo 3120 -- imported from [PKCS10] (note that if this choice is used, 3121 -- POPOSigningKey is simply a standard PKCS #10 request; this 3122 -- allows a bare PKCS #10 request to be augmented with other 3123 -- desired information in the FullCertTemplate before being 3124 -- sent to the CA/RA) 3125 } 3127 POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE { 3128 authInfo CHOICE { 3129 sender [0] GeneralName, 3130 -- from PKIHeader (used only if an authenticated identity 3131 -- has been established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a 3132 -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate) 3133 publicKeyMAC [1] BIT STRING 3134 -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for 3135 -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC 3136 -- (using the protectionAlg AlgId from PKIHeader) on the 3137 -- DER-encoded value of publicKey 3138 }, 3139 publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo -- from CertTemplate 3140 } 3142 InitReqContent ::= SEQUENCE { 3143 protocolEncKey [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, 3144 fullCertTemplates FullCertTemplates 3145 } 3146 InitRepContent ::= CertRepContent 3147 CertReqContent ::= FullCertTemplates 3149 POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge 3150 -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the 3151 -- same order as these requests appear in FullCertTemplates). 3153 Challenge ::= SEQUENCE { 3154 owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 3155 -- must be present in the first Challenge; may be omitted in any 3156 -- subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if omitted, 3157 -- then the owf used in the immediately preceding Challenge is 3158 -- to be used). 3159 witness OCTET STRING, 3160 -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a 3161 -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different 3162 -- INTEGER must be used for each Challenge.] 3163 challenge OCTET STRING 3164 -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert. 3165 -- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as 3166 -- Rand ::= SEQUENCE { 3167 -- int INTEGER, 3168 -- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above) 3169 -- sender GeneralName 3170 -- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader) 3171 -- } 3172 } 3174 POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER 3175 -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the 3176 -- same order as these requests appear in FullCertTemplates). The 3177 -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the 3178 -- corresponding Challenge. 3180 CertRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 3181 caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Certificate OPTIONAL, 3182 response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse 3183 } 3185 CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { 3186 certReqId INTEGER, 3187 -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value 3188 -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the 3189 -- corresponding request) 3190 status PKIStatusInfo, 3191 certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL 3192 } 3194 CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { 3195 certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, 3196 privateKey [0] EncryptedValue OPTIONAL, 3197 publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL 3198 } 3199 CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { 3200 certificate [0] Certificate, 3201 encryptedCert [1] EncryptedValue 3202 } 3204 KeyUpdReqContent ::= SEQUENCE { 3205 protocolEncKey [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, 3206 fullCertTemplates [1] FullCertTemplates OPTIONAL 3207 } 3208 KeyUpdRepContent ::= InitRepContent 3210 KeyRecReqContent ::= InitReqContent 3211 KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 3212 status PKIStatusInfo, 3213 newSigCert [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, 3214 caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 3215 Certificate OPTIONAL, 3216 keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF 3217 CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL 3218 } 3220 RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails 3222 RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE { 3223 certDetails CertTemplate, 3224 -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about 3225 -- the cert. for which revocation is requested 3226 -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available) 3227 revocationReason ReasonFlags, 3228 -- from the DAM, so CA knows what to use in Dist. point 3229 badSinceDate GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, 3230 -- indicates best knowledge of sender 3231 crlEntryDetails Extensions 3232 -- requested crlEntryExtensions 3233 } 3235 RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE { 3236 status PKIStatusInfo, 3237 revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL, 3238 -- identifies the certs for which revocation was requested 3239 crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL 3240 -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one) 3241 } 3243 CrossCertReqContent ::= CertReqContent 3244 CrossCertRepContent ::= CertRepContent 3246 CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 3247 oldWithNew Certificate, -- old pub signed with new priv 3248 newWithOld Certificate, -- new pub signed with old priv 3249 newWithNew Certificate -- new pub signed with new priv 3250 } 3252 CertAnnContent ::= Certificate 3253 RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { 3254 status PKIStatus, 3255 certId CertId, 3256 willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, 3257 badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, 3258 crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL 3259 -- extra CRL details(e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) 3260 } 3262 CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList 3264 PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL 3266 InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { 3267 infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 3268 infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL 3269 } 3270 -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited to: 3271 -- { CAProtEncCert = {id-it 1}, Certificate } 3272 -- { SignKeyPairTypes = {id-it 2}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier } 3273 -- { EncKeyPairTypes = {id-it 3}, SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier } 3274 -- { PreferredSymmAlg = {id-it 4}, AlgorithmIdentifier } 3275 -- { CAKeyUpdateInfo = {id-it 5}, CAKeyUpdAnnContent } 3276 -- { CurrentCRL = {id-it 6}, CertificateList } 3277 -- where {id-it} = {id-pkix 4} = {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4} 3278 -- This construct may also be used to define new PKIX Certificate 3279 -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general- 3280 -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for 3281 -- specific environments. 3283 GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue 3284 -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content). 3285 -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will typically 3286 -- be omitted for some of the examples given above. The receiver is 3287 -- free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does not recognize. 3288 -- If sent from EE to CA, the empty set indicates that the CA may send 3289 -- any/all information that it wishes. 3291 GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue 3292 -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it does 3293 -- not recognize. 3295 ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE { 3296 pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, 3297 errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, 3298 -- implementation-specific error codes 3299 errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL 3300 -- implementation-specific error details 3301 }